Ukraine's GIANT Russia strikes force Putin to admit failiure as Zelensky unveils lethal new missile

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AI GeneratedUkraine is intensifying strikes on Russian oil and military infrastructure while deploying the new FP7 ballistic missile. Russia has shifted to daytime bombardments of Kyiv's energy grid. Meanwhile, a severe humanitarian crisis persists in occupied Oleshki, and North Korean troops are reportedly aiding Russia in the Kursk region amid ongoing NATO deterrence efforts in the North Atlantic.
Russia's Volgograd oil refinery has been hit for at least the third time as waves of overnight
strikes hit factories in Krasnodar and Moscow.
But the standout images of this last week have been people fleeing from the burning
windows of the National Academy of Sciences in Kyiv.
And Russian drones hit the Privdeniy Bridge, spanning more than a kilometre across the
Ukrainian capital.
Putin has admitted that the oil blitz is hurting Russia's economy.
President Zelensky says Ukraine has fired a new kind of missile.
And British Royal Marine Commandos have carried out historic war games in the Faroe Islands
to deter Russia's little green men from trying to land on islands.
Can't give a go.
My name is Jerome Stark.
I'm the defence editor at The Sun newspaper and this is Frontline, your weekly roundup
of the most important news from the war in Ukraine.
We're starting with what's happened overnight.
Ukrainian drones have hit Volgograd, reportedly striking an oil refinery in an area that is
also home to the Kostik chemical plant.
That refinery processes around 4% of Russia's annual capacity.
Moscow said that overnight it down 646 Ukrainian drones.
We always take those figures with a pinch of salt, but also official reports of damage
in Tuapse in Krasnodar, that's at the eastern edge of the Black Sea.
Similarly, around 300 miles from Ukrainian controlled territory.
President Zelensky has also claimed that there have been strikes in Samara.
And this past week, we've seen the Perm oil refinery hit, now that's 1,100 miles inside
Russian territory.
Accounts are about 3.5% of Russia's refining capacity.
And I should point out, these refineries aren't being knocked out every time by every strike,
but often it is being inhibited.
Sometimes they're shut down for days, sometimes for longer, sometimes they manage to carry
on, but always at a sort of reduced functionality.
Also, reports of an electronics plant hit in Ulyanovsk and an optics plant, a military
optics plant in Rostov.
Rostov-on-Don being too sort of fairly close to Ukraine, just beyond the Black Sea.
On the 26th of September, the Ilsky refinery in Krasnodar Krai was hit.
That was the 17th time according to my tally.
So that is the refinery that's been hit more than any other.
That produces or has the capacity to produce around 2% of Russia's oil output.
Also, a pumping station on October the 1st hit in Samara.
The ammunition plant hit near Moscow was the Krasnovodsk chemical plant, which produces
chemicals for ammunition, for explosives.
According to the Moscow Times, 40 people in the plant at the time of that attack.
Seven of them reportedly killed.
Now, this week, we've also heard from President Zelensky, who has said that Ukraine has fired
in anger in combat operations an FP7 missile for the first time.
This is a significant development because the FP7 is effectively Ukraine's homegrown
It's a ground-launched ballistic tactical weapon.
Tactical, that means it has a range of 250 kilometres or thereabouts.
It's designed to take a warhead of around 200 kilograms.
These missiles, they're very, very fast, very difficult to intercept.
If Ukraine were to have an ample ready supply of them, that would be a significant advantage
in the sort of medium, medium battle.
So not in the close battle and certainly not in the deep, not in the thousands of miles
into Russian territory, but in that intermediate range.
In the close battle, Ukraine's forces continue to press on with their offensive around Liman
at the northern end of the fortress belt.
Ukraine claimed this week that Russia suffered the deadliest day of the war,
four and a half years of conflict.
Ukraine claims that in a single day, it killed 2,090 Russian soldiers.
Now, as always, we've said this before, we take all estimates of killed and injured with some caution.
But nonetheless, Ukraine's death tolls have been given some credibility by the sort of the fact
the way they're repeated and endorsed by many of Ukraine's Western allies.
And that's increasingly because of the way Ukraine insists on counting them,
certainly under the sort of data-driven demands of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence.
