The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: origins and importance

Global Affairs Academy
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Oct 1, 2026
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In this presentation I want to talk about the origins of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS as I'll often refer to it, which is one of the most important
conventions for this field of law and possibly for public international law generally. So I'm
going to be moving through a variety of topics. Why is UNCLOS important? What does it cover?
Why would states negotiate a law on this subject matter? How that law has developed over the 20th
century and particularly through treaties? The origins of what's called the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea that ran from 1973 to 1982. The course of those negotiations
and where we are now. So let's begin with a basic question. Why is the Convention on the Law of the
Sea important? Well it's been referred to as a constitution for the oceans and that's because
it is simply a huge and incredibly detailed treaty. It runs to 320 articles, nine annexes
implementing agreements on topics such as fishing and seabed mining, and in 2013 165 of 193 UN
member states were parties. So it has enormous coverage. Another very important fact is that
the United States, while it is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, accepts most
of it as binding customary international law and on many topics is bound by equivalent treaty
provisions in any event. So what does the Convention on the Law of the Sea cover? Well it includes
rules for coastal states on their rights in the territorial sea and innocent passage, something
we'll cover in a later screencast, rules governing foreign commercial shipping and their interactions
with coastal states, the existence of a contiguous zone in which states can enforce their customs
laws, an exclusive economic zone governing, surprisingly or rather unsurprisingly, economic
activities out to 200 nautical miles from shore, and rights in a continental shelf under the water
column. It also includes special rules on the status of archipelagos and how waters around them
are to be governed, certain guarantees of navigation through international straits, and rights of access
to the sea for landlocked states. More than that, it also includes rules on uses of the high seas by
all states, including fishing and duties regarding conservation as well as navigation, rules on marine
pollution from both shipping and land, rules governing marine scientific research, and given
its incredible scope and detail, unsurprisingly it includes rules on how to resolve disputes
regarding the interpretation or application of any of these rules. However, during the negotiation
of UNCLOS a major controversy was how to govern seabed mining in the area beyond national
jurisdiction. So once we get beyond the exclusive economic zone in the continental shelf, what rules
will govern mining in that deep seabed region, or as it's referred to in the convention, the area
with a capital A. This may lead you to ask, well why would states agree to have a law of the sea?
Wouldn't they simply be better to be free to do whatever they want to do on the high seas or beyond
national jurisdiction? And this is where scholarship helps us understand some of the reasons states
have for cooperating in this fashion. So I'm going to introduce very quickly two theories, one of
balancing of interest between states and the other of reciprocity. So MacDougall and Burke in their
major work on the public order of the oceans saw the law of the sea as balancing two sets of
interests, what they called exclusive interests and inclusive or general interests. So exclusive
interests belong to, for example, coastal or flag states. So coastal states will want control of
fisheries close to their shore and flag states will want exclusive control of their flag vessels on
the high seas. But those have to be weighed against inclusive or general interests of all states.
All states will want freedom of navigation in territorial waters or may want to cooperate
regarding high seas fishing so it doesn't become a tragedy of the commons. So the key is balancing
these different interests and the classic example is, as I've already indicated, rules on the use
of the territorial sea. So how do you balance the rights of a coastal state to regulate its fisheries
with other states' interests in being able to navigate through those waters? However, a note of
caution that we can strike about this balancing theory comes from the work of Guidel, a major
French writer on the law of the sea in the early 20th century, and he suggested that this kind of
balancing approach could imply a false opposition because coastal states will also often be flag
states. So the same state will want both control over its waters and freedom of navigation in other
states' waters. That brings reciprocity into play. That means you're only going to propose rules
you are prepared to be bound by because the rules you seek to enforce on others, say as a coastal
state, may come back to bite you when you are a navigating state and want freedom of navigation
through other coastal states' waters. So the law of the sea in the 20th century has developed
principally through a process of codification and progressive development. So codification means we
put rules that everyone already agrees to in writing and progressive development is essentially
the suggestion or negotiation of new rules. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations system
have provided a forum for both this codification and progressive development of rules on the law
of the sea, largely through treaty making. So sometimes treaties reduce to writing rules everyone
already agrees upon and sometimes they create new rules. So let's look at the history of the law of
the sea through treaties. These are the major 20th century treaty making efforts. There was the League
of Nations codification conference of 1930, the first UN conference on the law of the sea in 1958,
a second UN conference in 1960 and then the incredibly long-running third UN conference
on the law of the sea from 1973 to 1982. And some older textbooks in particular will use the
abbreviation UNCLOS only to refer to that third UN conference. So briefly, when the League of Nations
contemplated in 1930 the law of the sea, what was it concerned with? Essentially they were concerned
with questions about the territorial sea and these questions were debated but they did not result in
a treaty being adopted. To boil the debate down, most states supported the idea that states had
sovereignty over their territorial sea, that this was a zone of sovereign jurisdiction. However, on
the critical question of how wide the territorial sea should be, there was no consensus. There was
traditionally a cannon shot rule, the idea that states had a zone of control in their territorial
waters out to the distance that a cannon could be fired, so a sort of theory of military force,
but there was consensus that rule was no longer really useful and should be replaced by something
more precise, a rule expressed in nautical miles, but there was no agreement on whether it should be
a three, four or six nautical mile territorial sea. And the division here was between the great
naval powers, the United Kingdom and the United States, who wanted the maximum freedom of movement
for their warships and coastal states, who wanted the maximum zone of control near their coasts.
