California’s coastline is changing—and in some places, the ground beneath roads, rail lines, homes, and entire communities is literally moving toward the Pacific. Roughly 70% of California’s coastline is made up of eroding cliffs, while landslides, rising seas, powerful waves, and groundwater are putting increasing pressure on some of the state’s most vulnerable coastal areas.
In this video, DiscoverTube investigates what scientists are finding along California’s coast—from sensors that detected subtle cliff movement hours to days before dangerous collapses, to the repeated shutdowns of the vital LOSSAN rail corridor near San Clemente. Researchers monitoring unstable bluffs in San Diego County detected five failures in advance during a four-year study, revealing movements far too small for the human eye to notice.
We also travel to Rancho Palos Verdes, where an enormous landslide complex has damaged roads, utilities, and homes. Engineers have pumped more than 450 million gallons of groundwater from the hillside, helping slow the movement by around 60% compared with the previous year—but the ground has not stopped moving.
🔍 In this video: • Why so much of California’s coastline is actively eroding • How scientists detected cliff collapses before they happened • Why the San Clemente rail corridor keeps shutting down • The $305 million effort to protect California’s coastline • Why hundreds of truckloads of sand are being dumped onto beaches • What is happening beneath Rancho Palos Verdes • How groundwater pumping slowed a massive landslide • Why roads, railways, homes, and beaches remain at risk • What USGS models suggest California’s coastline could look like by 2100
USGS modeling indicates that, without intervention, substantial portions of California’s beaches could disappear by the end of the century, while Southern California blufftops could retreat tens of feet depending on future sea-level rise.
The bigger question is no longer whether California’s coastline will continue changing—but how far communities are willing to go to defend it.
💬 What do you think California should prioritize: sensors, sand nourishment, seawalls, or moving infrastructure inland?
00:00 The eroding California coast 01:17 Mechanism of cliff retreat 03:38 Early warning sensors 06:20 Crisis in rail transit 08:48 Resiliency planning 12:04 Sand nourishment 13:33 Managing deep-seated slides 17:47 Future projections
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California's coastline faces severe instability due to eroding cliffs and deep-seated landslides, threatening critical rail corridors and residential areas. While new sensor technology from Scripps Institution of Oceanography can detect precursors to collapses, rising sea levels and geological pressures continue to outpace current mitigation efforts, risking the loss of up to 75% of beaches by 2100.
Our top story, a powerful Labor Day weekend storm slams the Long Beach Peninsula,
bringing massive waves and flooding to the coastline.
Stand on a Southern California bluff top, and the geometry tells you everything.
Below you, waves work the base of the cliff,
grinding at soft marine sediment that was never built to hold a vertical face.
Above, rain soaks into the same material from the top down,
adding weight and pressure to a slope that is already losing its grip.
Somewhere between those two forces sits a rail line, a road, a campground,
or a row of houses with 15 feet of yard left.
Stories like this are what we dig into on DiscoverTube,
where our documentaries go past the headline
and keep you updated as new developments change the picture.
The coast that is mostly cliff.
That 70% figure is worth sitting with, because it reframes the whole problem.
In California, an eroding cliff is not the exception.
It is the default coastline.
Highways run along it. Rail lines run beneath it.
Coastal access stairways, energy facilities, sewer trunk lines,
and some of the most expensive residential real estate in the country
all sit on ground that is actively in retreat.
The mechanism is a two-front attack,
and the two fronts operate on completely different clocks.
At the bottom, waves undercut the toe.
Every swell removes a little material from the base,
steepening the face above it
and stripping away the support that holds the mass in place.
At the top, rainfall infiltrates the sediment.
Water adds weight, and more importantly,
it raises pore pressure inside the rock and soil,
which reduces the friction holding one grain against the next.
The cliff is being hollowed out from below
and loosened from above at the same time.
The rate at which any given stretch retreats
depends on a tangle of interacting variables.
