Public Financial Management - Andrew Lawson

Finance For The Future
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1 Video View·Oct 30, 2026
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis video discusses the complexities of evaluating and reforming Public Finance Management (PFM) systems. The speaker outlines the four primary objectives of PFM, the challenges of measuring efficiency, the essential requirements for successful reform, and the danger of \"isomorphic mimicry,\" where governments pretend to implement reforms to satisfy donors without achieving actual change.
One of the things you asked me was how we judge whether
a PFM system is efficient or not.
And it's actually not a very simple question.
I ought to be able to give you a simple answer,
but there isn't one. And the reason why
is because what a PFM system tries to do
is itself quite varied.
So we normally think of a PFM system as having four objectives.
The first is just to protect aggregate
fiscal sustainability. In other words,
to make sure that the country doesn't get
into too much debt, putting it simply.
Secondly, it should allocate resources to strategic priorities.
So what happens with a lot of PFM systems
is that you end up allocating money
to maintaining buildings and paying salaries and doing things,
and then you ask yourself, well,
this isn't really what we wanted to do.
We somehow want to organize our allocations and change them
so that they're going to the real priority.
So getting resources to priorities is the second objective.
The third is to ensure value for money in service delivery.
In other words, we want to be delivering services which give us
the best combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
And finally, we want to ensure transparency and accountability.
As I've said before, this is a right, a human value in itself.
The problem for a PFM system is that you've got to do these four
things simultaneously, and that's where the problem lies.
Quite a lot of governments insist on strict fiscal sustainability,
but they often do it at the expense of services.
They don't necessarily cut the low priority services,
they cut what's easiest to cut.
They don't necessarily do it in a very transparent way.
This could often be done in closed doors,
in deals between ministers and ministries of finance.
It's not a transparent process.
So to maintain fiscal discipline,
allocate resources to your priorities,
ensure value for money and transparency simultaneously is not simple.
But the OBI allows us to measure this,
our fiscal data allows us to measure this.
What's very difficult to measure is this bit in the middle,
because strategic priorities
may change from one government to another,
and they would change from one society to
another.
Some societies value education
and health much more than infrastructure and electricity
generation and energy supplies and things like that.
But different governments have different perceptions
of what are strategic priorities.
And then to measure value for money,
you need to measure in some detail the way in which
services are being delivered, how efficient they are,
how effective they are, how equitable
they are.
There are some ways of doing that,
but they involve very detailed studies.
So you can't easily measure these two things
when you're going into a particular country
or local government to examine their PFM system.
So what we try to do is to look at the...
Rules and procedures and practices which are most likely
to ensure that these four things happen simultaneously.
And there's various systems for judging that.
There's an international system called the PIFA methodology,
the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability methodology,
which has a set of 31 indicators.
And that allows us to reach a judgment
on whether the practices and institutions
most likely to generate these four
are working. But there's always a little bit of debate.
Sometimes some people say, well,
the PEFA methodology is not appropriate for our country.
We'd like to use something a little bit different.
So there's always a little bit of a grey area
about the question of efficiency. And
really what one tries to do is to reach a judgment,
to try to make sure that the
leaders
in the particular country involved with managing the system
share your judgment, and then from that you move to
Some ideas about how to reform it.
How do we ensure that we're going to get
a successful public finance management reform?
Most research and experience suggests we need three things.
We need leadership.
Specifically, it's got to be both political and technical.
Not enough just that the permanent secretary
of the Ministry of Finance should be wanting reform.
The Minister of Finance needs to want reform.
The Prime Minister or the President also needs to want reform.
And that needs to be supported by good communication and coordination.
Very often you've got well-committed politicians,
but they don't communicate their ideas very well,
they don't have a good coordinating team to make sure it all happens.
Secondly, you need what I describe as policy space.
In other words, the opportunity to generate appropriate reforms
suitable for each individual context.
One of the things we said earlier was that
Different countries will have slightly different PFM systems
for cultural and social reasons and for very valid reasons.
So that means, by extension,
that the reform that is needed in one country
is unlikely to be the same reform needed in another country.