Strikes on vehicles, on people had to be verified by drone footage
because that is the ubiquitous nature of this conflict.
Ukraine claiming that on Sunday into Monday, they killed 2,090 Russian soldiers.
We've also seen extraordinary footage from the Third Army Corps,
which has been leading that offensive in Liman, of using Soviet-era armoured vehicles,
BTR-60s, as sort of large, vast, if you like, kamikaze one-way attack drones.
So finding ways to control these vehicles remotely, loading them with explosives
and charging them at enemy positions.
If you think about this, the weight of explosives a vehicle like that could carry
compared to a missile or a small quadcopter UAV, then it's devastating.
And I have to say, when I watched that footage, it reminded me of something I'd forgotten I knew,
but which was of the ancient practice of navies using fireboats,
sending barges of flames to crash into enemy ships.
And I was looking into that today, and it dates back more than 2,000 years,
at least to around 300 BC, when the tactic was used by Alexander the Great.
So in one sense, very novel cutting edge of technology,
and in another sense, a reminder of the sort of ever-constant characteristics of war.
In the other direction, of course, it continues.
Surprisingly, though, this week, only 793 missiles and drones recorded by Ukraine's air force,
of which only eight were missiles.
Now this tally is of the largest sort of strategic weapons hit deep into Ukraine,
many of them hitting Kiev.
And as I said at the beginning, the most striking images, I think, for me,
were of people climbing out of windows from the National Academy of Sciences
as that building burned.
And part of what was shocking about that was that it's an academic institution,
but even more so, this is one of these daytime attacks which are becoming increasingly common.
For much of the war, Russia's bombardments, Russia's missile strikes,
air strikes were launched at night.
Now, for whatever reason, but largely it seems because Russia thinks it can overwhelm
or ignore Ukraine's depleted air defences, they're sending these attacks in the day.
The same day as that attack, which reportedly killed, those attacks, I should say,
that killed nine people around Ukraine, Ukraine's prime minister said
that there was an ice cream factory hit in Zhytomyr, which is to the west of Kiev,
and residential buildings in Sumy.
Further south, the region of Odessa has been hit for 78 days in a row.
That's according to the open source AMK Mappers.
Evidence, again, both sides continuing to try and hammer each other's economies,
limiting export opportunities by damaging port infrastructure,
both limiting export and import opportunities.
President Putin has claimed, although we haven't seen evidence to back it up,
that ships coming into Odessa have been unloading weapons.
The other standout strike for me this week was the drones hitting Kiev's Privdeniy Bridge.
That is a 1.2 kilometre suspension bridge, one of the two major bridges,
and the third bridge as well, but one of the two largest bridges spanning the Dnipro River
in the capital, Kiev, between the left bank and the right.
This is a suspension bridge, and the drone hit the road surface just adjacent to one of the towers,
erupting in a small ball of flames.
We know that there was at least one metro train crossing at the time.
Ukrainian officials insisting that the structure of the bridge, it remains sound, is undamaged,
and that's a reminder, of course, of how difficult it is to damage bridges.
Many of you ask in the questions, and please continue to ask your questions,
many of you ask about the Kerch Bridge that connects occupied Crimea to sovereign Russian territory
and why the Ukrainians haven't been able to down it, because it's very, very hard.
The significance of the Privdeniy Bridge, I think, is that's the first time it's been hit.
Thus far, Russia has appeared not to target that sort of infrastructure.
Certain things appear to have been off-limits.
But President Zelensky has said this week that he believes President Putin
has given his commanders to abandon those rules, to abandon the previous constraints,
which may have limited them, and it may be hard for us to believe there'd be any constraints,
but to abandon the rules of war that they might have been following thus far.
Whether or not it's related to that, this week we also saw a strike on a school in the capital Kiev.
There were 100 children in the building at the time.
Luckily, they'd managed to make it into a cellar before the drone struck,
but, damn it, one of the walls of the building did collapse.
A lot of you were asking in the comments last week about the situation in Oleshki,
and I'm going to do a little bit on that now.
Oleshki is a town on the left bank of the Dnipro River, just opposite Kherson in southern Kherson Oblast.
The left bank is occupied by Russia and has been since the start of the war.
