Thinking Like a Supermajority | The Ezra Klein Show
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So as we speak, Democrats are on track to win 56 seats in the Senate.
Sorry, I should have cursed for the beginning.
Don't edit that out.
Keep it.
Unfair.
Unfiltered.
So Democrats won far more power
in the midterm election than really any of them thought possible.
They're looking now towards 56 seats in the Senate,
very possibly, you know, more than
250 in the House.
They're going to have a majority of governor's mansions.
It's an incredible place for them to be.
But it's not where they ultimately want to go.
They want the presidency.
They want a filibuster-proof majority in the U.S. Senate.
They want to be able to compete in places like Kansas
and Texas and Alaska and Oklahoma.
In elections where Donald Trump has not done
so much of the work for them.
So how do they do that?
And how do they nominate the divides in their party?
The breadth now of a party that stretches from people like
like Abdul Sayed and Zohran Mamdani
and AOC and Bernie Sanders on the left.
To people like, you know, Adam Hamilton and Mary Patola on the right.
This week on the show, I want to do two episodes.
One with somebody who's more from, you know, you could call it maybe
the centrist wing of the party, the pragmatist wing of the party.
And another with somebody much more
from the left wing of the coalition.
Because, one, I want to see how much they actually differ.
I think some of these disputes seem deeper when you're,
say, on Twitter, X, than they really are.
And two, because I do think you see
a synthesis between these wings beginning to emerge
in both the way the party is running campaigns
and the way they might govern in the coming years.
Adam Jentleson is a founder and president of the Searchlight Institute.
He spent 20 years working in politics, served as a deputy chief
of staff to former Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid.
He was a chief of staff to Senator John Fetterman,
sort of more when Fetterman had just gotten elected before he took some
of what is his current form.
And Jentleson is also the author of two books, Killswitch,
The Rise of the Modern Senate and the Crippling of American Democracy,
as well as Supermajority, which is a book that really grounds
this conversation in his theory of what it would look like
for Democrats to try to act, think and govern in the way
that could once again make them an enduring supermajority party,
a party able to compete anywhere in this country at any time.
He joins me now.
Adam Jentleson, welcome to the show.
Thanks, man. Good to be here.
So as we speak, Democrats are on track to win 56 seats in the Senate.
That is a crazy number.
A year ago, 51 seemed functionally out of reach.
They're looking at between 250 and 260 in the House,
depending on who you ask.
Biggest majority since 2009, if not larger than that.
You call this the foothills of a supermajority.
You've been thinking for a while about
and arguing for supermajority thinking.
So I want to know what supermajority thinking is.
And how it is, in your view, different.
than what Democrats were doing at least before this particular cycle.
Yeah, supermajority thinking is thinking beyond the idea
that the best we can do is win narrow majorities.
It's a different way of thinking about electoral politics.
It is an aspiration to represent more than the minimum number of people
necessary to win an election, right?
And that's been the experience
of our politics the last 10 years, right?
It's that elections are won by getting to 50 plus one.
If you win control of the House or Senate, it's by a vote or two,
and the best you can do is try to hold on to power for a couple years,
maybe four, before you turn it back over to the other side.
And I think this has led to an incredibly unhealthy dynamic,
both in our politics and the way that we operate as a government,
but also in the way that we conduct political business interpersonally.
I think it's an incredibly unhealthy
and divisive way of being as a country.
And so supermajority thinking, it's saying,
listen, I don't want to just get to 50 plus one
because that will get me into power.
I want to build a real mandate. I want to build a real
big tent coalition and represent more people than
the minimum necessary. Now, I think there's a
moral argument for that.
In a democratic society that thrives on pluralism, that is a moral
aspiration. There's also a sort
of hard-nosed political aspect to it too, which is that if
you win power on a broader scale,
you're going to be able to hold it for longer.
You're going to hold power,
not just from one election to the next, but over a decade or more,
which is the amount of time that you really need to enact a big,
bold agenda that all Democrats want to see happen here.
And the sort of touchstone era is the New Deal, right?
I mean, this was the best example of a supermajority that we have
in our recent history because, you know, Democrats took power.
They held on to it for a long time.
They were able to enact an agenda that reshaped the country.
On a political level, it's aiming bigger.
It's saying that the battleground can be the entire map of the country.
There's not a single state in which we can't compete
if we run candidates who reflect the
states and districts that they're trying to win.
And I think that's what you saw happen on Tuesday night.
You know, Democrats were competing
in states where we haven't had a Democratic member of
Congress or a Democratic senator.
In decades.
And...
And, you know, that...
In Kansas in nearly a century.
Exactly, right.
I mean, I think it's, what, 1932.
Yeah, 1932.
I mean, it's wild.
And, you know, simple majority thinking
is looking at Kansas and saying,
there's no point in competing there
because Trump won this state by double digits.
Super majority thinking is looking at Kansas and saying,
we can win there if we run the right kind of candidate.
So I think you're, in a way, selling this too softly.
Democrats didn't. It's not like they didn't want a Senate seat
in Kansas. Their view on some of it was that there
was nothing they could do about it. Right. Right.
Money is finite. You're not going to spend it in Kansas to lose.
And one perspective on this election is the only thing
that changed is Donald Trump is such a hideous president.
That he made possible things that should have been impossible.
That, I think, may actually be,
at least halfway, a true take on this election.
I mean, Adam Hamilton does not win without Donald Trump.
But what I think is interesting right now,
what I think is sort of interesting about
your take on politics right now,
is it's like Democrats now have their foot in the door.
Yes.
In places they didn't have it before.
They're going to be able to raise money
in places they couldn't raise it before.
They're going to govern in Texas
in a way they didn't get to govern for a long time.
So what are you saying it should do differently as it tries
to get from the foothills of the supermajority to an actual 60
or 62 seats come 2029 in the Senate?
