Boeing vs Airbus: The Engine War That Could Decide Who Survives

The Engine Story
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThe aviation industry is currently defined by a critical struggle between Boeing and Airbus, centered not on airframe design but on engine integration and material durability. As manufacturers push thermodynamic limits to increase fuel efficiency, they have encountered systemic \"hot section\" failures, leading to massive groundings and a shift in aircraft valuation toward older, more reliable hardware.
Today, I'm going to show you the seven things that are actually deciding the Boeing vs. Airbus war right now.
And here's the twist nobody tells you.
Not one of them is about the airplane.
It's about what's bolted under the wing.
Because right now, in 2026, there are hundreds of brand new Airbus jets sitting on the ground.
Wings perfect, cabins perfect, and no engines to hang on them.
Stick around, because number one is a decision that hasn't even been made yet.
And it might decide who's still standing in 2040.
But before we get to number seven, you need 40 seconds of history.
Because this exact war has been fought before.
And how it went the first time explains everything about how the current one is being fought.
Rewind to 1974.
General Electric and a French company called Snecma.
Today, it's Safran.
Join forces and start running an engine called the CFM56.
And for years, it goes nowhere.
Very slow initial sales.
It looked like a dud.
Then it found the 737 and the A320.
And it never stopped.
Over 34,000 CFM56 engines have been delivered.
The most delivered engine of its class in history.
It's crossed a billion total flight hours.
It powered the 737 Classic, the 737.
Next generation, the A320 CEO.
The KC-135R tanker, the DC-870.
Sit with those numbers.
34,000 engines.
A billion hours.
That's not a product.
That's infrastructure.
And in 1983, a consortium formed specifically to fight it.
International Aero Engines, IAE.
And look at who was in that room.
Pratt & Whitney.
Rolls-Royce.
MTU Aero Engines.
Japanese Aero Engine Corporation.
Fiat.
Every single rival on earth, teaming up.
Because none of them could take CFM alone.
Their weapon was the V2500.
Certified in 1988.
Offered to A320 customers as the alternative.
Same thrust class as the CFM56-5A.
Around 25,000 pounds.
But about 4% more efficient.
Thanks to a higher bypass ratio.
So Airbus, from literally the beginning, offered a choice.
CFM or IAE.
That's not a recent policy.
That's in the A320's DNA.
And how did the first war end?
By 2022, roughly 65% of the A320 CEO family flew on CFM56S.
The remaining 35% on V2500S.
CFM won.
Not by a knockout.
By 2-1 over 30 years.
Now here's the part of this history that nobody talks about.
And it is the single most important thing in this entire video.
In January 1987, IAE offered Airbus an engine called the Superfan for the A340.
And the Superfan was, wait for it, a geared turbofan.
A high bypass geared design derived from the V2500.
Airbus said yes.
Several customers signed preliminary contracts.
And in April 1987, three months later, the IAE board killed it.
Number built. Zero.
And Airbus was forced to partly redesign the A340.
Read that again.
Airbus committed an airplane to a revolutionary engine architecture.
The engine maker walked away.
And Airbus had to redesign the airplane around the wreckage of that promise.
1987. Almost 40 years ago.
Now hold that in your head.
Because in about 20 minutes, I'm going to tell you what Airbus is betting the next 30 years on.
And you're going to see why the hedging you're about to hear isn't cowardice.
It's memory.
Okay. Now the countdown.
Let's start at 7 and work our way up.
Number 7. The engine choice that wasn't a choice.
Here's something most passengers never think about.
When an airline buys an Airbus A320neo, they get to pick their engine.
CFM's LEAP 1A or Pratt & Whitney's geared turbofan.
The PW1100G.
Two suppliers. Two prices. Two negotiating positions.
When an airline buys a Boeing 737 MAX, they get the LEAP 1B.
That's it. There is no option B.
The minus 1B variant is the exclusive power plant on the 737MX and has been since day one.
Now, on paper, that sounds like a weakness for Boeing.
Less choice. Less leverage. Right?
Watch what happened instead.
Because when your competitor offers two engines and one of them detonates, figuratively speaking,
half their customers are stuck.
And when you offer one engine and it holds up, every single one of your customers is fine.
Boeing didn't plan it that way.
Boeing chose single source because the 737's landing gear is famously short and the airframe is famously old.
And squeezing a modern high-bypass fan under that wing was already a nightmare engineering problem.
They picked one engine because they basically had room for one solution.
And that constraint, that limitation, that thing everybody criticized,
turned into the luckiest accident in modern aerospace.
Hold that thought. It comes back hard at number three.
Number six. The dust.
Okay, this one is genuinely wild.
And it explains half of what's gone wrong with modern engines.
Modern jet engines are hot.
Not warm hot.
The air passing through the high-pressure turbine can hit around 1,650 degrees Celsius.
That's about 3,000 Fahrenheit.
GE's Vice President of Product Safety, Quality and Engineering, Carlos Perez, has laid this out plainly.
That's several hundred degrees hotter than previous generation engines.
Now, here's the part that breaks your brain.
That temperature is above the melting point of the metal parts sitting inside it.
The components themselves melt at around 1,100 degrees Celsius.
The gas around them is running at 1,650.
So how do the blades not just turn into soup?
Cooling air.
Streams of it, threaded through microscopic channels inside the blades,
forming a film of cooler air that keeps the metal from touching the real heat.
Perez describes the tolerances involved as being about the width of a human hair.
That's the margin.
That's what stands between a turbine blade and a puddle.
And what wrecks that system?
Dust. Just dust.
The ordinary kind, suspended in the first few thousand feet of air.
Exactly where engines are gulping down enormous volumes of air on takeoff.
Those particles work their way into the core.
And over time, especially in hot and harsh environments,
they wear down the exact components keeping everything alive.
CFM figured this out largely by listening to customers in the Middle East,
where the environment is brutal.
They studied it. Tested it.
And on December 6, 2024,
the FAA certified an improved high-pressure turbine durability kit for the LEAP-1A.
New HPT Stage 1 blade. New Stage 1 nozzle.
New forward inner nozzle support.
CFM has validated that kit with more than 17,000 cycles of dust ingestion testing.
