Credit spreads have exploded in recent weeks, and not just the triple hooks. It has spread to other parts of the public market. And now that September has finished up, we might finally get more fundamental trading in USTs. Part (much?) of the recent selloff has been, well, three September effects. I'll explain what those are/were and what that might mean. It did for Oct 1.
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Video Summary
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Rising credit spreads, particularly the shift from high-risk \"triple C\" bonds to investment-grade credit, signal a broadening downturn in the credit cycle. Combined with seasonal liquidity bottlenecks in the repo market and the \"September effect\" on Treasuries, these technical and macroeconomic pressures may soon force the stock market to pivot from AI optimism toward systemic macro risks.
We've got a big move in credit spreads. In fact, risky credit spreads are exploding to the upside,
to the point they're even dragging in investment grade credit, which means it might be time for
the stock market to start paying attention. In addition to that, everybody talking about
long-term treasuries and bond yields rising, what they're not talking about is the September
times September equals September cubed effect, which we'll get into here, has to do with repo,
repo fails were up, liquidity in the system, bond yields rising at this time of year,
calendar effects, the stuff that you don't hear about anywhere else. So credit spreads,
September effect and bond yields. Thank God it's October. I guess if you're a treasury owner,
or if you're looking to buy treasuries, whole bunch of stuff going on in bonds and credit,
including let's start with credit spreads that are not just rising, they are exploding higher
right here. Okay. First things first, credit spreads. Like I said, they're flashing a warning
sign. What color warning sign? Well, we'll get to that in just a second. And because they're
starting to flash a warning sign and they're aggressively moving higher, there is a connection
to VIX and therefore the stock market. So if you're a stock market investor or an equity
investor, this is something you maybe need to start paying attention to because the stock market,
if it continues, likely will. And then finally, like I said, thank God it's October for the
treasury market. What is it with US treasuries, especially long-term treasuries and September?
There's more than one September effect, which means in what we're going to go over here,
September times September equals another thing that seems to be happening yet again. So we'll
talk about the repeating connections, what they are and exactly what they mean for the marketplace
and maybe how that might play out as October starts to show up here. Yes, it does involve
repo and liquidity and euro dollar stuff. And like I said, long-term rates, but let's start
with credit spreads. The triple C's, the triple hooks, the triple hooks we've been watching for
quite some time. And as you can say, I told you from the very beginning of this video,
it made an aggressive move here. A lot of it has to do, or some of it has to do with interest
rates because rising interest rates is going to put stress on the entire credit markets.
Treasury yields go up. That means that refinancing becomes more expensive, especially relative to
expectations. You would expect risky credit to not like higher interest rates, but this is not just
an interest rate story. And right now, even at 1,150 or 1,170, whatever the spread is now,
I think it's 1,170. It's not necessarily to the point where we need to panic. It's not flashing
red. But like Peter Buchbauer said in my conversation with him from a couple of weeks
ago, which you can check out at Eurodollar Talks channel, it is a flashing yellow sign. And it is,
like I said, something that we're going to need to start paying attention to if you're in the
stock market, which I'll get to in just a second here. But this rising credit spreads, what makes
it particularly compelling, unlike you can see like the prior ones from August of 2024, the
Japanese carry trade blow up, or the tariff disorder from late March and early April of 2025,
where spreads just kind of skyrocketed higher. This has been coming ever since last September.
That's tricolor and first brands, not interest rates. That's credit cycle stuff. So you've got
a credit cycle that has been, since tricolor and first brands, slowly progressing toward the
downside. And we see that pretty clearly here in the riskiest parts of the public credit market.
