We should 'salute' Ukraine for military campaign against Russian diesel infrastructure

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, John Stringer, thank you very much for joining us on Euronews. Great to be here. Well, I want to ask you a bit about what's happening in Abu Dhabi today. We see your boss, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Grinkovich there. People would say that they very much welcome, certainly the Ukrainians, his influence on the talks. What do you hope can come out of these talks this week? So my boss gets to wear two hats. So I would just emphasize that he's in Abu Dhabi wearing his hat as commander of U.S.-European command. But in terms of the talks, I mean, everybody wants to see an end to the war in Ukraine. But it can't be on unfair terms after the brutal and illegal invasion of the sovereign state. So Ukraine's interests have to be paramount in this discussion. And of course, we as NATO, through initiatives like ENSATU for support, The Biden training are absolutely supportive of Ukraine and have been since February 2022 and before. Yeah, but indeed, and I suppose with his hat in terms of European forces, you'd even imagine more that he could try to influence this in a way that's supportive of Europe, because we have seen concerns from the Europeans that the American side have said that they've basically equalized the Russian and the Ukrainians, their priorities. We heard from Jared Kushner, one of the U.S. envoys, saying that both need to be acknowledged equally. That's obviously a concern, given that one illegally invaded the other. So I won't put words in other people's mouths. You'll understand that. As I said, we as NATO, the nations in NATO, absolutely focused on a right and just ending to this conflict. OK. What we've heard so far is that Russia is saying that they want an agreement for a cease for the Ukrainians to give up those key areas in the eastern part of the country. But that's obviously a non-starter. So what can be achieved? So we all know the Russian demands have been maximalist from the start, I hope. But I say hope that they enter into negotiations in a genuine spirit of seeking resolution here. And that it's not just, frankly, a restatement of demands that, as I said, go back to 2022. So let's see how serious Russia is here. And in terms of territory. It is absolutely one for the Ukrainians. As I said, sovereign nation invaded in 2022, having had Crimea annexed in 2014. So Ukrainian interests here have to be paramount. Indeed. What indications are there? Because obviously NATO is formally represented by officials like before, like the Miami format. So what indication? Does NATO have, or do you have, that Russia is being genuine here? Because at the end of the day, why waste people's time going all the way to Abu Dhabi unless there's some inkling that they are genuine in ending this war? So, I mean, as I said, I hope that Russia is serious and that the time it's invested, and let's not forget the time that everybody else is investing in this. ...actually moves the dial, moves the process on. Any idea whether they are or not? Do you have any inclination that something might actually materialise from Abu Dhabi this week? So, no, and it would be quite wrong of me to try and sort of second-guess anything there. I'm kind of focused on the day job of making sure that a billion citizens in 32 nations remain safe and secure. OK, we will move on to that, because obviously that is about the hybrid war. Just before I let you go and move on from Abu Dhabi, what do you think may be achieved at this point in time? Could we look at maybe something of a genuine ceasefire, a prisoner swap like we've had before? And also, can you tell me a little bit about the deeper discussions around post-conflict resolutions, humanitarian tracks and so on? So, first part is I suspect, I suspect that those areas you've noted may be in discussion, may be in play, but I will leave that for others. In terms of what is or is not being discussed out in the talks at the moment, in terms of what has to be there for a lasting peace, kind of all of it, all of the above and then some Ukrainian interests, as I said, are paramount here in terms of what that means for Ukrainian territory and what it means for, as you say, post-conflict resolution, including what this means for a. Yeah, a return to a better security dynamic in continental Europe. Are you fearful, though, that we could be another year talking about having this conversation this time next year and again, Russia is not being genuine? Well, that's entirely possible. But you need to ask that question in Moscow. Tell us a bit about how Europe is prepared for in the event of a genuine settlement and how the coalition of the willing is prepared to. ...be there for Ukraine in terms of security guarantees? So there's two bits here which I should emphasise. So the coalition of the willing is a separate thing, it's not a NATO organisation. So again I won't speak to that because whilst we are aware of discussions etc and activity it's not a NATO thing. In terms of where NATO then takes the discussions, I'm obviously very much on the military side of the house and this will be a political discussion and debate. At some point, of course, the two come together. So where