ARMED REPRISALS IN ITALY: German Interpretation of International Law in World War II Part 3

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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis video examines the legal evolution and systemic application of \"reprisals\" by the German military, specifically focusing on the atrocities committed against Italian civilians during WWII. It analyzes how the doctrine of retaliation was used to justify mass executions and torture, transforming a legal concept of proportionality into a tool for state-sanctioned war crimes and terror.
In the early weeks of the First World War, a party of Germans and native soldiers stationed
in German Southwest Africa crossed the border into neighboring Portuguese West Africa.
As a result of a translation error during a parley, three German officers were killed by
the Portuguese soldiers. In retaliation, the Germans attacked six border posts
and killed a number of Portuguese and Angolans, including prisoners executed by machine gun fire.
The Germans did not consider their use of force anything unusual.
While unthinkable today in the Western world, the use of deadly force in reprisals was a
universally accepted practice, dating back centuries at least as far as Alexander the Great.
As discussed in an earlier video, a reprisal in the legal sense of the word is the use of
illegal means to compel an enemy combatant to adhere to international law. After the war,
Portugal made claims for damages, Swiss arbitrators compiled thousands of pages of evidence,
and an international tribunal convened in 1928 found the German governor had acted illegally.
Since the initial shooting by the Portuguese soldiers resulted from a translation error,
it was a mistake rather than an intentional breach of law, and thus the Germans had no case for a
reprisal. The violent German response, which included the execution of civilians, was also
found to be disproportionate. The inference drawn from the ruling was that a proportionate use of
In the meantime, restrictions on the use of lethal force began to be imposed by the Geneva
Convention of 1929, which specifically forbade reprisals against prisoners of war. The application
of deadly reprisals against civilians technically remained legal, through an absence of specific
legislation, though it was understood that any reprisals had to be justified by various criteria.
This legal understanding followed the Germans into the Second World War,
and guided their conduct in interactions with civilian populations.
The experiences of the German 65th Infantry Division make a useful case study. The 65th
was unique for being one of a handful of German infantry divisions to serve throughout the Italian
campaign. Italy was one of Germany's most important allies, beginning in 1940 when Mussolini, the
self-styled Il Duce, opportunistically invaded southern France in support of German operations.
They invaded Greece the same year, and performed so badly that Hitler had to divert forces from
the upcoming invasion of Russia to finish the campaign. Italy contributed an army to the
invasion of Yugoslavia the same month, and then sent an expeditionary force to Russia.
Italy also began attacking British territory in North Africa in 1940, capturing Somaliland,
but eventually losing all of East Africa by the end of 1941, while at the same time
unsuccessfully invading Egypt from Libya. In February 1941, German forces again came to the
rescue, and soldiers of the two Axis nations fought side by side during the seesaw battles
in the North African desert. After the fall of North Africa in the spring of 1943, German
forces moved into Italy in sizable numbers to prepare for the Allies' inevitable invasion.
Relations between soldiers of the two Axis partners remained good, at least on the surface.
The 65th Infantry Division left its bivouacs in the Austrian Alps in August 1943 for the long
trip south. They were met by waving crowds, and at Udina, an Italian band even played Lili Marlene
for them. The troops were reminded by their officers that Italy was an ally, and to treat
the local population correctly. That was the official word. Unofficially, German troops
regarded the Italians as a weak partner, and officers especially were disdainful of both their
fighting abilities and their unwillingness to participate in the persecution of the Jews.
Italy's fascist government had passed anti-Semitic laws in 1938, but the citizenry showed none of the
zeal that German citizens had in expelling the Jews from everyday life. Italian officers in Africa,
Yugoslavia, and Greece had even gone so far as to protect the Jewish citizens in their areas of
operations. German officers, conditioned to treat race and the so-called Jewish question as
fundamental issues, found the Italian attitude incomprehensible. Since the Germans believed
themselves to be superior to the Jews, the pro-Jewish attitude of Italian officers forced
the Germans to conclude that the Italians too were inferior to Germans. When the 65th Infantry
Division moved to coastal defense positions around Ravenna, on average the local population acted
correctly. Some Italians were especially warm, others particularly frosty, but there was always
an unspoken fear that the presence of Germans around their homes was an invitation to Allied
air attack. It was not unfounded, as the Royal Air Force had begun bombing Italy in 1940 and
continued raids on Italian ports into 1943 as a means of supporting the campaign in North Africa.
