Herodotus’ account of the Persian wars is full of bumbling, indecision, and selfishness. Yet in modern discussions of the Persian Wars, the concept of professionalism comes up again and again. To some scholars, the Spartans are stand-ins for heroic Latin Christians facing down natives and orientals, while to another group of writers, the Persians are a mighty imperial war machine prepared to roll over the free cities of Greece. Recent research has showed that this picture of the Spartan army is hard to reconcile with the evidence, especially the evidence before Thucydides and Xenophon. There has been less discussion of why researchers compare the Persians to these later armies, and whether this analogy is useful.
In this talk, I will show that while Xerxes’ armies had an impressive range of capabilities, these capabilities did not come from anything like the European armies of the 19th and 20th centuries (or from something exactly the same as the army of the Roman emperors). The discourse about professionalism comes from the politics of the Atlantic world in the 19th and 20th centuries, and from the use of the Persian Wars in political rhetoric. If we see Achaemenid armies as part of the Achaemenid world, and not as stand-ins for our own armies or enemies, we can understand them better. But we can also understand armies better, and the many different ways in which societies build and maintain military capabilities.
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This discussion challenges the projection of modern military professionalism onto the Persian Wars. By analyzing Herodotus and cuneiform archives, the speaker argues that both Greek and Persian forces were characterized by amateurism and social obligation rather than bureaucratic military science, relying on imperial administration and social traditions to project power.
So, thanks for all the talks at this stimulating conference and all the back and forth discussion,
as well as to Natasha and all the people in the background who've been putting this event
together. Of course, the actual conference days have a lot of organizing behind the scenes even
in this plague time. One of the interesting things about the Persian Wars, of course,
is that they bring together a careful and methodical scholarship, taking advantage of
the riches of sources like Herodotus or the Greek and Persian seals. But they also bring together a
lot of imagination and loose language and other things that are coming from somewhere different.
So, when I was looking for a paper, I decided to go through one of these ideas that seems a little
bit extravagant and see if there's maybe some kernel of value of why people keep turning to it.
And that is the sort of paradox that very many readers of Herodotus have noticed that his
Greeks seem unsure about what to do about Xerxes' invasion. So, it's not just that many of them
flee or submit to the invaders, but that also the ones who do resist are hesitating, they try
different things, they change their minds. So, they consider defending Tempe past and
then they retreat. They aren't sure whether to stay on Salamis or sail away. And, of course,
at Plataea, they march back before they struggle to counter the Persian attacks on their sources
of food and water. Herodotus' schemes include stories of Persian blunders and selfishness, too.
Xerxes ignores fearsome omens and the wise advice of Demeritus, who has to be freed in disgrace.
His Artemisia deliberately rams the friendly ship and is rewarded by the king. And after
brushing over the Persian sack of city after city in Ionia, he devotes two whole sections
to lovingly describing how Artebas has failed to conquer Plataea. That's Herodotus 8, 128, 129.
So, given this, it's sort of surprising that when people retell the story of the Persian wars,
they often invoke the idea of professionalism and then make analogies with European armies
in the 19th and 20th centuries. As recently as 2004, Barry Sprouse at Cordell called the Spartans
at Demopulae the most efficient killing machine in the world, or in the world history, who wielded
Greek military science mode against Persian blundering. And it's equally surprising this
idea of professionalism to be applied for both sides, depending on who was telling the story.
So, to Arthur Farrell in the 1980s, Englishmen were much more like what Alexander or Wellington
had than the Greek armies were. And during the Cold War, writers such as Peter Green often
hinted that Circassian men were really the fierce red army waiting to roll over their
western neighbors. So, people who use this kind of language agree that one side should be the
organized professional army, but they can't agree on which side that is. So, today I will talk about
why scholars make these comparisons, how it came that armies were related to the
ancient society, how else you might think about the differences between the ancient armies.
Well, it seems to me there's two main reasons this kind of language comes up. One is to do
with identity, and the other is to do with the idea of who has authority to write military history.
So, sometimes the invocations of professionalism reflect who the writer identifies with.
