=======Image-Copyright-Info======= Image is in public domain Artist-Info: Author William Miller (1796–1882) Description Scottish engraver Date of birth/death 28 May 1796 20 January 1882 Location of birth/death Edinburgh Sheffield Authority control VIAF: 75215312 LCCN: n82240733 ISNI: 0000 0000 6708 7623 WorldCat After Hugh William Williams (1773–1829) Alternative names Hugh 'Grecian' Williams Description British painter Date of birth/death 1773 3 June 1829 Location of birth/death at Sea Edinburgh Authority control VIAF: 70093934 LCCN: nr2001043883 GND: 132561204 ULAN: 500014002 ISNI: 000000006688732X WorldCat WP-Person Image Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Pl... =======Image-Copyright-Info========
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The Battle of Plataea (479 BC) was the decisive land victory for the Greek city-states against the Second Persian Invasion. Led by Sparta and Athens, the Greek alliance defeated the forces of Mardonius, effectively ending the Persian threat to the Greek mainland and shifting the momentum of the war in favor of the Greeks.
The Battle of Plataea was the final land battle during the Second Persian Invasion of Greece.
It took place in 479 BC near the city of Plataea in Boeotia and was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states,
including Sparta, Athens, Corinth and Megara, and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I.
The previous year the Persian invasion force, led by the Persian king in person,
had scored victories at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium and conquered Thessaly, Boeotia, Euboea and Attica.
However, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the allied Greek navy had won an unlikely but decisive victory,
preventing the conquest of the Peloponnesus. Xerxes then retreated with much of his army,
leaving his general Mardonius to finish off the Greeks the following year.
In the summer of 479 BC the Greeks assembled a huge army and marched out of the Peloponnesus.
The Persians retreated to Boeotia and built a fortified camp near Plataea. The Greeks, however,
refused to be drawn into the prime cavalry terrain around the Persian camp, resulting in a stalemate that lasted 11 days.
While attempting a retreat after their supply lines were disrupted, the Greek battle line fragmented.
Thinking the Greeks in full retreat, Mardonius ordered his forces to pursue them, but the Greeks halted and gave battle,
routing the lightly armed Persian infantry and killing Mardonius.
A large portion of the Persian army was trapped in its camp and slaughtered.
The destruction of this army and the remnants of the Persian navy allegedly on the same day at the Battle of Mycala,
decisively ended the invasion.
After Plataea and Mycala the Greek allies would take the offensive against the Persians,
marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars.
Although Plataea was in every sense a resounding victory,
it does not seem to have been attributed the same significances, for example,
the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon or the Spartan defeat at Thermopylae.
Background
The Greek city-states of Athens and Eritrea had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499–494 BC.
The Persian Empire was still relatively young and prone to revolts by its subject peoples.
Moreover, Darius was a newsurper and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule.
The Ionian Revolt threatened the integrity of his empire and he thus vowed to punish those involved.
Darius also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of ancient Greece.
A preliminary expedition under Mardonius in 492 BC
to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the reconquest of Thrace
and forced Macedon to become a fully subordinate client kingdom of Persia.
The latter which had been a Persian vassal as early as the late 6th century BC.
An amphibious task force was then sent out under Dattus and Artiphanus in 490 BC
using Delos as an intermediate base it successfully sacking Karystos and Eritrea before moving to attack Athens.
However, at the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory
resulting in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.
Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece.
However, he died before the invasion could begin.
The throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I, who quickly restarted the preparations for the invasion of Greece,
including building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont.
In 481 BC Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water as a gesture of their submission,
but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta.
Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states.
A congress of city-states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC
and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed.
This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world,
especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.
The allies initially adopted a strategy of blocking land and sea approaches to southern Greece.
Thus, in August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach,
a small allied army led by Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the pass of Thermopylae.
While an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium,
famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persian army for three days before being outflanked by the Persians,
who used a little-known mountain path.
Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard formed of the Spartan and Thespian contingents was surrounded and annihilated.
The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium, consisting of a series of naval encounters, was up to that point a stalemate.
However, when news of Thermopylae reached them, they also retreated, since holding the Straits of Artemisium was now a moot point.
Following Thermopylae the Persian army proceeded to burn and sack the buoy-ocean cities that had not surrendered Plataea and Thespia,
before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth.
Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season.
Conversely, the Allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnese.
The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict.
Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with the bulk of his army. According to Herodotus,
this was because he feared the Greeks would sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges, thereby trapping his army in Europe.
He thus left Mardonius with hand-picked troops to complete the conquest of Greece the following year.
Mardonius evacuated Attica and wintered in Thessaly.
The Athenians then reoccupied their destroyed city. Over the winter there seems to have been some tension among the Allies.