The 65th Division in particular, traveling along the eastern Adriatic coast, found the Italians
are unprepared for war. Valuable artifacts remained on display in public buildings,
none of which were protected from bombing with sandbags or window coverings. Coastal fortifications
were primitive, usually simple earthen pits. Contacts between German and Italian troops were
rare. When two German airmen were shot dead by Italian sentries on 14 August, the 65th Division
instituted daily passwords, in Italian, for all Axis soldiers in the sector. In September 1943 the
division moved to the mountain passes near La Spezia on the western side of the country. On 7
September a last moment of German-Italian cooperation occurred when one of the 65th's
regimental commanders took the march past of his men, accompanied by an Italian Alpini officer.
The next evening men of the division were stunned to hear the population cheering. Italy had agreed
to an armistice. There had been no appreciable act of armed resistance to Mussolini during his reign.
The Duce's fall from grace in July 1943 had been brought about by the monarchy,
with elements of the army and Mussolini's own fascist party. When the King and Marshal Bedoglio
fled Rome in September 1943, competing liberation committees were formed with subcommittees in all
major regions occupied by the Germans. The National Liberation Committee coalesced from a number of
anti-fascist groups. In the north there was greater support for the communists, who created their own
National Liberation Committee of Upper Italy. Germany had prepared plans to take over
administration of the country, and on September 8 the plan went into effect. A German puppet government
was installed in areas they controlled, and as German forces disarmed Italian troops, the Italian
Social Republic was declared under Mussolini. As the liberation committees grew, multiple competing
ideologies found representation, and Republicans, Fascists, Christian Democrats, and Anarchists
all formed partisan groups. The opposite extremes were represented on the one hand by the monarchists
and on the other by the communists. The latter were referred to as the Red Neckties by the Germans
after the practice of identifying themselves with red scarves. Collectively the partisans
were referred to as gangs or bandits by the Germans as a means of delegitimizing them.
The groups included former Italian officers, allied liaisons, and sometimes even German
deserters. They stole what they needed to survive, sometimes augmented by allied airdrops, and often
fought each other in addition to fighting German and Italian military, paramilitary, and security
troops. The 65th Infantry Division at La Spezia found the Italian 6th Mountain Division initially
refused to surrender, but eventually yielded their blocking positions in front of the port.
Standing orders were to disarm any Italian soldiers and demobilize them on the spot,
permitting them to return to their homes as civilians. The 65th encountered no real trouble,
but elsewhere the first German anti-partisan operations in Italy were being carried out,
including the first reprisal action against the populace by troops of the 1st SS Panzer Division.
For the most part though, the partisans spent the winter of 1943-44 either looting for survival items
or conducting very limited operations such as local assassinations. After the Allies landed
at Salerno, the 65th Infantry Division moved south where it spent three months on the Sangro River.
The Italian citizens in southern Italy were mostly poor, farm equipment was primitive, and much work
was done by hand. Cooking in farms and villages was done over open fireplaces, and electric lights
were luxuries. The 65th Infantry Division was engaged in heavy frontline combat and had no
contact with partisans in this period. The division suffered heavy losses in its efforts to defend
Orsonia in the winter line and pulled out for refitting in early 1944. The Germans still found
that Italian civilians in the cities treated German soldiers correctly, and one veteran of
the 65th remembered them as friendly and helpful, though there was an underlying widespread if
secret feeling among Italian civilians that the Germans were prolonging the war unnecessarily by
fighting on Italian soil. After its refit, the 65th moved to Anzio where the front remained
stagnant for long stretches. German soldiers and local Italian civilians were forced to live
in the same difficult conditions, often in caves and dugouts. Some soldiers of the division
relocated to Maliana for rest, and here again the Italian civilians were if not friendly,
then at least correct in one-on-one encounters with German soldiers. The division's history
noted in 1974 that some former soldiers were still in touch with the Italian homeowners
that they had been billeted with in 1944. By March 1944, with Allied soldiers at Anzio so close to
Rome, partisans began to increase their activities. There was a general strike in German occupied
cities that month, along with acts of sabotage and guerrilla activity. The most significant event
occurred on 23 March 1944 when a bomb was exploded on Via Rosselli in Rome, killing 32 German
policemen and wounding 110 others. In response to the Via Rosselli bombings, Hitler ordered that
10 Italians be killed for every German that had died in the attack. The Germans cleared the jails
of Italian citizens convicted to death for other crimes in order to comply, and added a number of
Jewish prisoners. 335 Italians were summarily herded into a cave and executed in small batches
the day after the bombing. The cave was then sealed. By May 1944, the rise of partisan groups
in German-controlled Italy prompted Field Marshal Keitel, the commander of the Armed Forces High
Command, to charge Field Marshal Kesselring, the supreme commander of German military forces in
Italy, to coordinate the fight against Italian partisans. Kesselring was given authority over
SS and police forces in Italy, and soon commanded military police, Italian guard companies,
battalions of former Soviet, Czech and Slovakian soldiers, with the German security police,
order police and gendarmerie taking the lead in anti-partisan operations.
