This documentary follows the Clark Michigan 675 from the drawing board to the scrapyard. A 175-ton machine with a 24-cubic-yard bucket, twin Cummins V12 engines, and four tires taller than a man. We break down the square-cube problem that made it possible, the single-point-of-failure economics that made it dangerous to own, the 1973 oil shock that wrecked its timing, and the verified reason it lost to Caterpillar's smaller 992 despite being years ahead. It ends with the three machines that survive today, and the one that still runs.
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📌 CHAPTERS 00:00 The Biggest Loader on Earth 05:46 Doubling a Machine: The Square-Cube Problem 11:07 Two Engines, Four Tires, One Weak Point 21:47 Why It Died: Parts, Tires, and the Oil Shock 27:50 14 vs 2,500: What Survives Today
The Clark Michigan 675 was a massive 1973 wheel loader designed to maximize mining efficiency by reducing the number of passes needed to fill haul trucks. Despite its unprecedented capacity, it was a commercial failure due to extreme mechanical strain, high operational risks, and poor market timing, with only 14 units ever produced.
It is the middle of a shift, and the whole mine is waiting on one machine.
The Clark Michigan 675 drives its bucket into a wall of broken rock, closes on close to 40 tons
in a single bite, and backs out to feed a haul truck the size of a house. 24 cubic yards of ore
lifted and dumped over and over hundreds of times before the shift is done.
The operator sits two stories up, reached by a ladder bolted to the frame, with two Cummins 512
diesels and every gallon of fuel on the machine below him and behind him. 1270 horsepower under
his seat, four tires standing taller than the men on the ground, a frame 53 feet long and close to
200 tons loaded. And here is the part nobody in the pit likes to say out loud. This one machine
does the work of two or three ordinary loaders, which means the mine no longer owns two or three
loaders. It owns one. When it stops, the trucks stop. The crushing plant stops. The entire payroll
stands in the dust and waits. Caterpillar, the largest earth-moving company on the planet,
would not build a bucket this big for another 16 years. Clark built it in 1973 and built exactly
14. That number is the whole story, and by the end of this, you will understand why it was never 15.
One quick thing before we climb into the rest of this.
If you are watching on a television right now, point your remote at the screen,
move up to the thumbs up, and press it, and then do the same on the subscribe button.
It is the easiest way to keep machines like this one from being forgotten.
That is all it takes. Now, back to the pit. Start with the job this machine was built to do,
because everything else follows from it. A wheel loader does one thing. It drives a bucket into a
pile, fills it, backs out, swings toward a truck, and dumps the load into the bed. It does not dig
the mine the way a shovel or a dragline digs a mine. It feeds the trucks. And the entire rhythm
of an open pit runs on that one cycle, repeated without end. Load, swing, dump, reverse,
load again. Every other machine on the property is scheduled around how fast that cycle turns.
Now picture the other end of that cycle in the early 1970s. The haul trucks were growing. A
truck that used to carry 85 tons was climbing toward 150 tons and beyond. And a truck that
size sitting empty in front of a loader is not resting. It is losing money by the minute. The
driver is paid whether the bed is full or not. The diesel is burning whether it is hauling ore
or standing still. So the number that actually mattered to the man running the mine was never
horsepower, and it was never bucket size on a brochure. It was passes. How many bucket loads
does it take to fill that truck? A loader working in five or six passes ties a truck up longer than
one working in three or four. And that difference is not a one-time thing. It repeats on every truck,
on every cycle, for the whole shift. Fewer passes, and the truck is loaded and gone
sooner. The queue behind the loader shrinks. The cycle tightens. More tons cross the scale in the
same eight hours with the same drivers already on the payroll. Run that across a shift, a week,
a year, and two or three passes saved per truck stops being a rounding error. It becomes the
number that decides whether the pit makes its quarter. So a bigger bucket was never really about
spectacle. It was a pass count argument, made in steel. And as the trucks kept growing through the
decade, the loaders feeding them had a simple choice. Grow to match, or fall behind the very
trucks they were built to fill. That is the pressure the 675 was born into. Clark was not
trying to build the biggest machine in the world for a photograph. It was trying to answer a
question the whole industry was asking. And it decided to answer it bigger than anyone else dared.