And we've been talking about private credit, tricolor and first brands kicking all that off,
the cockroaches, the latest stuff with all the private credit funds experiencing liquidity
withdrawals, that kind of stuff. Here we are, the public marketplace that is pricing out the
same type of thing, which also goes along with we've talked about the public stock prices of
these BDCs and credit, but you put all of it together, it is credit market, credit market
signal. It's not just a one time volatile spike. This has been building for over a year. And now
we see not just a building over a year, it's starting to accelerate higher, at least in the
short run. Some of it having to do with interest rates, but the credit cycle is at, it's really
about the credit cycle here. Like I said, it's not a flashing red sign or flashing red warning
just yet flashing yellow, like Peter said, 1100, almost 1200 basis points. That's above last year's
spike. So we're well above the of the tariff disorder high from 2025 or way above the August
2024 carry trade high. We're now getting into territory that is equal to 2022. Not a good time
for credit markets or the stock market or the real economy because the real economy suddenly
forgot how to grow from that point forward. So the next level that we're really watching here for the
triple hooks anyway, is around 1300 basis points. And the reason is because credits getting risky,
I'm sure a lot of people said this, this was from freight waves last week, and this got shared all
over social media. 16 trucking companies hit bankruptcy court in less than a month because
of rising diesel prices. So you can understand why in addition to interest rates, the credit cycle
and perceptions of the credit cycle are starting to really seep in and accelerate some risk aversion
in the credit markets. And that is simply because energy shock, weak economy, fragile economy,
you've got some, you've got some, especially higher interest rates and refinancing costs,
you've got some weaker credits out there, which could potentially turn into defaults. And yes,
the 16 trucking companies, they're smaller companies, not a huge deal. I'm not talking
about thousands of jobs, let alone tens of thousands of jobs. But this is the kind of
behavior that you start seeing in these credit cycles, especially when it collide with the
macroeconomic cycle that leads to this type of selling and credit markets. So the next level,
like I said, we're looking for 1300 on the triple C's, the triple hooks, that would be more of a
flashing pinkish kind of warning that would say, okay, this is really starting to get serious.
And after that, historically speaking, you see 1500 basis points on the triple C's.
That's where you start to get really serious. So we aren't there yet. That's why it's a flashing
yellow. But the aggressive move higher in the short run is certainly something to pay attention
to. Now, like I mentioned, stock market, there is a correlation with the VIX. Before I get that,
I guess I'm going to do investment spreads, or investment grade spreads. Investment grade
spreads deviated pretty sharply with the riskier triple hooks going back to last September,
they started to deviate a little bit before that, but it really changed in direction,
completely different direction since last September. So the credit cycle moved into
private credit. And in the public space has been largely the riskier edges of the marketplace.
So rising credit spreads from the triple C's, which are the junkiest of the junk,
whereas investment grade corporate bonds and corporate credit and leverage loans and everything
else have been largely performing pretty well. Spreads were tightening apart from a couple
spikes, you know, the energy shock, the early days, the energy shock spiked up credit spreads
even before then. But afterwards, you know, credit spreads, investment grade spreads continue to move
downward. So big time deviation with between investment grade and risky spreads, which is
in some ways abnormal, but in other ways, it's kind of how cycles go. The fact that it has
persisted since last September is another compelling factor as well. The timing,
tricolor and first brands and credit cycle, but persisting for well over a year means this is not
really a short term thing. It's not really about interest rates. Interest rates don't help at least
in the more recent period. But this is something that's been going on for quite some time here,
which, again, another reason to take it seriously. And now we see that investment grade spreads are
starting to participate in at least this latest sell off, which is not a flashing red warning,
but that's another factor, another development that means you need to start paying attention
to it because the riskier credit spreads, if they start pulling spreads from investment grade
credits upward with them, which means it's no longer just the risky parts of the public
marketplace, we start to see the same type of risk aversion seep into the investment grade
end of things. That's when it starts to get serious. Now, the spike in spreads is not huge,
but it's there. It may be potentially a first start or at least the starting point for maybe
the credit spread and credit cycle widening out and broadening out. Like I mentioned,
stock market, there is a pretty loose but detectable and visible correlation between
the VIX and credit spreads, not necessarily the triple C's, but I do want to show the triple C's
because as you can see here on this chart, there is more than a passing resemblance.
And what's important about it is not that they're a perfect correlation, but generally speaking,
and this goes back before 2020, but generally speaking, they're moving in the same direction.
So if credit spreads, junk triple C's are going down, VIX is likely going down too. If credit
spreads are rising, the VIX is likely rising too, not in a straight line, not completely one-to-one,
but generally speaking, they're moving in the same direction, especially during these periods
where there's a spike, there's usually a spike in credit spreads, there's a spike in the VIX,
except for the last year. Once again, we see this tremendous divergence at going back to
tricolor and first brands where the stock market basically has ignored the credit cycle up until
this point, writing it off as nothing more than just a quirk of a small niche part of the
marketplace, even though the BDCs that are priced in the stock market have performed terribly,
they're trading well below net asset value. But by and large, the stock market as a whole
has been preoccupied with a whole bunch of other factors and not the credit cycle.