The goal? Extend time between shop visits and, in severe environments,
roughly double time on wing.
Think about that for a second.
Some of the most sophisticated machinery humans have ever built.
And the thing that beats it is sand.
Number six and a half. The price Boeing already paid for that engine.
I said at number seven that Boeing's single-engine choice
turned into the luckiest accident in aerospace.
That's true.
It's also only half the truth.
And I'd be lying to you if I stopped there.
Because Boeing had already paid for the LEAP-1B.
Paid in a way no company should ever pay.
Here's the physics.
The 737 is an old design with famously short landing gear.
It was built in the 1960s to be serviced without ground equipment.
Low to the ground. Easy to load by hand.
Great in 1967. A prison in 2011.
The A320 doesn't have this problem.
Its fuselage sits much higher off the ground.
Room to hang whatever you want.
Boeing wanted the LEAP-1B 69-inch fan.
Roughly 9 to 1 bypass ratio.
Around 29,000 pounds of thrust.
And that engine physically would not fit where the old CFM56-7 sat.
So Boeing did what it had to.
They raised the nose landing gear by 8 inches.
They moved the engines forward and up, closer to the wing's leading edge.
They reshaped the nacelle geometry.
And out of all that, they squeezed another 14% improvement in fuel consumption.
And then aerodynamics sent the bill.
At high angles of attack, that big nacelle, sitting forward and high, starts generating its own lift.
Vortex flow off the nacelle body produces lift at high AOA.
And because the nacelle sits ahead of the center of gravity,
that lift acts like a weight on one end of a seesaw.
It pushes the nose up.
Which is a problem, because a pitch-up at high angle of attack is self-reinforcing.
Nose comes up, angle of attack increases, more nacelle lift, nose comes up more.
MIT's R. John Hansman described it as a divergent condition.
And it broke a regulation.
The abnormal nose-up pitching isn't allowable under 14 CFR 25.203A.
Stall characteristics.
Regulations require that the harder you approach a stall, the harder you have to pull.
On the MAX, the stick force was decreasing as angle of attack increased.
Wrong feel. Illegal feel.
Boeing tried to fix it with aerodynamics first.
They revised the leading-edge stall strip.
They modified the leading-edge vortilons.
Genuine engineering attempts.
They were insufficient to pass regulation.
So Boeing reached for software.
MCAS, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System.
A flight control law that commands nose-down stabilizer trim as angle of attack increases,
cancelling out the nacelle's pitch-up and restoring the stick force gradient the regulations demand.
MCAS was never a stall prevention system.
That's a myth.
It was a longitudinal stability enhancement,
built to counteract the non-linear lift generated by LEAP-1B nacelles
and give a steady increase in stick force as the stall approaches, as required by regulation.
And here's why it existed at all, in one word.
Training.
The point was that the MAX had to handle like the NG,
so airlines could add it to their fleets without extra simulator training,
and so certification could move fast.
Same type rating.
That was the entire commercial case for the airplane.
Then MCAS was given more authority, without notifying the pilots or the FAA.
It could activate multiple times in a flight.
It could override the pilot.
And it could do all of that on data from a single angle of attack sensor.
If that one sensor was wrong, MCAS would push the nose down on an airplane that was not stalling.
Repeatedly.
Two crashes.
346 people.
Now go back to the engine.
Boeing selected the LEAP-1B in 2011, and it deliberately chose exclusivity.
That was a decision.
Not an accident.
Not a constraint they stumbled into.
A choice.
And the chain runs clean from that choice to everything after.
Exclusive engine.
Bigger fan.
No ground clearance.
Engine moved forward and up.
Nacelle lift.
Pitch up.
Regulation failure.
Aerodynamic fixes insufficient.
Software patch.
Expanded authority.
Single sensor.
Two crashes.
20-month global grounding.
So when I tell you Boeing got lucky dodging the powder metal crisis, I mean it.
They did.
But they'd already paid an unpayable bill for that same engine years earlier.
That's what makes this war different from every other corporate rivalry you've ever watched.
In this industry, the engine decision isn't a procurement line item.
It reaches into the airframe.
Into the flight control laws.
Into the training syllabus.
Into the certification basis.
And sometimes into the accident report.
Hit like if you're still with me.
Because number five is where the other guy makes his own version of this mistake.
Number five.
The gearbox that was supposed to change everything.
Pratt and Whitney made a genuinely bold bet.
Instead of having the fan and the turbine spinning at the same speed, which is a compromise,
because the fan wants to spin slow and the turbine wants to spin fast,
they put a gearbox between them.
Let each one run at its own optimal speed.
The result, on paper, is spectacular.
The PW1100G geared turbofan is by design one of the most fuel-efficient narrowbody engines ever built.
Up to 20% better than the previous generation.
And that's the tragedy of this whole story.
Because the engineering worked.
Let me say that again.
Because it matters and because it gets lost in every angry headline about this engine.
The geared turbofan concept was not the problem.
The problem was powder.
Number five and a half.
And yes, I'm adding one, because you cannot understand this war without it.
The third player.
Everything I've told you so far is about narrowbodies.
Single-aisle jets.
The 737 and the A320.
That's where the volume is.
That's where the money is.
And that's where the war gets decided.
But there's a third engine maker in this fight.
And its story is the proof that what happened to Pratt is not bad luck.
It's a pattern.
Rolls-Royce.
The Trent 1000.
The engine that nearly took down the 787.
Few large commercial engine programs have suffered as many setbacks.
The Trent 1000 entered commercial service in 2011 as the first engine for the Boeing 787.
All Nippon Airways was the launch operator.
And ANA was also the first to identify durability issues related to blade erosion and cracking.
In early 2016, corrosion-related fatigue cracking was discovered in the intermediate pressure turbine blades
on Trent 1000 engines flying on ANA's 787S.
The cause was a design flaw in the turbine blades,
combined with changed environmental conditions from new materials used in the IP blades,
which made those blades more susceptible to cracking.
By 2017, Rolls-Royce admitted the durability issues extended to up to 500 engines across the global fleet.
500 engines.
And now watch Rolls try to fix it.
Because this is the part that should terrify anyone who thinks a fix is a single event.
They released a series of performance improvement packages.
Package B.