The war changed irrevocably in the first week of June 1944 when Rome fell to the Allies and a
third front opened in Normandy. The attitude of Italian citizens shifted and partisan groups began
operating more openly along the German lines of communication. On 16 June 1944 the 65th Infantry
Division, retreating north of Rome, had its first encounter with partisans in the Rocca Strada area
where a strong band of 400 men was closing roads, destroying bridges, power and phone lines,
abducting political prisoners from local Italian militia units and ambushing German vehicles.
German authorities issued warnings to the citizens not to support these groups,
increased their sentries and restricted the movement of Italian civilians. Security and
fighting patrols were formed as needed to attack the partisans. After bridges at Forsini and
Montecchiano were destroyed, the Divisional Fusilier Battalion formed Security Group Reichert,
named after the battalion commander, to secure the Siena-Grassea road. With this action a new
phase of the war began for the 65th Infantry Division. Coincidentally the next day, 17 June 1944,
Field Marshal Kesselring promulgated new regulations throughout Italy.
The fight against the partisans must be carried out with all means at our disposal and with the
utmost severity. I will protect any commander who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice
and severity of the means he adopts whilst fighting partisans. In this connection the old
principle holds good that a mistake in the choice of the means to achieve an objective is always
better than failure to act or neglect. Partisans must be attacked and destroyed. The wording of
the order was to have unfortunate consequences for Kesselring personally, but more significantly
the lives of hundreds of Italian civilians. The atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres in
Italy is the product of a joint commission between Italy and Germany begun in 2009. It is in essence
a catalogue of Italian civilians killed by German forces during the war. The atlas identified at
least two dozen incidences of violence committed either by soldiers of the 65th Infantry Division
or by unknown parties in the 65th's area of operations. The killings included civil crimes
such as the rape and murder of five women by German soldiers, crimes which the German army
held its soldiers accountable for. The majority however were related to reprisal actions. The first
incident occurred on 15 June when a 20-year-old resident of Santa Maria Amonte named Bini Alfonso
was captured by the headquarters of security group Richert. The Germans had been ordered to secure
San Gimignano after partisans freed prisoners from the jail there on 9 June. Local partisans
heard that Alfonso was captured and planned to rescue him, but were talked out of it by the
Bishop of Colle Valdelsa. The Bishop's fear was that the Germans would take reprisals on innocent
civilians, already a well-known practice. The Germans secured 30 hostages, put Bini on trial
by a military court, convicted him and sentenced him to death. The hostages were released.
Partisans blew up the Catello bridge on the Rocca Cornado Fanano road, and on 21 June
ambushed a German car at the bridge site, killing two German soldiers and wounding a third.
The Germans immediately took reprisals, setting fire to a house, killing 40-year-old Pietro Fiocchi
and his 49-year-old brother Domenico Fiocchi, and administering physical beatings to their families.
