Could Xi Jinping's Health Solve China's Succession Crisis?

The Communist Party of China has never developed a truly reliable, institutionalized system for transferring power from one leader to the next. If we look at the two comparisons, North Korea, North Korea has a hereditary system. I mean, power stays within the Kim family. It's essentially a communist red dynasty. And in the former Soviet Union, especially after Stalin, leadership transitions were generally negotiated among senior Politburo members and then approved by the Central Committee. But China is different. So under Mao Zedong, succession depended almost entirely on his personal wishes. He designated three successors at different times. The first two died. I mean, Liu Shaoqi was purged and died in disgrace. Lin Biao fell from power and died in a mysterious plane crash. And then Hua Guofeng helped remove Mao's widow and the Gang of Four. But then he was pushed aside by Deng Xiaoping. So Mao named three successors. Not one survived politically as his intended successor. And then Deng Xiaoping also had three successors. He removed the first two, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. And then during the 1989 pro-democracy movement, he got rid of Zhao Ziyang and then selected Jiang Zemin to lead the party. But then he also regretted his decision. He worried that Jiang Zemin was reversing his economic reforms. At one point, he wanted to replace him. But in the end, he didn't. But he did something unusual. He picked Jiang Zemin's successor for him, and that person was Hu Jintao. This is where the practice of the so-called cross-generational designation came from. It's called 隔代指定. So in another word, a retired paramount leader chooses a successor, not for himself, but for the leader who comes after him. So that's cross-generational. Now, Deng Xiaoping, to prevent Jiang Zemin from clinging to his power, Deng Xiaoping also pushed for a term limit, a 10-year, two-terms limit. Now, Jiang Zemin wasn't particularly happy about those restrictions, but he couldn't do much to overturn Deng Xiaoping's arrangements. Eventually, he had to pass the baton to Hu Jintao. And when it comes to choose Hu Jintao's successor, Jiang Zemin believed it was his turn to designate the next generation of leadership because of this cross-generational designation. But Hu Jintao and his people had their preferences, so the two sides fought. What followed was an intense political struggle resulted in the imprisonment of Zhou Yongkang and then Bo Xilai. Eventually, they settled on a compromise, and that compromise was Xi Jinping. Now, here's the problem. These were political arrangements. There are not firmly established institutional rules. So after Xi Jinping came along, he dismantled the succession conventions that Deng Xiaoping tried to establish. He removed presidential term limits. He started his third term. And now, 14 years after he came to power, the party still has no clear succession plan. And the biggest problem is not just Xi Jinping hasn't named a successor. The biggest problem is nobody knows who has the authority to choose one. Is it Xi Jinping himself? Well, I think he thinks so. Or does his predecessor, Hu Jintao, has the authority because of this cross-generational designation rule? Will the Politburo decide or have a vote? Will retired party elders have a say in the decision? Or will competing political factions fight it out and negotiate a candidate among themselves? There is no clear answer. And when the rules are unclear, succession becomes a struggle for power. So that's the first problem. And then the second problem is even more dangerous, in my opinion. It's the growing fracture between the military and the party. And this is why I believe Beijing's succession crisis could become extremely dangerous. Now, let's look at history again. So in the former Soviet Union, even during intense political struggles at the top, even when Khrushchev was removed in a coup, the military generally accepted the party's decisions on succession. The military sided with the party. In North Korea, of course, the Kim family controls both the party and the military. So there was never an issue. Now, in communist China, political power and military power have historically been inseparable because Mao Zedong has famously or famously said the power of the regime comes from the barrel of guns. So whoever controls the military controls the country. Mao commanded the PLA, so did Deng Xiaoping, even when they didn't hold the party's highest office or even when Deng Xiaoping didn't hold the party's highest office. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were different. Neither had the same personal authority over the military the way Mao and Deng had. But the PLA still operated under their leadership. There was no open institutional break between the party leadership and the military command before Xi Jinping. Now, let's fast forward to Xi Jinping. After years of military reforms, followed by purges, we're seeing a very different picture. And the turning point, in my view, was the downfall of Zhang Youxia, because he was not just another general. He was the senior vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. He was Xi Jinping's longtime military associate and one of the most powerful men in the PLA. He had the background, the experience and the connections that commanded respect within the PLA. And yet in January of this year, Zhang Youxia and another senior general, Liu Zhenli, were suddenly removed from their positions. under Xi Jinping's leadership. It took the party another eight months to formally announce their expulsion from the party and the military. And now think about what that means. If Xi Jinping couldn't trust Zhang Youxia, then who could he trust? And there's something else that's particularly revealing. After the September 21st official announcement, the PLA, I mean, that's when the PLA Daily published an editorial supporting the decision of the removal of the two generals, we have not heard anything from individual military services or theater commands. I have not found comparable public declarations of support from those commands. Whereas in the past, when you have a vice chairman of CMC removed, such a high-ranking military commander being removed, all service branches and theater commands have to issue a public declaration in support of the decision, but we have not seen them. And that apparent silence is very interesting. So the question is, are the commanders simply following orders and keeping their heads down? Or is there deeper resentment in the military? I believe Zhang Youxia's downfall has created enormous distrust between Xi Jinping and the PLA's senior officers. This distrust could have consequences far beyond Xi Jinping's own leadership. Because think about the succession problem. Suppose, let's suppose Xi Jinping names a successor tomorrow. Or let's suppose the Politburo, the party elders, or some combination of political forces agrees on a new party chief. Fine. But will the PLA accept that person? Will the generals follow orders from a new leader who they feel has no personal authority over them? And what happens if different military commanders support different political factions? Choosing Xi Jinping's successor is one thing. Making sure the military accepts that successor is an entirely different challenge. And there's another problem, and this one involves Taiwan. Now, for years, Xi Jinping has made national reunification with Taiwan a central justification for his third term and now possibly a fourth. He has effectively promised the party that he will accomplish the historic mission