Package C.
Both failed to ensure reliability.
Component weaknesses and premature wear persisted.
So Rolls went nuclear.
They released the Trent 1010, an engine incorporating elements of the newer Trent XWB,
sharing only about 25% parts commonality with the original Trent 1000.
25%.
That's not a fix.
That's a different engine wearing the same name.
And the 10 had its own problem.
Its original high-pressure turbine blades entered service with a limit of 1,000 cycles,
with some needing to be swapped out even sooner.
1,000 cycles.
Compare that to what we talked about earlier.
The LEAP, one B-disk everyone's worried about, has a 10-0-0-0 cycle limit,
and CFM is developing a 17-500 cycle replacement.
Rolls was replacing blades at a tenth of that.
The consequences were exactly what you'd expect.
Unplanned 787 groundings peaked in 2018 at more than 50 aircraft.
Airworthiness directives from both EASA and the FAA.
Inspections.
Depairing rules, meaning you couldn't put two of the suspect engines on the same airplane
because if both quit over the Pacific, that's not an incident.
That's a headline.
Accelerated shop visits.
Airlines had to rip up their networks.
British Airways and Virgin Atlantic, among other North Atlantic carriers, deferred 787 services.
Operational networks were thinned.
The spare engine pool got stretched so thin that short-term leasing rates skyrocketed.
Crew and aircraft rotations had to be replanned.
And the bill?
Rolls-Royce took a 1.4 billion pound exceptional charge in November 2019.
In-service cash costs relating to Trent 1000 technical issues
eventually ran to something like 2.1 to 2.2 billion pounds.
Roughly 2.9 to 3.1 billion dollars.
In 2019, they reported an operating loss of 852 million pounds
as the cost of tackling Trent 1000 durability eclipsed record engine deliveries.
And here's the darkest irony in this entire video.
You know what finally helped Rolls catch up?
COVID.
The pandemic collapsed flying.
Utilization dropped.
Airplanes stopped needing engines.
And that gave Rolls the breathing room to work through the maintenance backlog
it could never have cleared in a healthy market.
By December 2020, 115 Rolls-powered 787s were in storage.
About 30% of the 360 in service.
The global aviation industry had to shut down for the engine crisis to get fixed.
Rolls did eventually clear the backlog of parked 787s.
Their own words, a difficult journey.
One they could never have undertaken without their customers' patience.
Three specific blade issues emerging in close succession over four years.
And more recently, Rolls has introduced the Trent 1000 XE build standard
with durability enhancement packages
and a new blade aiming to more than double overall time on wing.
But even that had knock-on pain.
British Airways and Virgin Atlantic deferred 787 services to 2024
amid Trent 1000 XE engine delays and limited maintenance hanger slots.
Now stack these three stories side by side.
Rolls-Royce.
Blade durability.
Cracking.
Billions.
Years.
Pratt & Whitney.
Powder metal contamination in disks.
Cracking.
8 billion.
Years.
CFM.
Dust ingestion wearing down HPT hardware.
Durability kits.
Fleet retrofits measured in years.
Three different companies.
Three different root causes.
Same disease.
Every single one of them is the high-pressure turbine.
Every single one is a durability problem that only reveals itself
after the engine has been in service for thousands of cycles.
And every single one takes the better part of a decade to fully resolve.
And it's here that the coin drops on what this war is actually about.
The modern jet engine is running so close to the physical limit of what materials can survive
that all three manufacturers on earth capable of building one
have independently discovered the hard way that they cut it too fine.
That's not a scandal.
That's a frontier.
You want 20% better fuel burn?
You run the turbine hotter?
You run it hotter?
You're closer to the melting point?
Closer to the melting point, your margin for dust or a contaminated disk
or a slightly wrong blade geometry shrinks to the width of a human hair.
Literally, as GE put it,
the engine makers aren't incompetent.
They're standing at the edge of thermodynamics with airlines screaming for one more percent.
And that context changes how you should read everything in the rest of this video.
Because the question isn't which company screwed up.
They all did.
The question is who screwed up in a way they can recover from.
And before we go up the list, let me make sure you actually understand what a shop visit is.
Because that phrase is doing enormous work in this story and it sounds like nothing.
A shop visit is not maintenance.
It's not a mechanic with a wrench on the ramp overnight.
A shop visit means the engine comes off the wing.
It gets crated.
It travels, sometimes across the planet, to one of a very limited number of facilities certified to open it.
It gets fully disassembled down to individual blades and disks.
Parts get inspected, measured, replaced.
Then it gets rebuilt, tested on a stand, recertified, shipped back, and hung on a wing again.
That's a shop visit.
And there are only so many places on Earth that can do it.
That last part is what nobody outside the industry understands.
When an engine problem hits, you don't just need a fix.
You need capacity.
You need physical buildings with certified people and certified tooling.
And you cannot conjure those up in a year.
That's why Pratt has been racing to certify new workshops,
including units from Iberia, China Airlines, and Korean Air, to add throughput.
It's why they're installing an additional isothermal forging press at Columbus by 2028.
It's why RTX has poured over $400 million into forging and production capacity in just the first four months of 2026.
And it's why the number that really matters in the GTF story isn't $8 billion.
It's 360 days.
Because you can write a check for $8 billion.
You cannot write a check that makes a year go faster.
Okay, number four.
And this is the one where the physics gets personal.
Number four.
$8 billion of contaminated metal.
Some of the most critical parts in a jet engine.
The high-pressure turbine disks.
The compressor disks are made from metal powder that gets forged under enormous pressure into solid components.
These disks are what's called life-limited parts.
They spin at thousands of RPM.
If one fails, it doesn't fail gently.
Somewhere in that powder, contamination got in.
Microscopic impurities baked into disks that then went out into the world and started accumulating stress cycles.
Under operational stress, those impurities can develop cracks.
Pratt discovered the defect in 2020 through a related engine program, the IAE V2500,
and disclosed it publicly in July 2023, initially flagging 1,200 engines for removal and inspection.
Then it got worse.
On September 11, 2023, RTX, Pratt's parent company, revealed the scope.
They estimated 600 to 700 PW1100G engines would have to come off the wings of A320 Neo family jets for inspection
and took a $3 billion charge.