Other Italians were captured and forced to dig graves, perhaps as a psychological punishment,
for they were released without further injury. Two days later, German troops entered Fanano,
where the leader of the partisans who blew up the Catello bridge lived. Several Italians were found
to be in possession of weapons and ammunition. They were captured and interrogated, a civilian
was killed, and a number of houses were razed. One civilian attempting to help a house owner
was beaten by the Germans. A local religious figure intervened and, with the help of a woman
who spoke German, explained that detainees were not in fact partisans. The Germans withdrew to
Lizzano, where a dozen hostages were eventually released, but before they left, they killed Luigi
Bococchi, a young sailor three days shy of 18 years old. His corpse was left on the ground
with orders not to move it. He had been positively identified as a member of the 7th Modena Partisan
Brigade. On 27 June, the Germans began a roundup near Lizzano after an act of sabotage. A firefight
ensued and two partisans were left behind to cover the retreat of the band. One was killed,
an 18-year-old Ettore Gobolini, was captured, interrogated, and tortured. He refused to give
any information, spat at his interrogators, and was hanged that evening. Both men's bodies were
publicly displayed. A day later, on 28 June 1944, Field Marshal Kesselring broadcast an appeal to
Italian civilians, claiming the Allies had incited criminal attacks on German military installations
behind the lines. Up to now I have proved that to me the respect of human principles is a matter
of normal logic. However, as a responsible commander, I can no longer hesitate to prevent
by the most repressive means this despicable and medieval method of fighting. I give warning that
I shall use these means forthwith. Followers of the Allies and subversive elements are warned not
to continue the behavior shown hitherto. Partisan activity in the 65th Division's
area of operations continued to intensify. Two bicyclists of the division were killed
by members of the Malargia Partisan Formation on the night of 28-29 June in what was likely
a chance encounter. A unit of the division in nearby Valpromaro heard of the deaths and ordered
reprisals. Twenty civilians were rounded up. Some were sent to the SS headquarters at San
Macario. The others remained at Valpromaro when a local teacher and parish priest convinced the
Germans to keep them there, alive, as hostages to guarantee the safety of German soldiers.
Later that day, the parish priest was sent to Gambatella where partisans had captured a German
soldier. The priest was told to negotiate the release of the prisoner for hostages held by
the Germans. The priest and a well-known Italian Republican were spared, but 12 Italian men ranging
from 17 to 52 years old were shot to death. On 1 July 1944, Field Marshal Kesselring assured
the German soldiers in Italy that his words weren't to be regarded as an empty threat.
His orders read in part,
Where there are considerable numbers of partisan groups, a proportion of the male population of
the area will be arrested. In the event of acts of violence being committed, these men will be shot.
The population must be informed of this. Should troops etc. be fired on from any village,
the village will be burned down. Perpetrators or ringleaders will be hanged in public.
All countermeasures must be hard, but just. The dignity of the German soldier demands it.
In July and August 1944, punitive measures were undertaken by Germans against partisans
and civilians throughout Italy, resulting in the death of over a thousand Italian men,
women and children. In the 65th Infantry Division's area of operations, some shootings
restrict enforcement of curfews. For example, a father returning to an off-limits village with
his two children to look for food was captured on 25 July and shot on the spot. In another case in
July, five German soldiers were captured by partisans of the Carlino Band who did not have
the resources to feed and manage them. Unsuccessful in attempts to transfer them to another partisan
group, they killed the Germans instead. Two days later, the town of Piovoli was subjected to a
reprisal action in which any Italian men encountered were indiscriminately killed.
When family members asked permission to bury the dead men at the local cemetery,
the Germans initially refused, fearing it would be an admission of wrongdoing,
but the parish priest intervened and the 18 men, ranging in age from 16 to 62,
were given proper burials. The nature of encounters varied widely. On 2 August 1944,
elements of the 65th engaged in a firefight with partisans of the Baricchi Band. Both sides
reinforced during the battle and the Germans were forced to withdraw, suffering the death of a
senior NCO in the process. The partisans left but returned a day later, suspecting the Germans would
attempt a reprisal among the civilians there. A force of 200 Germans did return, arresting men
and burning and demolishing everything but the church and school. They took 11 prisoners, shot
five of them and released six. The youngest of the dead was 17, the oldest 44. A week later,
a surprise search of an apartment in Pistoia found a displaced man cleaning weapons in the
parsonage. He was shot as a suspected partisan collaborator. Pistoia became an active war zone
as the Allies approached the Arno line and raids and reprisals by the Germans were numerous.