of reunifying China under his leadership. But look at what he's done to the military. After years of purges, the PLA's senior command has been severely disrupted, destroyed. So that's Xi Jinping's catch-22 situation. He needs Taiwan to justify his continued rule. But his own military purges have undermined his ability to achieve that goal. And if reunification is no longer a realistic near-term objective, how does he justify a fourth term? In fact, the PLA leadership could simply tell Xi Jinping, we're not in a position to fight a major war right now. The military needs time, a long period of time to recover from the purges. And just like that, Xi Jinping's most important justification for starting or for staying in power could be taken off the table. Think about the irony. Xi has spent years purging the military to strengthen his control. But those very purges now gives the military a reason to resist his Taiwan ambitions. So what happens? And here's the question. What happens when the party issues orders and the man holding the guns no longer fully trusts the people giving the orders? And for a regime whose survival ultimately depends on the loyalty of its armed forces, that's an extraordinary vulnerability. This has never happened in the Soviet Union. This has never happened before Xi Jinping in communist China, but it is happening now. All right, so Beijing faces two problems at once. It doesn't have a reliable mechanism for choosing a successor after Xi Jinping. And even if it does choose one, there's no guarantee that the new leader can command the military's unquestioned loyalty. The party may be able to appoint a successor, but can it make the generals obey him? And so that's what makes this succession crisis so dangerous. Okay, so I covered the first two reasons why this is a major crisis. Now the third. The third one is related to his health. I have said over and over that Xi Jinping's health is a state secret. Even discussing his physical condition is a taboo in China. There has or there have always been rumors and rumors were all we heard, all we have heard. But recently something has changed. Major Western media outlets are supporting details that Beijing would normally go to extraordinary length to conceal. October 2nd, the Wall Street Journal published a piece about unusual arrangements made for Xi Jinping during his White House visit. The Chinese delegation requested a private room inside the West Wing where Xi could rest between engagements. A planned working lunch with President Trump was canceled. On the main day of the summit, Xi Jinping had roughly five hours without scheduled engagements. And then walking, standing, and the duration of activities reportedly became important considerations in planning his schedule. In other words, this wasn't simply a matter of canceling one lunch. The entire schedule was adjusted around Xi Jinping's need for rest. The journal also reported that the private room in the West Wing was so restricted that even Cai Qi, she's chief of staff and one of his closest political allies, wasn't allowed inside. Only his wife could accompany him. Now think about that. That's an extraordinary level of detail. And it raised the question, who leaked this information to the journal? Have you ever thought about that? The White House? American officials? that's probably what most people would assume but i'm not so sure why would trump's team want to embarrass Xi immediately after a carefully choreographed state visit why undermine the political pageantry by exposing Xi's physical limitations the white house doesn't gain anything you know other than i mean it's not it's what psychological satisfaction it no it doesn't it doesn't have to be that way. I'm not saying that the information couldn't have come from American officials, but I think we should consider another possibility. What if the information came from the Chinese side, especially when the name Cai Qi is mentioned? More specifically, what if someone inside the Chinese political establishment wanted this information to become public? Xi's political opponents could certainly have a reason, Because in the middle of a succession crisis, questions about the leader's health are not merely medical questions. They become political weapons. And look at the timing. The report appeared just weeks before the party's fifth plenum when questions about the party's future leadership could become particularly sensitive. What better way to challenge his continued rule than to raise doubts about whether he's physically capable of remaining in power? Now, here's something else that happened after the journalist piece. And this one came from the Financial Times. October the 6th, the Financial Times reported that Beijing was proposing some highly unusual changes to the upcoming APEC summit in Shenzhen in November. Beijing wanted to move a key ministerial meeting online instead of holding it in person. It also proposed canceling the traditional leaders retreat, which is probably the most interesting and important part of the summit to world leaders when they meet informally behind closed doors. And they also want to limit or reduce the leaders program to just one formal plenary session and a dinner. And then this is very shocking because this is the first time in 12 years that China is hosting APEC. And think about the international environment. China is facing enormous economic pressure and increasingly difficult relationships with the rest of the world, Japan, the U.S., and it desperately needs opportunities to showcase its global leadership, economic strength, and technological achievements. And APEC is the perfect stage. You have world leaders, 21 of them. You have international press. So why would Beijing voluntarily scale back such an important international event, especially the leaders' retreat? That's where some of the most important diplomatic conversations take place. Now, coming just days after the Wall Street Journal's revelation about Xi Jinping's health or his particular concerns in Washington, the Financial Times piece raises another possibility. What if the two reports are somehow connected? What if Beijing is trying to reduce the physical demands on Xi Jinping? Or could the scale back summit reflect something more political? And now let me give you another possibility. What if Xi Jinping's health is becoming the political justification for a leadership transition? I'm not saying Xi Jinping is necessarily gravely ill, but his medical condition may not even be the most important factor here. What matters politically is whether his health can be used as a reason for him to step aside. Think about the dilemma I mentioned in the beginning. Xi Jinping's opponents may want him gone, but they cannot easily remove him without undermining the party itself. So how do they solve the problem? Health could provide a political exit. So instead of accusing Xi Jinping of disastrous policies and grave mistakes, the party can simply say that after years of service, Xi Jinping has decided to step back for health reasons. And the party wouldn't have to repudiate its own leader. If that's the scenario being considered, then the recent media reports could be doing something very important. They could be preparing public opinion, testing how people respond to the possibility of a China without Xi Jinping at the top. Thank you so much for watching. If you're new here, please hit subscribe. Don't forget to give my video a like. If you want me to answer your questions directly, please join my live every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday at 9 p.m. Eastern Time. I'd love to chat with you there.