Did Russia betray Bashar al-Assad or did Syria misunderstand the nature of its alliance with Moscow?
During my appearance on Jamal Thomas' show, I was asked a question that has divided many people following the Syrian war: Why did Russia ultimately allow Assad's government to fall?
My answer is uncomfortable for everyone involved.
Russia did not enter Syria because of friendship. Moscow had strategic interests, and once Russian and Syrian interests increasingly diverged—particularly over Turkey, Erdogan and the political settlement Russia wanted Damascus to accept—the relationship changed.
But blaming Russia alone misses the larger story.
Syria became dangerously dependent on its allies while failing to adapt to a completely transformed battlefield. Damascus rejected compromises with Turkey, struggled to reach a workable settlement with the Kurdish authorities, and froze the military conflict in Idlib while its opponents consolidated a parallel political, economic and military structure there.
I also explain why I believe the Astana process and the freezing of the Idlib front were crucial strategic mistakes. Once the fighting stopped, Syria remained under devastating sanctions while Idlib continued receiving outside economic, military and political support.
Over time, economic warfare changed Syrian society itself. When people could no longer afford fuel, bread and basic necessities, anger that had once been directed toward armed groups increasingly turned toward Damascus. In my view, Syrian leaders badly underestimated the psychological and political effects of sanctions.
So did Russia betray Assad?
My argument is that “betrayal” is the wrong way to understand relations between states. Russia pursued Russian interests. Iran pursued Iranian interests. Turkey pursued Turkish interests.
The real failure was Syria becoming so dependent on outside powers that changes in their interests could determine Syria's fate.
CHAPTERS:
00:00 Did Russia Betray Syria? 00:49 Allies Are Not Friends 01:36 Russia's Interests vs. Syria's 02:43 Assad Rejects Moscow's Deal 03:45 Why Russia Walked Away 05:52 Iran's Role 06:13 Who Really Failed Syria? 08:47 Syria Became Too Dependent 10:14 Did Iran Also Abandon Assad? 11:59 Why Russia & Iran Pressured Assad 12:46 Assad's Turkey Dilemma 16:10 What Should Assad Have Done? 18:04 Syria's Strategic Mistakes 19:28 The Kurdish Question 21:20 The Idlib Mistake 22:43 Did Astana Doom Assad? 25:33 Why Idlib Was Never Retaken 26:55 Sanctions & Regime Change 28:47 How Economic Warfare Changed Syria 30:02 Jamal's Verdict
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In the interest of transparency, this is becoming an issue because I've had, let's say, different
people on the channel with very different points of view on this issue that have clashed vigorously
on this particular issue, not together, but just separate in getting this. So I kind of
want to have this conversation. And just the basic, just to set the tenor of the conversation,
it's the basic question of, did Russia betray Syria? Give me your take on that.
I guess first, just answer it as a yes or no. If it indeed is a yes or no, or if it's more
complicated, explain it. Because I got to be honest with you, I have questions on this one.
But give me your take. Treason and betrayal happens between friends. You cannot betray
someone who is not your friend. True, true. And the problem is that we in Syria,
we treated our allies like friends, not in the lens of interests, not in the lens of that
interest could change in the future. And Syrians have trusted Russia and Iran and Hezbollah like
friends. And we trusted them like we trusted, like we treated them like they are family,
they're part of our country. And that is not the case. In politics, Russians have strategic
interests in the region. And when Syria has been weakened due to this conflict,
and when the Russians presented Syria their solutions, Syrians said we are independent
and sovereign country and we reject these suggestions. We don't want to implement the
suggestions of Russia. We don't want to change the constitution to give the Kurds autonomy.