At San Pantaleo on 12 August, a woman named Amelia Bruna approached a number of houses
the Germans were wiring for demolition, possibly as part of a reprisal action. The woman was likely
retrieving personal belongings, but the Germans didn't question her. They waited until she was
inside her home, then detonated the explosives. Large population centers such as Pistoia and
Pescia were by now receiving the heavy German security presence. Italian patriotic action
groups operated inside the cities, while partisan groups roamed the nearby hills. Ordinary Italian
civilians lived in constant fear, caught in the middle. On 17 August 1944, two German officers
named Joachim Floset and Fleintz Fopp were killed by partisans, which included a number of ex-Wehrmacht
Austrian deserters. The partisans escaped the area and only old men, women and children were present
in San Quirico when soldiers of the 65th division arrived on the morning of 19 August. The women were
invited to leave with the children. Old men and the sick were locked in the church with the rector,
while Germans looted and burned the village houses. The old men were forced to dig what
they thought was their own graves, but a group of 20 younger laborers were selected for execution
instead. They were shot at the local cemetery and buried by the old man and the rector.
By now, the German policy of 10 dead Italians for every dead German soldier was well known.
In September, the 65th division passed into the Opowin Alps, a 55 kilometer long mountain
range that was also a pronounced partisan area. As early as 7 September, Major Reichert once again
formed a bandit fighting force from his Fusilier battalion to secure roads. Three days later, parts
of the divisional anti-tank battalion were also assigned to fight partisans in the area of Piva
Palago Lama. By the second half of September, Allied forces were operating with varying degrees
of success against the right wing of the 65th infantry division in the Serachio Valley. Throughout
German-occupied Italy, clashes with partisans were intensifying. Reprisal shootings were also
increasing, but reports of at least 20 cases of indiscriminate killings caused alarm at Kesselring's
headquarters. The field marshal admonished his command on 24 September. Instances have occurred
within the last few weeks which caused the greatest harm to the dignity and discipline of
the German armed forces, which had nothing to do with punitive measures. Just three days later, the
largest killing associated with the 65th infantry division occurred, allegedly carried out by the
First Company of Grenadier Regiment 146, though the atlas suggests SS troops and army soldiers
of the 42nd Jäger Division may also have participated. A company of Germans was fired
on by partisans, and despite taking no casualties, reprisals were ordered. Civilians in Pion Divo
were rounded up and killed, and houses were razed. A German-speaking civilian was spared,
but a partisan who blundered into the town on a motorcycle during the killings was hanged from a
tree, his body left on display to warn others. When citizens in Poggio Ferrato were lined up
against a wall, two Germans who had escaped partisan custody intervened and stopped the
execution. At Viticotico, Italian men were likewise lined up for execution in the town square,
but the parish priest intervened and a number were spared. All told, over the course of five days,
101 Italians were killed in a number of locations. At the same time, the Germans also released a
number of hostages, often at the insistence of local religious figures. The final killing
attributed to the 65th Division occurred on 4 October, when a married couple was shot for
hiding a German deserter at Cargia. Their corpses were burned along with their home.
Between June and August 1944, the German forces in western Italy retreated in good order from
the Trasimene line north to the Arno River. The 65th Division, shredded during its fight at Anzio
south of Rome, was rebuilt during the retreat by men of the East Prussia Shadow Division.
Training and combat experience among the men was below average. The Arno line proved to be only a
station, and on 30 August, the 65th received its first orders to move back to the Green Line,
known in Allied accounts as the Gothic Line, where Kesselring intended to spend the winter.