that takes us in terms of future posture of forces, let alone Ukraine's status, again, that is one that's going to be bottomed out, I think, in the period that would follow any resolution to the conflict. Can you tell us about what happens, though, when... These issues are coming together in terms of playing out what it might look like. What type of planning goes into it? Do you feel confident that Europe is ready to take on that responsibility? So I think one of the short answers to your question, yes, longer answer is what you have seen from European nations Thank really since February 2022. We can argue whether, you know. We could have anticipated stuff beforehand, but in terms you of NATO nations absolutely delivering on sort of two things really. One being that notion of NATO 3.0, an alliance that has had to get back very sadly into the business of collective defence over the 32 nations. much. And the second is the European nations absolutely standing up in terms of the capabilities, resources that they're putting in. And of course, the Ankara summit reaffirmed the 2% declaration that all nations have signed up to. What we are really now focused on is ensuring that that extra percentage is spent, is being turned into proper military capability. And before we move back on to Ankara, I just want to ask you a little bit about... Well, let's move on to Ankara, actually, because one of the issues that we are looking at is the lack thereof of interceptors for Ukraine, which is an urgent issue. And we saw at the end of the Ankara summit that there could have been a negotiation between the U.S. and Ukraine to produce and manufacture Patriot interceptors. That hasn't come to pass. Can you tell us a little bit why that might be? So on the specifics of that, I can't, but that's... Kind of not my part of the ship. What I can say, though, is if you look at everything that was on the Pearl, the prioritized urgent Ukrainian requirements list, those deliveries continue to flow. When we look at industrial capacity to physically make stuff, I sort of kind of come back to what I was saying about NATO 3.0. We know that we have to increase the size of the transatlantic industrial base, the defence industrial base. So the means of production through to repairing and upgrading systems has very, very sharp focus. It has sharp focus from myself and SACEUR. It has sharp focus across the alliance and with the nations. So one of the things we will need to do. is increase that capacity in the coming months and years and somewhere in that will fit, I'm sure, Sure. enhanced flow of interceptors to Ukraine. But even if I could be drawn on numbers, I wouldn't be able to say that in public. But in relation to the interceptor issue, President Zelensky said that they're waiting over a month for delivery of Patriots. To Ukraine, he said that all that's required is a signature from the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth. On top of that, the Finnish defense minister, Antti Häkkönen, said last week that political willingness is required for those patriots to be transferred to Ukraine. So the issue is that there are patriots paid for through the parole system, but just haven't been delivered because of a lack of political will. So I would frame it differently, if I may. First off, I obviously can't talk for the US and Finnish governments, let alone ministers. But one of the things that you are seeing is we know the urgency of Patriots and other systems, by the way, it's not just Patriots. Some of it we won't be able to talk about, but those are absolutely flowing. Patriots, understandably, are in high demand globally, hence my point on increasing the overall size of the industrial base. And a number of discussions have been held and are ongoing with a number of nations about how we might increase the flow of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine. But they're obviously sensitive discussions, and I can't really talk about them in public. Indeed, but can you understand, I suppose, countries like Finland, which is sort of a model country when it comes to defence deterrence and so on, and is also paying into Pearl? Saying that the money is there, there's no issue, and we know that there's obviously a global shortage, but that there's a political... Issue, that's an obstacle there. So, Shona, I'll leave the political side to the politicians on this one. But rest assured that Saka and myself and the very top of the military part of the alliance is absolutely focused on where we can increase taps for patriots. And from that, there are a number of countries within NATO that do have Patriots. Thank Saka and yourself are trying to sort of persuade some of them to give up. Some of their patriots to give to Ukraine, but they're seeking guarantees, I assume, that those stockpiles then will be replenished and they can't get those guarantees because of the production capacity issue and the stockpile issue. Is that right? you. What I would say is there are a number of options and they are being actively pursued. Do you think that there will be any result from that, Thank that those sort of options that are being put on the table anytime soon? Again, I won't be drawn on where nations may be or aren't in that particular discussion. you What I would say is a lot of