So we've had that debate at the League of Nations, little progress has been made, we turn now to the
United Nations era after 1945. What's happening here? Well, let's look into the history of the
first UN conference on the law of the sea in 1958. Now following World War II, there was increasing
state interest in control over maritime natural resources. President Truman of the United States
issued proclamations on US control of its continental shelf and fisheries adjacent the coast.
That development of the law of the sea by states suddenly makes codification of the law of the sea
an important issue. The United Nations International Law Commission, the ILC, a committee of experts
that reports to the General Assembly on legal issues, begins a project in which they aim to
produce draft articles on the law of the sea, draft articles which could eventually be turned
into a treaty. So this is both potentially a codification and progressive development exercise.
So the ILC works on the issue for a number of years from 1949 to 1956 and eventually produces
its articles concerning the law of the sea and submits them to the UN General Assembly.
Now these articles then formed the basis for negotiations in Geneva in 1958, the first UN
conference on the law of the sea, sometimes referred to as UNCLOS 1. In the course of debating
the ILC articles they're split up into a variety of treaties on different topics and the precise
formulation of the rules in these treaties changes sometimes in the course of negotiations but often
quite a lot of detail survives from the ILC drafting. So we have treaties produced on the
territorial sea and the contiguous zone, on the high seas, on fishing and conservation of the
resources of the high seas and on the continental shelf, as well as an optional protocol on
compulsory dispute settlement. But one key issue goes unresolved and that's the width of the
territorial sea. There is agreement however that the contiguous zone which is adjacent to the
territorial sea cannot exceed 12 nautical miles. So there's at least some sense that there's an
outer limit to coastal state control at about 12 nautical miles but no rule is settled on the
breadth of the territorial sea. So the second UN conference on the law of the sea of 1960 is called
to resolve this one single issue, the deadlock on the width of the territorial sea, and a proposal
for a six-mile territorial sea plus a six-mile contiguous zone fails by one vote. So this sets
the stage for the third UN conference, the really long-running one, and by this time in the 1970s
there are a range of new developments that suggest the need for a new convention. So there's an issue
surrounding seabed resources, increasing issues surrounding fisheries, protection of the marine
environment, and decolonisation. And I'll come to each of those in turn. The first point about
seabed resources is that large parts of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction are covered
with polymetallic nodules that are rich in valuable materials like nickel, cobalt, and so on.
And they look something like this. They're exactly how they're described. They're small
nodules composed of various metals found on the deep seafloor. At around this time, new estimates
of the quantity of these nodules on the deep seabed, along with the development of new technology,
suggested that there would soon be a gold rush of deep sea mining, that this could be
extremely profitable. The question then arises, well if there is going to be this gold rush,
should all this wealth go to develop states that already have the technology necessary to do this?
Won't this just result in newly independent states losing out once again on the rich getting
rich and the poor getting poorer? So how will we handle this as an international community?