That answer had a long runway behind it. Clark Equipment Company ran its loader business out of
Buchanan, Michigan. And it had been building toward a machine like this since 1953, the year it took
control of the Michigan Power Shovel Company. Clark kept the Michigan name on its wheel loaders
on purpose, because to the men buying heavy equipment, that name already meant something.
It meant a loader built like an anvil. Through the 1950s and 60s, the Michigan line climbed one
model at a time. 75, 175, 275, 375, 475. Each one a step up in size and weight. The 475 sat
at the top of that line for years. Roughly 12 cubic yards in the bucket, close to 75 tons on
the scale, running a big Detroit diesel and, in its later form, a Cummins. It was a serious machine,
and for most of a decade it was as large as a wheel loader got. Mines bought it and kept buying
it. Then came the 675, and here is the thing to understand about it. It did not refine the 475.
It did not add 10%. It doubled it outright. 24 cubic yards against 12. And that single decision,
to double a wheel loader instead of nudging it, is where this story turns from a bigger machine
into a genuinely harder problem. Because a wheel loader cannot simply be scaled up the way you
would enlarge a photograph. When you double the size of the bucket, you do not double the trouble.
You multiply it. And the men who built the 675 were about to run straight into a wall of physics
that no one in the industry had ever had to answer at this scale before.
Begin with how a wheel loader steers, because it is stranger than it looks,
and it matters. A highway truck steers by turning its front wheels while the rest of the frame
stays rigid behind them. That is fine for following a road. It is wrong for a machine
whose whole reason to exist is to drive straight into a bank with a full bucket and pull straight
back out without dragging the load sideways across the pile. So a Michigan loader does not
steer like a truck. It bends. There is a pivot joint in the middle of the frame and the front
half of the machine turns while the rear half tracks along behind it, which keeps the bucket
square to the wall of rock it is cutting into, no matter which way the machine is pointed.
That geometry is what makes a wheel loader a wheel loader and not a bulldozer with a bucket
welded to the front. But it also means that one joint in the center of the machine carries every
twisting force the whole machine produces. And now hang 40 tons of broken rock off a bucket
out in front of the front axle and a new problem appears. Every pound you hang out over that front
axle has to be balanced by weight somewhere behind it or the machine simply tips forward
under its own load the instant it tries to lift. Bucket first, nose down in the dirt. On a small
loader that is a manageable thing. On a machine this size it becomes the single constraint that
shapes everything else. Here is the part the engineers could not talk their way around.
When you double the dimensions of a bucket you do not double the weight it carries.
You multiply it by roughly eight because volume grows by the cube. But the beams and the pins
and the axles that have to carry that volume only grow by the square of their cross-section.
Engineers have a name for this. They call it the square cube problem and it is the reason nobody
had built a wheel loader this large before. The loads on a machine twice the bucket size of the
475 did not rise in a straight line. They rose faster than the steel meant to carry them.
So every structural piece on the 675, the frame rails, the pivot pin, the axle housings,
had to be built heavier than a simple doubling would suggest. And more weight demanded more
counterweight at the back to keep the nose down. And more counterweight demanded more strength to
carry it, which added weight again. Add strength, add weight, add more weight, then need more strength
to carry that. The 675 sat at the exact point in that loop where the numbers finally closed.
And closing them is what a machine this size has to pay for before it ever turns a wheel.
What all of that bought was a machine that could genuinely do what nothing else on the market could
do. The bucket alone spanned close to 21 feet across the cutting edge, wider than a lane of a
two-lane road. It could tear the better part of 40 tons of rock out of a bank in a single pull,
with a breakout force near 74 tons, and its side plates were cut from three-inch steel.
It could raise a full bucket to a discharge height near 20 feet, high enough to clear the
side of almost any haul truck running in a mine at the time, loaded or empty, so the operator
never had to think twice about whether the bucket would clear the rim before he dumped.