Because the Persian wars have been appropriated so many times,
they can serve as powerful symbols and metaphors. So, if a writer identifies with the Greeks,
it's tempting to assimilate the Greeks with their own army, with other armies that they admire.
And militaries, paramilitaries, and wannabes often fetishize the Spartans because of all
the early Greek armies they seem the most like a modern army. But on the other hand,
if you identify against the Persian, you just want to present them as powerful and menacing
to bring up the tension of your narrative. It's tempting to assimilate them with
armies that you or your audience are frightened of or see as powerful.
So, books about the Persian wars often use language and arguments which would not normally
be acceptable in a scholarly publication if the authors are scholarly. Other times,
the invocation of professionalism reflects ideas about who has the authority to write military
history. In the 19th and 20th century, the writing of ancient military history was strongly influenced
by staff colleges and military academies. Rohl has argued there was a fierce controversy in
imperial Germany about whether academics had any authority to write about military matters,
whether they should leave that to the army. This was reinforced when so many future academics
were conscripted into the two world wars and when, after the Second World War, English-speaking
academia turned away from military matters. And authors tended to see the kind of military they
would train to command, a military led by a specially educated and bureaucratic elite.
That's the ideal. Now, the modern military analogies also offer escapes from some of the
other problems. The lack of sources to prevent the Battle of Plataea and the inability to be
sure which bits of the ancient sources to believe in. And if you want to know how much room the
Persian camp would have needed if it had 300,000 men in it or how far part of the Greek army could
have marched in a night, why not ask a soldier or use data from recent army use? Everybody here has
read the papers by Whatley and Maurice which were inspired by their experiences during and after the
First World War. There's another interesting paper on logistics by Bayerischer General von Fischer
from 1932, where Maurice estimated the largest possible army which could cross the Hellespont
on that bridge of boats. Von Fischer was frank here that considering the narrative as a whole
and the route as a whole, he had trouble believing an army of more than 40,000 Persians. Now,
before this audience, I hardly need to say that the early Greek armies were aggressively
amateurish. This is one of the few things that the California school and the French families
schools could agree on. So the Western way of war contains some extravagant language about
ordered squares and deliberate drills, but also has chapters berating earlier scholars for trying
to make the ancient Greeks into too much like professional soldiers and trade generals.
And Thucydides and Xenophon Spartans do behave more like modern European soldiers,
but Herodotus and Plato's Spartans don't fight exactly the same way. And of course, in past
decades, scholars, especially in the UK, have questioned how many of these famous Spartan
institutions were traced back before Immaculate. And even Xenophon Spartans are still part of the
aristocratic amateurism. They were just more willing to accept orders and to train
than, for example, Athenians were. So while it's disconcerting that scholars occasionally present
Herodotus' Spartans as Ptolemiacans and Punic, I think the best way of understanding this is more
a statement of sympathy and identity than some kind of careful scholarly conclusion that deserves
careful scholarly response. But for the Persian side, Persian armies haven't been so well
intensely studied, and the sources have not been accessible until a few decades ago. So now that
I've set the stage, I'd like to turn to where Xerxes' armies came from and how they learned
their skills. In the period up to 480, we know the most about the Caymanid armies in the heartland of
the empire. Partly this is because of the famous monuments from Persepolis and Susa, but mainly
this is because of the so-called end of archives in 484 BC. In 484 BC, many families and temples
in southern Babylon had put away their archives and had not been touched in the game. Carolyn
Weir-Zegers has argued this was probably because these families and temples camped in their vaults
And so because of this, we have a great deal of everyday
documents and texts, even some letters from Nabonidus up to the early years of Xerxes.
But we don't have corresponding records from the city governors, satraps, or kings,
because they weren't implicated in their vaults, and they probably kept more of their records
on skin-wrapped papyrus that don't survive in the ground so well. So even in this period where we
have these wonderful documentary sources, we have to keep in mind that we have what was written down
on clay and what was deposited in these archives that were put away. If we had something similar
to the Persepolis archives that dealt with military matters, we might have a different perspective.
