Blaise Pascal's Philosophy: Full Summary & Score

Blaise Pascal
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The method employed in this video is designed to measure a particular type of theoretic coherence and balance.
It is not intended to show how true a given philosophy is, nor how good a philosopher is.
The basic objective is the categorisation of different philosophical ideas,
and the scoring system is introduced to add interest and increase accessibility,
but alternative metrics of scoring are possible.
Please refer to the video displayed now for further information on this particular system,
or refer to my book for the underlying theory.
Blaise Pascal was a French polymath who worked during the early modern period,
a time marked by the Scientific Revolution, the aftermath of the Reformation,
the burgeoning rationalism of René Descartes,
and the religious traditionalism that was still deeply entrenched in European society.
Born in 1623, Pascal was a child prodigy,
who was educated by his father, a tax collector in Rouen.
He was deeply influenced by the Jansenist movement,
which was a Catholic reform movement that emphasised original sin,
human depravity, the necessity of divine grace, and predestination.
The Jansenist doctrine was a response to the perceived moral laxity of the Jesuits,
as well as the rationalism of the Enlightenment,
and we can see this influence in his influential work, The Pensée.
But Pascal was also influenced by Renaissance scepticism,
particularly Michael de Montaigne, whose essays questioned the certainty of knowledge,
and we can see this theme in Pascal's own reflections on the human condition,
and his famous Wager on God's Existence.
Additionally, Pascal's early work in the natural and applied sciences
was influenced by the likes of Euclid and Archimedes.
The influence of Pascal was considerable,
and his Pensée laid the groundwork for much of the later existentialist philosophy,
such as that of Soren Kierkegaard.
Pascal's Wager, an argument for belief in God as a rational bet,
has also been a subject of extensive discussion and debate in the philosophy of religion.
Pascal's epistemology is incredibly complex,
as he attempts to straddle a line between pure scepticism on one hand,
and a kind of dogmatism on the other.
He is remembered for his critique of the dominant philosophical approaches of his time,
the rationalism of René Descartes,
and the emerging empiricism, which emphasised raw observation.
Yet Pascal was not critical of these routes to knowledge per se,
but merely recognised their limitations.
Pascal acknowledged that we have three faculties of knowledge available to us,
the body, the mind, and charity or grace.
The order of the body is analogous to raw sensationalism,
and is the lowest form of knowledge,
since it relies on instinct and passion unrestrained by rational thought.
The order of the mind is the next form of knowledge,
and contains two different ways of thinking,
logical-mathematical thinking and intuitive-speculative thinking.
Pascal thinks all three are insufficient without faith,
which provides knowledge in the order of charity.
When understood through the lens of charity,
the lower orders are not invalid, but rather they work together.
When charity is known, all three orders coalesce into a coherent worldview.
Reason and sensation relate to the natural world,
and point to matters of objective fact.
But there are truths that go beyond matters of objective fact,
and these can only be judged through faith,
by reference to scripture and divine revelation.
Thus, Pascal's epistemological position,
FIDEISM,
is characterized by a skepticism towards the capability of human reason
to uncover ultimate truths on its own,
especially in matters of the divine.
So, Pascal does appear to have some connection to intuitive-speculative thinking,
in our ability to recognize the limits of the order of mind,
and thus point us towards the higher order of faith.
His famous quote,
The heart has its reasons which reason does not know,
points towards an intuitive capacity that transcends pure reason and sensation,
and we can only identify this with synthetic a priori knowledge.
He believed that we have no logical certainty of first principles
beyond the intuitive conviction that we feel within us.
Pascal's work in the natural sciences,
such as his experiments with the barometer,
and his contributions to the understanding of vacuums,
demonstrates a clear reliance on empirical observation and experimentation.
Indeed, apart from faith,
which reveals those higher truths about the divine,
it is through our senses that we acquire knowledge of the world.
In the provincial letters,
he goes so far as to claim that
matters of fact are proven only by the senses,
so he also has a connection with the synthetic a posteriori.
The mathematical division of the order of mind
at first appears to have a clear association with the analytic a priori,
and Pascal also accepts Descartes' criteria of clearness and distinctness
as reliable justification of truth.