They should not place any limit on the states that they can compete in.
I think, you know, we should go back
to Howard Dean's idea of a 50-state program.
And, you know, yes, money is finite, but,
you know, a lot of these states are not expensive
places to run a campaign.
You know, you look at a state—
That's brutal, Montana.
In 2028, there are Senate races in North Dakota and South Dakota.
You know, each of those states has about the same number
of people as a congressional district, right?
I mean, you know, functionally, and this sort of gets out of my area
of expertise, but I, you know, I have worked on campaigns.
It's not that expensive to run campaigns in states
that don't have that many people, right?
But you have to find the right kind of candidate.
What does that mean?
It means a candidate who fits the state, right?
And it means breaking away from some of the rigidity
that sort of captured our party in the last decade or so.
I think...
The most refreshing thing about what happened
on Tuesday to me is that I think you saw a movement
away from a lot of the factional fighting
that's really been dogging the party for the last 10
years. And I think some of that fighting
and arguing may have been necessary to get to the
point that we're at. Even as you argue with people,
you might see that they have some points that are
correct. And I think from the moderate wing,
you know, there's been an embrace of economic
populism on a scale that you haven't seen before.
And I think that's really healthy. I think that
that you needed, again, you needed both things, right?
James Tallarico won in Texas.
By embracing the fossil fuel industry and saying,
this is a, an industry that produces
hundreds of thousands of working class jobs here in Texas,
but he also ran aggressively
on economic populism.
And it was both of those things together and faith.
I mean, you look at someone like Adam Hamilton,
he, you know, was made no bones about being
pro-life.
He was an Episcopal minister.
He wore his faith on his sleeve.
He talked a lot about bipartisanship and,
you know, not judging Republicans for their views.
So, you know, this is a very different tone from a Democrat.
Not a 2018 resistance candidate.
Yeah, exactly.
You know, but on the other hand, you know,
stuck to core liberal values like expanding health care, raising taxes
on rich people, you know, and expanding the social security.
And protecting choice, it's worth saying, right?
Absolutely.
He's sort of in this older school of Democrats
who will sometimes have a personal view and a policy view that differ.
Right. We used to see that used to be pretty common in the party.
You had candidates who were personally pro-life,
but, you know, voted pro-choice.
And, you know, I think in some ways this debate is basically over.
I think it's resolved. I think that, you know, people have seen how
this works in states like Texas and Iowa and Kansas.
And, you know, look, it takes some give from both sides.
Right. I mean, you have candidates sort of moving
to the right on some issues in a state like Texas or Iowa,
but at the same time running aggressively on economic populism.
And, you know, that's a sort of combination
that I think all factions of this party can get behind.
You have at different points argued
for something you call big tent absolutism.
Yeah.
What is Big Ten absolutism?
Big Ten absolutism says the only litmus test
is that there are no litmus tests.
And that means that, you know,
we should construct a Democratic Party that runs from, you know,
DSA members in parts of Brooklyn that they call
the Commie Corridor to, you know, Bobby
Polito in the Rio Grande Valley in Texas.
And, you know, we shouldn't try to police out
certain types of people
because we disagree with them on certain issues.
Okay, but this feels a little bit like a dodge
to that rule to me.
Bobby Polito, I'm a huge Bobby Polito fan.
This is a Bobby Polito stan account.
But Bobby Polito is not that far to the right
Like when you say there's no litmus test.
Oh, well, I don't know about that.
Bobby Polito has taken positions
that would have gotten him chased out of the party,
you know, in recent years.
Or, you know, a Josh Turret.
Bobby Polito is not a white supremacist.
Oh, absolutely not.
Bobby Polito, I don't even want to invoke his name
in this context,
because when you say there's no litmus tests,
I think that the obvious question here is,
well, then what is the Democratic Party about?
Can you be in this party?
And, you know, be genuinely anti-trans, not just, you know,
have a particular view on sports, but you don't think,
you think discrimination against trans people should be allowed.
Can you be in this party, this economically populist party
and think actually billionaires should have lower tax rates, right?
When you say no litmus test, do you, do you really mean that?
I mean it within the context of what we stand for as Democrats.
Okay, so what do you stand for as Democrats?
So, sure. So, I mean, you know, we as Democrats stand for.
Steadily expanding the circle of civil rights protections
to more and more people, right?
And so it is a very different, you know,
every single Democrat in this big tent
believes in aggressively protecting civil rights
for trans adults across the board, right?
Where there are some disagreements
are on specific questions that apply to kids,
where I think people of good faith can admit
that there are complicated questions,
a lot of which don't have easy answers.
And which, as long as you come at from a place
of compassion, can be addressed.
And probably there's some more persuasion we need
to do as a party to bring people along.
But that's different, right?
I mean, Republican, the Republican Party.
Disputes the existence of trans people at all
and actively wants to roll back rights for trans Americans.
So, you know, within this big tent rooted
and anchored by core liberal principles, we need to say there is room
for disagreement at the fringes of some of these issues. So, you know.
Every single Democrat in the big tent wants
to move towards universal access to health care.
Every single Democrat in the big tent wants
to raise taxes on the wealthy.
There are going to be differences in how we execute these things,
the degree to which, you know,
we go maximalist or try to move in a more moderate direction.
These are disagreements we can hash out in a good faith way,
but we're not going to chase people out for having those disagreements.
And every single one of those issues
that I just listed are things that draw a bright line.
between Democrats and Republicans.
So yes, you know, we are liberals.
Within that liberalism broadly defined,
we should not be chasing people out of the party
because disagreements on things
that really come down to a matter of degree.
Is this an argument for the Democratic Party to moderate?
No, absolutely not.
Because, you know, I talk a lot in this book
about this concept of heterodoxy.
So this is a word that I would like people to model,
but I don't ever want to hear a candidate say.
You know, I don't want to...
