Democracy, Authoritarianism and the International Legal System

Global Affairs Academy
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Oct 6, 2026
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedAmbassador Rolf Einar Fyffe examines the intersection of international law, democracy, and authoritarianism. He analyzes the shift from a traditionally neutral legal stance on internal governance toward a modern framework where regional agreements and the rule of law actively safeguard democratic values against global backsliding.
Hello, what I'd like to do in this third recording is talk about international legal method for a
while and why international law will strike you as quite a different way of doing law at first.
But I'm also going to attempt to emphasize some of the same ways or some of the ways in which
when we do international law we're still just doing law and the basic techniques we apply
are those we know from other legal courses or methodologies. So there are a couple of questions
we need to deal with first in terms of some of the difficulties we encounter in thinking about
international law as law. So in one of the further readings Hilary Charlesworth says
the sources of international law seem disconcertingly negotiable to a domestic lawyer
accompanied to a recognized hierarchy of legal sources. Doctrines of sources embody unease about
whether international law should reflect the behavior of states or a deeper system of human
values. That captures something important. International law is still to some extent
navigating between its origins as a form of natural law where one discerned the rules of
international law either from right reason, from pure deduction, or from essentially theological
reasoning about what the mind of God would dictate the rules should be. So that obviously now perhaps
has its sort of modern incarnation in values-oriented reasoning. What should international law do?
But on the other hand we have the consent-based focus of international law. States are bound by
the rules they accept and in some contexts the tension between those sort of early
origins that are still deeply embedded in international law and the modern positivist
conception that we need to focus on what states actually do. One of the areas of greatest tension
there is obviously around human rights where the law is directly attempting to embed deeper values
in a way that challenges the behavior of states. Now this isn't a human rights course but these
same questions perhaps also crop up in various aspects of the law of the sea and the fluidity
of international law. Perhaps it comes down to this first question I have on the slide.
Can we meaningfully speak of law without central enforcement? Now one of the questions here
is what do we think of as law? So if we think of law as a command backed by sovereign power
with a penalty, that's a fairly good model for criminal law. It's a very poor model for
administrative law or constitutional law. Constitutional law is not ultimately enforced
by the police. Constitutional law works because governments accept that courts may legitimately
review the exercise of their power and they cannot go against that ruling. There is no enforcement.
The ruling of the court itself is, if anything, the enforcing action. What holds constitutional
law together, at least in a democratic state, is a belief in the rule of law that the courts are
the final arbiters on the powers of a government. Also, quite apart from constitutional law analogies,
there are less than 200 states in the world. Now if you had a community of less than 200 people,
would we really expect them to have a parliamentary body, a notion of sovereignty,
an executive, a judiciary, and a police enforcement arm? That's not how small communities
governed by law work. The kind of law I'm talking about here is indigenous or tribal law. We
recognise these as systems of law without centralised enforcement. Law can be something
separate from enforcement. But we might then ask, well, what then makes the rules worth following?
What makes them binding? International lawyers sometimes call this the question of
bindingness or normativity. Other ways of talking about this are to talk about the legitimacy or
compliance pull of rules. This suggests that rules might be followed under certain conditions.
Theorists will talk about the relationship between a lawmaking process and whether the
rules are generally accepted as binding. What do I mean by that? This goes to Charlesworth's point
of the fluidity or non-hierarchical nature of international law. Just because a rule exists in
a treaty doesn't necessarily mean it's always exerting the strongest impact on actual state
behaviour. We can say that the rule is binding as a matter of law, but we might conclude that the
rule has relatively weak normativity. It's not actually in practice regarded as binding. It
lacks compliance pull. The idea here is you need rules that are respected, that states want to
follow if they are going to be binding. This draws a distinction that might be unfamiliar to us
in a domestic legal system. The same thing really happens. Just because a rule is, as it were, on
the books doesn't mean it will always be followed. If we think about that for a moment, we realise
that there are similar things in domestic law. The point it makes here is the campaign for getting a
rule recognised as a truly binding norm of international law often only begins with something
like a treaty-making process. There's a further amount of work to be done for it to be internalised
into the international legal system. One way of thinking about that is that rules work best when
they become internalised by the people who are in charge of carrying them out. One answer as to where
the compliance pull of rules comes from or their effectiveness is that rules of international law
work when they've become part of the habits of foreign legal services and government departments
that deal with international affairs. I've covered the point I wanted to already, but just on the
doctrine of sources and compliance, the main point I wanted to make here is that you might think that
treaties are a superior form of law to custom. They are not necessarily. They will be clearer
because they've been reduced to writing. As a general matter of interpretation, when you have
two rules that appear to be in conflict, the more specific rule will prevail over the more general
rule. Normally, treaty rules will be more specific than customary rules. Treaties will often
pre-empt custom when we're solving a problem, but not always. You can have very generally worded
treaty obligations and very specific customary norms. At the end of the day, this lack of
hierarchy of sources means we have a lot of rules to navigate and we have to think about how they're
going to work in a particular context. The other question I wanted to touch on here is
the extent to which the way we do international law in practice looks like the way it's described
in textbooks. I'll move to the last idea on this slide, which is the idea of soft law. This is
unfamiliar usually to Australian law students, although if you've studied EU law, it probably
has some familiarity. Soft law is what you get when you ask lawyers to draft,
for example, guidance documents. You'll wind up with things that look a lot like a legal text.