The division solidified positions astride Highway 65 and the Futa Pass, connecting Florence to
Bologna as the campaign in central Italy came to an end. Similarly, the intensive partisan actions
of the summer also ended. There were so many partisan volunteers now that the Allies couldn't
arm them all. German security forces reorganized beginning in September 1944, while the partisan
forces created free zones, from which they hoped to concentrate forces and launch major operations,
as Tito was doing in Yugoslavia. They were not successful, and the premature designation of a
number of free zones served only to water down partisan activity. German security forces launched
a blitz of the rear areas in October, by which time the 65th Division had firmly settled into
its winter positions. They defended the Futa Pass without seeing major partisan action until April
1945 and the final Allied offensives. The 65th was compelled to retreat through Bologna and was
shattered in the final days of the war during a disorganized retreat across the Po River,
where units had been told to save themselves and run for the Austrian border. Field Marshal Albert
Kesselring was put on trial after the war as an accused war criminal. At issue were the number
of killings of civilians that occurred during his time as Supreme Commander in Italy. Kesselring
defended the orders of 17 June and 1 July as legal, stating the intent was to remind German
troops they were permitted to do severe things, but had to remain within the law, and he defended
as appropriate his quotation of a principle which, by 1944, had appeared in German training manuals
for a hundred years, that it was better to select inappropriate means to achieve an objective than
to fail to meet the objective. A mistake in the choice of the means to achieve an objective is
always better than failure to act or neglect. Kesselring further defended the taking of hostages
and the infliction of reprisals as legal, noting his orders were to be hard but just. During the
trial the prosecutors conceded that even in the case of the largest mass killing of Italian
civilians by the Germans in Italy, the Germans had been justified in imposing reprisals.
The legality of the killings was not dismissed out of hand. The judge advocate pointed to the
fact that Hitler had ordered 330 Italians killed, a 10 to 1 ratio, but by an error 335 Italians had
been executed. Clearly, the judge advocate noted, five of these 335 were murdered since they fell
outside the limit given by Hitler. Therefore it was a war crime. Again, as in 1928, the inference
was left open that if the killings had not been excessive or disproportionate, they would not
have been crimes, but rather permissible under existing international law. The understanding
of the major combatants related to hostages was introduced at Nuremberg in defense of Germans on
trial as war criminals. A German military law text published in 1941 read, hostages are held in a kind
of safe custody. They vouch with their lives for the lawful conduct of the opponent. According to
the usages of war, it must be announced that hostages are being taken and for what purpose.
Above all, the taking of hostages has to be brought to the notice of those for whose lawful
conduct the hostages are a guarantee. If the event which was to be prevented by the taking
of hostages occurs, e.g. if the opponent continues his unlawful conduct, the hostages can be killed.
U.S. Army Field Manual 2710 published in 1940 confirmed that the allies had a similar understanding
of international law of the time. Hostages taken and held for the declared purpose of ensuring
against unlawful acts by the enemy forces or people may be punished or put to death if unlawful
acts are nevertheless committed. Similarly, the British manual of military law at the time stated
reprisals were retaliation for illegitimate acts of warfare for the purpose of making the enemy
comply in future with the recognized laws of war. They are by custom admissible as an indispensable
means of ensuring legitimate warfare. They are not a means of punishment or of arbitrary vengeance
but of coercion. As part of the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the United States military tried
General List and 11 others in what became known as the hostages trial. That trial along with the
trial of Kesselring and two other German generals all raised the question of whether the practice
of killing hostages or reprisal victims was indeed a war crime. There is a distinction between the
two groups of victims. Hostages were civilians taken into custody for the purpose of guaranteeing
with their lives the future good conduct of the population of the community from which they were
taken. Reprisal prisoners were civilians taken from the population solely to be executed in
retaliation for offenses committed by others. Hostages had once been commonly used as insurance
that international treaties would be respected, a practice that had largely died out by the end of
the 1700s. During the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, soldiers from the German states began
using hostages for a different purpose, to ensure peaceful compliance among citizens of occupied
territories. The practice was repeated in the First World War. The scale with which the Germans
used hostages between 1939 and 1945 was unprecedented. It is estimated that German
soldiers killed about 46,000 Italians, including soldiers and about 7,000 Jews, the latter as part
of the Holocaust. The sheer scale of the practice suggested to post-war observers that the killing
of hostages was not protected by international law, not only because Germany was the only nation
in the world to kill civilians in such numbers, but because the Hague Convention of 1907 spoke
against collective penalties and identified a responsibility to protect life in occupied
territories. The German defense councils failed to win their cases. Generals von Mackensen and
Meltzer were found guilty of war crimes and sentenced to death, commuted to life imprisonment.