RTX shares hit a two-year low that day.
The final cost of the recall?
Around $8 billion.
And I want you to sit with the mechanics of this for a moment,
because this is where it stops being a spreadsheet problem and starts being a fleet-killing problem.
Each of these inspections takes 360 to 365 days.
A year.
The airplane is fine.
The wings are fine.
The airline is paying the lease.
And the engine is in a shop for a year.
If you're enjoying this so far, do me a favor and hit that like button.
It genuinely helps the channel.
And subscribe, because the next three are where this gets brutal.
Here's where the theory turns into numbers you can actually feel.
As of late 2025 into early 2026,
roughly 835 aircraft powered by Pratt & Whitney GTF engines were grounded or in storage worldwide.
At the end of October 2025, that figure was around 835,
up about 90 aircraft compared to the summer months.
It wasn't getting better.
It was getting worse.
And the A320 Neo took the worst of it.
720 aircraft out of a global fleet of 1,912.
That's roughly 38%.
38% of the fleet on the ground.
Now, here's the comparison that ends the argument.
The PW1100G grounding rate has run somewhere in the 33 to 38% range.
The CFM Leap competitor?
Around 4%.
That's nearly 10 times the grounding rate on the same airplane,
differing only in what's hanging under the wing.
Remember number 7?
Boeing's weakness?
The single-source engine everybody said was a bad idea?
Boeing accidentally dodged the biggest propulsion catastrophe of the decade
because they never had the option to make the wrong choice.
Sometimes you don't win.
Sometimes the other guy just loses harder.
And the human cost of this isn't abstract.
Low-cost carriers got hit hardest.
And it's not bad luck.
It's math.
Ultra-low-cost carriers like Wizz Air, Indigo, Spirit, Volaris, and Viva Aerobis
ordered GTF-powered A320 Neos aggressively,
precisely because they wanted those fuel savings.
Their entire business model depends on flying each airplane as many hours as physically possible.
Each grounded aircraft eliminates something like 8 to 12 daily flights.
Wizz Air, with over 220 A, 320 family aircraft, has had 40-plus on the ground,
roughly a 20% capacity loss, with groundings expected to continue through 2026.
JetBlue's CEO estimated the groundings hit their operating margin by about 2.5 percentage points in 2024,
growing to an estimated 3 points in 2025.
ITA Airways, now a Lufthansa subsidiary, is seeking around €150 million in damages from Pratt & Whitney,
with several aircraft grounded in Naples for over a year.
And Swiss temporarily grounded its entire nine-aircraft A220-100 fleet in 2026
just to conserve scarce engines and parts.
An entire sub-fleet, parked to cannibalize.
Spirit Airlines is the sharpest example of all.
The causes of what happened to Spirit were multiple.
Legacy debt, pricing pressure from mainline carriers offering basic economy,
a failed JetBlue merger, two bankruptcy filings in under a year.
The GTF crisis didn't cause all of that, but it was the accelerant.
Comment below and tell me.
If you were running an airline in 2019, and someone offered you an engine with 20% better fuel burn,
would you have taken the bet?
Be honest.
I want to show you what an engine shortage actually does to money,
because until you see this, you don't understand why airlines are panicking.
When engines get scarce, you lease one.
Normal.
Every airline does it.
So what does a spare cost right now?
A pair of GTF engines can command around $400,000 per month.
$400,000.
A month.
For two engines.
And here's the line that made me stop and re-read it.
That often exceeds the lease rate of the entire airframe.
Let me make sure that lands.
The engines cost more to rent than the airplane they hang on.
The wings.
The fuselage.
The avionics.
The landing gear.
The seats.
All of it is the cheap part.
That is not a market.
That is a hostage situation.
And it's rippled backwards through history in a way nobody predicted.
Because if you can't get a new generation engine, what do you do?
You keep the old airplane flying.
Which means old engines.
Engines that were supposed to be heading for the scrapyard suddenly became gold.
The CFM56-7B, the 737NG engine, saw the highest market value change of any engine.
Up around 20% from 2023 to 2024.
Monthly lease rates went from about $35,000 in 2019 to around $100,000 in 2024.
Roughly tripled for a legacy engine because its replacement doesn't work reliably enough.
The V2500A5, the 1988 IAE engine, the loser of the first engine war,
is now trading between $11 million and $13 million for examples fresh from overhaul with new life-limited parts.
Lease rates of $70,000 to $80,000 a month.
Its lease rates actually ran slightly higher than the CFM56-5B in 2024,
purely because supply was smaller and demand was higher.
The engine that lost in 1988 is having the best decade of its life in 2026.
And the MRO system, the shop network, is drowning.
IBA projected around 2,500 shop visits in 2024 across the major narrowbody types,
jumping to 3,500 in 2025.
That's a 40% increase in one year.
Then a plateau around 3,800 annually through 2027,
before peaking at over 4,000 visits in 2028.
And that's excluding the extra shop visits driven by the GTF issues.
Meanwhile, MRO facilities are short-staffed and OEMs are fighting supply chain problems and scarce shop slots.
Heavy CFM56 shop visit turnaround times now exceed 120 days.
So operators do the only rational thing.
They extend their current engine leases to avoid the turnaround times
and the uncertainty around new generation reliability.
Read that motive carefully.
Airlines are actively choosing older, thirstier, dirtier engines over new ones
because the new ones might not stay on the wing.
That's the whole crisis in one behavior.
Even the widebodies caught it.
With 777X entry into service sliding,
airlines are holding on to their 777, 300, ERS, and GE90.
115 market values and lease rates have increased significantly.
The Trent 700 on the A330 is up around 7%.
The delay of one airplane inflates the value of the airplane it was supposed to replace.
And for the money people, this changed how an airplane is even valued.
An aircraft can no longer be assessed only by model, age, or lease status.
It's engine type.
It's maintenance position.
It's shop visit exposure.
It's access to spares.
All of it materially moves the value.
Same airplane.
Same age.
Same airline.
Different engine.
Different asset.
Comment below with your take on this one because I'm curious.
Does it change how you feel about flying on a 20-year-old A320
knowing the industry is fighting over its engines?
Number two, the leap is not innocent.