And the family had already proven what that kind of capacity did in the field. One size down,
the 475 worked Australian coal, shifting and stockpiling as much as 20,000 tons in a single
day, day after day, on a machine with half the bucket of the 675. That is what a machine with
double that bucket was expected to do once it reached a working pit. But it bought something
else too, something that would not show up for years and would not show up while the machine
was running well. It only showed up the moment the machine stopped. Hold on to that, because we
are coming back to it. If this is the kind of story you like, take a second and subscribe.
We pull one of these forgotten giants back out of the dirt every week, and you will not want to
miss the next one. Moving that much machine, with that much rock hanging off the front of it,
took power that no single diesel engine on the market in the early 1970s could deliver in one
block. So Clark did not put one engine in the 675. It put two. Now there is a real argument about
which two, and it is worth settling here, because it is the single thing people fight about most
when this machine comes up. The two prototype units, the early ones built around 1970,
were open machines with no cab and no roll bar, and they were moved by two enormous General Motors
Detroit diesels, 24 cylinders of screaming two-stroke sitting right behind the operator.
That is the machine in the old factory film that still circulates today, and it is exactly why so
many men who know these loaders will tell you, flatly, that the 675 ran on Detroit power.
They are not making it up. They are describing the prototype and the smaller Michigan loaders
in the same family, which genuinely did run Detroit's. But the 14 machines that actually
went to work in the pits, the production 675s, carried something different. Two Cummins V12
diesels, 1270 horsepower between them. Both stories are true. One of them just came first,
and that decision, two engines instead of one, solved the power problem and created a maintenance
problem that never went away for the life of the machine. Two engines is not simply twice
the horsepower. It is two starters, two cooling systems, two sets of air cleaners, two exhaust
systems, two fuel systems, two engines needing oil changes on the same schedule, two sets of
filters, two rounds of valve adjustments, and twice as many individual parts that can fail and put the
machine down. A mechanic on a normal loader services one set of everything and moves on.
A mechanic on the 675 did the whole job twice in the same afternoon. Every hour of scheduled
maintenance doubled, and every hour skipped was an hour closer to an unscheduled stop.
On a machine where an unscheduled stop did not slow the pit down, it stopped the pit
cold. We will get to exactly what that cost. But first, there was one part of this machine
that could not be made stronger no matter how much steel Clark threw at it, and it was hiding
in plain sight at all four corners. The tires. 675s rode on four of them, each standing roughly
10 feet tall, among the largest production tires anywhere in the world at the time.
And a tire is the one piece of a machine like this that engineering cannot simply muscle. A frame,
an engine, a drivetrain can all be made stronger within limits by making them thicker and heavier.
A tire cannot. Rubber flexing under load generates its own heat, and heat, not weight, not impact,
not age by itself, is what eventually kills an off-road tire from the inside out.
Make the tire stiff enough to resist that flex, and it cracks. Let it flex enough to survive,
and it runs hot. There is no way to engineer around that trade. There is only managing it.
And on a machine this heavy, carrying loads this large, the tire was never going to be the part
with room to spare. Giant tires in this class, even today, are built from as many as 40 different
rubber compounds layered together, and the capacity to build tires that size has always
been limited. Shortages of them come and go across the whole mining industry, and always have.
On the 675, the tires were the weak point on purpose. Not by accident. On purpose,
because everything else on the machine could be built heavier, and the tires could not.
And it was not only the tires taking that punishment. None of this work is dramatic to
watch. It is the same handful of motions, shift after shift, and the repetition is what wears
the machine down. A single hard hit rarely breaks a wheel loader. Hundreds of ordinary ones,
absorbed the same way every time, are what do it. The pivot joint in the center of the frame
takes the twist every time the machine turns under load. The drivetrain takes the shock of
driving a full bucket into a solid bank at full throttle, again and again. A load that arrives
all at once the instant the bucket meets rock. And the brakes take the worst of it, because
bringing close to 200 tons to a stop, hundreds of times in a single shift, turns all of that
motion into heat and pours it into the brakes, over and over, until something gives.