If it's a candidate out there
who describes themselves as heterodox,
I'm going to come track them down.
You know, but I want them to model heterodoxy.
You know, what it means, it's the opposite of orthodoxy.
It is getting away from purity tests
and getting away from rigid ideologies
and just thinking for yourself.
We're developing a mix of policy positions that reflects
the heterodoxy of the American voter. And the reason this is important
is that the American people do not form their worldviews strictly
from a liberal perspective or a conservative perspective.
They look at the world and they take a little bit
from column A and a little bit from column B and they smush
these positions together and they get an incredibly unique mix.
And, you know, one of the most educational things you can
do if you're interested in politics is just to watch focus groups
because you will have a voter who says,
In one breath, something like, you know, I want every tech CEO thrown
in jail for what they're doing to our kids, and I also want everybody
who came over the border illegally deported, right?
Those are not moderate ideas on either front.
One's from the left, one's from the right.
You put them together, what you have is heterodoxy.
So heterodoxy accommodates big, bold ideas in a way
that moderation doesn't, but it does say you can't just come forward
with a rigidly left-wing ideology.
You're never going to win in a state like Montana.
You know, I was thinking about this.
chart I saw from, I think it was G. Eliot Morris.
And he was showing that, you know,
you could see overperformance from Blue Dog Democrats
and you could see overperformance
from DSA Democrats. And I think you can misinterpret
that chart a bit because they
are overperforming in very different kinds of districts, right?
Overperformance in Kansas is
meaningful to the size of the Democratic majority
in a way that overperformance in
Brooklyn may not be.
That said, I do think something you see there is that
almost more than most voters are liberal
or conservative or moderate. They really,
really, really don't like politics and party hacks.
And one thing that I think is interesting
about, you know, the various ways you saw different Democrats breaking
from Democratic molds, be it in
who they were, right? I'm a pastor, I'm a seminarian,
I'm a Paralympian, I'm a, you know,
a Navy pilot, you know, all the way to what they were saying, right?
James Tallarico running as a
Christian populist who embraces the oil
and gas industry, right? Is that part of the message is simply
like, I'm not like those Democrats over there, right?
And so how much is like the work here aligning
to public opinion and how much is it just like sending
a signal that I'm independent from party opinion
It's much more of the latter, right?
I mean, authenticity means thinking for yourself.
It means being independent.
And so when you come to the voters,
and it just so happens that all of your opinions
line up exactly with the Democratic Party brand,
voters are going to be rightly suspicious
of you as an independent thinker, and they're going to rightly suspect.
That you're not a truly authentic thinker.
And so, you know, this idea of authenticity is sort of,
you know, the golden goose in
American politics right now.
It's what we're all chasing after
and we're all trying to generate as politicians,
But you don't get it, you know,
by wearing Carhartts if you went to Hotchkiss.
You know, you get it by being an independent thinker.
Adam Hamilton came across as authentic to the voters of Kansas, right?
Because that's who he is.
And he talked about politics and he talked about...
things in a moral language that resonated with people that,
you know, brought in issues of faith
and theories of faith that, you know,
made people think, okay, I know what your values are. I
recognize you. I recognize some of the way I look at the world in you.
And I trust you to go to
Washington and to make decisions based on values that I have in common.
You've done some interesting
research where, you know,
building on big and more complex than normal survey design.
Talk me through at least a little bit of that research
and what you all found about the way people's opinions organize
in the real world versus the way the Democratic
and Republican parties kind of insist opinions should be organized.
Right. So one of the things that we found in our research
is that there are issues that would never pop in sort
of your average poll of top voter concerns that nonetheless.
are extremely powerful signals to people that you have
a heterodox point of view and that you don't
think in a rigidly ideological way, right?
So one example is the issue of, you know, what's called
social promotion in schools or the idea that you just,
you know, promote kids to the next grade
regardless of whether they failed the tests or not. Being against that.
is something that people don't expect
to hear from Democrats these days.
You know, they think of Democrats as sort
of everybody gets a trophy, squishes.
And so if you say, you know, if kids fail
the requirements of their grade,
they should not be promoted,
that sends a really powerful signal to voters
that you're a different kind of Democrat.
Being against homeless encampments, right, is a very powerful signal.
You know, being open to things like spanking.
Those issues are incredibly culturally loaded,
but I think, you know,
sort of connect with voters on a values basis.
So we don't always have to be talking about,
you know, trans sports or climate change
or the border security.
There are lots of ways for people
to develop these complicated appeals
that reflect the complex way
that voters interact with the world
beyond these sort of, you know,
four or five issues that we're always talking about.
One thing I just noticed, though,
about that list was those were all kind of issues where,
partly on cultural dimensions, Democratic parties move left.
Right.
Do you, when you did this research,
I'm asking you, when you did this research,
all right,
did you find issues where the Democratic Party was too far right?
Yeah. You really can't go far enough on economics.
I mean, people are very, you know, into Democrats proposing big,
bold ideas on economics. The key is to just combine
those economic points of view with some level of texture
that shows you're not rigidly ideological on every single issue.
And again, this is mostly about how you win,
you know, in these more challenging states.
If you're from Massachusetts, you know, be as liberal as you want.
But if your listeners, you know,
think to themselves, I'm sure there are issues.
That they diverge from sort of democratic orthodoxy on.
And I think that's true of candidates too.
You know, it is more authentic to show the world
issues where you disagree with your party
or where you disagree with your side's orthodoxy
than to pretend that you agree with them
on every single issue down the line.
Is what we're talking about here heterodoxy,
which is a slightly academic-y word
for voters don't have fully, you know,
aligned with any party political opinions?
Are we just talking about a democratic party,
about a party that varies a lot by place?
And what has kind of happened is that the media nationalized,
the political money nationalized,
we got social and algorithmic media.
So everybody's kind of in the same thing.
And the parties are more of the same thing everywhere.