Now, if you've been watching this and thinking,
OK, so CFM won.
Leap good.
Pratt bad.
Video over.
No.
Not even close.
And this is the part that most coverage of this story completely misses.
The leap has its own durability problems.
They're just less catastrophic and less visible.
Start with the LEAP-1A.
We already covered the dust issue and the December 2024 durability kit.
But look at the pace of the fix.
In less than a year after certification,
CFM produced more than 1,200 HPT durability kits.
By late 2025,
the reverse bleed system was installed on nearly 50% of in-service LEAP-1A engines.
By early 2026,
the durability kit was on more than 30% of the CFM-powered A320neo fleet.
30%.
Which means, flip it around,
roughly 70% of that fleet was still flying on the old hardware.
And GE CEO Larry Culp explained exactly why.
And it's a beautifully honest answer.
The fleet retrofit is a multi-year effort.
Those engines come in for their first shop visit on a relatively predictable schedule.
Nobody's bringing an engine in early just for the kit.
So the fix exists.
The fix is certified.
And the fix arrives at the speed of the maintenance calendar,
not the speed of the press release.
Now the LEAP-1B,
the 737 MAX engine,
Boeing's supposedly lucky engine.
In February 2026,
CFM told operators that the life limit of the original LEAP-1B high-pressure turbine stage 1 disc
would not be extended beyond its current 10-0-0-0 cycle threshold.
Let me translate that.
A life-limited part has a hard number of cycles.
You hit that number, the part comes off the airplane.
Doesn't matter how it looks.
Doesn't matter if it's pristine.
It's done by law.
CFM is developing a new disc with a more conventional 17-500 cycle limit.
That's equivalent to 9 or 10 years of flying for the busiest engines.
But that improved part wasn't going to be ready before the second half of 2026.
And Southwest Airlines,
which flies the 737 and nothing but the 737,
got concerned about a potential engine shortage
because their highest-time MAX engines are heading for overhaul
and the better part might not arrive in time to feed those overhauls.
Notice what CFM chose to do here, though.
Findings from routine shop visits prompted them to develop an improved version
rather than seek a life extension.
They could have gone to the regulator and argued for more cycles on the existing part.
They designed a new one instead.
That's the difference between this and the powder metal story.
Same category of problem.
Critical rotating hardware.
Life limits.
Shop visits.
Wildly different scale of consequence.
Then, in mid-2026, the FAA approved the LEAP 1B durability kit.
New turbine blades, nozzles and forward inner nozzle supports
addressing wear seen particularly in hot, harsh environments.
So both engines have issues.
Both are being fixed.
The difference is that one manufacturer is managing a maintenance schedule
and the other spent $8 billion pulling engines off wings for year-long inspections.
That's the whole war in one sentence.
And I should be fair to Pratt here because they're actually digging out.
By late 2025, PW1100 maintenance, repair and overhaul output was up 21% year-to-date through Q3
with full-year output expected to hit around 30% growth.
RTX has invested over $400 million in the first four months of 2026 alone,
expanding forging and production capacity.
They're installing an additional isothermal forging press at their Columbus site by 2028
targeting a 30% increase in critical component output.
Lesser Avalon said in January 2026 that more than 150 GTF-powered aircraft
were expected to return to service during 2026.
But industry analysts expect the disruption to extend into 2027.
Pratt itself expects the recovery to continue through the end of this decade.
The end of the decade.
From a defect discovered in 2020.
Ten years.
That's the half-life of a manufacturing mistake in this industry.
And this is where you have to zoom out because everything I've told you so far is the past.
Number one is the future.
And it's the one that actually decides who survives.
Number two and a half.
The comeback.
If this video has felt like a eulogy for Pratt and Whitney, here's the turn.
Because Pratt did not roll over.
And what they've done is genuinely impressive.
They built a new engine.
The GTF Advantage.
And they didn't tinker.
The Advantage includes fully redesigned, life-limited parts and technology enhancements throughout the gas path.
It is fundamentally more durable.
With increased airflow in the core to lower operating temperatures.
Plus a state-of-the-art hot section to increase time on wing.
In the high-pressure turbine.
That same HPT that's the villain of every story in this video.
There's an advanced airfoil design with improved coatings.
The HPT and combustor got optimized cooling hole size, shape and location.
With improved hole drilling techniques to reduce oxidation.
Cooling hole drilling techniques.
That's the level we're operating at.
The shape of a hole you can barely see is the difference between a working engine and $8 billion.
The claim, up to double the time on wing.
Plus 4% more takeoff thrust at sea level.
And 8% more at high-altitude airports.
Which unlocks payload and range.
And matters enormously for missions like the A321XLR.
And they tested it like people who had learned something.
The GTF Advantage accomplished more than twice the amount of testing compared to the current GTF engine.
It draws on over 100,000 hours of engine and rig testing across all GTF programs.
Plus 38 million flight hours of in-service operation.
Twice the testing.
That's not a spec.
That's an apology written in engineering.
The timeline, FAA type certification in February 2025.
EASA validated it in October 2025.
And on April 17, 2026, EASA certified the GTF Advantage-powered A320neo itself.
Clearing the way for production deliveries and entry into service.
And Pratt made two smart calls.
First, the Advantage is fully intermixable and interchangeable with today's GTF.
Airlines can run both variants in the same fleet without disruption.
A phased transition, not a rip and replace.
It's expected to become the production standard around 2028.
Second, and this is the clever one, Hot Section Plus.
HS Plus.
It takes Advantage technology and lets existing GTF operators absorb it during routine maintenance.
Delivering 90 to 95% of the Advantage's durability benefits.
So the airplane's already in the shop for a year.
Might as well come out with the good hardware.
And demand? Still there.
More than 2,200 GTF-powered aircraft delivered to over 80 customers
with 11,000 engine orders and commitments across all platforms.
11,000.
After $8 billion of recall.
After 720 aircraft parked.
Because the underlying fuel burn is still the best in the business.
Up to 20% better efficiency.
And Pratt still claims the lowest fuel consumption for single-aisle aircraft.
That's the thing about this industry.
The market has an extraordinarily long memory for money
and an extraordinarily short one for grudges.
And now, Boeing's turned to bleed.
