In 2026, China is the world’s second-largest economy by GDP and holds the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves. It also appears unbreakable. But when the two timelines are placed side by side, 7 striking similarities emerge: concentrated power, economic imbalance, ideological control, youth despair, demographic decline, international isolation, and institutional rigidity. These 7 fatal characteristics have all appeared. This is no longer just a prediction, but a reality unfolding today.
On Christmas Day 1991, the world's second largest economy by GDP, the former Soviet regime,
collapsed. In 2026, China is the world's second largest economy by GDP and holds the world's
largest foreign exchange reserves. It also appears unbreakable. But when the two timelines are placed
side by side, seven striking similarities emerge. Concentrated power, economic imbalance,
ideological control, youth despair, demographic decline, international isolation, and institutional
rigidity. These seven fatal characteristics have all appeared. This is no longer just a prediction,
but a reality unfolding today. One, unchecked power. Before 2012, the top leader of the Chinese
Communist Party was expected to step down after serving two terms. This consensus came from the
lessons of the Cultural Revolution. But over the following decade, this process was gradually
dismantled. In 2018, constitutional changes removed the presidential term limit, which many at the
time viewed as a symbolic adjustment. By the 20th Party Congress in 2022, all seven members of the
Politburo Standing Committee were close allies of current leader Xi Jinping, leaving little room for
internal opposition. This trajectory closely resembles the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev.
Brezhnev ruled for 18 years. In his later years, Politburo meetings were no longer places for
decision making, but ceremonies to confirm decisions already made. Conclusions were
settled before meetings even began. Officials no longer needed to be persuaded. They only needed
to obey. More concerning than the institutional changes is a series of unusual departures among
officials. Former Premier Li Keqiang died suddenly in October 2023, less than six months after leaving
office at the age of 69. The official cause of death was listed as heart disease. Questions
around the circumstances of his death were quickly removed from the Chinese internet,
leading to speculation outside of China. The military leadership has also undergone
frequent changes in recent years. The case involving former Central Military Commission
Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia has drawn particular attention. Authorities described it as an
anti-corruption action, but outside observers have noted that many of the officials removed
were concentrated in sensitive departments, while details of the cases were rarely made public.
Since 2012, more than 6 million CCP officials and members have been investigated or punished.
Yet in 2025, the number of provincial and ministerial-level officials removed from office
continued at a pace of dozens per year, suggesting that the anti-corruption campaign
has not addressed deeper systemic issues, but has instead served more as a tool to eliminate rivals
and reshape the balance of power. Compared with the era of Joseph Stalin, when about two-thirds
of Soviet marshals were purged, China's use of anti-corruption measures to make individuals
disappear has had an effect that some argue is even greater. After the Soviet purges,
the entire bureaucratic system fell into a state of self-protection and paralysis,
with officials waiting and avoiding action. This is now the widespread attitude among
Chinese officials today, seeking no achievements, only avoiding mistakes.
More than 40 years after China's reform and opening up, the government's role in directing
the economy has clearly expanded again over the past decade. The EV industry is a typical example.
Under the push for strategic emerging industries, local governments rushed to launch projects,
and at its peak, the number of EV companies in China exceeded 100. However, since 2024,
the industry has fallen into a fierce price war. Some automakers have been selling vehicles below
cost to maintain market share, while suppliers' average payment cycles have increased from 99
days in 2022 to 108 days in 2026, showing widespread pressure on cash flow. The solar
industry is even more extreme. China currently accounts for more than 80% of global solar
manufacturing capacity. But by 2025, annual solar panel production capacity has already exceeded
two times the world's demand. With severe oversupply, solar panel prices fell by a combined
42% between 2023 and 2025. This kind of capacity expansion, driven by government targets rather
than market demand, closely resembles the Soviet Union's overproduction of steel.
Under its five-year plans, output piled up in warehouses. In both cases, resource allocation
was driven less by profit and more by meeting political targets. Changes in corporate ownership
structures are even more visible. In mid-2021, private companies accounted for 55% of the
market value among China's top 100 listed companies. By mid-2025, that figure had fallen
to 37%, cut nearly in half over four years. During the same period, the share of state-owned
enterprises rose from less than one-third to 54%. The situation of private entrepreneurs
is also reflected in several high-profile cases. In 2020, Alibaba founder Jack Ma publicly
criticized the banking industry's pawnshop mentality. Three months later, his Ant Group
IPO was abruptly halted, and Alibaba was later fined 18.2 billion yuan, or about $2.6 billion.
From 2020 to 2025, the private education sector underwent a major contraction. Internet platform
companies faced multiple rounds of regulatory meetings, and real estate developers experienced
a wave of defaults. Each round of regulation came with official justifications, but in practice,
they all reduced the space available for private capital. Fiscal risks are also becoming increasingly
significant. Official data show that by the end of 2025, government debt was about 88% of GDP.