They might have numbered paragraphs. They might be drafted in a way that looks very much like
a statute or a treaty. They may use legal language and legal terminology, but they are not strictly
intended to be binding. These nonetheless can have some significance in international law.
They may provide guidance as to how more general rules are to be carried out and they may be
evidence that, as it were, there is an idea loose in the legal system which may be on its way
to becoming a rule of custom or treaty. In practice, if something intended as
a flexible guidance instrument or policy, something that's been framed as soft law,
is followed, then it may be as effective as a rule of treaty or custom anyway. This is just
to make the point that we will very often be using non-binding instruments alongside things
that have the formal status of law. We might ask then if this non-binding instrument nonetheless
indicates something about the party's belief as to the content of customary international law,
or whether it provides evidence of how parties understand their obligations under a treaty.
It may still have evidentiary value, even if it is not of itself binding, and help us
in our interpretation of rules which are binding. When I give you a series of documents, don't just
go, oh, well, if it's not a treaty, it has no status. It might be evidence of a customary rule,
or it might be pure soft law, but nonetheless help us interpret other documents. All right.
Now, I want to talk about the gap between theory and practice, and before I go to each of these
ideas on the slide, I just want to circle back to this idea about do we do international law
in real life in the way the textbooks perhaps indicate? The simple answer is no, not always.
If you think about the conventional explanation of how we find a rule of customary international
law, the textbooks tell us the International Court of Justice has said since the time of the
Lotus case in the 1920s that to prove a rule of custom you need two things. You need evidence
of consistent state practice, and you need evidence of opinio juris, a belief that that
practice is required by law. Now, if courts were genuinely going to do that when they went out
looking for custom, we would expect judgments to contain acres of historical research, tons of
examples, and some very fine-grained analysis. Then we would expect perhaps a long inquisition
into what states have said about this practice in forums like the UN General Assembly and so on.
Honestly, we generally do not find that. Courts have limited time and limited resources,
and usually just need to get to an answer, yes or no, on a particular issue.
So the International Court of Justice, when it actually has to discern a rule of custom,
is far more likely to do one of a number of things than engage in that long historical analysis.
It may rely on its own previous decisions which have declared a rule to be custom,
so it will rely on a precedent, or it may rely on statements of opinio juris
to the exclusion of much state practice. So if there's overwhelming evidence, for example,
in the General Assembly that states consistently say they believe this to be a rule,
the ICJ may well treat it as a rule. Now, there are counter-arguments one could make about whether
what states say in the General Assembly is a reflection of their innermost convictions,
or simply their political convenience, but that hasn't detained the court. If there's consistent
opinio juris, sometimes that will be enough, particularly if the field doesn't give rise to
a lot of state practice, such as issues concerning outer space or the deep sea bed.
Finally, occasionally, the court will simply resort to inductive reasoning and say, well,
given the following general principles of the international legal system,
it follows that there must be a rule on this point. So very often, what the textbooks tell
about the formal methodology of international law might not be what's quite going on.
And I want to arm you with a couple of other ideas that help explain international law
reasoning and international lawmaking dynamics. The first is the idea of reciprocity. This is
terribly powerful. So the basic idea of reciprocity is that when you engage in
international lawmaking activities, you are trying to push for your own national best interest,
but at the same time, you're part of a community of international actors engaged in lawmaking,
and you know that whatever rule is formulated will bind you as well as everyone else.