And I can't really tell if in
this environment, this media environment, you can really turn that
Clock back, because maybe this ability
to have politicians in a single party who vary
dramatically state to state to state was simply
a function of the states existing in different
informational universes, having very different
political cultures and having many much more
of their attachment to politics being.
Yeah. I mean, you know, you know, what's something
that varies region to region, the United States of America,
you know, and I think this is a politics majority thinking
is a vision of politics that reflects that difference.
And I think that, you know, we have sort of taken for granted
for a long time that everything is nationalized. And I think part
of what we're seeing is that that's not necessarily true.
And a lot of the candidates who performed best on Tuesday were not ones
who got a ton of national attention and in a lot of ways
who shied away from national attention.
I mean, you had folks like Rob Sand running for governor in Iowa
who just focused entirely on the state.
Roy Cooper did not get remotely the amount
of national attention as some candidates,
but won the state of North Carolina by 20 points, right?
And so, and there's, you know,
Roy Cooper sort of embodies the Tar Heel persona, right?
So I think that as things go in cycles and there's...
undoubtedly been a cycle of nationalizing American politics,
and that will always partly be true.
But part of this is Democrats sort of.
Contrasting themselves against that nationalization, right?
Using that as a way to differentiate themselves
from the party brand
by breaking away from their party's orthodoxy
and saying, I'm not, you know, that same kind of Democrat.
I'm my own Democrat.
I'm a Roy Cooper Democrat.
I'm a Rob Sand Democrat.
I'm a James Talarico Democrat, right?
And so as nationalized and sort of homogenized
as things have become in our politics,
that presents people with an opportunity.
Because, you know, you can come across to voters in surprising ways
if you say things that they don't expect to hear from a Democrat.
And they, you know, they have a very fixed idea
in their mind of what Democrats are.
A lot of that is a function of Republican
advertising and things that aren't true.
So, you know, you can sort of play off
those stereotypes in helpful ways.
Not all of it.
You know, it's often rooted in quotes
and things that we've actually said.
And, you know, woke one was a goldmine.
And party discipline is actually imposed.
Right, exactly.
Woke one is a goldmine for Republican researchers,
not just because Democrats were saying these things,
but because there were outside forces working on them
to sort of take these positions and enforce this rigidity.
I was emailing with David Hopkins,
who is a political scientist at Boston University,
wrote this great book, Polarized by Degrees,
and another one called Red Fighting Blue
that's more about geography and politics.
And one thing he said to me when I was asking about
how durable the change in the political map might be,
She said, look.
All of my research
and many others just shows that the geographic polarization is driven
by more cultural issues being at the forefront of politics.
And the way to reduce it to be more competitive
in more places is to focus politics more on
economics.
And what's funny is right now that feels
to me like a uniting thought in the party, right?
It's not really, that sounds like maybe
a left-wing thought that, you know, it should
be about class conflict, but because
the left actually has like a lot of also cultural
commitments, it's not always.
But the focus on affordability and the sort of pushing aside,
you know, woke one was crazy and the focus on Donald Trump,
I think, created an ability in the party to put the version
of itself forward that was the least polarizing.
Well, that's right. And what's really interesting is I think the
candidate who best embodies that approach for this is Zoran Mamdani.
You know, when he was running for election,
it became a joke how he could turn any question
back to the subject of affordability.
And, you know, at Searchlight,
this is a theory of ours that we call crowding out, where it's
very, very easy for other issues to creep
into the picture for voters, right?
If you spend time talking, because as a politician,
voters' attention is an extremely finite
resource.
You only can command their attention
for a limited amount of time, and it takes time
and money and effort to get that attention, right?
And when you have their attention, if you say,
okay, I want to do affordability, but
I also kind of want to do these two
or three other things, it's easy for that to cloud
the picture for voters.
There's really no way to over-focus on affordability.
And I think that's an area of broad agreement
that all factions of the Democratic Party
can get behind.
You know, we just released a poll this week
that shows that voters did think Democrats
were more focused on affordability than
Republicans, and that's a big reason.
Well, they were.
They were, but.
But when you ask voters, were they focused enough on affordability,
were they as focused as you wanted them to be,
even Democrats still fell short.
So, you know, the best optimal strategy, right,
if you could just sort of wave a magic wand, is to pick, you know,
two or three issues on which you are strongest with voters
and talk about that and nothing else.
Right. And then once you get power,
you're going to have to do a lot of things.
There's a million things before Congress.
You know, they run a big country.
There's lots of pathways to make progress.
On legislation across a wide range of issues, you know, the challenge
of how to keep progress going along those tracks while keeping
the public's attention focused on the things that are strongest
for you politically is a challenge, but life is all about challenges.
And that's a challenge that's worth aiming at as Democrats.
And I think one of the things that we can do here is try to sort
of start to differentiate between the issues where Democrats,
you know, have strong, deeply held principles
and are also politically popular like health care.
And issues where we want to make progress, but the public is more mixed
and look at pathways to keep advancing those issues,
but not pushing them to the center of the conversation.
And both things are possible.
So this, to me, is maybe a more precise way of getting at,
I think, the push you're making on the party.
But, you know, you can tell me if that's untrue, which is that running
as the opposition party in an election when your party has no power,
that's actually the easiest moment for variation.
Right.
Because you're really just talking about Donald Trump.
And then when you get asked, do you hold
the least popular positions in the Democratic Party, you say no.
Right.
It gets harder when you have to vote on bills that are being whipped.
It gets harder when you have to vote on bills that have a lot
of moral force behind them and, you know, are very tough decisions.
And so I guess my question here is,
how does supermajority thinking turn into supermajority governing?
What does it take to act like a supermajority?
In construction, you build political capital in order to spend it.
And I believe that very firmly. And what we've built for ourselves
as Democrats right now is a lot of political capital.