The International Monetary Fund separately estimated that local governments' hidden debt
amounted to about 48% of GDP. Combined, the total exceeded the size of China's economy,
and some local governments have already resorted to borrowing new money to repay old debts.
Before its collapse, the Soviet Union was also burdened with heavy debt and eventually relied
on money printing, triggering severe inflation. China is not experiencing high inflation for now
because its economy is facing deflation. But that may be even more challenging.
Deflation means economic vitality is gradually disappearing.
Imprisoned ideas. While economic indicators can still be measured with numbers,
another loss that is far harder to quantify is the continued shrinking of space for free
speech and independent thought. In Freedom House's Global Internet Freedom report released in 2025,
China scored only 9 out of 100, ranking at the bottom worldwide. Major internet platforms,
including Google, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, have long been blocked,
while content boundaries on domestic platforms are set by authorities.
In other words, what people in China can see and say online has been strictly filtered.
Since the 2022 white paper movement, the term white paper was temporarily unsearchable on Weibo,
and even everyday expressions involving metaphors could be removed.
The scale of China's surveillance infrastructure is also striking.
China currently has more than 600 million surveillance cameras, averaging about one
camera for every two adults. These systems are widely equipped with facial recognition
and behavior analysis, and are connected with national ID databases, mobile phone location data,
and big data platforms. Analysts have compared this with the Soviet Union's KGB,
which relied on informants and secret files. While the basic logic of social control remains similar,
the technology has shifted from human intelligence networks to algorithm-based
surveillance, creating a level of control far beyond that of the Soviet era.
In specific cases, human rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong was sentenced to 14 years in prison in April 2023.
He was charged on subversion of state power. The accusations mainly involved articles he wrote
advocating democracy and the rule of law. Several young people who participated in the white paper
movement were later questioned by authorities, and some disappeared from public view.
The cultural and entertainment industries have also faced strict controls.
China's National Radio and Television Administration has repeatedly called on creative
works to reject vulgar and decadent trends, but regulators have full authorities over how those
standards are defined. As a result, many creators have turned to self-censorship,
with content increasingly focused on official themes or low-risk entertainment.
Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn was forcibly expelled from the USSR in 1974
after publishing The Gulag Archipelago. His book exposed the Soviet forced labor camp system.
The persecution and crimes committed by the Chinese communist authorities against dissidents
and religious groups have gone far beyond those of the former Soviet Union. The way ideology
overrides professional judgment has also been particularly evident in China's pandemic policies.
By the end of 2022, most countries had gradually lifted COVID restrictions,
and the virus fatality rate had declined significantly. China's dynamic zero-COVID
policy, however, continued until it was adjusted after the outbreak of the white paper movement.
Analysts argued that the delay in changing course was driven less by scientific assessment
and more by the political cost of admitting failure. The promotion of the digital yuan
has also been examined through a similar lens. The government has invested substantial resources
in promoting it, but public adoption has remained limited. Observers point out that its design
allows transactions to be tracked, making it function more like a financial surveillance tool
rather than simply a convenient payment system. During the Soviet era, Trofim Lysenko's theories
dominated agricultural policy, replacing scientific methods with ideology and contributing
to disastrous agricultural failures. This historical case is often cited as an example
of the consequences when political correctness overrides scientific reasoning. The two situations
are highly similar. 4. Desperate youth. A country's future depends largely on the situation facing its
younger generation. In 2025, the number of Chinese university graduates exceeded 12 million,
equivalent to the population of a large city entering the job market all at once. The official
urban surveyed unemployment rate has remained around 5% for a long period, but in June 2023,
the unemployment rate among people aged 16 to 24 surged to a record high of 21.3%. The data was
then no longer released. When publication resumed in 2025, the statistical method had been adjusted,
and the figure fell to about 16%. Several economists estimate that under a broader
measurement method, the actual youth unemployment rate could be between 40 and 50 percent, or even
higher. The mismatch between education levels and job opportunities has become increasingly clear.
It's no longer unusual to see master's degree holders working in food delivery or domestic
services. PhD graduates competing for middle school teaching positions and graduates from
top universities applying for entry-level community government jobs have gradually become more common.
This reflects the shrinking demand for workers as companies face economic pressure.
To avoid employment difficulties, many young people have chosen to continue their education
or take civil service exams. The number of applicants has repeatedly hit record highs,
while competition for some job positions has become extremely intense. This resembles the
late Soviet period, when highly educated technical professionals struggled to find suitable jobs
because of a rigid economic structure. The scale of talent development became structurally
disconnected from actual employment opportunities. The term lying flat has become widely used online
in recent years. It describes a mindset among some young people who, after realizing that effort and
rewards are no longer correlated, choose to reduce their desire to compete. Another popular term is
run, which reflects a strong desire to leave China. Applications for overseas education,
investment migration, and jobs at foreign companies have increased significantly in recent years.