The Athenians in particular, who were not protected by the Isthmus but whose fleet was the key to the security of the Peloponnese,
felt hard done by and demanded that an Allied army march north the following year.
When the Allies failed to commit to this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in the spring.
The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotikides, thus sculpt off Delos while the remnants of the Persian fleet sculpt off Samos,
both sides unwilling to risk battle. Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless.
While the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponnese,
Mardonius moved to break the stalemate by trying to win over the Athenians and their fleet through the mediation of Alexander I of Macedon.
Offering peace, self-government and territorial expansion,
the Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was also on hand to hear the offer, and rejected it.
The degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly something you need to bring to our attention.
We are already well aware of it, but even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender.
Upon this refusal, the Persians marched south again. Athens was again evacuated and left to the enemy.
Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis.
Athens, along with Megara and Plataea,
sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance and threatening to accept the Persian terms if it was not given.
According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus,
delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by a guest, Chileos of Tegea,
who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered.
Prelude
When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force, he completed the destruction of Athens,
tearing down whatever was left standing.
He then retreated towards Thebes, hoping to lure the Greek army into territory that would be suitable for the Persian cavalry.
Mardonius created a fortified encampment on the north bank of the Assypus River in Boeotia
covering the ground from Erythraea past Hycaea and up to the
lands of Plataea.
The Athenians sent 8,000 hoplites, led by Aristides, along with 600 Plataean exiles to join the allied army.
The army then marched in Boeotia across the passes of Mount Sideron,
arriving near Plataea and above the Persian position on the Assypus.
Under the guidance of the commanding general Pausanias,
the Greeks took a position opposite the Persian lines but remained on high ground.
Knowing that he had little hope of successfully attacking the Greek positions,
Mardonius sought to either sow dissension among the allies or lure them down into the plain.
Plutarch reports that a conspiracy was discovered among some prominent Athenians,
who were planning to betray the allied cause.
Although this account is not universally accepted,
it may indicate Mardonius's attempts of intrigue within the Greek ranks.
Mardonius also initiated hit-and-run cavalry attacks against the Greek lines,
possibly trying to lure the Greeks down to the plain in pursuit.
Although having some initial success,
this strategy backfired when the Persian cavalry commander Macistius was killed.
With his death, the cavalry retreated. Their morale boosted by this small victory.
The Greeks moved forward, still remaining on higher ground,
to a new position nearer more suited for encampment and better watered.
The Spartans and Tegeans were on a ridge to the right of the line,
the Athenians on a hillock on the left and the other contingents on the slightly lower ground between.
In response, Mardonius brought his men up to the Assypus and arrayed them for battle.
However, neither the Persians nor the Greeks would attack.
Herodotus claims this is because both sides received bad omens during sacrificial rituals.
The armies thus stayed camped in their locations for eight days, during which new Greek troops arrived.
Mardonius then sought to break the stalemate by sending his cavalry to attack the passes of Mount Sideron.
This raid resulted in the capture of a convoy of provisions intended for the Greeks.
Two more days passed, during which time the supply lines of the Greeks continued to be menaced.
Mardonius then launched another cavalry raid on the Greek lines,
which had been the only source of water for the Greek army. Coupled with the lack of food,
the restriction of the water supply made the Greek position untenable.
So they decided to retreat to a position in front of Plataea,
from where they could guard the passes and have access to fresh water.
To prevent the Persian cavalry from attacking during the retreat, it was to be performed that night.
However, the retreat went awry.
The allied contingents in the center missed their appointed position and ended up scattered in front of Plataea itself.
The Athenians, Tegeans and Spartans, who had been guarding the rear of the retreat, had not even begun to retreat by daybreak.
A single Spartan division was thus left on the ridge to guard the rear.
While the Spartans and Tegeans retreated uphill,
Pausanias also instructed the Athenians to begin the retreat and if possible join up with the Spartans.
However, the Athenians at first retreated directly towards Plataea,
and thus the allied battle line remained fragmented as the Persian camp began to stir the opposing forces.
The Greeks According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men, 5,000 Spartiates,
5,000 other Lycodaemonian hoplites and 35,000 helots.
This was probably the largest Spartan force ever assembled.
The Greek army had been reinforced by contingents of hoplites from the other allied city-states, as shown in the table.
Diodorus Siculus claims in his Bibliotheca Historica that the number of the Greek troops approached 100,000.
According to Herodotus, there were a total of 69,500 lightly armed troops, 35,000 helots and 34,500 troops from the rest of Greece, roughly one per hoplite.
The number of 34,500 has been suggested to represent one light skirmisher supporting each non-Spartan hoplite,
together with 800 Athenian archers, whose presence in the battle Herodotus later notes.
Herodotus tells us that there were also 1,800 thespians, giving a total strength of 108,200 men.
The number of hoplites is accepted as reasonable.