Now we need to spend it in ways that show what we're about. You know,
we are on a first date with a lot of voters after this election.
They are open to us, but they're not committed yet. And what we need
to do is spend that capital in ways that show them why they should.
form a committed relationship with us,
why they should stay in our coalition.
Not just a situationship.
Yeah, exactly. You know, I mean,
we want to turn these folks into a long-term
commitment here. And, you know,
that is about doing things that all Democrats can agree on.
And I think for all the factional fighting
that's taken place within our party of the last decade or so,
It's sort of masked the fact that there are broad areas of agreement,
you know, from Bernie Sanders all the way to Adam Hamilton. Right.
And so as what I would do in terms of governing with this power
is to really try to focus on those areas of broad agreement.
Those those areas of common ground also happen to be the things
that draw the strongest contrast with Republicans. Right.
Every single Democrat in this big tent caucus wants to expand.
healthcare access and achieve the goal
of universal healthcare, right? Not everybody's
sold on doing that via single payer,
but everybody's sold on that broad goal. So you can advance
legislation that says, let's do things like lower
the retirement age to age 50. Let's do things like
Andy Kim's bill on Medicaid.
You know, let's do things like free primary care. It's kind of like
a Medicare program for kids. That's right.
You know, you can start to move towards this goal.
of universal health care that have agreement within the entire caucus.
And that's both, you know, an expenditure
of political capital that is useful.
It's an investment because you're showing people what we will
do if you give us more power.
So it's interesting because the theory emerging here.
It has an interesting paradox at its heart, which is,
on the one hand, we're talking about a more focused Democratic Party,
a party more focused on particularly its more popular issues,
the version of itself that is less geographically
and politically polarizing.
On the other hand, the point of a big tent party,
a party that includes Abdul El-Sayed and Adam Hamilton,
Zoran Mamdani, you know, and in some other condition,
Joe Manchin, is that you will have more disagreement.
This sort of both more focused party,
but a party where you should expect more defection.
So in this more big tent vision, how do you handle defection,
disagreement, or maybe a different way to put it is,
how has the Democratic Party been handling that?
You were in the Senate. What kinds of things did you see
when you were in the Senate in these moments?
And how do you want to alter that approach?
I mean, it's really about...
What will we do differently? Right.
We came in in 2009 and we had, you know, 60 Senate seats at one point,
you know, 250 plus seats in the House and a Democratic president.
Right. And, you know, we got a lot done, but we left a lot
of people disappointed and we probably could have done more.
And so I think a lot about that.
And a big thing that we did in 2009 that I would
not do again is sort of trying to get Republican.
engagement on every single thing that we did.
You know, it's hard to go back to that moment in time.
And realize that there was actually
a good chance of getting Republican support.
It wasn't completely naive to think that that was possible.
You know, this was the era
when Mitch McConnell was turning into the Mitch McConnell that
we all know today, but it wasn't clear he was going to win.
You know, he was aggressively whipping members of his caucus
who wanted to work with Democrats
and twisting their arms to get them not to do it.
And he did win.
And he made us waste a year.
You know, on sort of this side quest
of trying to get Republican support.
I think what Democrats should do differently now
with this power is come in and aggressively pursue
the agenda that the American people elected them to enact.
And if Republicans want to join them, they absolutely should.
That door should always be open.
We shouldn't treat it as a necessary precondition
of getting things done,
which is one of the things that really held us back in the Obama era.
I think there's a bunch of interesting lessons from the Obama era.
But one worth thinking about here is they got a supermajority,
but it was actually like they had a bare majority.
Right.
They had 60 votes.
You needed 60 votes to break a filibuster
so they could lose zero people.
At least on things that weren't going through
budget reconciliation, but most of the things
weren't going through budget reconciliation.
In a world where there was no filibuster
and you could have passed Obamacare with a public
option with 51 votes.
You can lose Joe Lieberman.
It doesn't matter.
You can lose Ben Nelson.
It doesn't matter.
I think one reason the whipping has gotten
so much more intense in the Senate in particular
is because it is so hard to lose members under the current rules.
But if you were able to act, you had a 55-vote majority,
and that meant you have five votes
to spare, well, you could lose five members on every vote.
Right.
But if...
You're not in that world.
Then it becomes so, so, so important.
You hold everybody on everything
and you can't do things that are risky.
And so I think that's an interesting question here,
whether or not the big tent we're talking about
actually requires...
A more radical approach to the rules than
we've seen Democrats willing to consider.
100%. I mean, you know, look,
I think there's a moral case for supermajority thinking.
I think it is a moral good to aspire
to represent more people than you need to to win an election.
It's morally good to hold a majority that is broader than,
you know, 51 or the minimum necessary you need to have power.
But there's a politically hard-nosed, pragmatic aspect to it,
too, which is that you need votes to spare to do things.
And yeah, listen, I believe very strongly
that we should get rid of the filibuster.
This was the topic of my first book,
and you and I have discussed it at length.
And part of the reason is I think it just creates a healthier system.
Thank
You are able to deliver for the American people
on the things that you said you were going
to do, and then the American people can
decide whether they like it or not.
And you don't get to sort of hide behind this supermajority threshold.
As as insurance or as a as a cover.
But the other thing that it does is it allows you to,
you.
you know, just from a caucus management perspective,
looking at this as a Senate leader.
If you only need 51, 52 votes to pass something,
you can let people break away from the party.
You can let them preserve their independence,
and it doesn't affect the final outcome.
So, you know, and that's the kind of thing
that allows them to continue to win re-election
in these deep red states.
This to me is a pretty subtle point,
but I think it's very important,
so I want to stay on it for a little bit,
which is when we talk about parties in the past,
because the parties were so much less polarized
and there was so much less penalty
for voting with the other party,
it was very normal.
There was a lot more fluidity.
And so you could be a Democrat
who just routinely did not vote with the Democratic Party.