Number two and three quarters.
The 15.9.
While everyone was watching narrowbodies,
Boeing's widebody future was quietly turning into the most expensive delay in the company's modern history.
The 777X.
Launched in 2013.
Originally expected to enter service in 2020.
Powered exclusively.
There's that word again.
By the GE9X.
The largest and most powerful commercial jet engine ever developed.
Exclusively.
Boeing did it again.
Now watch the timeline.
Because it's a horror movie where the monster is a calendar.
The first test flight was supposed to be mid-2019.
Pushed to early 2020.
Because of GE9X durability problems.
In 2019, durability concerns involving high-pressure compressor stator vanes delayed the program.
There's that word again.
Durability.
High-pressure section.
Every single time.
September 2019.
Certification efforts begin and immediately halt.
An extreme pressurization test blew a door off in a hangar under FAA oversight.
January 2020.
Test flights start.
December 2020.
Suspended.
Flight control system flaws.
2022.
Flight testing suspended again over a GE9X temperature issue found during a borescope inspection.
Delays run through 2023 as regulators intensify reviews.
A direct consequence of the 737 MAX accidents and 787 manufacturing complaints.
The MX crashes made the 777X harder to certify.
The engine decision on one airplane poisoned the certification of another.
July 2024.
Flights resume.
August 2024.
Grounded again.
Structural damage in the primary pylon connecting the GE9X engines to the wings.
Failures in the titanium thrust links.
Five months of pause while design changes went in.
Addressing vibration-related causes.
January 2025.
Tests restart.
By late August 2025, five test aircraft had accumulated 4,100 flight hours across heat in Arizona and snow in Alaska.
November 2025.
FAA clears Boeing to the next certification stage.
And as Boeing shares performance data with customers, the feedback is reportedly positive.
The airplane is good.
That's the tragedy.
Then January 2026.
Boeing confirms a new GE9X durability issue on the 777-9.
CEO Kelly Ortberg says it doesn't affect the certification timeline.
GE implements an on-wing inspection program while analysis continues.
And May 28, 2026.
At the CAPA Airline Leaders Summit in Charleston, FAA Administrator Brian Bedford says the 777X will be certified after the MAX 7 and MAX 10, putting it last in the queue in early 2027.
Now the bill.
The program has accumulated approximately $15.9 billion in charges.
That includes a $4.9 billion pre-tax charge in Q3 2025, when Boeing officially moved first 777-9 deliveries from 2026 to 2027.
$15.9 billion.
And here's the cruelest structural fact in all of this.
Cash flow from the 737 single-aisle family funds, the widebody 777X program.
So the narrowbody war isn't just a war.
It's the thing paying for the widebody.
Lose more narrowbody share to the A321neo, and you're not just losing a market.
You're defunding your own flagship.
That's why this fight is existential in a way most rivalries aren't.
And to be fair to Boeing, this is not a demand problem.
The 777X still has Lufthansa, Emirates, Qatar Airways, Cathay Pacific waiting.
Boeing has consistently said the recent delay is about certification process, not a newly discovered technical issue.
Ortberg attributed the 2027 shift to certification delays, not new technical problems.
But regulators are now authorizing the test program in tightly controlled increments instead of broad approvals.
Every step requires extensive data packages on flight characteristics, systems, performance, software, failure mode analysis.
Far more granular than earlier widebody programs.
That's the Max's ghost sitting in the room adding months.
If certification lands in 2027, the 777X enters service roughly 7 years late, about 14 years after its 2013 launch.
And every delay hands Airbus more time to position the A350-1000 as the lower-risk fleet renewal choice.
And let me give the Leap its due for a second, because I've spent this whole video on what's broken.
The Leap family has been the most successful new product introduction in CFM's 50-year history.
It surpassed 70 million flight hours in 9 years.
More than 4,000 aircraft delivered.
CFM calls it the fastest ramp in commercial aviation history, and for once the marketing line is just true.
It delivers 15% better fuel efficiency and 15% lower CO2 than the CFM-56 it replaces, using composite fan blades and ceramic matrix composites.
And it runs 99.95% departure reliability.
And the ramp keeps going.
In 2025, CFM delivered 1,802 Leap engines, an 18% increase over 2024, and expects another 15% rise in 2026, putting the total around 2,072 units.
2,000 engines a year.
That is an astonishing industrial achievement, and it's happening while they're simultaneously retrofitting the fleet with durability kits.
But even here, the same disease.
The Leap has faced durability challenges, including fuel nozzle carbonization and accelerated wear in harsh operating environments.
Carbonization.
Fuel coking up and gumming a nozzle.
The most advanced engine of its generation, and one of its problems is essentially soot.
And GE Aerospace is putting a billion dollars into suppliers and production this year, including expanding capacity for the Leap durability kits.
Everyone is racing.
Nobody has won.
Here's the thing that finally clicked for me while putting this together, and I want to hand it to you straight before we get to number one.
Every single crisis in this video is the same crisis.
Rolls-Royce.
Intermediate and high-pressure blades cracking.
Pratt.
High-pressure disks cracking.
CFM LEAP 1A high-pressure turbine hardware wearing from dust.
CFM LEAP 1B high-pressure turbine disk life limited to 10,000 cycles.
GE 9X.
High-pressure compressor stator vanes, then temperature issues, then durability again.
Five programs.
Three companies.
Two continents.
Every one of them.
The hot section.
Because that's where the promise lives.
Every percent of fuel efficiency you're sold, every 20% better in an airline's press release, is bought by running the core hotter.
And the hot section is where the metal and the physics have a fight.
We're at the point where the gas is 500 degrees hotter than the melting point of the parts it's flowing over.
And the only thing standing between those two facts is a film of cooling air controlled to tolerance as the width of a human hair.
That's not a manufacturing problem you can fix with better quality control.
That's the edge of what's possible.
And here's the part that should genuinely change how you watch this industry.
Every one of these problems took years to appear.
The Trent 1000 entered service in 2011.
ANA found blade issues.
By 2017, it was 500 engines.
Pratt found the powder defect in 2020.
Disclosed it in 2023 and expects recovery through the end of this decade.
CFM found the LEAP 1B disc issue through routine shop visits.