energy is going into it. So there's no timeline then as to see very when Ukraine might get access to those? All right. Well, not that I'm able to share. And as I said, because discussions are ongoing. much. Trying to kind of nail this one down in public at the moment, we're unable to do. But they're at a deep level, these discussions. And have been ongoing for some time. Yeah. Just on the issue of the global shortage, is that really mainly because of the war in Iran? Or tell us a little bit about why we're seeing such a shortage when Europeans, I suppose, thought that the flow of patriots might be something they could rely on. So I think there's probably two bits. I think, yes. You know, clearly a lot of patriots and other weapons have been used in the Middle East, and that is having an impact on delivery stockpiles, etc. That, you know, would be odd if it wasn't. But I think, as I said earlier, one of the things that you're also seeing is an industrial base that nations didn't have to worry about. You know, we came out of 1990, 1991, and we'd, hey, we won the Cold War. And also, we had had 15 to 20 years of very bloody, but, you know, contingency operations at range from Europe. What we are seeing is a bunch of nations now re-gearing for the needs of collective defence. And what that means is the industrial base and the defence industrial base being re-geared. But you can't do that overnight. And therefore, there is an inevitable lag in the system. Tell us a bit about the impact on the sort of changes to the NATO force model from the United States, withdrawing pretty high level capabilities from use for NATO allies and whether or not that's been replenished or replaced by European and Canadians. Yeah, so one of the key parts of my job is actually engaging with nations to do what we call force sourcing. So actually going to them and making sure that we can fill what's required in the NATO force model. So what I would highlight here actually is how European nations and Canada really stepped up. It's actually a part of that generating, not just talking about a NATO 3.0 and being a stronger Europe in NATO, not just talking about it. And so if you look at what I would call the backfill, The replacement for some systems and platforms that work well. We're being removed from the order of battle by the U.S. This actually is a story that should be quite heartening for people because if you look at the number of nations who supplied additional fighter jets, who put maritime patrol aircraft, who put a whole bunch of other things into the mix. So actually, that bit was done really quickly and we've been able to fill Basically all of what was what was removed. There are some areas Where NATO allies don't have the same as what the US has. So we've looked at using other options to generate, again, a horrid military phrase, but the effects that some certain US platforms would deliver, delivering in a different way. Well, let's talk sort of not hypothetically per se, but where there are precision weapons delivered by a platform. Actually, if I can deliver those precision weapons by other means. to ensure that I can still have the same effect then that actually that is backfill in action that's us actually being able to put into the plans, put into the force model what's required and we've done that in a number of areas. In a few weeks' time, Marco Rubio, the U.S. Secretary of State, will be here for the meeting of foreign ministers. And it's likely, well, it's maybe likely that he will give an update on the global force review of the United States. And what do you expect from that? I mean, what we heard from Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, was that there will be a significant withdrawal of U.S. troops from NATO territory. First off, we don't know, do we? So the analysis has been done. Obviously, U.S. effort. That has gone back into Washington. And ultimately, this will be, as you intimate, it will be a political decision. Me being drawn on that is pointless because it is business that's quite rightly being done by the U.S. Yes, but again, you know... Where my boss now wears his hat as the boss of US European command, he's clearly had a key role in that. Oh, so he's working with the US military on... what that would look like and he would have an idea of the number of troops that are being withdrawn. Well, as commander of European, sorry, American forces in Europe, it would be slightly strange if he didn't. But of course, he's well aware of what this also means in the wider NATO context. So I will leave others to make their calls on that. Very good military advice will have been offered. I'll now leave it to others. What does happen then when the number of Number of troops is known. What does NATO do then to fill them? Tell us what this sort of procedure is after a decision like that. Okay, so, well, you've seen kind of the example from May, June of this year, which we were just talking about. So again, without prejudging anything that falls out of that review, we would take, we would look at anything that came out of it. Work out what that means for the plans themselves and then work out whether they are able to do a direct like for like replacement or whether, as I said, we would do something different that would generate the same level