We don't want to deal with Erdogan before Erdogan formally committing himself to withdraw his
forces from Syria. But then the Russians told the Syrians, look, our strategic interests
precede your strategic interests. You are a smaller country. We are above regional country,
we have a strategic conflict in Ukraine. And we have to solve the situation in Syria in the
context of reconciliation with Turkey, because we don't want to antagonize Turkey. And we want to
keep Turkey in the middle between us and the Americans. We don't want for Turkey to move all
the way to the American side. And the Syrian side rejected this. We have to be honest. And I'm not
blaming Syrians in this case, by the way, because this is the right thing to do. But in politics,
when the Russians saw that Assad is stubborn, and he will not compromise, and by compromise
meaning give Erdogan huge leverage in northern Syria, then the Russians saw that it is useless
to continue dealing with Assad. Meanwhile, he rejects this regional deal with Erdogan that
would give that would relatively stabilize Syria, but gives Erdogan the upper hand over the country,
because we always confuse politics with morality. We think the decision makers in Russia, and those
are in the national security apparatuses, those are in the secret services, those are in the
Kremlin, in the defense industry there, they are not here to achieve the goals of Syria,
they are there to achieve the interests of Russia. And when the interests of Russia
didn't match the interests of Syria, they abandoned Syria at a very sensitive time.
So if you want, you can call it a betrayal. I would call it the Russians were following their
interests. And this is how much the Syrians have made the mistake of trusting their allies like
they trusted themselves. This is now not how politics work. In different interviews by Assad,
he continuously said that Russia and China are different than the United States. Yes,
they are different in certain ways, but they are similar in other ways. When you reach to
a conjunction, like you reach to a point, and it's an intersection, you either go this direction or
that direction. And if a smaller country like Syria, whose entire security umbrella was built
around Russian protection, rejects your request and your suggestions to include some of the
opposition figures into the government or allow Turkey to have more access into the country,
then when Turkey, it was Turkey who started this offensive in Aleppo, and when Aleppo fell,
Assad flew to Moscow. I don't know what happened there exactly. We were not present in this
meeting, but apparently he didn't receive support from Putin. But if I want to speculate,
if I want to put myself in the shoes of Putin, when Aleppo fell, and Assad is still rejecting
this deal, which is the siege Hezbollah, then in order to restore Aleppo through military means
with the participation of Russia, which is already in a strategic conflict in Ukraine against NATO,
this will need months, if not years of military buildup, mobilization, deployment, and offensive.
And when you do the offensive, there is no guarantee that you will liberate the city again,
because now we have direct Turkish participation in this conflict. So this is going to be a huge,
another 10-year conflict that the Russians didn't want to participate in. And therefore,
they told Assad that it is over. And the same thing, by the way, goes with Iran.
The Iranians have also, at a certain point when Aleppo fell, they said that we've been warning
Assad about this attack, and he didn't prepare for this offensive by the Jolani forces.
It is mind-boggling, Jamal, because we in the online community, we like blaming people, right?
I mean, if something fails, and we are emotional, and we love Syria to be victorious, so we search
for someone to blame. But I am a Syrian, and I tell you that if we have to put a list of players
who should be blamed for this defeat in Syria, the first level comes us, the Syrians. It's us
who are fighting each other. It's us and these Jolani people who are Syrians who are destroying
the air defenses. It's the Syrians who are carrying the TOW rockets and missiles against
the Syrian army tanks. It's the Syrian people who were massacring the Syrian soldiers. It's
the Syrian people who are destroying the infrastructure, and the power grids, and the
powerhouses, and every asset that Syria used to have. It's the Syrians who got money from Qatar
and sold out military bases. It's the Syrians who did this, right? So the corruption in Syria
has reached a point, especially after the sanctions on the country, and the people
were impoverished. And I'm not giving justifications, of course, to the traitors,
but there was treason inside the country. So if there was anyone who betrayed, it's the Syrian
people who betrayed their country, not Russia. Russia is not Syria. It's Syrians who betrayed
themselves first, and brought this misery upon themselves. And worse still, celebrate. This is
the thing. Imagine you destroy your country and you celebrate. You think you're free now. So if
you don't learn from history, then history repeats itself. Because people say history repeats. No,
history doesn't repeat itself. It is us who never learned from history, therefore it repeats
itself. So if you don't learn from Iraq, from Libya, and all the regime change operations that
happened in the past two, three decades, then why would you blame Russia for it, right? You didn't
learn. You participated in a conflict against your own army, which led to the killing of 600,000
people. 160,000 of them and 70,000 of them were Syrian army soldiers and officers, right? You
killed your own country. So my message to the Syrians would be, we should blame ourselves first,
and then we could have our disagreements with these countries. But betrayal is something that
people do for their own countries, and not that outside power comes and betrays you because they
were not part of the country anyways. But we have given them so much access. We have given them so
much leverage over us. We have given them everything. Syrians have basically given the
decision making of the military to the Russians, right? Several units in the Syrian army have
become integrated into the Russian forces. Why? The same way other countries, for example,
Ukraine now, they have sold out to NATO, right? So they don't have independent decision making
any longer. This is a similar situation, by the way. But Ukraine is too important now for NATO.