Meaning the engine had to fly for years before anyone knew.
You cannot test your way to this knowledge.
Not fully.
Pratt ran the advantage through more than twice the testing of the original GTF.
Plus 100,000 hours of rig testing.
Good. Necessary.
And still, the only test that tells the whole truth is a decade of airlines flying the thing in Delhi in June.
Which means both Boeing and Airbus are, right now, making a 2040 decision on 2026 information.
Knowing the information is structurally incomplete.
That's not incompetence.
That's the job.
Number one and a half.
And I'm putting this before the finale because it's the payoff for everything I've told you.
Remember the landing gear?
The 737 sits low because it was designed in the 1960s to be loaded by hand without belt loaders.
That's a heritage trait.
That's why the LEAP 1B had to move forward and up.
That's why the nacelle made lift.
That's why MCAS existed.
Now watch that same six-decade-old decision kill Boeing somewhere completely different.
Stretch a fuselage and you hit something called the rotation limit.
On takeoff, the airplane pivots on its main gear to lift the nose.
If the fuselage is too long and the gear is too short, the tail hits the runway before the wings make enough lift.
The A321neo was designed from the outset with a taller stance to accommodate its 44.51 metre frame.
The 737 was not.
And so, look at the scoreboard in the segment that actually matters.
Big narrowbodies.
The 737-600 and the A318?
Both duds.
Even.
The 737-700 sold almost as many as the A319.
Close.
The 737-800 outsold the A320.
Point to Boeing.
And then the A321 dramatically outsold the 737-90737-900ER.
And that trend continued straight through the Neo and Max generations.
Where Boeing has struggled is in selling large narrowbodies.
That's the sentence.
That's the wound.
And large narrowbodies are where the entire market went.
Since its launch in 2010, the A320neo family has taken more than 11,000 commitments.
The 737 Max, which arrived less than a year later, has secured just under 7,000.
4,000 aircraft.
That's the gap.
And it's driven overwhelmingly by the A321neo, which has become the best-selling narrowbody.
Period.
Then Airbus poured salt in it with the A321XLR.
Rear center tank, 3,700 extra litres, and a range of 4,700 nautical miles.
Unprecedented for a single aisle.
New York to Rome.
Delhi to London.
Dublin to Boston.
Edinburgh to New York.
Routes with enough demand for 180 to 200 passengers, but not enough for a widebody.
It's letting airlines fly long-haul routes on narrowbody economics and skip the hub entirely.
The Max 10, Boeing's answer, reaches 3,300 nautical miles.
And on a 3,000-mile flight, it might have to leave seats empty or limit cargo to keep legal fuel reserves,
especially against winter headwinds,
because the A321neo's larger wing area and structural capacity let it carry more fuel without giving up as many passengers.
And the MX-10 isn't even certified yet.
It's behind the MX-7 in the FAA queue, expected around Q3 2026, with first deliveries in 2027.
Ryanair's first 15 MX-10s are guaranteed by spring 2027.
So Boeing's answer to a jet that's been dominating for nearly a decade arrives in 2027.
Now, I want to be fair here, because the MX-10 is genuinely good, and Boeing is not helpless.
The MX-10 holds 1,271 orders.
Boeing's backlog is concentrated in the MX-8, with more than 2,700 still to deliver.
Southwest, FlyDubai, SpiceJet, Ryanair.
And Boeing pairs it with the 787, the best-selling widebody in history at over 1,400 orders,
which lets them upsell across both segments using the 787's reputation.
The Max 10 will take real market share when deliveries begin.
Airlines are waiting for it.
But trace the causal chain one more time, because it's beautiful and it's brutal.
1967.
The 737 is designed low to the ground so ground crews can load bags by hand.
2011.
Boeing picks the LEAP-1B exclusively, and it doesn't fit, so the engine goes forward and up.
2018 and 2019.
MCAS and 346 people.
2026.
The same short gear means the fuselage can't stretch far enough to fight the A321,
so Airbus takes the most profitable segment in aviation by roughly 4,000 aircraft.
And the narrowbody cash that Boeing is losing is the cash that funds the 777X,
the program already $15.9 billion in the hole.
One design decision.
60 years.
Still collecting.
That's what people mean when they say aerospace has a long memory.
Number one.
The fork in the road.
Right now, both Boeing and Airbus have to answer the same question.
What replaces the 737 and the A320?
Not upgrade.
Replace.
The next narrowbody cycle is increasingly framed around the mid to late 2030s,
with propulsion and wing technology being the main gating factor.
Airbus has been explicit about targeting the late 2030s for an A320 family successor.
And the engine is the gate.
Whatever engine you pick, the airplane gets designed around it.
You can't change your mind in 2034.
So here's the fork.
CFM is betting on the open fan.
It's called RISE.
Revolutionary innovation for sustainable engines.
And it is exactly what it sounds like.
An engine with no cowling around the fan.
Giant carbon fiber blades out in the open air.
If that gives you flashbacks, it should.
The industry tried this in the 1980s with prop fans,
flown on test aircraft including a Boeing 727 and an MD-80.
And those early prototypes suffered from excessive noise,
reduced cruise speeds and serious vibration.
The concept died.
RISE is different in one crucial way.
The old open rotor used counter-rotating fans.
RISE uses a single rotating fan paired with adjustable stators.
Simpler.
And it's leaning on things that didn't exist in 1985.
Supercomputer-driven blade aerodynamics, advanced composites
and hard-won lessons from the GE90, G-ENX, LEAP and GE9X.
The target.
More than 20% lower fuel burn and CO2 versus today's most efficient turbo fans.
20%.
In an industry where 2% wins contracts.
But strip the duct off a fan and you inherit the duct's job.
That duct isn't decoration.
It contains blades when they let go.
So blade-out is the central concern.
And CFM has been unveiling containment design work specifically to address it.
GE's counter-argument is decades of composite blade service
across the GE90, G-ENX, LEAP and GE9X
with no recorded composite blade throw events.
Noise, too.
CFM simulations are now giving them confidence
the open fan can be quieter than current engines.
Described internally as a real breakthrough.
With the next step being an integrated test with an aircraft wing
to confirm the simulation holds at full scale.