If we go back right to the beginning of this conflict, Russian forces stormed out of occupied Crimea into Kherson.
They crossed the Dnipro River, they captured Kherson and they advanced towards Mykolaiv
and were halted on the outskirts of Mykolaiv.
Ukraine then forced them back and they retook the city of Kherson,
the only regional capital that Russia managed to capture in this entire conflict since 2022.
They pushed Russia back to the other side.
Oleshki, which is on that other side, on the Russian-held side,
has remained under Russian control for four and a half years.
The reason the situation has changed is that no food has managed to get into that town since May.
Now, Ukraine clearly blaming Russia because Russia controls all the land routes into Oleshki.
It's a town that used to be home to about 24,000 people.
In June, the estimate was that there were around 6,000 people still living there.
But as food supplies dwindled, more and more people have tried to leave.
A report in The Guardian newspaper, if you're interested in Oleshki, well worth a read,
describing it as hell on earth, that people are now reduced to eating weeds.
Just 2,000 people of 24,000 left in the city, including about 50 children.
Ukraine says it launched drone operations to try and airlift around four tonnes of food in recent days.
That was 100 sorties of drones, four tonnes of food.
But it said they were unclear if how much or if any of that was intercepted by Russian forces
and how much of that made it to those starving civilians.
But a dire situation and a sort of an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe.
And a reminder, I think, a really good reminder for all of us,
that the people who really pay the highest price in this war are the civilians whose homes,
livelihoods, very existences are caught up in this Russian war of aggression.
On the political front, I've mentioned already that President Zelensky said
Putin has ordered his commanders to scrap the constraints, to abandon the rules of war.
Simultaneously, there was a report in The New York Times,
which detailed what it claimed were Russian plans to knock out Ukraine's energy infrastructure.
Russia has targeted Ukraine's electricity grid and its thermal and heating power plants
since about the second winter of the war.
So the first winter was that February when they launched the invasion.
The following, by that November, they were targeting energy infrastructure
in an attempt to try and break the will of people to fight, break Ukrainian's will to resist.
That hasn't worked, nor have they thus far been able to totally knock out the energy infrastructure.
But they get closer each year.
The New York Times suggesting that the plan has three phases.
Phase one would be to target substations in Western Ukraine,
close to Ukraine's border with its NATO allies.
Secondly, to knock out hydro plants, hydroelectric power plants.
And thirdly, to isolate the nuclear power stations,
which still generate significant amounts of electricity.
President Zelensky, who's in Kiev today, said that he believes it's part of a campaign
to force people to leave the capital, Kiev.
So in tandem, the strikes on the capital, the strikes on the National Academy of Sciences,
the attempts to try and cripple the energy infrastructure to force people to leave.
According to that New York Times report, Russia, this plan at least,
envisages knocking out 90% of the electricity, 90% of the heating infrastructure.
Although it did caveat it, suggesting that the plan exists,
it's not clear whether Russia would enforce it.
But huge resources, thousands of drones and missiles available,
or at least earmarked to carry out that plan.
Also on the political front, President Putin has admitted, possibly for the first time,
that Ukraine's long-range campaign of strikes against Russia's oil infrastructure is having an effect.
We've seen that effect in the queues outside petrol stations,
the fights, the bans on exporting diesel and the price rises.
But President Putin, speaking at his Valdai Economic Forum,
which is taking place in Moscow, admitted that it had hurt.
He said there has been damage. He said it's not critical, but damage nonetheless.
He said it affected Russia's GDP, decreased Russia's GDP by about 1%.
And that's interesting because he's acknowledging the pain.
We have to look deeper into his motivations for why he might be doing that.
But also significant that he's acknowledging at the same time he's prepared to soak up that pain.
And that's something that we have known.
Clearly Putin won't be feeling that pain quite as much as the ordinary Russians
facing those fuel shortages, rationings and queues.
He also repeated the familiar nuclear sabre rattling that we do tend to hear
from the Kremlin and Putin acolytes.
And he was referring to Kaliningrad.
He used the language that were Russia's westernmost territories threatened,
then the use of all weapons would be on the table.
Now that's, whilst this might sound surprising, that is the more measured end of the Russian language.