So this knowledge that any rule I propose could later be invoked against me may limit how hard
and how fast states are prepared to push the development of rules. Then there's an idea that
I'll come back to a number of times between exclusive and inclusive interests. This arises
from the work of McDougall and Burke in the 1960s on the law of the sea. But the idea here is that
states, or rather the international system, always contains a tension between exclusive
interests. So the classic example is coastal states would like the greatest possible degree
of control over their territorial sea. They would like exclusive control in a perfect world.
But when we come to the high seas and say fish stocks on the high seas, these are going to be
by everyone. They're a common interest. Or similarly, all states share a relatively
common interest in freedom of navigation for trade and commerce. So the coastal state might,
on the one hand, say, well, we want to maximise our exclusive interests in the territorial sea,
but at the same time I'll have to say, ah, but we want to be able to navigate in other states'
territorial seas. That's an inclusive interest. We need to support a common rule.
And this loops back to reciprocity, okay, because the balance there between a state's exclusive
interests and inclusive interests is found in reciprocity. Yes, we would like to control our
territorial sea, absolutely, but in the end we can only exert as much control as is consistent
with everyone else having the same power. Another important idea here might be the difference
between rules and principles. So in the work of Ronald Dworkin, and I'm paraphrasing very roughly,
a rule is something which, when applied to a given situation, gives you a yes or no answer.
A principle is something stated at a higher level of generality. Say,
someone shall not profit from their own wrongdoing. So equitable principles would be
And principles won't be specific enough to give you an answer to a concrete legal problem,
but the principles might be things you weigh in the balance when working out how to apply a rule.
Now, obviously, there's a spectrum involved here. A rule that is very generally phrased,
even if it's legally binding, might begin to look like a principle, such as, for example,
in the law of the sea, the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment begins to sound
more like a principle the further one takes it. And conversely, one might have some principles
which, while strictly non-binding, are very specific and begin to look more like rules.
But so we'll often see in international legal reasoning, you may have
a rule stated at a reasonably high level of generality, and you have to take principles
into account, various aims of the law of the sea or relevant ideas from other bodies of law,
in order to work out how to apply the rule in a particular system.
The last question is slightly more philosophic and goes to the idea of whether international law
is a legal system or whether it's just a fragmented collection of rules.
So the consent theory of international law, at its most extreme, would say,
every individual rule in the international legal system has been consented to by states.
No consent, no rule. If there's a gap, then there's just a gap. You simply have to make
a series of rules to cover every situation. And if you haven't covered the situation in advance,
nothing applies. Now, that isn't, in any meaningful sense, a legal system. It's just
a fragmented collection of rules. And it would deny the idea that there could be general principles
that might help you navigate situations where there doesn't appear to be a rule directly on point.
So this goes to the question of, if you're an international decision maker,
if you're a court or tribunal trying to resolve a case, can you simply declare
there is no applicable law? So the Latin term is a non-liquet, and it appears on the slide.
Or do you start from a presumption that international law is a formally complete
system which is capable of answering the questions put to it? And if you take that completeness
approach, then you might be more comfortable coming up with principles or even finding new
rules of custom that help resolve a particular case. And you will be very reluctant to say,
no, there is no applicable rule that can give an answer here. And in practice, so looping back
to the idea of the difference between international law as it's described in the books and
international law as it's carried out in practice, in practice, international courts
and tribunals are very reluctant to find there is no applicable law. They are more likely to find
that a rule might be applied by analogy, or another rule might be extended, or that there's
a very generally applicable rule, and the precise way it should be applied in this case can be
guided by various principles. And by that method, you can get to an answer. So usually,
international courts and tribunals will start from the idea that the range of tools available
will give us an answer. And that leads me to the quote from Judge James Crawford, the
present Australian judge of the International Court of Justice, from our further reading.
And he says of international legal method and of international lawyers,
we are lawyers first and last. The short answer to the question of whether we can expect
international law to make a difference in creating order and coherence in the international system
must be yes, relatively. For all its various perceived shortcomings, when analogised to
municipal law, the reality is that international law is a system of laws and of the coordination
of laws. Of course, the classification of the system as legal does not predetermine its
effectiveness. So what's Crawford saying there? What he's saying, I think, is that
international law is not less a body of law, for not looking like a national legal system
in every aspect. But it does make a difference in international affairs,
if not always a decisive one. But it makes some difference, because there has to be
a rules-based system for reconciling situations where states' interests come into conflict.
Because if there is no such system, the conflict simply remains. And this does not mean that
international law can solve every problem, or is always the most effective means, perhaps,
of solving a problem. But law in general is not always the best way of solving our problem.
All right, I hope you found these ideas, at the very least, interesting,
and we'll be exploring them more in class.