The narrowing of social mobility has also become increasingly visible. In 1991, official Chinese
documents acknowledged that about 3,000 to 5,000 children of senior officials held important
positions in the party, government, military, and state-owned enterprises. More than 30 years later,
this group has not significantly declined in size. Current top leader Xi Jinping himself
comes from a princeling family background. Advancement within the government system and
success in business increasingly depend on family background and personal networks,
rather than ability alone. This structural feature closely resembles the hereditary
tendencies among Soviet elites in the later years of the Soviet Union. The theoretical
ideal of social equality appears deeply ironic in the face of entrenched privilege.
5. A population aging before it becomes wealthy. In 2022, China experienced its first population
decline since 1961. Many demographers believe this was not an isolated event, but the beginning of a
long-term trend. The main driver is the continued decline in people's willingness to have children.
The reasons behind the low birth rate mainly fall in three areas. First, the high cost of
meaning that raising one child to adulthood can cost millions of yuan.
Second, family structure pressures. The four-to-one family model, with four grandparents,
two young adults, and one child, places the middle generation under the double burden of
supporting elderly parents while raising children. Third, uncertainty about the future has weakened
the motivation behind decisions to have children. Although the government introduced the two-child
and three-child policies in 2016, the actual impact has been limited. Many scholars point
out that the root cause of low fertility lies in social confidence rather than policy tools
themselves. By comparison, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a population
crisis lasting more than 20 years. Birth rates fell sharply in the 1990s, life expectancy declined,
and the situation has still not fully recovered. If China's current demographic trend continues,
its massive population base means challenges involving pensions, health care, and labor
are expected to be even larger and more difficult to address. Six, the fearful silence. After the
2022 white paper movement, some participants were questioned by police or disappeared from
public view. But the broader impact has been reflected in the growing tendency towards
self-censorship on social media. On platforms such as Weibo and WeChat, references to sensitive
figures and events are often replaced with nicknames or homophones. To refer to Xi Jinping,
internet users use names such as Acceleration Master, 200 Jin, and Baozi. This reflects how
users have adapted to and learned to navigate the system over time. Some say that people in
China now speak as if they're playing a word guessing game. But this game is not entertaining.
It creates frustration and forces people to separate their public words from their private
thoughts. Russian writer Mikhail Bugakov wrote in his novel Heart of a Dog about a state where
individuals outwardly submit while internally resisting, creating a divided psychological state
under an authoritarian system. This literary image is often used as an allegory for contemporary
Chinese society. The widespread use of surveillance systems and the ability to access digital
communication records in real time has made cautious speech a common survival strategy.
Studies in social psychology suggest that widespread self-censorship is often accompanied
by collective indifference. When speaking out carries risks, remaining a bystander
rather than intervening becomes a rational choice, creating what is known as the chilling effect.
Surface-level social stability may conceal dissatisfaction that is rarely expressed
publicly. This self-censorship of intellectuals, the transformation of media into channels for
and the silence of ordinary people together create an environment where tensions are suppressed
rather than resolved. The democratic movements in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the national
movements before the collapse of the Soviet Union are often cited by historians as examples of how
long-term suppression can accumulate until tensions are released at a critical point.
They're used as a reference framework for understanding similar social dynamics.
China today appears increasingly similar to the Soviet Union on the eve of its collapse.
The decline of great powers is often accompanied by failures in foreign expansion.
The Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan consumed enormous resources and the lives of tens of
thousands of soldiers. The USSR eventually withdrew. Afghanistan was later known as the
graveyard of empires for the Soviet Union. China has not been involved in a similar military
conflict, but the impact and risks of the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013 have also
sparked debate. About 80 percent of China's overseas lending has gone to countries with
high debt risks. The case of Sri Lanka's Hambantota port is often cited as a key example.
After the Sri Lankan government was unable to repay loans for the port's construction,
the facility was transferred to Chinese management through a 99-year lease,
triggering accusations of neocolonialism. Countries like Zambia and Ghana have also
faced fiscal difficulties linked to debt issues involving China. Although Beijing denies the
existence of a systematic debt trap, these cases have already affected China's image in some
developing countries. In terms of diplomatic partnerships, China's closest strategic
relationships are currently mainly with Russia, North Korea, and Iran. All three countries have
While each also faces challenges involving sanctions, geopolitical conflicts, or domestic
stability, their strategic value is therefore limited. By contrast, Japan, South Korea,
and Australia maintain alliances with the United States. India has adopted a strategy of balancing
multiple sides, and Southeast Asian countries generally maintain relationships with both China
and the United States. This reflects the growing diplomatic pressure China faces in the region.
The strategic competition between China and the United States continues to deepen,
covering technology export controls, tariff barriers, and investment reviews. This has
encouraged part of the global supply chain to shift towards South Asia and Southeast Asia.
The fact that India's population surpassed China's in 2023 is part of this broader trend. If conflict
breaks out in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, China could face even tougher financial
sanctions. The Soviet Union's relative isolation during the later Cold War prevented it from fully
participating in the IT revolution and was seen as a major factor behind its declining competitiveness.
Critics argue that the Chinese Communist Party is now moving rapidly along a similar path.