So the credit cycle starts to show up in the triple C's, it hasn't really shown up in the VIX
because the VIX is basically what we have is a collision of these titanic factors. We've got AI
and the potential capital expenditure boom on the one side, the positive side. And on the other side,
you've got basically everything else, macro economy, flat beverage, as well as now the
credit cycle. So the stock market has definitely focused on the AI side of things and believing
Jay Powell and now Kevin Warsh about the resilience of the economy, whereas the credit market is not
really convinced about either of those things. And so if one starts to move in the direction of the
other, if credit spreads were starting to really collapse at the triple C's and move in the
direction of the AI reflationary boom, that would be one thing. The more and more we're starting to
see financial markets move in the other direction. And the reason I bring up the VIX specifically
with the investment grade spreads is there's a much tighter correlation there. Again, it's not
one-to-one, but the VIX, the stock market and the investment grade part of the marketplace have
definitely been focused on anything but the credit cycle since last year. And a lot of this has to do
with passive investing. You invest in stocks mechanically, the flows go into stocks.
If you've got a 60-40 allocation, then some of that has to go to bonds. And bond managers
increasingly over the last year have been avoiding the risky parts of the credit market and everybody
rushing into the investment grade parts of the market, which is why there's a tighter
correlation between the VIX and these investment grade spreads. So if the triple C's are reflecting
an accelerating downturn in the credit cycle, which means spreads are starting to
really get aggressively higher, and that starts to filter into the investment part of the corporate
credit market, that's going to mean something about the stock market too. Again, not there yet,
but you at least have to start considering if it is spilling over, if there is a risky to investment
grade, then the next step would be the stock market having to pay attention, which would mean
more volatility in the stock market, less appreciation and focus on AI, more focus on
macroeconomy, the energy shock, which is the other titanic factor that's colliding here.
How does anybody really expect a reflationary economy to develop with massively high energy
costs that aren't going away anytime soon, and a whole bunch of poor credits
that are just hanging on, a lot of zombie companies too, they're just hanging on for dear life.
So as this gets more and more, if it does, if it goes from the junk parts, public credit as well
as private credit junk into the investment grade parts of it, then you're definitely going to see
a stock market reaction too. So something to be aware of as we're starting to get a bigger move,
at least here in the short run. So that's the credit spreads going on here. I just want to
take a moment here to tell you about Eurodollar University and our subscriptions. This is the
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help you along, filling in these massive gaps that have been left behind for decades by economists,
the mainstream central bankers, and all of it. So let's get back to September. September,
now that it's October 1st, we've seen what happened in the back half of September in particular.
Again, this is the kind of stuff you don't hear anywhere else because nobody pays attention to
these things. And of the few who do, they don't make these same connections. So September,
there's actually two different effects. The first one we call the September bottleneck.
And the reason it's a bottleneck is because it's a low point on the seasonal calendar.
It's not a cyclical thing, it's a structural thing that's embedded in the calendar. And
there are these bottlenecks every single quarter. They're quarterly bottlenecks,
not necessarily strictly about September. But September shows up repeatedly throughout
history and there's some ancient reasons for that. And September 15th specifically,
you think about all the main events that have clustered around September 15th in the modern
era. You go back to LTCM. LTCM failed a week after September 15th in 1998. Low point in liquidity
calendar. You got cyclical problems, the Asian not financial crisis combined with a low point
in the calendar. Next thing you know, we've got potentially a 2008 showing up in 1998 and it just
didn't for various reasons. But we've gone over here at URDAL University. So September 1998,
obviously September 2008. When did Lehman Brothers fail? The low spot on the calendar
that weekend, September 15th. There's been others, September 2019, September 16th,
2019. The repo mess that showed up there, low point on the calendar. So there is a September
bottleneck, a low point on the seasonal calendar. It doesn't show up every year.
It doesn't, it shows up every year, but it doesn't create big problems every year. It's
there every single year. So there's a September bottleneck focused right on the middle part
of the month of September the 15th. Then there's another September effect. And I'll get into these
in a little bit more detail as we go forward. So you can actually see them on the charts. You can
see everything that's going on. The other September effect is mainly about long-term treasuries.