of effect. But this is at the moment a kind of hypothetical discussion, but because we don't know what will come out, I can set out the lines of how it would be approached. But I'll wait for others to make a call on what it actually looks like. The number of hybrid war... Incursions all across NATO territory is increasing and, as we've heard, becoming more kinetic and more dangerous. There are some countries, particularly the Baltic countries, who believe that maybe NATO should have a little bit more of a stronger response to them. What's your own assessment of where we stand with these drone incursions or balloon incursions in the case of Lithuania or arson attacks, sabotage and so on? Yeah, so I think there's probably a number of bits to it. The first is I think President Putin's risk appetite is now in areas probably more reckless than it was, and that might be saying something. His three-day special military operation is now in its fifth year, and things are not going well for Russia. So we absolutely know that. In terms of the responsive nations, I kind of draw on the classic and much... ...reproduced British slogan from World War II, which says a kind of keep calm and carry on here. The worst thing we could do is overreact, be overly alarmed, turn into a slightly sort of frozen approach to it and almost do, in this case, what President Putin would want us to do. Actually, what we need people to do is be calm, measured, resolute. It won't surprise you that a lot of effort is going on at information sharing across nations. Where we are confident of attribution by anybody, we will call that out. And of course, what the military does is only part of a set of responses open to nations, either singly, multilaterally, or in the case of NATO, at 32 nations. There is more than just a military response that can be applied here. But we have also looked at some of the structural things we do as NATO. So our approach to integrated air and missile defence has been significantly overhauled and continues to be overhauled. We went from 20-odd years or so where we call things air policing Because, of course, it was peace in Europe, wasn't it? And we're kind of returning to, no, we need to be more hard-nosed about air defence, particularly to pick up your point, where we now look at the threat that comes at the cheaper but far more multiple end of the spectrum. From uncrewed air systems through to, as Ukraine, sadly, you're seeing in most days, ballistic missiles of various types. So adjusting how NATO stands to that, bringing in the new systems that we need and the overall kind of the architecture, for want of a better phrase, that has had a significant evolution, even in the space of the last year or so. And I say this having been for the last five months or so in my previous job. NATO's air and missile defence commander. And I mean, as you mentioned there, obviously Russia's not doing well. Five years into a supposedly five-day attack on the whole of Ukraine. I mean, Partly, though, would you agree that the Ukrainians have been able to strike into Russian territory, in particular at the diesel infrastructure? Would you agree that this is a... Legitimate, obviously it's legitimate, but would you agree that this needs to continue in order to stop the access that Russia has to money through its oil production and exportation? So quite rightly, the Ukrainians are running their campaign. But you're absolutely right in the sense that what they have done against Russian oil and gas. has had a demonstrable impact on the Russian economy, it is economic warfare in 2026 and it and it is a key element obviously you need to look at it from outside, a key element in the Ukrainian campaign so it's hurting Russia, I will leave it to Ukrainians as to you know how how they prosecute that campaign in the future. But it does underline my point. This is hurting Putin. He thought he was going to roll in, establish a new security architecture in Europe that started in Ukraine in early 22, and he's been sorely... disabused on that one and what Ukraine has been able to do through imagination, innovation and will is quite incredible and we should salute it. Okay, and just before I let you go, General Grinkovich's theory of victory strategy, which he outlined recently in Warsaw and the blunt, the first part again, block, blunt and break. Sorry. Sorry. Why did he come, not obviously, I know he's been working on it for a long time, but why did he tell us about it at that moment? Is it because there's been concerns about NATO's deterrence effect? So two reasons. The first one is we wanted to reassure the citizens in the 32 nations that we've got this. The second, to your point, is we want to make sure that any adversary. Who looks and thinks they're going to try it on with NATO, looks at us every day and thinks today is not the day. So setting out in broad terms what, as a defensive alliance, a defensive alliance, not an offensive one, would do to protect our people is absolutely key to us. And leaving no doubt in any adversary's mind as to how resolute we would be in defence and deterrence and if necessary in any fight to protect that. OK. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, John Stringer, thank you very much for joining us on Euronews. Thank you very much. Thank you.