However, Pascal also has a couple of serious criticisms for the deductive method.
First, he believes that logical reasoning is useless without empirical evidence,
and second, he does not believe that logical reasoning
can justify the first principles on which it relies.
Pascal sees this to reflect a basic epistemological dilemma,
and it is only through faith that our synthetic intuitions
of first principles can have any foundation.
However, he does acknowledge that the logical reasoning of the mind
and the intuition of the heart
are complementary to each other and must work together,
the latter providing the principles
and the former deducing the consequences.
So, we will be generous here,
as he clearly intends to describe a way
in which all aspects of knowledge contribute
towards a more holistic perspective,
and will acknowledge that he has a secondary connection
to the analytic a priori as well.
Finally, Pascal's emphasis on the importance of personal experience,
particularly in matters of faith,
could be seen to align with the analytic a posteriori.
His own mystical experience, which is detailed in his memorial,
profoundly influenced his religious philosophy,
suggesting that he saw self-consciousness
as a pathway to knowledge about the existence of God.
Additionally, there is an argument to be made
that faith and mysticism exist on a shared spectrum,
with the former ultimately relying on the possibility of the latter,
and both pointing towards an ultimate reality in some form or another.
So, taken together, I think we can conclude
that Pascal does indeed have an alignment with the analytic a posteriori.
So, to summarise, Pascal aligns primarily with epistemological objectivism,
objectivism and superjectivism,
with a secondary connection to subjectivism.
He acknowledges the importance of empirical science
for knowledge about the physical world,
but he also recognises the limits of empirical,
so as rational methods in accessing the divine,
instead emphasising the role of inner experience and faith.
Yet he also talks about a form of intuitive insight from the heart,
which is not merely a matter of faith.
Pascal's ontological ideas are expressed in his work on the philosophy of religion,
and particularly in his celebrated Pensée.
In this work, Pascal explores the human condition,
asserting that humans are paradoxically both wretched and great.
This duality stems from our mortal weakness
contrasted with our unique capacity for thought and understanding of the divine.
Throughout Pensée, Pascal examines the stark contrast
between the misery of human existence without God,
and the potential for greatness and fulfilment through divine grace.
We can gain some further insight into Pascal's ontological position
by considering his perspective on the distinction between animals and humans,
and how it aligns with certain aspects of Descartes' philosophy.
Like Descartes, Pascal regarded animals as machines,
whose behaviours could be entirely explained as responses to external stimuli, or instinct.
In contrast, human nature,
even without considering the theological concept of the fall of man,
transcends mere mechanism.
Thus, despite his reservations of much of Descartes' method,
Pascal appears to align with the dualistic aspect of the former's philosophy,
which posits a clear distinction between the soul and the body.
The soul is seen as an immaterial thinking substance,
capable of reason and understanding,
which does not adhere to the physical laws that govern the body,
a material, extended substance.
So, firstly, Pascal does not explicitly discuss any kind of abstract particulars,
but he was a substance dualist, following in the tradition of Descartes.
The human soul is an immaterial thinking substance,
and each soul is particular to the individual in which it exists.
And in this sense, souls can be interpreted as abstract particulars.
As we just discussed, his perspective on the distinction between animals and humans
is involved with a belief in the existence of the material world beyond the realm of mind.
This, in addition to his background as a scientist,
allows us to determine that he held a belief in the existence of concrete particulars.
Now, there's not too much information out there on Pascal's view on abstract universals,
but what I have found all implies that he was largely a nominalist about such matters.
He certainly thinks that we have no knowledge of the essences of qualities and concepts,
but only what they designate.
These essences do not have existence in our minds,
but result from the interaction of our awareness with features of the world.
He does believe it is possible to know qualities through the heart,
but there is no reason to believe he saw these as objectively existing universals,
so we cannot associate him with this class.
And Pascal's passionate belief in God as a universal, immaterial substance
can be interpreted as a belief in the concrete universal.
In summary, Pascal was a Christian existentialist,
who acknowledged the reality of both the mental and the physical
without reducing one to the other.
Yet mind and matter are secondary to the relationship between the individual and the divine.
Pascal can therefore be classified as an ontological objectivist, objectivist, and superjectivist.