But from these documents in Babylonia, we can see that crofty owners such as individuals or temples
were obliged to provide armed soldiers for the king. They were divided into bowmen, horsemen,
and chariot teams. Often individuals were organized into groups to simplify the administration.
Citizens were often part of daiquiris and fifties. After the end of archives, we hear a lot about
groups called hatru or hadru in Babylonia. These were often named after professions. They lived
close together, often in the countryside, and many of them were ethnic minorities such as
Judeans or descendants of Judeans. Matthew Stolper has written a book on these that many of you will
be familiar with. The Cuneiform texts also mention that lists of men liable to serve inside a hatru
were that the men actually serving on behalf of them were kept on writing boards, so wax tablets.
We're dealing with a part of the written record, even though what we have is so
extravagant. Individuals who did not want to serve had alternatives. In this and other
periods of Mesopotamian history, men who did not want to be called up could either find a substitute
to serve for them, or they could pay a commutation payment, so they came to hire a substitute.
The famous contract between Galiyama and the Murashu family specifies that Galiyama will be
recorded on this list as his substitute by the scribe of his hatru. Xenophon confirms that this
was also practiced on the western fringes of the empire, or at least hints of that,
when he has Agisileus promise that rich Ionians will not be conscripted if they can find a
substitute, and find a substitute of a horse and military equipment to serve instead. So orthodox
Mesopotamian thinking, just like Greek thinking, was that every free man was a soldier, but in
practice quite a few men had other priorities. I find one detail in Babylonia especially striking.
In Babylonia, soldiers were responsible for bringing a substantial amount of silver to pay
for provision, so-called moinger. They didn't have to just bring food themselves, because a Persian
campaign could last a lot longer than three days, so you couldn't just carry a sack of barley and
onions with you. Galiyama asked for one pound of silver when he was going to be a substitute,
aside from his horse and armor. Substitutes had to be paid a salary and moingering by their
sponsors. The wages in the long 6th century BC were often quite high, up to 10 shekels a month,
which is the highest monthly wage that we see in Babylon in this period. By weight,
that would be about 20 drachmas a month, but silver was worth a bit more in Babylonia than
the Aegean, so it's hard to make an exact equivalent. Both the Romans and the Athenians
remembered that being important when they started paying their soldiers, not just expecting them to
serve at their own expense. Margaret Miller has imagined how lining up to receive ration
is precisely reflecting one's relationship with the king or the satrap,
might have worked psychologically. But on the same note, there's a difference between receiving the
king's salt and buying the king's salt with your own money, even if in theory the land
that your money comes from was granted by the king or the king's father.
Now, because so few royalists had traveled texts about soldiers surviving, we know less about
standing forces. We know the best through the Greek and Roman authors such as Xenophon.
Powerful people in Mesopotamia had long maintained large households,
such as the 3600 people who Sargon of Akhad boasted of feeding, and it seems plausible that ethnic
Persians were especially likely to be conscripted. On the other hand, Xenophon equates the Persians
undergoing the special Persian education with the Spartan peers. Greeks are often vague about
differences between Persians, the whole nation, and Persians, the aristocracy, the ethnoclass
dominant, as Pierre Briont called it. So as far as we can tell, an early encampment army consisted
of landowners with enough property that they did not need to work the land for their employees
and dependents. The temples had dependent workers who they sent to do their military obligations.
And smaller standing forces of bodyguards, salaried foreigners, and so on. There were signs
of over time and after 484, the Persians tried to convert more kinds of service to cash payments
rather than giving people the choice of serving themselves or finding a substitute or paying cash.
And the army that we see was very socially and ethnically diverse. So for example,
later in the 5th century at Elephantine on the upper Nile, we see a garrison of Arameans and
Judeans, a kind of military caldi, but their commanders often have Iranian or Babylonian names.
So one key difference I see between the encampment army and the army that's often compared to
is that the encampment army was not an institution as far as I can tell.