And here it is, worth being careful and honest. Because a story about a machine this big can
drift toward drama, it cannot actually back up. The Mine Safety Agency in the United States
still puts a warning in front of crews today about tires of exactly this class. It states plainly
that a large off-road tire can throw debris as far as 900 feet when it explodes,
and it documents cases of fires that started inside such tires, became explosions, and killed
the men nearby, usually when a torch or a welder was taken to a wheel with the tire still mounted.
None of that is written against the 675 in particular. There is no record of it happening
to one of these machines. But the 675 carried four tires of exactly the class that warning
is about, mounted underneath a cab two stories off the ground, with a single ladder as the only
way down. That is not a claim about a disaster. It is a description of what the men who worked
around this machine were standing next to, every shift. And if this is the kind of story you come
here for, we have put ten of them into a book. It is our new book, Steel, Steam, and Nerve,
about how the machines built America and broke the men who ran them. It is linked below,
or you can scan the code on your screen to go straight there. There is also a link to buy the
channel a coffee, if you would rather just help keep the work going. So let us talk about those
men, because in the end, every ton of stress cycling through this machine came down to the
people standing next to it. The operator sat roughly two stories up, reached by a ladder,
and a set of walkways bolted to the frame. Climbing into the cab at the start of a shift
meant climbing that ladder, every single time, in whatever weather the site had that day,
in whatever boots the man was wearing. And that height was not just a matter of a long climb.
It meant that in any emergency, a fire, a hydraulic line letting go, a slide on uneven ground.
The way down was that same ladder, on a machine carrying its fuel and its hydraulic fluid,
and two diesel engines below and behind the cab, all of it between the operator and the ground.
It also meant the operator could not see the ground close in around a machine
53 feet long that bent in the middle. Anyone on foot near a working 675, especially close to the
sides, was standing in space the man in the cab could not fully account for. And the center pivot,
where the front and rear halves of the frame sheer past each other, opened and closed with
every turn the machine made. That is not a place a person stands while the machine is moving.
Underneath and behind the cab, a mechanic servicing the engines worked beneath two
V12 diesels mounted overhead, wrenches raised above his own head instead of down on a bench
in front of him. We do not have to guess at what that world felt like, because the men who ran the
smaller machines in this same family left a record of it. One fitter who kept the 475s,
running for British Steel in England, remembers a machine that broke through the crust of a slag pit
and dropped into the molten iron underneath. And he remembers a tire that caught fire and
exploded with enough force to damage the buildings around it, after which the crew
started filling the tires with nitrogen instead of air. He remembers the operator, a big man,
seen running from that fire like an Olympic sprinter, and he remembers with some affection
that the man was perfectly fine once he had changed his clothes.
Those were the 475s. Smaller machines than the one we are talking about. The 675 doubled all
of it. And now the honest part, the part we owe you. We went looking, hard, for a death or a
injury tied to a 675 specifically, in the public record, in old mine reports, in the memories of
the men who worked around these machines. We did not find one, and we are not going to invent one
to make this story darker than it actually was. With only 14 of these ever built, scattered across
whatever sites bought them, an accident involving one of them might never have surfaced in any
record that survives 50 years later. So the honest position sits between two facts.
Nothing is documented, and a record this thin proves very little either way. What we can tell
you plainly is where the men stood. Two stories up, over the fuel and the engines, with a ladder
as the only way down, next to four tires that could throw debris the length of three football
fields if they ever let go. That was the human cost of this machine, whether or not anyone wrote
it down. But the thing that actually finished the 675 was never written in an accident report at all.
It was written in dollars, and it came due the moment the machine stopped moving.
The cost of a machine like this does not show up while it is running. It shows up the instant it
stops. Start with parts. 14 production machines is not a number that can support a parts network.