It's existential for them. If Russia wins this war, then Russia will be able to project its
dominance in Eastern Europe, and this could lead into Western Europe also being some of the players,
some of the parties in Western Europe wanting to have a better relationship with Russia.
So they see that we still can support Ukraine. But if there is a better deal for them to cut
on the expense of the Ukrainians, they will do it. And they're doing it anyways,
because this war is not in the interest of the Ukrainians, but rather the NATO powers, right?
And the same thing in Syria, in my opinion. What we have done basically, this proxy war
has gone out of our hands. And we have given so much of a trust to our allies. I mean, look,
now that people blame Russia, okay, let's mention also Iran, right? Under the administration of
Pezeshkian and what was his name, Arakchi, for example. I mean, look, I respect them.
I respect them. They're doing, at least Arakchi is doing a great job on the diplomatic level.
But let's be honest, what they have done to Syria is unjustifiable. Because what they did
to Syria, for example, during their short time, they cut the fuel for Syria for three months.
And we in Syria, our fuel fields are in the hands of the Americans. And the Pezeshkian government
cut the fuel for Syria for three months, because they wanted to force Assad to shake hands with
Erdogan. The same thing with Russia, the Russians now did the same thing. And they abandoned Syria,
basically, because they wanted Assad to reconcile with Erdogan. And the Iranians were saying,
telling Assad the same thing. You must talk to Erdogan. And Assad said, no, I don't want to talk
to him without commitments of him withdrawing from the country. And the Iranians told him, look,
the region is moving toward a different direction. There are preparations for war against us. And we
have to solve this issue with Erdogan and with you before everything goes out of hand. And the same
message was delivered by the Russians. So both of these allies, they pressed Syria, and they
inflicted some damage, right, for our economy to force Syrians to... I don't come and say,
oh, look, the Iranians betrayed us, because there is no obligation for them to give us free fuel.
Why would the Iranians give us free fuel, right? No, no, there is no...
Can I interrupt you for one second? Let me interrupt you for one second. Did they do that?
Because from their point of view, they could see from an intelligence standpoint,
that Syria was being infiltrated. And at some point, it was going to reach a crisis point.
Meaning they weren't telling them that just because they wanted to. They weren't telling
them that because they enjoyed having the conversation with Assad. It was politically,
your country is being infiltrated. Politically, if you don't do anything,
this is going to reach a crisis point that is going to be untenable, meaning you need to move.
You don't have the option of just saying, no, you need to do something about a crisis that
is brewing in your country. And Assad wasn't responding to this crisis. Is it that?
Meaning, because it sounds like the Russians and the Iranians were telling him the exact same thing.
Yes, they were telling him the exact same thing, but it is a big trap for Assad.
Assad wanted to preserve the Syrian pan-Arabist nature of Syria. And the solutions presented by
Russia and Iran is that we have to include the Turkish-affiliated opposition into the country.