It was more like a bucket of beads which kings or sacrabs could choose from when they need to
put an army together. And so the imperial Roman army had standardized paths of motion and ways
of exchanging soldiers between units. The encampment army did not. The Roman army was governed by
special laws such as the Augustan marriage ban. I have trouble thinking of anything similar in
the encampment world. Being a member of a Batavian cohort was distinct from being a Batavian
from a particular village, but being a Jew or Aramean of Cyene was probably not so distinct
from being a resident of this village in this community. The closest thing to a standard
organization I can think of is like in the Roman cohorts in the region, or hence the units were
organized in tens, hundreds, and thousands. And because the encampment army was not an institution,
it doesn't often appear as a political actor separate from the population, the classes it was
drawn from. Now because of the lack of narratives and military manuals, it's hard to talk about
how the famous soldiers learned to trade. We have the famous passages on Persian education
and mandatory military service in Broaddus, the Cairo Paideia, and Sprebo. So in Babylonia,
humble temple dependents were issued with bows and arrows. So the tradition of training an archer must
have been quite widespread socially. These were not wealthy people, they were
probably only partly, they were obliged to work for the temple. They weren't kind of the
relatively wealthy people seen to be archers in the Greek world.
And in the Greek Roman world, archers and horsemen tend to be seen as especially difficult to train,
whereas it was thought that you can make a useful spearman relatively quickly. There wasn't
very much training for that. And the hatchery in Babylonia and the banners in Egypt
exist in peacetime, so it seems plausible that there was some kind of peacetime training.
Certainly Egyptian and Neo-Assyrian art often shows organized groups of troops
moving across the battlefield together, and that's much harder to find in art from the Aegean.
And Herodotus 959 also describes Mardonius' men raising the standards to signal the final
advance of the Paideia. And there's famously no evidence for any kind of battle standards
or visible signals like that in the Greek world until the campaigns of Alexander.
Of course, in the 100 years after the events I'm describing,
Xenophon in the Anabasis famously describes how orderly and quiet the
arctic turquoise men were at the Battle of Cunexa. He doesn't say they fought very well,
but he has to admit they were very orderly and quiet in the event. So I'd argue that
senior commanders and administrators probably learned their trade through family traditions,
apprenticeship, experience organizing other large projects, and independent study.
Greek writers tell us stories about aristocratic Greeks at Persian courts,
such as Alcibiades or Phalanus. Presumably these were just some of the experts that
wealthy Persians might hire to learn from or to educate their children or educate their households
in different matters, including warfare. So basic training in the use of weapons was
probably embedded in everyday life and childhood education,
much like the Persian troops trained at Cunex. Again, we do have the suggestion about the Persian
education, whoever that applied to. And I think one other key difference here is that we have
armies that have skills but not credentials. Because the general staff that emerged in the
Napoleonic War in 1914 claimed that through their special education and their professional
skills, only they had the skills to wage war effectively. And they used this to seize control
over the operational level of war from traditional crowd of aristocrats and favorites and hangers-on
to a traditionally-led European armies. And they also established themselves as a distinct center
of power with their own interests. So I can't think of an Achaemenid army which was not commanded
by an aristocrat of some kind. The Hamdan of Rhodes, of course, had family connections to the
Pharnabazid, that was Pontine Phrygia. And the Greek generals, who get so much attention from
the classical literary source, tend to be paired with or subordinated to a Persian aristocrat.
So I think that the lack of formal education, education independent from other entities,
is another key difference between ancient armies and their own armies. One of the things which
makes a profession a profession is that it regulates itself. So we let doctors and engineers
do things that other people can't do because they impose certain standards of professionalism,
education, and so on, on their members. Now it's hardly a new observation that equating
with the modern European army is hardly new. D. F. Lazenby, for example, made that point in his
1993 book. But thinking about these similarities and differences at least gets us to the point
that this was an imperial war on the imperial periphery. Of course, the Persians were the imperial
side here. They had many capabilities which the average Greek did not. They had their army
integrated into the system. The bureaucracies were collecting and redistributing resources.