And that was normal and it was fine.
And the Democratic leadership could accept
that you acted like that because there were
Republicans who did vote with the Democratic Party.
But in this world where bipartisanship
is not completely absent, but it is much rarer
than it used to be,
and you have constant filibustering in the Senate, the parties have
almost been forced.
into imposing much harsher party discipline
because their room for coalition building
is so constrained.
But that then means when you get to election time.
You don't have as many people who can honestly say,
yeah, I'm a different kind of Democrat
because you're not a different kind of Democrat.
You might want to be a different kind of Democrat,
but Chuck Schumer or Harry Reid or whoever it is
twisted your arm so you weren't one.
And so weirdly, I think that part of the pathway here
is getting serious about filibuster reform
so that if you have 57 Democrats,
that is seven Democrats on any vote in the Senate
who can say, I think Chuck Schumer is wrong
and I'm not going to vote with him.
And then they can go back to their constituencies and say,
see, I voted against Chuck Schumer 50% of the time
or whatever it might be.
I mean, supermajority coalitions in an era of majority rule.
Legislating is, I think, the healthiest dynamic,
and it also happened to be the dynamic that was in place during
the most productive periods of American history
and during the times of greatest progressive achievement.
You know, I mean, not to get deep in the Senate history here,
but the Senate was a majority rule institution for almost all
of its existence, really up until the 70s and 80s when the filibuster,
as we know it, started to emerge.
Except it wasn't majority rule on race.
Correct.
The filibuster was used to stop anti-lynching, civil rights laws, etc.
And that was the exception that proved the rule.
Yeah.
Basically, on any other topic, any bill that came to the floor got
a majority rule vote except anything related to civil rights.
Very broadly defined.
Yeah,
But at the same time, you had, you know, supermajority
Democratic control of Congress for most of the 20th century.
And this was a healthy dynamic,
that's
and it allowed Democrats to pass things like the New Deal
achievements, like Medicare, like the Voting Rights Act,
but then have some of their party
break away and define themselves as independent and,
fine.
you know, authentic to themselves on
issues where they disagreed with the national party.
And that created a virtuous cycle
that reinforced itself where we were getting big things done
for the American people.
And you had parties that were sort of regionally distinct,
sometimes in bad ways when it came to the South, but, you know,
also distinct in the West and the North and the Midwest.
And they're able to define themselves
not just by the national party brand.
I think that to take the other side of the argument, just for the sake
of argument, one case that more centrist-y Democrats will make
for the filibuster is that if Democrats do get a big majority,
you know, 57 votes, 60 votes, and they have the presidency.
And then you don't have a filibuster.
Well, isn't it easier
then for every like extremely left-wing group who in truth, like
Democrats are fairly sympathetic to,
to come and say, you got to do my thing.
And there's not this disciplining mechanism to say, well,
we don't have the votes because now you probably do have
the votes in a time of, you know, fairly good party discipline.
And that is how you get this dynamic where parties gain power
and then repeatedly overreach.
Or maybe a different way of asking the same question
is if the filibuster is not the thing and your slim majorities
are not the thing keeping you from overreaching in a way where you're
doing what you want to do, not what the public wants you to do.
What is keeping you from overreaching?
What does create the discipline needed
to create your kind of party?
If you try to count the votes,
it is actually quite hard
to get to a majority in this country.
And in fact, James Madison's faith in majority rule,
was undergirded by this notion that forming
a majority in a country as big and diverse as
America will always require you to assemble
a coalition of different interests, right? And this
was, you know, the time when the country was much smaller
and remains true today. So it's not just
that getting to a majority in the Senate will require you
to get an Adam Hamilton or a Scott
Collum, you know, or a Josh Turek,
Look at the rest of the caucus. You still have to get.
A Mark Warner, a Tim Kaine, a Chris Coons, right?
You know, so there is very difficult to build
a majority coalition that ranges from Bernie
Sanders to Mark Warner to Chris Coons
to Scott Collum to Adam Hamilton, right?
And that in and of itself is a force
that mitigates against these sort of radical swings.
And, you know, you look at a bill like Medicare for All, right?
Right. Last I checked, it had something like 17,
co-sponsors. So I don't think that we are in danger of,
if we move to a majority rule system,
of having, you know, this sort of rush to the left and,
you know, passing exclusively left-wing
positions because you're still going to have
to assemble a majority coalition that includes
members who aren't far to the left.
And, you know, really at the end of the day, you have to decide,
you know, there's risk in both directions, right?
The risk of the supermajority threshold is gridlock.
And, you know, that's not a hypothetical risk.
That's an extremely real risk.
We live it every day.
It's gotten impossible to get things done.
It's so bad that, you know, the only way things pass
in Congress is these mega bills where
you lump everything together and just jam it through,
which is like a nightmare for
transparency or any semblance of regular order.
So gridlock is real.
That is a risk that has been realized.
The risk on the other side is, yeah, you do have some overreach.
The upside to that is that the party
in power actually gets to get things done, and when
they do overreach, probably the American voters will respond and,
you know, vote them out.
But that, to me, is a much healthier system.
It's a much more responsive system to the American people,
and it's a much more transparent
system where each party says,
here's what I want to do, now I'm going to do it, then
you, the American voter, get to decide what you think about that.
You know, there's going to be a big tension between
the parts of the party that want to sort of just oppose
and enforce accountability and investigation on Trump.
And the parts of the party may be now coming from redder districts.
They're going to want to show they can work in a bipartisan fashion.
They're going to show they can get things done.
You know, one place this is going to come out really quickly
is there's this big bipartisan permitting bill moving forward.
And you already see it beginning to split
the Democratic Party because, you know, it
makes it easier to build clean energy,
but it also makes it easier to build dirty energy.
It's, you know, good for affordability.
People are debating, is it good for climate change?