Russian nuclear doctrine effectively states that if the Russian state,
the existence of the Russian state is threatened, then it would use nuclear weapons.
At the sort of more frothing, rabid, warmongering end,
we have the Russian television hosts, the national security aides, Dmitry Medvedev,
suggesting things like always calling for Russia to launch pre-emptive strikes on the UK.
That's not what Putin's doing.
But he is sort of reminding the West, as he often does, that Russia is a nuclear power.
He is speaking sort of in the context of scaremongering stories in Russia,
which we've seen no evidence to back up that NATO is somehow planning to attack, seize,
take hold of Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic.
Also good news politically, Ukraine has today received 2.9 billion euros from an EU mechanism
that was set up to sort of guarantee around 50 billion over a period of three years
to support the running of the Ukrainian government.
There's a report on the American ABC News channel, however, less good news for Ukraine,
cautioning that President Trump's promise to let Ukraine build Patriot missiles under licence
will take several years.
I think we said as much when we first reported that.
Trump said he'd let Ukraine manufacture these vital top-end air defence weapons.
Then he appeared to wobble.
It's not going to happen quickly.
It's incredibly complicated, complex, sensitive, secretive technology.
The licensing agreements, precautionary measures that need to be put in place around that
are vast and complex and it's not going to happen quickly.
Unfortunately, America has also massively depleted its own stockpiles of these missiles
and its allies' stockpiles of these missiles through the defence of Gulf nations
as a result of the US-led war on Iran.
And finally, President Zelensky said around half of Ukraine's F-16 fleet
are out of the country being maintained at any one time.
He suggested in Belgium.
Now, I did a quick tally.
Around 50 F-16s have been delivered, we think, to Ukraine from the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway.
Belgium has promised another 53, although they're not due to arrive
until the end of this year and through to 2030.
A lot of you often ask, what are the F-16s doing?
As far as we know, their main role continues to be air defence, shooting down missiles and drones.
They tend not to be used in offensive airstrike operations
simply because of the risk to those aircraft if they're put too far forward in the front lines.
This challenge of maintaining complex equipment reminds me
of what the soldiers who were using British Challenger 2 tanks said
when I met them in Zaporizhia during the summer counter-offensive.
And similar story there, just the complexity of getting vehicles back
or getting parts back, getting those parts, bringing them back into theatre,
getting these complex weapons repaired, was leading to significant delays
and significant amounts of time for these weapon systems, tanks, aircraft, out of the fight.
Finally, before we get to questions, I want to talk to you a little bit
about a really interesting story about British Royal Marine Commandos
carrying out historic war game exercises in the Faroe Islands in the North Atlantic.
It's the first time Royal Marines have set foot in the Faroe Islands,
which is an independent nation, part of the Kingdom of Denmark.
First time Royal Marines have set foot there since World War II.
And why did they do it? Fundamentally, it's to try and deter any attempt
by little green men, Russia's kind of covert special forces, to infiltrate these islands.
So I'll unpack that a little bit.
The Faroe Islands sit about 250 miles north-northwest of Cape Wrath in Scotland.
They are in the middle of what is known as the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap.
And this is a strategically vital stretch of water, which is the gateway,
a channel through which Russian vessels and submarines must pass
if they're to sail from Murmansk, home of the Russian Northern Fleet, into the Atlantic.
And this is a stretch of water that is incredibly heavily surveilled by NATO nations,
but particularly by the UK and the United States and Iceland.
There are concerns, and they've been expressed several ways,
that Russia may attempt to test NATO, to undermine Article 5,
by threatening a less well-defended place, sliver of territory, outpost or islands.
We've talked about Narva in Estonia, we've talked about islands in the Baltic,
Svalbard, those Norwegian islands in the high north in the Arctic have been discussed.
The Faroe Islands clearly have concern as well.
And so what these Royal Marines were doing, they practised boarding operations against fishing trawlers.
Because the concern is that what Russia might do is use fishing trawlers to smuggle its little green men,
its plain clothes, if you like, special forces, onto the island,
and then suddenly it turns out they're there, they've effectively taken control,
not necessarily of the entire Faroe Islands, but of one or two islands within the archipelago.
So this was the United Kingdom's Royal Marines, Danish special forces,
to prepare for such a scenario, to try and deter it from happening in the first place.