Between sometime in August and ending sometime in October, therefore encompassing the entire
month of September. Ever since at least 2018, if not 2017, as you'll see, there has been a
September effect in long-term treasuries. They tend to rise for reasons that over a decade later,
it is over a decade because you started noticing this as early as 2011 or 2012, but it really
became a solid thing around 2017 and 2018. And this is not just U.S. Treasuries, by the way.
This is something you can see in JGBs or German bonds, French OATs, government bonds, Canadian
bonds, all over the planet. September. So August into September and into October,
long-term rates tend to rise. And like I was saying before, I interrupted myself and digressed.
I have spent a decade, over a decade, trying to figure out why this is. And to this day,
I still can't figure out. The fact that it happens globally across the bond markets
means it's not something specific to U.S. Treasuries or U.S. or U.S. dollars, meaning
Eurodollars. It's likely Eurodollar connecting everything else across the marketplace, which
it's something to do with banks, which could potentially point to regulations. I'm not
convinced on that either. But it's some global factor that causes bond yields specifically,
not specifically, but mostly long-term bond yields to rise August, September, and into some parts of
October. That's the second September effect. So we've got the bottleneck and we've got the
September effect. And what has happened over the last five years or so here in the 2020s
is those two September effects appear to be combining. So you've got the September bottleneck,
which is largely, repo is at the middle of it, because repo is, let's face it,
it's at the middle of a lot of things. So you've got September bottleneck, low level of liquidity.
You've got the September effect, which encompasses some reason for selling,
selling in long-term treasuries. And then this third September effect seems to be focused after
the bottleneck in the second half of September, which leads to an accelerating sell-off in
long-term US treasuries, which we'll get to that in just a second here. So let's talk about the
bottleneck real quick and what might actually connect these two Septembers together. If you're
not familiar to something called the basis trade, the basis trade was a bunch of hedge funds
realized that there's an inequity between treasury futures and long treasuries that has to converge
over time because that's the nature of the futures market. And the futures market means that this is
an arbitrage. But in order to take advantage of that arbitrage, hedge funds have to short treasury
futures and go long treasury bonds. And the reason they go, the way they go long treasury bonds is
through repo, because these are, you know, these are small amounts. These are fractions of basis
points, which means you got to have a ton of leverage. So when a ton of leverage means you
got to borrow in the repo market. When the basis trade starts to blow up, which means there's
difficulties and illiquidity in repo, you've got dollar problems in repo that leads to forced
selling in the U.S. treasury market. Last year is a perfect example, late March and really early
April 2025. Treasury started to really violently sell off and everybody's like, wait a minute,
the treasury rate should be going down. And the missing part of that was the illiquidity in the
repo market that developed as a part of the disorder related to the tariff disturbances,
the market chaos and everything that happened late March and into early April. So you had
liquidity problems centered on repo that caused basis traders to have to sell their U.S. treasuries
leading to rising treasury rates. And I hope you can already see where we're going with this.
So basis traders who, by the way, have become a very important marginal source of buying in the
U.S. treasury market, if they are hampered in some way because of repo market illiquidity, such as
immediate aftermath of a bottleneck, then they're going to be forced to either sell
treasuries or maybe they just can't buy them like they would normally do. So something happens,
illiquidity in the repo market for whatever reasons, secular reasons, calendar reasons,
cyclical reasons like April of 2025 or March of 2020. And you also see this earlier, 2008,
wasn't the basis trade, but similar type of thing shows up. Whenever you have illiquidity,
there's a connection to the treasury market. It's a global dollar shortage kind of thing.
And we just identified what is a global dollar shortage. And the connection to the repo market,
we can make tenuously through something like repo fails. This is a repo fails are a frustrating
signal, but it is a signal nonetheless. Whenever we see repo fails spike, that means that collateral
flow is impaired for some reason. In this case, it doesn't necessarily matter. And if collateral
flow is impaired, as we know here at Urdal University, because there's lots of material
showing us, I even got a presentation series on why collateral is so important, why collateral
needs to flow. And the fact that when collateral doesn't flow, cash doesn't flow because the
Eurodollar system is basically a binary system where collateral flows and cash flows. And if
collateral don't flow, cash don't flow. So when we see repo fails, that tells us that maybe there's
some kind of impediment or impairment in the flow of collateral. And if there's an impediment,
impairment, flow of collateral, there's probably an impediment impairment in the flow of cash.
