DRESS LIKE THE ENEMY: German Interpretation of International Law in World War II Part I

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1 Video View·Oct 2, 2026
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis video explores the legal and practical complexities of using enemy uniforms and \"false flag\" operations during World War II. It examines the tension between the Hague Convention's prohibitions and the military practice of deception, highlighting how different nations interpreted international law to justify or punish such actions.
A number of fictional depictions show German soldiers in the Second World War
wearing enemy uniforms in an attempt to safely transit enemy-held territory.
The use of enemy uniforms for this purpose did happen in the Second World War.
Article 23 of the Hageland Warfare Convention stated that it was forbidden
to make improper use of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy.
The actual matter is more complicated than a simple reading of the law suggests, however.
Article 24 went on to further state that
ruses of war and the employment of methods necessary to obtain information about the enemy and the country
are considered allowable.
The Russe-de-Guerre, or false flag operation, has a long history in naval warfare.
The fictional Royal Navy Captain Jack Aubrey successfully carries out such a false flag operation
in the Master and Commander film.
His ship poses as a civil whaling ship until in firing range of an enemy warship.
This practice happened in the Second World War as well,
most notably at Saint-Nazaire when a British destroyer was altered to look like a German vessel.
On the night of 28 March 1942, HMS Campbelltown steamed towards Saint-Nazaire flying a German flag.
Upon discovery, it lowered the German flag and hoisted an English naval jack
before carrying out its mission of ramming the dry dock and depositing its load of British commandos.
The legality of the false flag operation acquired international acceptance
on the understanding that the use of a false flag to disguise a warship's nationality
was only permissible before shots were fired.
A ship was required to raise its own flag immediately before opening fire on the enemy.
Whether or not this could be applied to land warfare was a subject of some debate.
An article in the American Journal of International Law in 1941, for example,
notes that Article 23 of the Hague Convention prohibits the improper use of enemy uniforms
but never defines what the term improper means.
The article goes on to say that while there was universal agreement
that fighting while wearing enemy uniforms should be prohibited,
there existed no such consensus on the use of enemy uniforms as a deception
in cases where the disguises were abandoned before contact and combat with the enemy.
For their part, the Germans interpreted these rules quite liberally to permit such use.
On 15 October 1939, the first company of what later became the Brandenburg Commandos was formed,
expanding quickly to battalion strength, and by the spring of 1940
were employed in small groups to secure key terrain, particularly bridges,
in advance of German invasion troops during operations in France and the Low Countries.
In one case, three Dutch Nazis dressed in Dutch police uniforms and escorted German commandos
disguised as prisoners of war to secure the bridges at Hennep.
Another platoon dressed in Belgian uniforms secured the Oost and Nieuwpoort canal locks and bridge.
There were other successful missions, and by autumn these special operations units
had been expanded to regimental status.
The Brandenburgers performed a number of missions in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Soviet Union,
but by April 1943, with the war going against Germany, the need for regular forces was more acute
and the Brandenburgers became a division for employment in conventional operations.
At about the same time, the Waffen-SS stood up its own special operations organization,
headed by Otto Skorzeny.
Their missions were more strategic than tactical,
but they nonetheless also found occasion to wear enemy uniforms.
The largest operation was in the Ardennes, where troops and equipment were disguised as Allied soldiers.
A number of Skorzeny's men were captured in Allied uniform.
The Americans chose to interpret the Hague Conventions wording differently than the Germans had,
and the men were executed as spies.
Skorzeny was captured at the end of the war and put on trial as an alleged war criminal.
Among the charges against him was the improper use of military insignia
and uniforms of the armed forces of the United States of America
by entering into combat disguised therewith and treacherously firing upon
and killing members of the armed forces of the United States of America.
His defense was able to gain him an acquittal on those charges.
It's not clear exactly why.
There seems to have been persuasive evidence presented by the defense
of Allied soldiers performing similar acts while disguised as Germans,
but the judgment was announced without explanation.
One legal journal suggests the court interpreted Article 23 of the Hague Convention
the same way the Germans had, permitting deceptive use of enemy uniforms
outside of direct combat actions, but that was only speculation on the author's part.
The author, writing in 1959, concluded that even 15 years after the end of the war
there was still need for clarification of international law
with respect to the use of enemy uniforms by combatants.
Articles 23 and 24 of the Hague Convention offer just one example
of how the Germans sometimes interpreted international law differently than their opponents.
Those at the bottom of the chain of command will have to carry out the instructions
of their superiors based on these differing interpretations
were usually the ones to suffer the most when authorities in opposing armed forces
could find no consensus on what the laws actually meant.