And once you give the Turkish-affiliated opposition figures inside the government,
you're giving the Muslim Brotherhood organization the opportunity to infiltrate
your political system. And the Muslim Brothers, they don't believe in the pan-Arabist nature of
Syria. So you are basically giving 30%, 40% of your executive and legislative powers to people
who do not believe in the pan-Arabist nature of the country, but they see themselves as extension
to Turkey. So you're basically giving Turkey the infiltrator, the soft leverage over the country
through the proxy Muslim Brotherhood inside the country. So even if Assad wanted to include some
of these opposition figures into the structures of power, and he did several of them, but he always
brought people who were agreeing at least on the general direction of the country, and that is
Syria as an independent pan-Arabist country and not part of, let's say, Muslim Brotherhood,
Qatari-affiliated and Turkish-affiliated umbrella. So I think Assad preferred that
he would wait for a strategic opportunity to rise, that time would change the policies inside
Europe and inside the United States. He thought that the Saudis and the Emiratis can persuade
Trump when he comes to power to lift the sanctions, and when sanctions are lifted,
he could restore control over the country. And he was promised. I mean, he was visiting Saudi
Arabia and the UAE in the past two years, and he was told that once Trump comes to power,
if you give him enough, let's say, compromises, then he would lift the sanctions on you.
And this regime change operation started just, I think, two weeks before Trump has officially
became a president again for the second time. And I think the Turkish intelligence was basically,
they're detecting these communications between the Gulf Arabic countries and the United States,
and they thought that if Trump comes to power, because he's a businessman, and if Assad gives
him something in return and Trump lifts the sanctions on Syria, then this would be bad
news for Turkey, right? So they preceded Trump and they killed Syria before Trump came to power,
and they took over the country and imposed a new reality. And that's why every time Trump
meets with Erdogan, Trump tells him, you, Erdogan, did this in Syria. You own Syria now.
Because he knows that before he came to power, it was Erdogan who changed the situation in the
And this led to the complete, basically, destruction of the former political system in the country.
So what should Assad have done? I mean, I guess, look, from my point of view, I understand your
point, but look, and just, again, full transparency, agree, there's no argument.
I thought we were going to go back and forth. I agree, because from my point of view,
Russia is not a resistance actor, right? They're realists. Just like, as you point out, the US,
realists. Europe is more ideological, but realist countries look at it and say, okay,
what is in our best interest? We function in what is in our interest to function in a particular
way. If something is no longer in our interest for other reasons, we stop. It's just that.
It's not like, there's not a religious pull to it, right? There's not a resistance thing to it.
So when it became, okay, this is no longer within our realm of,
this is no longer in our interest to do this. We're in the middle of a war. We can't do this.
And I've even heard arguments of people saying that Erdogan was putting pressure on the Russians,
because of the war, especially when you're dealing with Black Sea and those type of things,
that Erdogan has a bit of influence on the Russians, in this case,
in which the Russians are pushing the Syrians. Hey, I need you to do this, because our other
interest with Istanbul is putting pressure on us to get this done. There are several things that
were in play that was pushing behavior. I don't know. I guess betrayal, I agree with you, is a
bit strong say, but this internal politics, I guess my question would be, what was Assad
supposed to do in this situation? Either you make a political move, which hurts you,
but allows you to maintain Syria, even though it's obviously changed, or you don't make a
political move and lose it all. What is the middle ground between these two things, from your point
of view? Jamal, when we see broader geopolitical conflict like this in Syria, you don't make just
one mistake that leads into complete catastrophe. Those are sequences of wrong decisions that you
make, and this accumulation leads into disaster, and this is what happened under Assad.
Under Assad, in the broader sense, I agreed that every inch of Syria should be liberated,
but in practice, how are you going to achieve that? You liberated two-thirds of the country
with your allies, and now one-third of the country, which was occupied by the United States,
the Kurds and the Jolani forces. How are you going to restore these areas? You're not going
to go to war against the Americans. Nobody is interested. The Iranians are not interested.
Russians are not interested. You are incapable of fighting against the United States.
When you already have new facts on the ground, established new facts on the ground, then you
have to see it through the lens of politics. You cannot go to war against the Kurds, because they
are protected by the Americans, and they will basically hit the ---- out of you if you do that.
And the Russians say, we're not interested for a collusion with the Americans. So you talk to
the Kurds. You invite them to Damascus. The Kurds come. The Kurds ask for political autonomy. You
offer them language courses. You say, okay, I allow you to teach Kurdish. But this is after
10 years of war. It's too little too late, even for the Kurds. The Kurds have tens of thousands
of forces there. They will not accept. And I'm not in favor of the Kurdish autonomy, right?