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Now back to the video.
Pascal's thinking about ethics and morality is closely linked to his Jansenist faith.
He believed, on the one hand, that humans are inherently flawed due to original sin,
but on the other, that we can achieve greatness and act nobly through the grace of God.
The highest value, therefore, lies in the Christian God,
and in living a life that adheres to Christian principles and virtues.
Again, his Fideism led him to believe that moral understanding doesn't come from reason alone,
but must also come from the heart.
Therefore, there is no purely rationalistic, philosophical, moral system available to humanity,
apart from the laws that God has revealed.
Pascal believes that a life lived in accordance with spiritual and charitable values,
which include those that relate to the well-being of others,
and to one's relationship with God, are most in line with God's laws,
surpassing the intellectual pursuit of understanding, as well as bodily pleasures.
Pascal does not believe in the incommensurability, or normative equality, of competing values,
but rather believes that certain values are greater than others, so he is not a value pluralist.
While he acknowledges the subjective nature of human perception,
and the role of imagination in shaping value judgments,
he sees this subjective aspect as something to overcome in order to apprehend objective moral truths,
so he is not a moral subjective relativist.
He does believe in an objective moral order,
and emphasizes the need for a fixed point in morals which he identifies with Christ,
so he can be associated with moral objective absolutism.
And again, while he acknowledges the role of the subjective heart in perceiving value,
the ultimate function of the heart's intuition is to realize objective moral truths,
so he is not a moral subjective absolutist.
In summary, Pascal aligns most closely with axiological subjectivism, or moral objective absolutism.
He believes in an objective moral order, and the existence of absolute moral truths.
While our subjective experiences and imagination play a role in shaping our moral judgments,
they must be guided and corrected by an intuitive understanding of the objective laws given by God.
Pascal's political thoughts are closely linked with his religious beliefs,
particularly his views on human nature after the biblical fall of man,
which is to say, the transition from a state of innocent obedience to one of guilty disobedience.
According to Pascal, human behavior is primarily driven by desire and concupiscence,
which leads to societies characterized by power struggles and hierarchies of authority.
And yet, he argues that the laws and societal structures are legitimate,
and should be accepted simply because they have been established,
reflecting a conservative viewpoint that supports maintaining the existing social order.
While he stresses the ethical responsibility of the wealthy to help the poor,
revealing his concern for social and economic inequalities,
the fact that he saw morality to be a personal, spiritual matter
meant that he did not feel compelled to extend his ethics to social structures at large.
In fact, his reflections on the human condition express a concern that life is filled with such suffering and uncertainty
that tradition and custom should be respected in order to preserve some form of stability.
So, Pascal's emphasis on the importance of social order
and his conservative stance on the preservation of social structures to prevent chaos and strife
can be seen as a form of authoritarian individualism.
He went so far as to assert that no matter how unjust and tyrannical the authority may be,
still it should be respected, for it is through God that they have been established in the first place.
His scepticism of reason as the sole guide for human affairs
likely led him to question the value of rational self-interest as a foundation for social organisation,
so he is not a libertarian individualist.
Although he recognised the importance of community and shared beliefs,
particularly in the context of religious faith,
he did not argue for any collectivist ideals as primary civic values,
so he is not an authoritarian collectivist.
And his wariness of the potential for reason and individualism to disrupt social harmony
does not support the superjectivist idea that the wills of individuals and the collective
might come into harmony without centralised governance,
so he is not a libertarian collectivist.
So, in summary, Pascal aligns most closely with political abjectivism.
His philosophical conservatism, with its emphasis on the preservation of social order
and the acceptance of established hierarchies,
reflects abjectivism's acceptance of some inequality and authority as necessary components of a balanced society.
In conclusion then, Pascal appears to be an epistemological abjectivist, objectivist and superjectivist,
but with a minor element of subjectivism as well.
He is an ontological abjectivist, objectivist and superjectivist,
he is an axiological subjectivist and he is a political abjectivist.
He therefore receives a consistency score of 15.67 out of 24, or 65%,
and he receives a neutrality score of 14.33 out of 24, or 60%.
In total, then, his score is 30 out of 48, or 63%.
And for this, we award him the grade of B-.