As ever, if you've got any questions, please do write them in the comments below.
We love reading them, they really make us think, they really make me laugh.
I'll start with one of the ones that made me laugh this week.
Do I know that I look like Jason Statham?
I answer that as I answer it every time, we do get it quite a lot,
and they answer it by saying, I think Jason Statham would be quite offended by that comment.
So the person who described me as a Temu Jason Statham, perhaps closer to the mark.
But thank you for that.
It's a good question.
The assumptions are, it's worth reminding you, in March 2023,
the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin
for crimes against humanity, principally for his hand in the forcible relocation and re-education of Ukrainian children.
Under the Rome Treaty, the Rome Statute, which underpins the International Criminal Court,
signatory nations are obliged to arrest anyone for whom an arrest warrant by that court has been issued.
Significantly, 137 nations of the world have signed and ratified the treaty.
I think that's right, 137 signatories out of 193 nations recognised by the UN.
But notably, among the nations that have not signed up to the Rome Treaty,
United States, Israel, Iran, Russia, other nations include Palestine, Afghanistan and Japan.
But America and Russia are not signatories to the Rome Statute.
So they are not obliged by the obligations to arrest people who are wanted by that court.
Worth pointing out though, South Africa is a signatory to the Rome Treaty.
When the Sudanese president, who was wanted by the International Criminal Court, visited Johannesburg,
there was an arrest warrant issued frantically by local authorities, but the state was acting against itself.
Half of the state was trying to arrest him, but actually the executive, the presidential apparatus
was used to get him out of the country before he could be arrested.
Question number two, I talked about Russia's definition of winning last time,
but what is Ukraine's definition of winning? I think it's really good.
Initially, and I think it's maximalist ambition, it's stated claim,
which Ukraine stuck to for a long period of this war,
was to reclaim all of its territory back to its 1991 independence borders.
So that would mean getting Crimea back under Ukrainian control,
pushing Russia out of the Donbass, out of Donetsk, Luhansk,
and of course now out of Zaporizhia, Kherson and parts of Kharkiv as well.
Realistically, I think those ambitions have been curtailed by what's happened over the last four and a half years.
I would suggest, although Ukraine hasn't expressly, Zelensky hasn't expressly said it like this,
that surviving as a sovereign nation is a form of victory with the sovereignty to choose its future
and particularly with the options open to join the European Union or NATO.
Now whether that joining process is ever fulfilled obviously is up to many, many nations, not just Ukraine.
But it needs to survive, it needs the independence, the sovereignty to have those options on the table.
It would clearly want to regain its territory too,
and I suspect that what might happen in a deal that would still be seen as a victory for Ukraine
would be to freeze the front lines more or less where they are.
That wouldn't necessarily be settled in perpetuity, that would be a de facto rather than a de jure agreement,
but nonetheless Ukraine would be able to stop, both sides would stop fighting and move on.
Question number three, are farmers still working in these vast fields that we see under the drone feeds?
Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Rarely in those areas very, very close to the front lines inside what we'd call the kill zone.
But further back, Ukraine's a vast country, a huge agricultural nation and grain exporter.
Yes, farms are still working, grain farms, sunflower farms, vineyards still working.
Next question, is Russia's use of Zircon anti-ship missiles indicative of a missile shortage?
Perhaps. We used to try and interpret the use of these missiles
and try to really delve into what they were using and what that indicated about stockpiles.
We looked at serial numbers on the weapons, see how recently they'd been produced,
because sometimes they were coming from factory to firing point within days or weeks,
and that was evidence of shortages.
The use of Zircons suggests yes, they might have a shortage of other kinds of capabilities,
but equally they're using Zircons against targets on land because there are far fewer targets at sea for them to hit.
Question number four, should NATO respond to every attack, a sort of 10 to 1 ratio?
So for example, every time Russia commits an offence, should Russia, this was the example the person asking the question suggested,
every time Russia commits an offence, should they seize, for example, 10 Shadow Fleet ships?
I think that it would be a massive sort of oversimplified response,
and having such a predictable response in itself is a weakness,
and also fundamentally that would just create a ladder of escalation and the situation spirals out of control.