But put yourself in their shoes. Why should they accept the restoration of the centralized
government into their areas if what they gain after 10 years of war and paying thousands of
soldiers in this conflict for them to teach, to be able to speak Kurdish? No, they will not do that.
So you have to give them more, realistically speaking, right? But giving them more, again,
means changing the constitution. You have to change the constitution. You have to change
the political nature of the system. And you no longer can rule Syria through centralized
authorities. It's over. Because you cannot fight against them militarily, right? I'm talking about
realistically and not what is right and what is not right. Now, with the Jolani forces,
I think the only possible way of dealing with them was through military force, unlike the Kurds.
Kurds are, in my opinion, in Syria, they are good people. I'm talking about ordinary people.
They are productive people. They are people of civilization, of language. And they're not
taqfiris. They don't want to blow up themselves. They don't want to destroy the country like
the Jolani's are doing. So there had to be certain understandings with the Kurds. This is in my
opinion. But with Jolani, again, when I said this is a series of wrong decisions, you agreed
to freeze the conflict in 2018. You, Assad, agreed to freeze the conflict in 2018 with Jolani. You
agreed for the Astana Accords with Turkey, with Iran, and with Russia. And when you agreed,
you also agreed for a political transition in the country, because this was the process.
And once you froze the conflict, the Americans imposed harsher sanctions on you. Turkey enabled
Jolani and he built a parallel state for him in Idlib, basically. It's a state inside a state.
People no longer need a centralized government. They receive electricity from Turkey. They deal
with the Turkish lira. They buy Turkish products. Everything is from Turkey. The borders are open.
Weapons are coming, training, Ukrainian intelligence, British intelligence, CIA,
everybody's there. So they survived. Unlike you, you're under sanctions. You don't have
your grip over the fuel. You're printing money to feed your people, which creates hyperinflation.
You rely on Russian money and Iranian fuel. So you're standing not even on one leg. It's a
quarter of a leg anyways. So when you agreed for the Astana Accords, you basically killed
the military solution. He shouldn't have agreed for the Astana Accords. He should have imposed
on the Russians and the Iranians. Imagine in 2016 and 2015, when the Russians intervened and Syrian
army started capturing, liberating the country again, there was a high morale among the people,
among the Syrian military. Everybody was on the side of the military in this liberation,
most people. And when they reached to Idlib, they said, OK, we're stopping here.
No, the Syrian army had to continue this conflict. The Americans were always threatening Assad in
this day, but he was protected by this umbrella of a joint Russian-Iranian security umbrella,
Hezbollah was on the ground. And when Turkey set a red line for Assad and said, you cannot move
north of Hama, the Syrian army challenged that red line. And they opened the highway. This was
the M5 or M4 highway. And the Russians had to intervene and destroy the Turkish tanks,
including German tanks on the highway. So the Syrian army imposed this situation on the Russians
and the Iranians when the opportunity was or the conditions were ripe or the conditions were
correct or right. But then when you froze the conflict and you agreed for a political settlement
and all the parties have cooled down the conflict, they will no longer accept to re-escalate a big
war on the borders with Turkey, where probably more tens of thousands of people would go as
refugees to Turkey and then to Europe. So all the situation changed when you agreed to that. So this
was a big mistake, in my opinion, to agree to such settlement, political settlement that the
Turks can invest in, create a mini-state inside the state, enable their military, and then
unleash them on you. Why did they stop in Italy? I gotta be honest with you, I didn't quite
remember saying the Americans were making threats like basically being ISIS air force.
That's what it came across as. And even the UN said there are 40,000 terrorists in Italy,
et cetera, et cetera. I never understood beyond this idea that America was threatening
bombings, basically America was going to be ISIS air force if indeed Italy was attacked.
