Are China's research ships actually underwater spies?
A new CSIS report reveals unusual Chinese research vessel activity near critical undersea communication cables around Guam, Japan, Alaska, and even Russia.
The findings raise serious questions about China's military ambitions beneath the ocean.
A separate Reuters investigation also uncovered China's massive seabed mapping operations and its "Transparent Ocean" surveillance program.
Could these activities help Beijing prepare to disrupt American military communications during a future conflict?
In this report, we examine the evidence, the strategic risks, and what the United States and its allies can do.
Are Chinese research ships secretly mapping
the underwater cables that connect U.S. military
bases to the rest of the world?
A new report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies
raises serious concerns.
And previous reports about the CCP's cable-cutting technology
suggest that potential threat goes beyond surveillance.
The CSIS study examined 223 research vessels
from 48 countries using tracking data from 2020
through December 2025.
It found that Chinese research ships spent unusually large amounts
of time near critical underwater infrastructure.
In 2024, seven Chinese vessels ranked among
the most active near these facilities.
One ship, Xiangyanghong-06, repeatedly mapped
waters near Guam, a major U.S. military hub.
Between February and May 2024, it made three
trips to waters about 210 nautical miles from Guam.
Its routes overlapped with important
submarine cable corridors connecting Asia
and the United States.
Another vessel, Ke Xue,
mapped waters near Japan and later traveled into the Bering Sea.
These activities appeared
to include areas near Russia's Polar Express cable.
The ship also stopped transmitting its tracking signals
for about three hours near Alaska's
Shemya Island,
home to a U.S. military installation.
Submarine cables carry about 99% of international data traffic.
They support global financial transactions,
civilian communications, and military operations.
Damage to these cables could disrupt communications during a conflict.
Repairs can take weeks or even months.
The CCP has also shown a cutter.
In March 2025, the China Ship Scientific Research Center unveiled
a device that can sever
armored cable at up to 4,000 meters. In April 2026,
Haiyang Dizhu tested a cutter at 3,500
meters. Suspected cuts are already on record.
In November 2024, the Chinese ship Yipeng-3
was near two Baltic cables when they were severed.
Investigators suspected a dragged anchor. Sweden
later found no proof of intent.
In January 2025, Taiwan blamed Shunxing 39 for damage to a Taiwan
US cable. A Taiwan court gave the Chinese captain
of Pengtai 58 three years for cutting a cable to
Penghu. A separate Reuters investigation identified
extensive Chinese seabed mapping across the
Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans.
The CCP's Transparent Ocean Program also uses underwater
sensors to collect oceanographic data.
Such information has scientific uses,
but it can also support submarine operations.
CSIC recommends three measures, stronger
international intelligence sharing,
coordinated maritime patrols, and expanded cable repair
capabilities. The critical question remains,
Are these vessels conducting ordinary scientific
research or gathering intelligence that could help
the CCP disrupt vital communications during
a future conflict.