The balance that NATO tries to strike, and many of you may disagree about whether or not they get there,
is to respond without escalating, to respond firmly enough to deter, but without escalating.
But then the counter-argument is that Russia maintains what is known as escalation dominance,
and it's NATO's fear of meeting Russia that allows Russia to continually escalate at its time and place of choosing rather than the other way around.
Next question, what happened to Ukraine's attempt to close Russia's skies?
Fundamentally it hasn't worked, although if you look at Flightradar or any of these flight tracking apps,
you will see that compared to European airspace, which is incredibly crowded with aircraft,
Russian airspace remains remarkably sparse.
It's really only domestic Russian carriers, Chinese carriers, and a handful of Turkish airlines flying in and out of Russia.
But civilian flights are still operational, but those civilian airliners have been warned by President Zelensky
that a place like Russia is no place for civilian aircraft.
I don't know, and perhaps we should look more closely at this,
as to whether that's affected the price of, for example, insuring Russian flights,
but sanctions on Russian industry would mean that that insurance is already being done outside of, for example, the Lloyds of London insurance hub.
So that market, which would have responded to that threat by premiums going through the roof, is not involved.
Next question, if North Korean troops appeared on the front line, would that be a declaration of war?
Well, it's worth remembering North Korean troops, of course, did fight in sovereign Russian Kursk,
occupied Russian Kursk when it was captured by Ukraine.
They were part of that effort to push Ukrainians out. They were very much on the front line.
I suppose if you're asking, were those same troops or similar troops to turn up in sovereign Ukrainian territory,
would that be a declaration of war? It would certainly be a significant escalation.
And it would all, I suppose, depend in what numbers, if they were there in large numbers, sanctioned by Pyongyang,
then effectively, yes, Pyongyang would be joining the war of aggression in a way even more than it has already.
But it's already supplied troops. It's already supplied munitions. Pyongyang is already pretty much shoulder to shoulder with Moscow.
Is Ukraine reforming its doctrine, particularly around basic training, junior leadership and conscription?
Around basic training and junior leadership, I think what's happening with the Third Army Corps around Liman
and the descriptions those commanders have given about things like mission command
and the dynamism they have needed in the battlefield to exploit advantages rapidly,
suggests that yes, that sort of doctrine has filtered in to that particular military unit.
But it's not going to be homogenous. It's not across the board.
Different Ukrainian units are sort of vastly different stages of these reforms.
Some far more Soviet, some far more modern. And conscription, I think, remains something slightly different.
What's interesting, though, is that the most dynamic, best performing Ukrainian units have really,
really sort of aggressive, slick advertising campaigns to try and recruit their own soldiers.
And if you're a Ukrainian fighting age man who's at risk of being conscripted,
you have a sort of vested interest or they present it to you as a vested interest to join one of these better units
because they claim you're better trained, treated better, deployed better,
sort of more cleverly rather than being thrown into battle.
So you're better to do that rather than risk being conscripted and then sent to a unit of which you have no say.
Final question. Very interesting. Are NATO countries committing sabotage against Russia?
I haven't seen evidence of it. In one sense, it would surprise me if they weren't.
But we haven't seen evidence of it. And were there tangible evidence of it,
we have to assume that Russia would try and celebrate that, sort of trumpet that,
show it to the world as evidence because it claims that it is at war with all of NATO.
But I would draw your attention to remarks made probably 18 months, two years ago
by the former head of Britain's MI6 when he was speaking in Paris.
And he was talking about his organisation's relationship to the SOE, the Special Operations Executive,
which was formed during World War Two with orders from Winston Churchill to set Europe ablaze.
And the SOE conducted sabotage operations, targeted killings behind Nazi lines.
And Richard Moore said we are proud of our SOE heritage and we keep it alive by helping our Ukrainian friends.
If you've got any questions, please ask them in the comments below.
If you'd like to know more about what I've been doing on defence coverage,
then of course, please follow me on Twitter at Jerome Starkey.
You can see that we've been reporting on the fate of some senior officials in the British defence firmament.
You can follow me on Instagram.
I was joining people jumping out of World War Two C-47 Dakota jets not long ago.
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And if you've got any questions, once again, please do ask them in the comments below.