They had access to skills such as siege engineering to take cities, which early Greek cities
armies could not do. But that doesn't mean that they did it the same way as European armies in
the last 200 years. And if we think both about this imperial context and about trying to understand
how imperial armies outside of this 19th and 20th century European tradition have the capacities
they do, why other armies in the ancient world often struggled to achieve these things, and
what the advantages and disadvantages of these different systems were, I think we might come
closer to understanding the Persian side of the story as something of interest in its own right
and not just as a stand-in for other struggles. I think I've come to the end of my time,
so thank you and I hope we have discussion after this. Thank you, Sean. That was really a great
overview of the mechanics of how we can extract information about the economic and social elements
that contribute to the making up of the Persian army and whether we can consider professional or
on the basis of our definition of professional. That was very, very helpful and a great overview.
Do we have any questions? John has his hand up. Yes. Sean, thank you for that talk, which I really
enjoyed and, you know, it really builds on the topics that you explore in your book. I know
there were limits of time for the talk itself, but I was wondering if you could say a little bit more
about your thoughts on the comparison between the Neo-Assyrian military system and the Achaemenid
one. I found this one of the strengths of your book in looking at the Assyrian army as a sort
of model through which we can try to understand Persian military dynamics. Yes. Thanks for the
let's say, but I do think it's the context we should maybe set things in more. One interesting
difference I see is that the Assyrians make a big deal about incorporating people into the land of
Assyria, and if you're Assyrian, you have special military obligations, which the other nations
under Assyrian hegemony don't have. So for the Assyrians, it's important to not just deport people,
but to make them part of the land of Assyria because then they have a military obligation.
And again, some views of the Persian army focus on the, you know, the Western Iranian or the
Afghans, but at least in the documents we have in the game, keeping in mind that we don't have
the royalist geographical records, we seem to see that they're eagerly drawing on all kinds of
communities and ethnic groups in their empire. Siege warfare, for example, is I think another
good example, because we can see that at least the early Achaemenids could very much keep up this
old Near Eastern tradition of the sieging cities, putting a mound against the wall and advancing
battering rams and probably siege towers up against it that we see so beautifully in the
Neo-Assyrian sculptures. And that was, I mean, that was a very, an issue that the early Greek
armies struggled with, because they quite liked the idea of talking to their neighbors and forcing
them into larger political units, but they had trouble with what seemed to us
from our armchairs, that's not particularly sophisticated devices, that seemed so difficult
to build a siege mound and push a battering ram up it, but it seems like it was more difficult
in practice than it seems. And if we try to think about how maybe how this knowledge of siege warfare
was transmitted in the ancient Near East, before we have all these Greek engineering manuals that
name the Greek aristocratic engineers, that might help us think about the transmission of knowledge
and the skills. Scarlet, did you have a... Yes, thank you. And thank you for your paper,
Sean. Your paper really made me go back to Herodotus and think about a motif that
Chris Pelling has identified as operative at Plataea, and this is the motif of cosmos or
order in line with professionalism. He talks about this in his new book, Herodotus and the Question
Why. So Ardonius is amazed at the lack of order among the Lacedaemonians, they keep changing
their wings. And then he finally leads the Persians after all these days of delay against
the Greeks. And at this point, his foreign armaments, they break into a run. And he says
that it's a run with no order. When the Persians have to retreat, it's a retreat which happens with
no order. And Herodotus talks about the problem of the Persians being anoploi, which of course,
I would be interested, Meg, to hear what you thought about that. So I'm wondering how your
research can help us to think about what Herodotus is saying about the Battle of Plataea and how
there's a lack of professionalism in the Persian armament that he identifies.
Yeah, I think that's a very good and interesting point, because I think our focus on
what we think of as order and discipline comes out of one military contact, but trying to figure
out what it might have meant to a man from Hylacarnassus in the 5th century BC
might tell us some interesting things. And of course, there's also the Homeric illusions,
where a few times the Iliad wants us to know that the Trojans advanced like a disorderly
flock of birds, making all kinds of different noises, whereas the Achaeans were orderly.
Yeah, that's a really good point. And you're right, Cosmos is constantly being referred to
in Homeric, well, in particular in the Iliad, as an attribute of good leaders. That's what
good leaders do, which sort of speaks very negatively to Mardonius.