Airbus is all in on de-risking this.
They're running wind tunnel campaigns with Onera and DNW
and they plan to flight test the open fan on an A380 by the end of the decade.
Yes, an A380 as a flying testbed for a narrowbody engine.
Boeing, meanwhile, is thought to be reluctant to embrace the risks of an open fan engine
and is prioritizing hybrid electric and core engine technologies with NASA and GE.
Now stop and look at what's happening here.
The same joint venture.
CFM, owned 50-50 by GE Aerospace and Safran, supplies both airframers
and its two customers want opposite things.
Airbus is pulling toward the open fan.
Boeing is pulling toward conventional.
And that tension produced the single most interesting piece of news in this entire story.
On February 12th, 2026, Reuters revealed a previously undisclosed project inside Safran
referred to as Advanced Ducted Large,
a project for a more traditional engine architecture than RISE.
Now, publicly, CFM's line had been absolute.
We are all in on open fan.
No plans for an alternative.
And when Safran's CEO Olivier Andries was asked about it
while briefing analysts on February 13th, 2026, he played it down.
His framing.
CFM was simply getting prepared for any scenario.
And that shouldn't be a surprise.
Yes, they're working on an open fan architecture.
But they need to be prepared for any architecture.
Read that carefully.
Because that is a hedge.
That is the most important engine company on Earth
quietly building a plan B for the possibility that the open fan
doesn't clear certification and integration in time for the 2030s.
And they're not alone in the fight.
Pratt & Whitney is pitching a next-generation version of its geared turbofan
for the next-generation single aisle.
Rolls-Royce is working a similar architecture through its Ultrafan 30 demonstrator.
Airbus, for its part, insists it hasn't selected a power plant yet
and expects to offer dual-source engine options on the successor.
Which is its own puzzle.
Because if you pick an open fan,
offering a conventional alternative is enormously difficult.
The installation differences are massive.
You can't just swap them.
Guillaume Fauré has been open about this.
He'd prefer open fan offers from at least one other manufacturer,
and Airbus has made that clear to them.
But he's also philosophical about it.
If it doesn't happen, it's not the end of the world.
The 737 is a single aisle with only one engine option.
The A350 has only one engine option,
and it's a very successful program.
Which brings this whole story full circle
in a way I genuinely did not expect when I started digging.
The thing Boeing got criticized for,
one engine, no choice, no competition,
is the thing Airbus is now openly saying it could live with.
So let's tally the real war.
Today, Boeing is winning on availability.
Boeing delivered 143 aircraft in Q1 2026.
In June alone, it hit 42 max deliveries,
matching the FAA-approved production rate of 42 per month
that RateCap imposed after the January 2024 Alaska Airlines door plug incident.
Boeing's been cleared to move toward 47 per month.
First half of 2026 was Boeing's strongest first-half delivery performance since 2018.
Airbus is winning on demand and losing on supply.
As of the end of June 2026,
Airbus held a backlog of 7,461 A320neo family aircraft,
plus 581 A220s and 1,174 widebodies,
roughly 10.6 years of production coverage against its 870 aircraft delivery target.
Through June 30th, Airbus was ahead of Boeing by 441 gross orders for the year,
holding nearly double Boeing's total,
nearly double the orders,
and behind pace on its own delivery target.
Guillaume Fauré pushed back Airbus' long-running goal of reaching Rate 75 on the A320 family
and blamed Pratt & Whitney engine shortages for limiting deliveries and slowing the ramp.
Read that one more time.
The most in-demand airplane in the world, held back by its engine.
And Boeing's not out of the woods either.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes was still loss-making in Q1 2026,
and in March 2026,
a wiring defect forced inspections and rework on roughly 25 finished MAX aircraft.
Small factory problems still ripple straight through the delivery schedule.
So who survives?
Neither company is going anywhere.
That's not really the question.
And any video telling you Boeing or Airbus is about to die is selling you something.
The real question is, which one is holding the right engine in 2040?
Because the airframers don't fully control that.
They're both hostages to a supply chain of maybe three companies on Earth
capable of building a modern commercial turbofan,
and those three companies are making architectural bets right now,
today, on incomplete information,
with the answer arriving 15 years from now.
Airbus is betting the open fan works.
Boeing is betting it doesn't.
And Safran is quietly building both.
And there's one more thing I have to say,
because it's the honest answer to the title of this video.
Who survives is the wrong frame,
and I want to retire it right here at the end.
Boeing and Airbus are not going to kill each other.
They are going to spend the next 15 years locked in a marriage neither one chose,
with three engine makers they can't live without and can't fully control.
Airbus already knows what it feels like when an engine maker walks away.
The superfan, 1987, three months from promise to nothing,
and an airplane that had to be redesigned around the hole.
Boeing already knows what it costs to force an engine onto an airframe that doesn't want it.
The 737's landing gear, 1967, still sending invoices in 2026.
So when Safran quietly starts a project called Advanced Ducted Large
while publicly saying, we are all in on open fan,
don't read that as dishonesty.
Read it as an institution that has been burned and remembers.
The real answer to who survives is
whoever is most honest with themselves about what they don't know yet.
Because every single crisis in this video,
the powder, the dust, the blades, the discs, the nozzles,
was a thing somebody was sure about,
right up until an airplane had been flying for five years,
and the shop visit told the truth.
The engine is where confidence goes to get tested.
And that's the thing I can't stop thinking about.
We've built machines that move 400 people across an ocean,
burning less fuel per seat than a car,
running a fire hotter than the melting point of the metal containing it,
separated from catastrophe by a film of air the width of a hair.
And we've made it so reliable that 99.95% departure reliability
is considered a problem worth a billion dollar fix.
The scandal isn't that these engines break.
The scandal is how astonishingly close we've come to making them perfect,
and how much it costs to close that last fraction of a percent.
So, like the video if it earned it,
subscribe if you want more of these,
and tell me in the comments, open fan or ducted,
Airbus' bet or Boeing's,
because in 15 years, one of us is going to be right.
And if this one got you, the story of how the A380 died,
the biggest passenger jet ever built,
killed, not by safety, not by scandal,
but by an engine decision made 20 years earlier,
is on screen right now.
Go watch it.