And to get back to your question about the biggest frustration,
one of the biggest frustrations for me
and for my colleagues working in this area
is that usually this policy space is not allowed,
in particular for developing countries.
Donor agencies typically have a predefined set
of ideas about what they think reform should look like.
They virtually force governments to adopt these reforms.
And it's not surprising that those reforms rarely work properly.
So what's needed is policy space and what I describe here
as an adaptive, iterative and inclusive process.
In other words, making reform happen with public finance management,
maybe with other things too, is all about learning.
It's about recognizing from the outset
that you don't necessarily know the right way forward.
You have an idea of what might improve systems,
and you therefore start off with that,
and you monitor as you go along.
You say, well, it's working quite well in country X but not in
country Y. You know, why is that?
How can we refine what we're doing? Or within a particular country,
it might work in local government in the south
but not a local government in the north.
Why is that? Is there something about the reform?
Is there some tweaking we can do to make it work better?
So it's very much about learning and having sort of feedback loops
so that you carry out a reform in year one,
you go back on yourself, you ask questions,
you ask the users of the system, how has it worked for you?
You get the feedback and then improve on it.
And that process allows you to generate the policy space
to generate reforms that are likely to be appropriate.
It's very rare that that actually happens, unfortunately.
Because governments maybe are too ambitious,
they want to get things done too fast.
Donor agencies again have agendas which are very short.
They insist on getting results in a short period of time.
They don't necessarily want to leave the time
and space for this adaptive learning process to work.
But this is exactly how you get reform.
And the countries that have been able to do this are the ones
which have sustained their reforms better.
Somebody asked me about mimicry, isomorphic mimicry.
Well, I said earlier that we shouldn't use jargon,
and this is one of the worst bits of jargon you can imagine.
But what it means is that instead of actually doing something,
you pretend to do something.
So, for example, one of the common reforms around the world
is to move towards more complicated systems of accounting.
There's a system of accounting called accrual accounting,
which is based on assessing assets as well
as assessing spending, putting it simply.
Well, one can be moving towards accrual
accounting over five years, over ten years,
and it's often an excuse for not doing any reforms
to the accounting system at all
and simply pretending that one
is stepping towards accrual accounting over a longer term.
Similarly, one can often make reforms to procurement.
which are based on decentralizing procurement responsibilities,
creating boards at different levels,
which is a model of procurement reform
that works quite well in some countries.
But again, you can set up the boards without
necessarily giving them the right training,
you can set up the boards without really giving them
the mandate to make decisions about procurement,
and it's very easy to pretend to reform without really doing it.
So one of the problems about this policy space issue
Is that when governments are forced
to adopt a particular model of reform,
those governments that don't really want to reform in the first place,
that makes it very easy for them.
They'll say, yes, we will do accrual accounting.
Yes, we will do decentralized procurement,
mimicking what other countries are supposedly doing,
and in some cases, convincing the financial markets
that reform is really happening,
and therefore reducing interest rates, etc., etc.
But in reality, no reform actually happens.
But by the time people realize that,
there's a new government in place and we're back into the other cycle.
What we try to do is only work
in the countries where we think there's a genuine interest in reform.
In other words, we may be invited
to do an assessment of the PFM system in country X.
While we're in country X,
we take some time to actually talk to the ministers and the senior
civil servants, and we make a judgment.
You know, are these people serious about reform?
And if country X isn't really serious,
then we can go work somewhere else.
But what's a little bit more difficult for a donor
for the UK Department for International
Development is that their job is to try
to help a wide range of poor countries.
And if they also judge that that poor country
is not really interested in reform,
it's not so easy for them to walk away.
They still feel that they need to do something to promote reform.
So without really meaning to, they get into this mimicry situation
because they want to promote reform in...
Country X, I won't name any countries.
That particular country, the leaders don't want reform,
but they click pretty quickly
that if they say they're going to do a particular reform
and prepare a plan and maybe even pass a law,
which they actually never implement,
that stalls the whole process of reform for three or four years,
by which the elections have arrived, and it doesn't matter anymore.
And in the meantime, they might have received resources
from the UK Department for International Development
and from other agencies precisely because they're pretending to reform.
So the incentives are stacked, unfortunately,
against a genuine, honest approach to the reform.
