International legal subjecthood

Global Affairs Academy
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2 Video Views·Oct 7, 2026
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis session introduces the concept of legal subjecthood within international law, explaining how rights and duties are allocated. It emphasizes that while the modern legal landscape includes a diverse array of actors, states remain the primary subjects whose consent is the fundamental prerequisite for the creation of international legal obligations.
Hi, and welcome back. In this session, we will cover the absolutely fascinating subject of,
well, the subjects of international law. The book covers a lot of ground talking about many
different actors. So what I want to do in this first video is take a step back and talk about
legal subjecthood as a general concept and what it entails. We will then move on to talk about
statehood. So what gives rise, what are the criteria determining statehood. And in the
third and last clip, I want to zoom in on one topic that is not discussed as much in the textbook,
which is the question of self-determination and the adjacent question of the rights of peoples.
As you know, in this first part of the course, we are taking a doctrinal, a positivist approach
to understanding the general principles that govern international law. So within such a legal
system, what gives rise to legal certainty? What gives us an answer to the question, what is legal
and what is illegal? Even if, as we have seen before, question is sometimes more difficult and
actually a matter of interpretation. Within such a framework, the question of legal subjecthood
or legal personality is an absolutely central one. We can think of any legal system, including
international law, as basically a framework that allocates two various legal subjects on the one
hand, rights, and on the other hand, duties. For instance, if I buy a car and become the owner of a car,
I obtain various rights. I obtain the right to drive the car, I obtain the right to lend it to a
friend, I can also smash it if I like. On the other hand, I also accrue various duties. Most notably,
I have to pay, of course, for the car, but I also have to register it, pay taxation on it. I also have
to obey traffic rules and not drive into another car. This may be a relatively straightforward
example, but in a way it works in a similar manner also in other legal spheres, including
international law. The important thing to realize here is that if we want to understand what the
rights and duties are, we first need to understand who the eligible legal subjects are who can
effectively hold these rights and duties. To stay with our example for a moment, if you're a child,
if you're a minor under 18, you will not be able to drive a car. You will also not be able to make
such a big purchase, which already takes you out of the running to be a legal subject and engage
in such acts. While all of this holds true in general, also for international law, things are a
bit more complicated because, of course, as we have seen, there is no single authority to decide
in this particular case who a legal subject is. The main complication that arises from this
will be discussed in a second video and pertains actually to this question of statehood and how we
recognize, how we determine statehood in the international legal system, which is mostly
through the recognition of other states. For now, however, it is important to note, and I would even
argue that this is the most important lesson to take away from this session, that states are the
primary subjects of international law. Sometimes also referred to as the masters of the treaty,
it is the consent of states which is absolutely crucial and absolute prerequisite for any kind
of international legal obligation to come about. From a narrow traditionalist standpoint, one might
even argue that states are the only real subjects of international law, because other actors,
other subjects, completely depend on states and their consent to obtain any right and any duty.
Without state consent, other actors would be altogether irrelevant within the international
legal system. One of the actors that was recognized quite early on were international organizations,
and the chapter dedicates quite a bit of space to discussing various international organizations,
their setup, their powers, and I cannot summarize all of this here. What is important to remember
is that, as already said, these international organizations depend on states and the powers
that they delegate to them for their personality, for the international legal subjecthood. Without
specific powers that have been put down in a constituent treaty, international organizations
will not be able to operate, and they are in fact limited to the powers that either explicitly or
in a sort of implied way were given to them in these international instruments. But despite this
theoretically subordinate role, international organizations are absolutely vital to the
functioning, to the everyday functioning of international law. Think of international
organizations such as the United Nations, which has various branches, the European Union, or the OPCW,
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or the IMF. All these organizations can
and will do a lot with the powers that have been allocated to them, and can in many cases put
considerable pressure on states to behave, to conduct themselves in a certain way. The main reason
for this practically elevated role of international organizations, and this is a bit of a recap from
the last session, is that states usually have a hard time amending and changing, in particular,
multilateral treaties. So, international organizations feel quite comfortable, quite secure
with these constitutive instruments, and will be able to rely on the powers that have been given to
them to then act in an effective way. The narrow traditionalist point of view that only focuses on
states and international organizations has come under quite some pressure in recent years, and I
would even say has been replaced by the more expanded view that, as you will see here on the
screen, includes many more actors. Consider, for example, individuals who, under international human
rights law, have specific rights. They can invoke them before domestic, but also before international
courts, and they also have duties, for instance, on international criminal law, not to engage in
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, that we will discuss in a few weeks down the road. Or think,
for example, of NGOs, non-governmental organizations, who in various international organizations, such as
the UN, can obtain observer status, can officially consult and support states in negotiations, for
example, of treaties, can submit reports, but who also hold rights under international human rights law,
for example, when it comes to the freedom of expression and their freedom to publish a report
that, for example, is critical of a government. Corporations also have rights under international
law, and specifically under international investment law, which they can also invoke
vis-a-vis their hosting state before world bank international dispute settlement mechanisms.
Finally, and I'll address this in much greater detail in the last clip, there are also peoples
who also hold specific rights, most notably the right to self-determination, though how this is
then realized is another matter. Long story short, in various fields of international law, various
subjects that are not states and that are not international organizations hold specific rights
and specific duties, and are therefore logically also international subjects. However, states can,
in principle, give and take away these rights, and they therefore remain the primary subjects of
international law, so it is important to make this distinction, even though by now the expanded and
more complex viewpoint is arguably the more applicable one. This concludes the first video,
I now invite you to have a look at the second one, in which we zoom in on states,
and in particular on the question of statehood.