So what do we see? Well, we see a spike in repo fails. This is a couple of weeks ago,
middle part of September, repo fails rise to above $320 billion combined.
Saw the same thing last year, middle of last September, repo fails were almost identical.
In fact, it's weird how close they are in terms of the numbers there. Go back to middle of September
2024, repo fails were much higher, over $400 billion. Not saying that repo fails at $320
is catastrophically bad, pointing to some kind of imminent collapse. What I'm saying is it's more
evidence and not dispositive, a completely provable evidence that something's going on
in repo, but it does tell us, it gives us a good sense that maybe there's a problem in repo. And
it does happen regularly at the quarterly bottleneck. And this goes back to various
points in the 2020s. So you can see that there's difficulties in repo around September 15th,
which is consistent with the idea of the bottleneck. And therefore,
knowing what we know about the basis trade and how dependent it is upon repo,
if there is a difficulty around the middle of the month of September with repo,
through the basis trade, especially how important the basis trade has become to the treasury market
as the marginal source of buying, something that interrupts basis trade, either forcing them to
sell or maybe not even forcing them to sell, but just being unable to buy like they normally would,
would create a disturbance in the treasury market, which would lead treasury rates, you would think,
to rise. So what do we see? Well, let's look back. So the September effect, the first September
effect, this is the calendar effect. You can see clearly August through October 2026, rates are
obviously rising, not just for the September effect. They're going up for a triche reasons
and the push from the short term two year, certainly doesn't help. We had it in 2024.
We saw it in maybe one of the most perfect examples in 2023, and really 2022 is the perfect
example. 2023, a perfect example. We didn't get much of a September effect in 2025, which at the
time we thought maybe this thing was over. Because one of the possibilities that could explain the
September effect in the bond market is just that traders got used to it. They saw it develop in
2017, 2018, 2019, and figured this is something that happens every year. So as a trader, I'm just
going to sell my treasuries in August and buy them back in October. It becomes sort of like a
self-fulfilling prophecy. So maybe given the conditions of 2025, traders are like, hey,
no reason to sell in August and buy back in October because rates are going down either way.
But whatever the reason, there wasn't much of a September effect, if any September effect last
year. There may have been a September Q, but we'll get to that in a second. So you keep going back in
time. August through October, you see the rise in yields is pretty consistent. You can go all the
way back to 2019, 2018, and even 2017, though 2017 was early September, not really August.
And there's a pretty consistent pattern here. It's a dependable, consistent pattern apart from 2025.
Something happens that causes the system to sell, especially long-term bonds,
August, September, and into October. Now, when we combine that with the bottleneck,
the September effect plus the bottleneck, we get this September cubed kind of a thing. And yes,
this is science. This is mathematical formula. September times September equals September cubed.
Obviously, I'm kidding. But it is a recurring pattern, which makes it something that you
should definitely consider as you're looking at whatever it is, whether it be investments in bonds
or just analysis of conditions, what bond yields are telling us. We go back to September of 2020.
There was really no September cubed in September 2020. There was a September bottleneck. There also
was a September effect. But at that point, there wasn't the September cubed. But you go back, you
go up to September of 2021. Suddenly, we start to see it. What it is, is that, okay, you have rates
that are rising, long-term rates that are rising due to the September effect. You hit the bottleneck,
and suddenly, you don't just have rates that are rising. You have rates that accelerate sharply
higher. Now, it wasn't a huge move in September 2021, but it's there. You can see it. It's
clearly visible. It was about 13 or 14 basis points. But when rates were that low, 13 or 14
basis points was a pretty substantial move. It wasn't as big as we've seen later on. But at that
time, we had short-term rates moving, medium-term rates moving, and then you got the September
bottleneck. Suddenly, you get this acceleration higher in rates in the second half of September.
The next one, one of the best examples, because you have rates rising pretty sharply even before,
this is in 2022, you get to the bottleneck in September 14th, a couple days later,
boom. You get this acceleration upward in treasury rates, and it lasts until September 29th. So the
second two weeks in September, accelerating selling in U.S. treasuries, long-term U.S.
treasuries. Fast forward to 2023, same thing. You got, see how you see rates that are going higher,
but they're going higher at one rate, and then suddenly, they accelerate upward after the
bottleneck. That's the September cubed effect, and I think it has to do with basis traders and
the illiquidity in the repo markets. We saw it again in 2024. A little bit afterward,
some of it had to do related to the FOMC meeting at the time, but it started even before the FOMC
meeting. So a little bit after September 14th, and then September 29th, you got the acceleration.