Some of the, most of the analyses I've
seen say yes, but not everybody buys that.
But also, I think there's just going
to be this feeling like Mitch McConnell pioneered
the strategy.
You don't give the opposition president big bipartisan achievements.
You don't show that Washington is working under the other side, right?
You stop them and you show that Washington is gridlocked
and dysfunctional under them.
And that is how you win power.
So how do you think about something like very direct
and soon to come up like the permitting
bill?
Yeah, there's a dance like a butterfly, sting like a bee,
Aspect here, right? Where should you pass
a bipartisan permitting reform bill that's never going to get
a ton of national attention, but will bring down energy costs?
And by the way, those lower energy costs will probably kick
in somewhere around 2029 or 2030. So I think there's sort of a tactical
and strategic advantage to getting this done and just getting it out
of the way so that the next president doesn't run into the same
permitting constraints that held back Biden's climate investments.
That, I think, is a smart area to get something done.
That validates our promise of affordability
and also sets up the next Democratic president
for success.
But then when there's a monumental fight like
a Supreme Court seat opening up,
which could start to shift the balance back to a liberal majority,
Democrats should go to the mat and hold that seat open.
You know, and this.
Look, it's the right thing to do.
We should not let this president, this mentally unstable,
lame duck president, fill another seat on the Supreme Court.
That would be a bad thing for America.
But it's also a fight that will absolutely rally
our coalition together.
So and we'll show people the Democrats are willing to put, you know,
and we'll show people the Democrats are willing to fight hard.
What do you do about places where you
don't have agreement on directionality?
So, for instance, and also places where you have real conflict.
In terms of different values jamming into each other. So for instance,
there could be some of these in bills that on the one hand,
you know, if you restrict fossil fuel development,
you can to some degree slow greenhouse gas emissions.
On the other hand, maybe that's bad for affordability.
Or a different version, Israel.
There are genuinely just irreconcilably different views about whether
or not the US should support the state of Israel.
So yeah, how do you see that?
So let's let's let's anchor on Israel on that one.
What's happened over the last few years is you've seen a really
distinct evolution among Democrats on that position specifically.
Now, a lot of that has been driven by horrific outside events that have
caused people to reevaluate stances that they had in the past.
But it's also been driven by coalitional dynamics within the party.
And I think the place where the party is moving
to is is reflects that dynamic and is.
the right response to all of those forces acting on it.
So I think that, you know, you've got to give some room
for growth, for change, for evolution,
you know, for the idea that activists may sometimes represent
the leading edge of a moral issue,
even if we disagree with some of their approaches
or the maximalist stances they'll take on something.
And then you process that through, you know,
the legislative process, writing bills,
seeing how many votes you can get for it.
Reflecting public opinion changes in that.
How is it evolving on an issue like Israel?
But, you know, you try, look, big tents are messy, right?
Big coalitions are hard to steer.
So it's not going to be a sort of easy or neat process.
But the job of leaders and ultimately the job
of a presidential candidate is to try
to sort of, you know, allow some of those,
you know, chemical reactions and those changes
to take place within this body while generally trying to steer it.
Towards a direction that is focused on the things we have in common
and is broadly appealing to the American people
and is continuing to invite more and more people into our coalition.
So here's a good specific question about that.
You were chief of staff to John Fetterman.
Sure was.
And you could say, you could look at John Fetterman and say,
now there you have a heterodox Democrat.
Sure do.
He has.
Yes, sure.
There's a lot in that shirt right there.
He has a lot of opinions that many other Democrats don't share.
He kind of mixes and matches views in an increasingly unusual way.
He showed up at the President Trump's kind of big midterm rally.
Is John Fetterman, is he part of the big tent?
Is he a model of a heterodox Democrat?
How do you see John Fetterman now?
I see...
Senator Fetterman, as a cautionary tale, you know,
I think that heterodoxy is an extremely powerful political force.
I think we saw that in the election on Tuesday and candidates
who embraced it, you know, did very, very well.
But it can also turn on you if it becomes the entire point.
For Fetterman, it's become clear that he's
no longer guided by principle or broad goals that
he's trying to achieve for the people of Pennsylvania,
but just seeking fights. And,
you know, that is heterodoxy gone wild.
And I think it's become sort of sad because it's become
the whole way he identifies himself in public.
And it's the entire goal of his life in public service right now
But I actually think this gets to something interesting.
And Fetterman is an extreme case,
and you would understand better than me how much had
to do with his stroke and other dimensions of his psychology.
I've never quite known how to totally understand his arc.
One place where I have seen the relationship between politicians
who are maintaining a
distance from their own party's main brand,
one place where I've seen that turn toxic
is when the relationship between them
And the mainstream of their party becomes fundamentally hostile, right?
That happened with Joe Lieberman and the Democratic Party.
That happened with, has happened very much with Fetterman
and the Democratic Party.
Fetterman radiates a dislike of much of his own base.
And to be fair, the Democratic base doesn't like John Fetterman.
Yeah, it's mutual.
And so one of the, I think,
quite difficult things when you're, you know, a congressional
leader trying to kind of manage these dynamics
or just like somebody in them.
These are very tough issues.
I was furious and said things that I kind
of basically stand behind about how, I think,
ugly the actions of Joe Lieberman were during the public option debate.
And because people's worlds were in the balance.
I mean, when you're talking about healthcare,
when you're talking about authoritarianism,
when you're talking about Israel,
when you're talking about immigration, when you're talking
about this range of issues, you know,
when you're talking about discrimination.
It's very hard to say sometimes, well,
we all disagree to disagree because the stakes are so high.
And I think it's harder in an era of social media, harder in an era
of algorithmic media, harder in an era of nationalized groups,
harder in an era of nationalized media, where it's not like,
you know, Joe Manchin's decisions primarily get covered
in West Virginia, right? Like, you know.