The United States Geological Survey models it using sea level rise,
wave energy, the slope of the seafloor approaching shore,
the width of the beach, the height of that beach,
and the strength of the rock itself.
Change any one of those, and the outcome shifts.
Narrow the beach, and more wave energy reaches the cliff.
Widen it, and the beach absorbs the blow first,
which is why coastal scientists treat sand not as an amenity
but as the first line of defense against flooding and erosion.
Here is the part that makes cliffs so dangerous to live above.
Retreat is not gradual.
USGS researchers put it plainly.
Unlike beaches, cliffs can remain stable for decades
between large landslides that remove several feet of bluff top at once.
That is the perceptual trap.
Nothing happens for 20 years.
The house is fine. The fence is fine.
Then a threshold gets crossed,
and two decades of accumulated retreat are released in about four seconds.
Setbacks, insurance, and property values
are all calibrated to the quiet decades.
The landscape delivers averages
that no individual property ever actually experiences,
which raises an obvious question
for anyone trying to keep people safe on a beach below a 100-foot bluff.
If the failure comes without visible warning,
is the quiet period genuinely silent?
Or is the cliff already telling us something
at a scale too small for a human eye to catch?
A four-year field campaign in San Diego County
set out to answer exactly that.
The crack you cannot see.
Researchers at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography
have now publicly released the results,
and they are the most encouraging development in this story in years.
The work was led by coastal geomorphologist Adam Young
and geophysicist Mark Zumberg,
who buried instrument networks directly into unstable coastal bluffs
at three sites,
Beacons Beach in Encinitas,
the rail corridor at Del Mar,
and San Elijo State Beach.
The instruments measured tilt, strain, and displacement,
movement far below the threshold
of anything a person standing on the bluff top could perceive.
The headline finding is that the sensors detected motion
hours to days before dangerous collapses.
Across the four-year campaign,
five separate failures were flagged in advance.
The Del Mar case shows what that actually looks like in the ground.
Before roughly 200 tons of cliff came down in the pre-dawn hours,
a crack about a tenth of an inch wide had opened,
running 30 feet parallel to the cliff edge.
It was widening at about 15 thousandths of an inch per day,
roughly the thickness of four sheets of paper
spread across an entire 24 hours.
A tilt meter had already flagged an elevated likelihood of failure
days earlier.
Nobody standing on that bluff could have seen a thing.
The study also produced a number with immediate practical use.
Debris from these failures travelled an average
of just under 20 feet from the base of the cliff,
and 90% of measured run-out distances stayed under 43 feet.
That turns beach closure lines and bluff top setbacks
from guesswork into measurement.
The project ran on $2.5 million
secured through the state budget
under a monitoring and reporting program
established by state legislation.
But the researchers were careful about what they had
and are not claiming.
The sites were chosen because activity was anticipated,
not guaranteed.
Five detections across four years is a promising sample,
not a validated hit rate.
And Scripps stated directly that more work is needed
before any of this becomes an actionable warning system.
There is also a harder limitation.
A warning is only useful if something can be moved out of the way,
which brings us to seven miles of coastline
where nothing can be moved quickly,
and the failures keep arriving anyway.
A year of missing trains.
The Lausanne Corridor runs 351 miles
between San Diego, Los Angeles and San Luis Obispo.
It is the second busiest passenger rail route in the United States,
carrying close to 8 million passengers a year
and moving more than a billion dollars in freight.
For most of that distance, it behaves like ordinary railroad.
For about seven miles, from Dana Point through San Clemente
to the San Diego county line,
it behaves like a coastal engineering problem.
The tracks there sit at the toe of the bluff,
inside the way run-up zone,
with the failure surface directly overhead.
That is close to the worst geometry available.
Armor at the base can slow undercutting from the ocean side,
but it does nothing about groundwater loading the slope from above.
So the corridor gets hit from both directions,
and both directions have delivered.
Since 2021, erosion, bluff movement, landslides,
high tides, storms and heavy ocean swells
have combined to shut that stretch down again and again.