A district warehouse stocks components based on how many machines in the district will need them,
and a machine with 14 examples built across its entire run generates almost none. That is not
neglect on anyone's part. It is arithmetic. Nobody keeps a shelf stocked for a part that might be
ordered once a decade. And there was the matter of the men who had to run it and fix it. A mechanic
learns a machine by working on many of them, by seeing the same failure a dozen times until he
knows it by feel. There were 14 of these in the entire world. A crew that drew a 675 was learning
it more or less alone, on a machine so rare that almost nobody they could call had ever laid hands
on one. Everything a common machine teaches a whole industry across thousands of examples.
This one had to teach a single crew at a time, the hard way. Tires are where this got expensive
in the most physical way possible, and it was the direct bill for the trade-off built into the
machine on the day it was designed. Four tires, each standing 10 feet tall. Changing one is not a
job a two-man crew does with a floor jack in an afternoon. A tire that size cannot be broken down
and mounted by hand at all. It takes a purpose-built handler capable of lifting and positioning it,
a crew trained to work around that much weight suspended and moving over their heads,
and enough clear space around the machine to bring equipment that large in close. The old tire alone
weighs more than most vehicles on the road. Getting it off the rim, checking the rim for
damage, and seating a new one is a job measured in shifts, not hours. And once the old tire is off,
there is the separate question of whether a replacement even exists anywhere close by,
because nobody stocks a tire that only a handful of machines in the entire world are built to use.
Then there was moving the machine at all. Roughly 20 feet wide, over 20 feet tall,
53 feet long, and close to 200 tons. A machine those dimensions does not travel down an ordinary
road in one piece, and it does not cross an ordinary bridge rated for ordinary loads.
Relocating a 675 from one pit to another, or from a mine to a dealer, was not a Sunday drive.
It was a planned project, with routing and permits, and almost certainly a partial disassembly,
worked out well before the machine ever left the ground it stood on.
And all of that led to the real bill, the one that never showed up on an invoice,
but showed up on the mine's production numbers every time the machine went down.
A mine that bought a 675 was not buying a loader. It was buying its entire loading operation in a
single frame. When a mine ran three smaller loaders and lost one to a breakdown, it lost
a third of its loading capacity and kept running at a reduced pace. When a mine ran a single 675
and lost it, it lost all of its loading capacity at once. The truck still had their drivers on
the clock. The crushing plant still had its crew standing by. The whole payroll was still running,
and nothing moved, because the one machine built to do the work of three ordinary loaders
was also the only machine on site that could do that work at all. The better this machine was
at replacing several smaller ones, the more expensive its silence became every time it stopped.
And then, on top of all of that, came the timing, which could hardly have been worse.
The 675 reached the market in 1973. In October of that year, the oil embargo began. Crude oil
went from under $3 a barrel to nearly $12 a barrel in a matter of months, and diesel
followed it straight up. On top of the fuel shock came a recession that ran into 1975,
the worst downturn the country had seen since the 1930s, and capital spending across mining
and construction was cut hard during exactly those years. A machine whose entire argument
was that bigger meant more efficient arrived in the one stretch of the decade when any efficiency
argument built on burning more fuel was the hardest sell in the industry. Nobody wrote that down as
the reason the 675 failed. But it is difficult to set those two dates side by side. The machine
reaching the market, and the embargo beginning that same October, and call the second one an
accident. Mines that might have gambled on a giant, unproven machine in a good year
were cutting every budget they had in a bad one. The 675 was asking a mine to bet its entire
loading operation on a single new frame, at the exact moment nobody in mining wanted to bet
on anything. One last thing before we close this out. If you see a hype button underneath this
video, give it a single tap. It helps push this story in front of more people who would want to
see it, and it costs you nothing. Then let us finish. So here is the number that ended it.
In 1976, three years after the production machine reached the market, Clark discontinued the 675.
Fourteen built. And to understand what that number means, you have to set it against what
happened at the other end of the same market. Caterpillar built a machine called the 992C.