He becomes known to every member of the Democratic Party
when he is pushing back.
So that's part of the structure here that I think makes it tough.
It's very hard to keep that cycle from escalating out of control.
I don't think anybody has managed
to hold together a big tent party in this era.
And I don't think it's totally accidental.
I think it reflects how hard it is to keep
those dynamics from spiraling into enmity.
I mean, you see, you are part of how hostile the fighting
Between quite liberal and then somewhat leftist people
is on X, on Twitter and on Blue Sky and others.
I mean, those are debates between people
who are all the left of the median American voter by quite a lot.
When you actually start getting into debates between the people
who are truly, you know, maybe even a little bit
to the right of the median American voter, it gets very,
very, very hard to hold a fundamental generosity together.
It's going to be hard.
But it's worth it to try.
And I think part of what underlies all of this for me
is an embrace of this underlying tension.
Not tension in an antagonistic sense,
but tension in a, you know,
just the idea that there is,
there are complicated dynamics at play here.
And there is going to be tension
between pursuing goals
and going as far as some folks on the left want you to go.
But I think acknowledging those tensions
And trying to deal with them in as constructive
a way as possible is part of what's necessary
for managing a big tent supermajority coalition.
I think part of what we've tried to do in the past is to wish them away
and to say that there's no tension between American public opinion
and all of the big things we want to do from a left perspective, right?
And that's led us to, you know, into a bubble, basically,
and to fall dramatically out of step with the American people.
We're going to get a lot of big things done
if we keep going in this direction, and then we're
also going to be some disappointments, but it's going to be worth it
because we are going to change the face of this country,
and we're going to change the lives of millions of American people
if we can hold this big tent coalition together and, you know,
do things like expand access to universal health care and expand
the social safety net with the threat of AI coming down the pike.
Just also drawing on your background in the Senate here,
one of the early decisions Democrats are going
to have to make is who leads them in the Senate.
I think Chuck Schumer has some real bragging rights after
this election. He had some recruiting
misses, but he also brought in Roy Cooper,
brought in Sherrod Brown, brought in Mary
and they got a gigantic Senate majority under him.
On the other hand, you've already
seen, say, Abdul Syed and Alyssa Slotkin,
the sitting and incoming senator from Michigan
and from very different parts of the party say they don't want.
Schumer to run again. There's a question of, you know,
establishment versus anti-establishment, age,
like all these things are in the swirl of the Democratic Party.
What should they do?
Well, there's two decisions that need to be made.
There's whether Schumer should be reelected as leader,
and then there's whether he should run for reelection in 2028, right?
One of the things that Joe Biden did was he said,
I'm going to be a bridge to the future.
And I think everybody took that to mean he
was just going to run for one term.
And then he failed to be a bridge to the future
and to the next generation.
I think Schumer has an opportunity here
to be the bridge to the next generation.
And look, it's hard to argue with winning
the biggest victory since Watergate when you ask
Is he up to the job as leader?
Like, that is an incredibly impressive achievement.
We wouldn't be here without some of the recruiting successes he had
and a lot of the things he did behind the scenes,
including, you know, investing $50 million in Michigan
to help El-Sayed win after a contentious primary.
Moving money into Mississippi, which a lot of people thought was crazy.
He was on Mississippi before many people, right?
These were very, very smart decisions that he made.
And for those reasons, I do think he deserves
to be reelected as leader.
But obviously, there is this tension about,
you know, are we still putting, you know,
are we moving to the next generation of leaders
if we have an octogenarian leading us?
And I think the smart thing for him to do would
be to get reelected as leader, but say
that he's going to pass the torch in the next generation
and not run for reelection in 2028.
This is what my former boss, Harry Reid, did announcing his retirement.
It is something we see very rarely these days in politics,
which is going out on top and going out gracefully.
It's the right thing to do, I think.
So I think there are going to be some tough conversations.
Democrats don't hold these elections until December.
But I think, you know, really putting his money where his mouth is
and saying, I will actually be that bridge to the next generation
would be a smart thing for him to do.
And that's a place to end.
Then always our final question.
What are three books you'd recommend to the audience?
So I just finished a book called Bernie for Burlington,
which by Dan Chodsen, which is a biography of Bernie's early years that
I found incredibly revealing, you know, very interesting and honestly,
how heterodox he was in his in his approach to politics. Great read.
Give me an example.
Okay. So at one point after he was reelected,
there was a weapons plant outside Burlington and the anti-war community
in Burlington, which was very active, as you can imagine.
staged a protest to try to shut down the weapons production facility.
Bernie, having been elected as a socialist,
sided with the workers at the plant against
the anti-war activists.
So, you know, there was a lot of sort
of class first approach to Bernie's politics that I
think got lost in the sort of modern era.
But, you know, it was really fascinating to see how
this was sort of a common thread through
his early career.
Um, second book is a book called Hollow Parties, uh,
by political scientists, Danny Schlossman and Sam Rosenfeld, which, uh,
is one of the most, uh, thoughtful, uh, uh, illustrations of how we've,
how the parties themselves have deteriorated over the last few decades.
And that's left a space for, uh, you know, activists and,
uh, sort of the para party infrastructure to try to fill.
I talk about a lot of this in my own book, you know,
their sort of successes and failures of trying to fill that.
But it looks at both parties, you know,
from the 19th century up until modern times and shows how they
deteriorated and left this massive vacuum in our political space.
The third book is a fiction,
a work of fiction called The Gay Place by Billy Lee Brammer.
It is sort of the lost classic of American political novels.
Billy Lee Brammer was an aide to LBJ and a journalist.
And it's sort of this great synergy of like.
like Gonzo-era atmospherics and LBJ politics.
So having been thinking a lot about Texas recently
and, you know, being a big fan of political novels,
I would highly recommend that one to people.
Adam Jentleson, thank you very much.
Thanks for having me.
Tell me.