And then speaking to John Hyland's point, there's also all this Neo-Assyrian
language and rhetoric and self-justification about going to war and preserving order and
punishing treaty breakers and so on, which sometimes gets left out of the Cayman studies,
which can be done from a more Zoroastrian or Iranian-centered perspective.
And of course, the Persians seem to draw on both Iranian and Elamite traditions,
and they're also taking over these established empires to their west.
So I think there's also some room to place some of these things like trying to restore order
and punish oath breakers in maybe a broader Near Eastern context,
and not just exclusively an Iranian or Zoroastrian context.
Yeah, thank you. What strikes me as interesting about his
depiction of Plataea is the way that there are almost two armies. There's the Persian army,
and they fight with braveness and courage, and they're in no way inferior. But then there's
the rest of the army, which is something totally different from the Persians, right?
Yeah. And that's also something we see elsewhere in Greek historiography, too.
The battle wasn't outside of, I think, Miletus in the Anabasis, where Xenophon wants us to know
that some of the Greek contingents were preparing for battle in a nice, quietly and orderly way,
while others were dropping their spears and looking for somewhere to hide until it was over.
I realize we're now into our special general discussion time, but let's not
worry about that and ask Paul to ask a question or raise your point.
So my question was, I think that there's very little drill that was being done amongst
hoplites, formal drills, considered like early modern drills. And my question is,
what do we see amongst the Persians when we're considering things like larger units? Is there
any sort of drill? Like with the Greeks, obviously there's a lot of dancing that I
think is the bottom-up way you coordinate groups. Is there anything like this amongst
the Persians? Are there formal parades? What are the things where men would move together?
That's a good question because, of course, recently several different people have pointed
out that maybe things in the Greek world such as choral dances might have been the thing they did
to get experienced movement together in time, as William McNeill did. That maybe square bashing
isn't the only way of giving this kind of physicality, at least to the level which is
necessary for using spears and shields, not muskets and Martini-Henrys. There's that interesting
instruction text for the royal bodyguards which describes the royal bodyguards practicing
moving together when they're outside in front of the king's court for these judge-in-law cases,
and then when the king's about to ride through the countryside and it's part of a procession
with guards in front of him to keep stray animals out of the way and so on.
And like I said, I think it's striking to me that, for example, in New Kingdom Egyptian art,
there's all these pictures of groups of four or so Egyptian infantry moving together through the
chaos of the battle side to side. And speaking of this, the chaos and the cosmos idea too,
again, for this New Kingdom art, for this also Neo-Syrian art, they like to show chaos and
bodies screwed everywhere and bodies running every way, and then their own troops in some
kind of organized collective action. For this Assyrian art, I think the most realistic portrayal
of what Assyrians look like in combat is actually on that lion hunt. So that's maybe something.
Yeah, and there's those pictures of Assyrian troops going through forests or swamps side by
side in rows of spearmen that kind of recall some of the Herodotus' rhetoric about the Persian army
searching islands like a net of fish. So since we don't have military manuals from the first
millennium from the Near East, it's difficult. I mean, the closest thing, I suppose, is the book
of Maccabees. I suspect that there was some kind of practice in collective moving. And
there's also, we hear about the Persian troops calling the armies together at specific points.
So Galileo had to go to Uruk as part of a larger army. There's actually a lot of
tabloids which talk about this calling together troops in Babylonia at Uruk under Darius II.
But then there's also the bit in Xenophon's Economy and the Charapideia about the
Persian king's troops being inspected every year. And it would make sense that there was some kind of
training at these occasions. So I would, again, I suspect that there is some kind
of collective training in the background that we just don't hear about because our sources
aren't really interested in, especially what ordinary barbarians are doing.
You know, the Greek literary tradition will tell us about aristocrats like
but they aren't really interested in the ordinary soldiers.
Yeah, well, thank you. Christopher, did you?
Yeah, well, various things have gone through my mind. I mean, the essential problem about
getting grip on the Achaemenid army is, it is a source one, it's a data problem.