Rates continue to go higher from there, but they weren't accelerating at the same rate as they did
in the last week in September of 2024, and even in 2025, where there was no September effect,
you know, the calendar September effect, there was some selling between September 14th and
September 29th. It wasn't huge, but it was there nonetheless. So even in 2025, you get a little bit
of September cubed, and of course, here we're in September 26th, 2026, and once again, the bottleneck,
post-bottleneck, we've got a sharp acceleration, and maybe even that the acceleration before
September 14th, which is around the 11th and 12th, maybe that was just the marketplace getting a jump
on the bottleneck, because the bottleneck isn't exactly the 15th. It can move a day or two on
either side of the 15th, so maybe that was the entire acceleration upward. Either way, you see
it there. September cube shows up in 2026 in a very big way. So what that suggests is that in
addition to the stuff we've been talking about here, why are bond yields going up? Well, one thing,
we know it's not inflation expectation. The TIPS market tells us that. All these consumer surveys
tell us it's not inflation expectations. The flat curve and a bunch of other things tell us it's not
growth expectations either. A lot of it has to do with the expected path of short-term rates, which
is the expectation in the marketplace that the Federal Reserve is going to continue raising rates
regardless of macroeconomic fundamentals, because that's what central bankers do. But we also have
to consider that maybe, just maybe, one of the reasons why bond yields accelerated upward,
including the two-year Treasury, not all triche. Maybe part of it was September cubed, especially
since we see once again the accelerating sell-off in the second two weeks of September,
making a speculative connection between the bottleneck and therefore problems in repo,
therefore maybe basis traders who aren't buying Treasuries or maybe even selling them,
buying Treasuries in the way they would have before, maybe even selling them.
So now that we're in October, we'll see if the September cubed effect, along with the
whatever's left of the September calendar effect, and now that the, after we get past the September
bottleneck, which October 1st, especially October 2nd and October 3rd, we get past the September
bottleneck, we'll see what happens in the Treasury market. Does the Treasury sell-off start to come
down again? Do we see the September effect start to wear off? And how does all of that relate to
what we talked about earlier, which was credit markets, the credit cycle, because that's going
to be yield positive, and by yield positive, I mean yields going down, flattening curves,
all that kind of stuff. And if we get past, because it's, you know, thank God it's October,
if we get past all the September stuff, maybe Treasury rates will perform a little bit more
fundamentally. We've still got the pressure from, you know, triche risk at the Fed, but it's very,
very possible, if not likely, that one of the reasons why rates have skyrocketed or appeared
to skyrocket or soar or surge, whatever superlatives that get thrown around the mainstream,
a lot of it has to do with not fundamental reasons, but these technical reasons relating
the Treasury market to liquidity conditions, stuff that's going on in repo and the Euro-Dallas system.
So now that September's over, we'll see how this performs, but credit spreads, that's our key
warning to watch moving forward as it relates to the credit cycle, especially that it's now
spilling over into investment grade, which means it's moving further into the public market,
not just private credit, and that's, you know, the collision of the energy shock,
the macroeconomic cycle, the credit cycle, and on the positive side, AI, which the stock market is
focused on, maybe now that credit spreads are moving in investment grade, the stock market
will have to focus on credit cycle and macroeconomic fundamentals that go along with
it, the energy shock, and the energy shock's demand destruction effects on the economy,
which we're already seeing, that's why I brought up the Freightwaves articles about bankruptcies
and among truckers, all of these things combine to, they get you to the flat yield curve,
the flat yield curve which is resisting the trichiness in the front end of the yield curve,
for reasons, macro, fundamental reasons, and then the upside, upside pressure and rates,
short end as well as long end, maybe September cubed has a big part of it.
So we'll see moving forward, but now that we're into October,
credit spreads are the big one, and that's all I really want to talk about today,
I thought this was important enough to bring it up, especially on October 1st,
and today, Treasury market's pretty calm too, so who knows in the short run,
but see you all again very soon.