The Athenians alone had fielded 10,000 hoplites at the Battle of Marathon.
Some historians have accepted the number of light troops and used them as a population census of Greece at the time.
Certainly these numbers are theoretically possible.
Athens, for instance, allegedly fielded a fleet of 180 triremes at Salamis, manned by approximately 36,000 rowers and fighters.
Thus 69,500 light troops could easily have been sent to Plataea.
Nevertheless, the number of light troops is often rejected as exaggerated, especially in view of the ratio of seven helots to one sparsiate.
For instance, Lazenby accepts that hoplites from other Greek cities might have been accompanied by one lightly armoured retainer each,
but rejects the number of seven helots per sparsiate.
He further speculates that each sparsiate was accompanied by one armed helot
and that the remaining helots were employed in the logistical effort, transporting food for the army.
Both Lazenby and Holland deem the lightly armed troops, whatever their number, as essentially irrelevant to the outcome of battle.
A further complication is that a certain proportion of the Allied manpower was needed to man the fleet,
which amounted to at least 110 triremes, and thus approximately 22,000 men.
Since the Battle of Mycala was fought at least near simultaneously with the Battle of Plataea,
then this was a pool of manpower which could not have contributed to Plataea,
and further reduces the likelihood that 110,000 Greeks assembled before Plataea.
The Greek forces were as agreed by the Allied Congress under the overall command of Spartan royalty and the person of Pausanias,
who was the regent for Leonidas' young son Pleistarchus, his cousin.
Diodorus tells us that the Athenian contingent was under the command of Aristides.
It is probable that the other contingents also had their leaders.
Herodotus tells us in several places that the Greeks held council during the prelude to the battle,
implying that decisions were consensual and that Pausanias did not have the authority to issue direct orders to the other contingents.
This style of leadership contributed to the way events unfolded during the battle itself.
For instance, in the period immediately before the battle, Pausanias was unable to order the Athenians to join up with his forces,
and thus the Greeks fought the battle completely separated from each other.
The Persians According to Herodotus,
the Persians numbered 300,000 and were accompanied by troops from Greek city-states that supported the Persian cause.
Herodotus admits that no one counted the latter, but he guesses that there were about 50,000 of them.
Ctesias, who wrote a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed there were 120,000 Persian and 7,000 Greek soldiers,
but his account is generally garbled. Diodorus Siculus claims in his Bibliotheca Historica that the number of the Persian troops was some 500,000.
The figure of 300,000 has been doubted, along with many of Herodotus's own numbers.
By many historians, modern consensus estimates the total number of troops for the Persian invasion at around 250,000.
According to this consensus, Herodotus's 300,000 Persians at Plataea would self-evidently be impossible.
One approach to estimating the size of the Persian army has been to estimate how many men might feasibly have been accommodated within the Persian
camp This approach gives figures of between 70,000 and 120,000 men. Lazenby, for instance,
by comparison with later Roman military camps, calculates the number of troops at 70,000, including 10,000 cavalry.
Meanwhile, Connolly derives a number of 120,000 from the same size camp.
Indeed, most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range. For instance,
Delbruck, based on the distance the Persians marched in a day when Athens was attacked,
concluded that 75,000 was the upper limit for the size of the Persian army, including the supply personnel and other noncombatants.
Strategic and tactical considerations
In some ways the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon.
There was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the other.
The reasons for this stalemate were primarily tactical, and similar to the situation at Marathon.
The Greek hoplites did not want to risk being outflanked by the Persian cavalry and the lightly armed
Persian infantry could not hope to assault well-defended positions. According to Herodotus,
both sides wished for a decisive battle that would tip the war in their favor. However,
Lazenby believed that Mardonius's actions during the Plataea campaign were not consistent with an aggressive policy.
He interprets the Persian operations during the prelude not as attempts to force the Allies into battle but as attempts to force the Allies into
retreat. Mardonius may have felt he had little to gain in battle and that he could simply wait for the Greek alliance to fall apart.
There can be little doubt from Herodotus's account that Mardonius was prepared to accept battle on his own terms.
However, under these conditions, the tactical considerations outweighed the strategic need for action.
When Mardonius's raids disrupted the Allied supply chain, it forced a strategic rethink on the part of the Allies.
Rather than now moving to attack, however, they instead looked to retreat and secure their lines of communication.
Despite this defensive move by the Greeks, it was in fact the chaos resulting from this retreat that finally ended the stalemate.
Mardonius perceived this as a full-on retreat, in effect thinking that the battle was already over, and sought to pursue the Greeks,
since he did not expect the Greeks to fight.
The tactical problems were no longer an issue and he tried to take advantage of the altered strategic situation he thought he had produced.
Conversely, the Greeks had, inadvertently, lured Mardonius into attacking them on the higher ground and, despite being outnumbered,
were thus at a tactical advantage.