And it's one of those problems, like many in Achaemenid history, which are all to do with
an encircling gloom into which occasionally bright beams of light shine, not necessarily
where you'd want them. So, I mean, we can say a great deal, in a sense, about the military
environment of Achaemenid Babylonia, as Sean has shown, though, at one level, it's really
a series of propositions about Babylonian taxation and economic activity, rather than
actually sources about the military environment itself. It's a meta source, if you like.
You can perhaps discern large groups of military people in the Persepolis fortification tablets,
though, opinions might differ about the degree of their military character, partly because
what you don't actually see them being is military. You see them as groups of people
moving around in certain, again, types of economic setting. What you see is the economic
spin from this, telephantany, you see the economic and social life of a bunch of people
who are actually also soldiers, but you never see them as soldiers. There are occasional similar
traces in the Bactrian Aramaic documents. What you don't see is kind of the core.
I mean, Isocrates somewhere talks about the army that goes around with the king.
I think that's as close as you ever get to a Greek source referring somehow to the core,
as you might say, professional, but at any rate, the closest thing to a standing army.
The only other thing you can put into that category is precisely those wretched immortals
we were talking about yesterday, who are at least conceived as a coherent, special body of people
of a certain size. I mean, to the point that their size is kind of reinforced by this notion
that it's always maintained at full capacity, which is kind of ideal, I suppose. They're not
a very large group, though 10,000 isn't to be sneezed at, but it's kind of ordinary.
My conception of the army is that it's a bit like what I said about Plataea. You have an Iranian
core, and in practice at Plataea, half of it ran away, because its commander sussed intelligently
the way things were going, but you have an Iranian core, and then all other sorts of stuff,
which may only come from peripheries. It may sometimes come from Babylonia. I mean,
there are documents suggesting when Darius went on an expedition to Egypt early in his reign,
people were recruited in Babylon to do that. I do not believe that they would necessarily have
been particularly militarily useful, except insofar as the people who actually went were
effectively mercenaries who were hired by other people to serve for them. I mean, that's where
professionalism would come in, but I struggle to decide what is the equivalent of the Persian
high command reckoned on such people as a crucial part of what we might loosely call a Persian army.
My suspicion is not very high, at least in the early period, but then things may very well be
rather different 150 years later. I mean, things don't remain unchanged. I mean,
one thing doesn't remain unchanged that Sean was talking about is all this stuff.
Early accumulated armies have this big reputation for building siege mounds and being almost like
Assyrians when it comes to battering their ways into cities, and after that early period,
nothing. We never hear, really, about that as a feature of Persian armies again.
That I find puzzling, but things change. Not always for the better.
Well, I guess one thing I could say is, one thing I guess I came across in this talk is that
having all these bureaucratic resources left to redistribute resources was a useful thing. I mean,
that's a big thing in the beginning, obviously, but the Athenians could do all kinds of stuff
because they had these tax revenues and these systems for administration.
And that when the Spartans, if the Peloponnesian wanted to invade Attica for more than a few weeks,
let alone go further afield or raise a navy, it was difficult because they didn't have the
fundraising resources. They had lots of soldiers, but that was only good for some things.
And again, I mean, one thing I wish I'd been able to do in my book, which one of the reviewers
rightly criticized me for, was not doing more connections to the Hellenistic period,
because then we also see a similar system, especially well documented in Egypt,
of men being granted land which they can use to support themselves when they're called up
to be in the army. We also see this diversity of the soldiers in Egypt, both in terms of their
ethnicity and in terms of their origin, and of course what these ethnic labels mean in
the Peloponnesian Empire is the whole other can of worms. So I mean, yes, I think it is a challenge
that we don't have, that to understand how well an army works, you really need sources from within
it at the kind of social level, which isn't the kind of thing that we have from the Achaemenid
world. You know, we have the Greek sources talking about that there were 10 myriads of
barbarians, and Mardonius took 12 myriads to fight the Plataea. But we don't have the, I mean,
one conscript army can be enthusiastic and reasonably effective, another conscript army
can be just biding time and looking for a place to have a nap and get through their service as
quickly as possible with all their limbs intact. So figuring out how well this system works in
practice and challenging the stories that the classical literature can love to tell us is a
challenge. Well, thank you. Yanni, should we turn to you and your question?
