William Burke-White examines how rising powers are reshaping the international legal system

Global Affairs Academy
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2 Video Views·Oct 7, 2026
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Hi, I'm Bill Burkwhite.
I'm a professor of law and deputy dean
for international programs here at Penn Law School.
I've just finished a major research project
that I'm likely next to turn into a book
on the impact of rising powers like India, China, Brazil,
and Russia on the international legal system.
And the international legal system as we know it
has really been constructed by the United States and Europe
in the aftermath of World War II and for the 50 years
subsequently.
And in the last 5 to 10 years, we've
seen an extraordinary transformation
of international politics and economics
with the rise of the so-called BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India,
and China.
And in this paper, I try to understand and examine
how those shifts in global power are
going to translate to changes in the international legal system.
And fundamentally, I argue that we
are seeing tension points emerge in three places
in international law.
One is about notions of sovereignty.
The United States and Europe have
had a relatively permeable vision of sovereignty.
In other words, it was OK for one country,
say the United States, to intervene in Iraq or perhaps
Syria or elsewhere.
Rising powers like Russia and China
have a much stronger vision of sovereignty
and that sovereignty matters much more.
And I argue in this paper that sovereignty
is likely to ratchet back toward a more absolutist vision
of what sovereignty means.
A second one of these tension points
is around legitimacy.
The United States and Europe, as they've
constructed the international legal system,
have largely defined legitimacy to be about outcomes.
If the institution works, it's legitimate.
If the process gets you the objective you need,
it's legitimate.
Countries like India and Brazil, in part
because of their colonial legacies,
are much more skeptical about that kind of legitimacy
and define legitimacy much more based
on which countries are at the table and who participates.
Finally, I argue that we're going
to see tensions around the understanding
of economic development.
The Washington Consensus, a kind of liberal model
of development inherent in much of international law,
is about keeping the state out of the economy.
And international law and trade and investment
has been about trying to push the state out of the economy.
China, Russia, Brazil, and even India
have much more state-centric visions of economic development.
And we're already starting to see changes
in the trade and investment law that
create more space for the state to be involved in the economy.
And so I contend that international law
is changing in ways that the United States may not always
like, but that, in fact, the United States may actually
be able to benefit from a legal system that's
somewhat more indeterminate, in which there are smaller
groupings of states that work together separately sometimes
and could gather in other times in kinds of coalitions
of the willing as law changes around these three tension
points of sovereignty, legitimacy,
and economic development.