That's the way I understood it, but I don't know if that's true. I'd never understood otherwise
why they stopped in Italy. Maybe you can answer that. And this could be the last question. We
have a couple of minutes. The Americans bombed Syria several times. They bombed Syrian army
forces during the clashes against ISIS and al-Nusra. And the Russians were also present
on the ground. They were assisting the Syrian army. At the end of the day, the Russians have
established a strong military presence and the Iranians have established a strong military
presence in the country. And they were not only a counterweight to the Americans, but they were
superior to the American force. Americans had 900,000 forces in the country. If they want to
fly fighter jets, they have to come from Jordan. They have to come from neighboring countries. But
the Russians and the Iranians, they had forces on the ground inside the country. And the tides,
the tide has changed very quickly between 2015 and 2018 that the Americans started going into
this fake chemical attack so they could have some excuse to bomb the country. So the only reason I
think that the Americans and basically the Turks, they draw a red line in Idlib because they had
this in their mind. The Americans are strategists. And once the military aspect of the regime change
failed in 2017 and Trump ended the Operation Timber Sycamore, and this is the same year they
imposed this deal, 2018, the Asana Accords, because this is the same year when Trump imposed
the Scissor Act on Syria. So they wanted to freeze the conflict and give the impression that this
could be sold through political means. Meanwhile, they devastate the Syrian economy and they prop
up the economy inside Idlib and they create a parallel or a mini-state inside Idlib. So the
in my opinion, they succeeded in, this is not the first time they fooled the Russians or
other forces. They have done it in Ukraine several times and they strike a deal to freeze the
conflict and arm the other part and then the conflict would be restarted. So the Americans
with the Russians, they said that, okay, Assad has won. They have given him the impression that
he has won, that there is no way for a regime change. They gave him the false hope that they
could deal with him in the future and they could solve this situation politically inside Idlib.
And Syrian side has agreed. But later when the Syrians wanted to open a frontline again against
Idlib, it's not like the Americans came and said, we will annihilate the Russians and the Iranians
for Syria. Because they said, you can basically deal with Erdogan and finish this diplomatically
because Idlib is, as you said, 40,000 Al-Qaeda fighters, 5 million people living there. It will
be huge casualties. It will be big uproar in the press, in the international scene,
huge influx of refugees again to Europe. And nobody has an interest to create such a situation
again. So they wanted this to be solved politically. And as I said, the opportunity
was in 2017 and 2018 before they struck this deal. But once they struck this deal, and this is
important again psychologically for your respected audience to understand Jamal, when there is an
actual war or when there was an actual war, you as a Syrian citizen, you see there is a terrorist
fighting against you, destroying your infrastructure, and you see the Syrian military protecting you.
Therefore, you can distinguish who is the enemy, who is the friend, and you side on the side of
the military, your military. But when 2018, they froze the conflict and they imposed sanctions and
you became poor, and 90% of the people were sent below the poverty line, you no longer can see who
is the enemy here. It's an invisible enemy imposing sanctions on you. And then you direct your anger
at your government for not being able to secure the basic necessities because all of a sudden,
the government says, I no longer can finance your fuel, your bread, your basic necessities.
But this happened due to the sanctions. But the people, you're a father, you want to feed your
children, you cannot do that, you blame the government. So you turn against the government.
And this is how they change the public opinion in the country from people overwhelmingly siding with
Assad and not saying supporting, siding with Assad against this terrorist into seeing Assad
the problem because he no longer can secure the bread. And this is the success of the
sanctioned regime basically against Syria, something that they couldn't understand.
And Syria never understood the psychology behind this warfare.
Gabor, that is a fantastic breakdown. A fantastic breakdown. I swear to God it is.
Thank you for this. Just great analysis. I don't know that there's another way for me to put it.
Exceptional analysis. I thank you for that. And I agree with you, by the way.
I feel like we're going to debate. It's not a debate.
I would love, I would always love debating, bro. I truly do. And I love that you create
a respectful environment for discussion, conversation, debate. This is why alternative
channels should exist. And this is how you should present. So all the chapeau to your respect. And
for the people who are watching now, don't forget to hit the like button, guys, before leaving,
OK? This is important. You should show support for Jamal.
Thank you for that. Thank you for that. And Gabor Almazian, definitely check out his channel. It's
Syrian Analysis. It covers Syria and the Middle East broadly from a Syrian perspective. And I
thank you for this, man. You be safe, OK? And I hope you come back. Great breakdown.
I will. I will.
Have a good one. Thank you.
Safe. Bye.