First of all, hi, Son. Pleasure to finally talk to you in person, so to speak, after years of
corresponding in other discussion forums. So the Greek unprofessionalism is infamous,
especially when it comes to cooperating with other armies and forming big armies. But
in a sense, they are experts in what they're doing, because they have the internal strife,
they have this war culture, they are full of military themes for centuries before the Persian
Wars. What about the Persian army that came, that invaded Greece? I mean, how much action,
especially in pitched battles, would the average Persian soldier have seen? And what experience
would the Persian commanders have? We know of the expeditions in Scythia and the insurrection in
Egypt, but still not the kind of pitched battles that they were forced to fight in Greece.
Although, I mean, you could equally say that something the size of Plataea was unprecedented
too. Whether or not you believe Herodotus' 38,500 Greek hoplites,
certainly it must have been the largest Greek army that there'd be in living memory.
And certainly that probably has something to do with the reason that the Greeks seem to be
struggling a bit to try to figure out what to do with this situation, and why they have troubles
with supply or so on. The problem is that because the Achaemenids weren't interested in producing
something like the Neo-Assyrian annals that tell you who they're fighting every year, and why the
blighters deserved it, and just how the king punished them, we don't hear about wars usually,
unless they're mentioned in the Plataean Literary Edition. And I think that Masr-e-Urach in under
July 2nd, I'd like to write an article on that at some point, just because it's one of the rare
cases where there's... It might be mentioned in Ctesias, or at least it might have been behind
some of the stories in Ctesias. There's, I think, six or ten tablets that mention
being called up this year. I think also we shouldn't exaggerate the extent of internal
peace in the Persian Empire. Of course, Benjamin Isaac, 40 years ago, pointed out that if you look
at the sources in the Roman Empire, especially sources and subjects like Babylonian Talmud,
you see quite a lot of evidence that in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire there's
a lot of small-scale violence and banditry and so on. That doesn't get noticed in our sources,
unless the emperor decides to do something about it, or at least the governor sends out a whole
legion. So presumably that's there to give... And of course there's also things like
the conflicts in Anatolia, which Xenophon tells us so much about.
I think that lack of practice with serious opponents might have something to do with
the military troubles of the Persians in later periods, but this close to the period of initially
putting the empire together, where they're still fighting out where western boundaries are exactly,
I think that's a little bit harder. Sorry I couldn't give you anything more concrete.
Given the state of our evidence, you've given us a lot. Natasha?
Thank you so much, everybody, for these three amazing talks. I think my question is very broad,
just reflecting the amount of things that I need to learn. My question was about the...
We spoke a lot about compulsion in relation to the Greek contingents in the
Achaemenid army, right? We spoke about Orchis and Macedon, etc. So do we have any better
resolution, evidence about ways of compulsion, especially beyond Herodotus? And I think what
Christopher just said, this kind of review that you gave of how Achaemenid army would work,
and especially with being the mercenaries, for me that was already very informative.
And it's also a question to everybody, including Margaret, including Meg, because I'm thinking
not only about the Greeks, but about this sort of infinite, amazing list of contingents
from Book 7. So who are all those people, in the sense, are they all mercenaries? Are they
attracted or are they compelled? Do we know anything about all of that?
And the other thing that strikes me, of course, with the Catalogue of Nations in Book 7,
is that there Herodotus wants to show off everybody individually, multi-characteristic
individual nations, but in Babylonia we see everybody's getting a bow and a spear and a
quiver of arrows, and a tunic and a mountain garment, whatever that is exactly.
So these guys are like the West Radians in Herodotus. And like others, I think that this
list of contingents probably has something to do with things like the reliefs of the throne bearers
or beliefs of nations in the Achaemenid monuments, where whatever this list came from, it tried to
show off the individuality of the different nations that the king ruled, and then maybe
actual armies are a lot less colorful. Although it would be nice to have something about, as
Christopher said, how were these troops on Elephantine armed? Were they archers? Were they
spearmen? We don't know.