The Orange County Transportation Authority
puts the cumulative total at nearly a full year of lost service.
A year of closures on a line that normally carries
close to 8 million passengers annually.
Some of the failures come from city-owned slopes.
Others come from private property above the tracks.
Either way, the consequence is public.
The emergency response has been physical and expensive.
Roughly 1,200 tons of riprap placed to stabilize eroded sections.
A catchment wall about 1,400 feet long at Mariposa Point,
built specifically to intercept landslide debris
before it reaches the rails.
And it keeps happening.
In early August, swell activity was reported
to have stripped protective material off the line,
and saltwater intrusion caused communications interference
affecting train operations.
Crews worked inside the existing track footprint
on a compressed schedule
because more high tides were already in the forecast.
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Years of patching eventually forced a formal study.
Late last month, the results reached a board.
The toolbox with no decision in it.
In late August, the OCTA Board of Directors
reviewed the draft Coastal Rail Resiliency Feasibility Report,
a study of that seven-mile corridor
built around a 30-year planning horizon.
The board did not choose a project.
It directed staff to continue coordinating with other agencies
before the report is finalized later this year.
That is not bureaucratic drift.
It reflects what the report actually contains.
The draft deliberately avoids naming a single preferred solution.
Instead, it presents what OCTA calls a toolbox,
a set of potentially feasible rail-side,
bluff-side, and beach-side concepts
that could be combined depending on location and funding.
The largest question of all,
whether to move the tracks inland entirely,
was not answered here at all.
It was pushed to a separate, state-led study,
looking beyond the 30-year window.
The reason no single option wins
is that each one fails a different constraint.
Hard armoring protects the rail
but starves and narrows the beach in front of it,
which, over time, removes the very buffer that absorbs wave energy.
Sand nourishment restores the beach and preserves public access
but has no proven lifespan on a high-energy open coast.
Relocation solves the geology completely
and detonates the cost and the politics.
You can see that reasoning in what got cut.
At a public meeting earlier in August,
OCTA staff confirmed that a cobble berm,
a bank of rounded stone designed to absorb wave energy
the way a natural cobble beach does,
had been evaluated and did not make the shortlist.
The concerns were specific.
Unproven performance protecting critical infrastructure on an open coast,
the sheer volume of cobble required,
and the likelihood that wave action would simply move the material somewhere else.
That answer did not satisfy everyone.
Local officials have pushed for a sand-first approach,
and one San Clemente official described significant beach loss
across portions of north and south San Clemente over the preceding month.
There is also a funding wrinkle that reframes the whole thing.
Roughly $305 million in state and federal money
was secured for erosion work in the region,
and it has not been fully spent.
The bottleneck cited is permitting, not budget.
Surfrider and other coastal advocates argue that riprap accelerates beach loss
and cuts off public access,
which puts the fastest engineering fix in direct conflict
with the thing the coast is valued for.
So the money exists.
The engineering exists.
What does not exist yet is an agreed endpoint,
and towns cannot plan land use around a rail corridor
whose long-term location has been assigned to a study that hasn't started.
One option, though, did survive all the way to implementation.
It involves the strangest supply chain on the California coast,
trucking a desert into the ocean.
The plan for San Clemente calls for placing
up to roughly 540,000 cubic yards of sand along the coastline.
That volume is not decoration.
A wide beach moves the breaking point of waves seaward,
so energy is spent on sand instead of on the base of the bluff.
Widen the beach, and you buy the cliff time.
The first delivery showed exactly how hard that arithmetic is.
About 3,400 cubic yards of sand arrived in more than 300 truckloads,
hauled from a quarry near Palm Springs
and spread across roughly a quarter mile of North Beach.
Desert sand trucked over the mountains, dumped at the edge of the Pacific.
Set that first delivery against the full plan,
and the scale problem is obvious,
and more than $300 million has been secured for priority rail protection overall,
which tells you this is not a shortage of commitment.