Caterpillar had been building the 992 line since 1968, and even this later C version carried a
half the size of the 675s, 12 against 24, and Caterpillar sold more than 2,500 of the 992C
worldwide. In its own words, Caterpillar calls the 992 the best-selling large mining loader of
all time. Fourteen against more than 2,500. Sit with that for a second, because the 675 did not
lose that comparison on capability. Its bucket was nearly twice the size of the machine that
outsold it by that margin. It lost on everything that was supposed to exist around the capability,
and did not yet. The tires in stock, the parts on a shelf, the trained mechanics,
the second machine on site to cover a breakdown, all the ordinary infrastructure that a machine
selling in the thousands builds up around itself, and a machine selling in the teens
never gets the chance to. And here is the proof of that, the fact that closes the whole case.
Sixteen years after Clark built a 24 cubic yard bucket, Caterpillar finally answered it.
The Caterpillar 994 went into production in 1990, and it carried a bucket only slightly
larger than the one Clark had already built and shipped in 1973. Sixteen years to match a machine,
not to leap far past it, but to match it, seventeen years after Clark had managed it
the first time. And the 994 sold in numbers the 675 never came close to, because by 1990 the
tires existed in supply, the parts network existed, and the mines had grown to a scale
that finally justified the machine. The whole arithmetic that failed the 675 in 1973 worked,
at last, in Caterpillar's favor. So this is the answer the record actually gives,
the 675 was not too big. Its capability was correct, and it stayed correct for sixteen years,
until the largest equipment company on the planet matched it, and not a day sooner.
What the 675 did not have, what could not exist yet in 1973, was everything that was supposed to
surround that capability. The machine was never the thing that was wrong, it simply arrived too
early, and arriving too early has a bill of its own, paid privately, one machine at a time,
by whoever owned the only 675 on their property. There is a strange footnote to the ending,
and it says a great deal about what Clark itself thought of the machine.
Two of the fourteen were bought back by Clark, taken in from the customers who owned them,
and rebuilt to an upgraded version called the 675C. Records list that rebuilt machine as produced
into the middle of the 1980s, years after the original line was supposedly finished in 1976.
Read that plainly. The company that could not sell the 675 new,
went back out, and bought its own machines off its own customers,
just to keep working on the design. It did not save the model.
Within a few years, Clark's wheel loader and dozer business passed to Volvo. The Clark,
Michigan name was set aside, and in time the Michigan name disappeared from the market
altogether. The biggest wheel loader in the world had outlived the brand that built it.
So what is left of it? Of the fourteen machines Clark built,
three are believed to survive today. Two of them are incomplete. They will never move again.
The third one still runs. It sits in a yard near Grand Rapids, Michigan,
owned by a man named Russ, who has bought this machine, and sold it, and bought it back,
three separate times. In his own words, he just had to keep buying it back.
He describes it the way the men who ran this line always did. No frills, built like a tank,
a real workhorse, and nothing it ever pretended to be beyond that. The last time, people had
contacted him wanting to buy it, simply to keep it out of the scrapyard. He starts it,
and runs it a couple of times a year. A model builder named Don Campbell drove out to see it,
and Russ let him climb all over the machine, and the day he was there, the batteries were dead.
Inside the cab, Campbell found the levers and the pedals worn smooth,
rubbed down by the hands and the boots of operators over decades.
Operators nobody ever kept a record of. Sitting in that seat, he said, made his mind spin with
all the men who had run this machine so many years ago, and looking at the worn controls
made him a little sad, knowing this old machine may never scoop another bucket of anything.
The purchase price was always the easiest cost to see. Everything behind it, the tires nobody
stocked, the parts nobody carried, the mechanics nobody had trained, the shift that stopped dead
when the machine stopped, was paid out slowly, quietly, by whoever owned it. And what is left
of that account, of the biggest wheel loader the world had ever seen, a machine so far ahead of
its time that the largest company on earth needed sixteen years to catch it, is three frames
scattered across the world. Two of them will never move again. The third one starts twice a year,
turns over its two engines, and idles there for a while in a quiet yard in Michigan.
And then somebody reaches up and shuts it off.