Kesselring's death sentence shocked allies and foes alike. British commanders felt, despite his
record for ordering reprisals, that he had fought honorably in Italy and the Italian government
considered the death penalty a terrifying reminder of Mussolini's fascist regime. Driven by Cold War
politics, a movement to commute Kesselring's death sentence was successful, and Kesselring was
released from prison on health grounds in 1952. While the Italians had wanted his life spared,
they were also unhappy about his sudden freedom. Legal minds and the world at large were horrified
by the scale of German brutality during the Second World War, and the war crimes trials
redefined many key concepts and closed loopholes. International law was strengthened, even if the
ability to enforce it was not. By taking hostages and executing civilians, even innocent ones,
the Germans felt they were waging war in a traditional way that was tacitly accepted in
the international community. As Kesselring's defense pointed out, the military desired to
keep their honor intact and to behave within what they considered the confines of the law.
Those of us enjoying life in liberal democracies today look on the actions of the Germans in the
Second World War in horror. The machinery of the Holocaust, in which millions of innocent
civilians were killed, based solely on being part of identifiable racial, religious, or social groups,
was more obviously a criminal enterprise in nature. Similarly, incitements to genocide,
such as the Commissar Order, the displacement of millions of people for use of slave labor,
and other activities were much more obviously war crimes. Entire books have been written about
the German army's role in these crimes. Post-war accounts and memoirs have clouded the historical
record. The Western democracies were keen to redeem the Germans, as their defeated,
divided, and occupied country was needed as a bulwark against communism. As historians continue
to try and put everything that happened in proper perspective, it becomes trickier to explain the
German attitude towards civilians without buying too deeply into narratives on the extreme edges
of our understanding. The average German soldier was neither an inhuman monster, for whom the
killing of innocent women and children was a sport, nor was he a helpless victim himself,
forced to kill or unfairly lumped in with the SS and extermination squads.
Taken on a case-by-case basis, we have seen the 65th Infantry Division, which was representative
of front-line German army formations, had treated civilians in occupied territory firmly,
and according to the laws of war, as they knew them. Even the Atlas of War Crimes in Italy notes
that hostages held by the 65th Division were sometimes treated with compassion and mercy,
and yet, when required, soldiers of the division could be ruthless. After 1945, few Germans admitted
to being enthusiastic supporters of Hitler or the Nazis. Likewise, the post-war history of the 65th
Infantry Division contains only a single fleeting reference to the war against civilians waged in
the division's rear areas in the summer of 1944. Wartime photos and the defense mounted by
commanders like Kesselring portray no great feeling of shame or guilt for waging war in the
manner familiar to them. There are many photos of German soldiers proudly posing with the corpses
of civilians. Far from hiding their activities, war correspondents were often tasked with recording
large-scale shootings for posterity and propaganda purposes. The Germans called them reprisals.
We know them today as massacres. In order to fully understand or judge historical figures and events,
it is important to comprehend, as well as possible, the context of the times they lived in,
seeking to understand how civilized, educated, trained and experienced soldiers, such as those
of the 65th Infantry Division, could be so callous as to round up, intimidate,
beat, and in too many cases shoot or hang innocent civilians is in no way endorsing their actions or
suggesting it was moral. It's useful to note that for the Germans, violence and death were common
currency, not only in their dealings with foreign civil populations, but their own people as well.
Hitler introduced the guillotine to the German judicial system in 1936, and by war's end over
16,000 citizens had been beheaded for civil crimes. Another 15,000 Germans were executed
by their own comrades in the military for desertion. The July bomb plot brought about
its own frenzy of killings, and by war's end 84 general officers had been executed for various
reasons. The discussion of reprisals may seem beside the point when contrasted to the millions
of innocent lives taken during the Holocaust. The Germans made efforts to hide their perpetration of
the Holocaust, whether as consciousness of guilt or simply to avoid spreading alarm and making
their task harder to accomplish. German military units taking reprisals felt no such shame or need
to hide what they were doing, and indeed these actions were often advertised as a warning to
others, which was a prime purpose of these activities. While not excusing the practice
of armed reprisals or suggesting it was morally right, it is worth comparing the behavior of
German soldiers carrying out these activities to that of another group of Germans in the summer of
1944. At the same time the 65th Infantry Division was conducting its struggle against civilians in
Italy, escaped Allied prisoners of war in Germany were systematically killed in a very different
manner that indicated their killers were conscious they were in breach of international law.
The contrast between the two only highlights the suggestion that German commanders in Italy
believed that reprisal killings, even of innocent civilians, were an acceptable and legal practice.
This will be explored further in part four.