Also, there's a question about fisheries jurisdiction. So an increasing number of states
are asserting that they have a 200 nautical mile exclusive fishery zone off their coast,
and what will be done about that development? And also, pollution had not been a big issue
in previous conventions, but now protection of the marine environment was much more on the agenda,
particularly because of the major oil spill of 1967, the Torrey Canyon disaster, which brought
the issue to particular prominence. Also, as I've already hinted, we had the issue of newly
independent states emerging in a post-colonial era. So the shape of the international community
was now very different from the post-World War II international community in which the United
Nations had been formed. So you have a large number of newly independent states, effectively a majority
in the General Assembly of the UN, and they are much poorer states and much less developed than
the states that had founded the UN system. Now, Malta's ambassador to the United Nations,
a diplomat called Avid Padro, says, well, wait a minute, many of these issues are closely related,
or we're not going to reach agreement on one without reaching agreement on the other. Therefore,
we need to address all of these issues in a package so we can negotiate trade-offs between
them. So we're going to need a new Law of the Sea Convention. And that's how we get to the third
UN conference. However, we're then faced with long and difficult negotiations. As I've repeatedly
emphasised, this is a very long treaty negotiation process, possibly the longest in history. It runs
from 1973 to 1982. Negotiation proceeds by consensus. You don't vote on individual articles.
And that's because the whole thing is being negotiated as a package deal. Everything is being
traded off against everything else. And the subject matter involved is huge. All ocean activities
are in the mix. The simple scale of what was going on means that much of the work has to proceed in
committees. And many of these committees consist really of the groups most interested in particular
issues, for example, fisheries or the continental shelf. And the other point to make here is that
the whole idea of the package deal was that this was going to be a convention which did not allow
states to enter reservations. So reservations normally mean you can say we accept all of the
treaty, but not the following provisions. This was going to be a treaty where you accepted all of it
or none of it. There was to be no picking and choosing. And that allowed some of the trade-offs
involved to be negotiated. When you couple the package deal with consensus decision making,
this means that the entire convention is a finely balanced set of trade-offs between different
interest groups. As we've already said, the result is a vast and seemingly comprehensive
convention referred to by Ambassador Tomiko as a constitution for the oceans. However, at the last
minute, the adoption of the final text was not by consensus. The United States forces a vote.
Why does it do that? Well, the answer is the United States and a number of other industrial
states have concerns about the deep seabed mining regime that's been established as part of this
complex set of trade-offs in the UNCOS negotiations. And here's a stylized view of
what was going on. So everyone agreed that mining on the seafloor beyond national jurisdiction
would require the supervision of an international seabed authority, an ISA. But over here on the
left of my diagram, developing states wanted a strong ISA, internationally controlled mining
and production controls, so limits on the amount of minerals that could be extracted from the deep
seafloor so as not to disturb their mining industries and technology transfer requirements,
so they too could have access to mining technology. Highly industrialized states that already had
corporations investing in deep seabed mining wanted a much weaker ISA, essentially just a
registry system. And they wanted a commercialized system of mining, not one that was run by the
international community. And they wanted protection for the investments that had already been made by
private companies and protection of the intellectual property in the technology
they had developed. So the complex compromise ISA system that was eventually established under the
convention proved unacceptable to developed states. However, without them participating,
no seabed mining would ever occur because they were the only ones with the technology, so they
had an effective veto. And indeed this issue could have blocked them participating in the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea at all. So this was a very serious deadlock. So the result was the
so-called Implementation Agreement of 1994. It simplified the ISA arrangements. Developed states
were going to have greater influence over ISA decision-making procedures, and mining corporations
were going to pay much lower royalties on their activities outside national jurisdiction. This
had the strange result, though, that in effect the deep seabed mining regime was amended before
the treaty even came into force, which is highly unusual. Normally you can only amend a treaty once
it's come into force. But this Implementation Agreement allowed developed states to join
UNCLOS with confidence that they had an international seabed authority regime they could
live with. So that was the course of negotiations. Where are we now? Well, UNCLOS is now the most
important treaty governing the uses of the oceans. However, despite the ISA amendments or the
Implementation Agreement being designed to meet US objections, it has still not ratified the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the seabed mining regime remains a central political issue
in that decision. Nonetheless, as I've already said, the US accepts much of UNCLOS's binding
customary international law, and here is the further reading I'd recommend on this topic
in some of the key classic and most recent textbooks. Thank you for listening. I hope you
found this interesting.