The deeper issue is that sand is a consumable, not a structure.
Longshore currents move it down the coast.
Winter swell pulls it offshore.
The ocean sets the removal schedule,
and it does not consult the budget cycle.
That is why the delivered volume and the planned volume sits so far apart,
and why the cobble berm question keeps resurfacing despite being cut.
Nourishment remains the only intervention that protects the rail
and keeps the beach usable at the same time.
It is also the one that has to be bought again indefinitely.
Now move about 70 miles north to a place where the problem is not the cliff face.
It is the entire hillside, the town that slowed its own landslide.
On the Palos Verdes Peninsula, southwest of Los Angeles,
the ground itself is the moving part.
The Greater Portuguese Bend Landslide Complex
is not a cliff face shedding material into the surf.
It is a deep-seated slide,
a slab of hillside moving seawood along a failure plane
buried well beneath the surface,
carrying roads, utilities, and houses with it.
The driver is water working on two levels.
Rain percolates down from the surface.
Groundwater sits trapped deeper inside the formation,
raising pressure along the slip surface
and cutting the friction that would otherwise hold the mass in place.
Historically, the complex has moved as much as 8.5 feet in a year,
slow enough to live with, fast enough to destroy a road.
Then the wet winters arrived.
At the peak of the crisis,
parts of the complex reached roughly a foot of movement per week,
compressing a year of typical sliding into seven days.
Researchers at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory
flew airborne radar over the peninsula
and measured displacement of up to four inches per week.
JPL landslide scientist Alexander Handwerger
described that rate as more than enough
to endanger both people and infrastructure.
The city attacked the water directly.
Dewatering wells were drilled into the slide mass
to pull groundwater out and lower pressure along the failure plane.
More than 450 million gallons have been removed,
roughly enough to fill 680 Olympic-sized swimming pools
pumped out of a hillside one well at a time.
It worked.
Survey data from early July
puts the complex at about 60% slower than a year earlier.
That happened despite a rainy season slightly above average,
which is the detail that matters scientifically.
If the slowdown had arrived with a dry winter,
you could credit the weather.
It didn't.
The engineering is fighting the actual driver rather than the symptom.
Here's a question worth putting to you directly,
and the comments on DiscoverTube are the right place for it.
When a city has to pump a hillside dry forever to keep it in place,
is that a solution or a permanent subscription?
Because 60% slower is not stopped.
The gains depend on hydrology,
and a single severe winter can reverse them.
Rancho Palos Verdes has bought a rate reduction, not stability.
The city's own actions say the same thing.
Alongside that encouraging number,
the council was weighing 60-day extensions
of the local emergency declarations
and an extension of the temporary ban on bicycles,
motorcycles, and similar wheeled vehicles
across roughly 2 miles of Palos Verdes Drive South.
Slower ground still deforms pavement under moving traffic.
The costs give the scale.
Landslide response spending has been projected to reach $64.4 million.
Separate from that, the city spends about $1 million every year
resurfacing the section of Palos Verdes Drive South
that keeps cracking and shifting.
That is not a recovery expense.
It is a standing line item, a permanent tax paid to geology.
Everything else has followed.
Gas service was suspended in the worst affected areas.
The electric utility flagged the possibility of de-energizing lines,
and the city responded with expedited solar permitting,
so residents cut off from the grid had a legal route to power.
A federal voluntary buyout program of roughly $42 million
was anticipated for 23 damaged properties.
The historic Wayfarer's Chapel was taken apart and relocated.
Homes have been lost outright,
leaving open ground that cannot be rebuilt on
and trail networks that will never be restored.
Two geological hazard abatement districts,
funded by assessments on property owners,
have existed on this peninsula for decades.
The land was known to be unstable long before anyone declared an emergency.
What changed was the speed.
Rancho Palos Verdes had one advantage most of the coast does not.
It had a discreet enemy sitting inside a mapped slide mass
and a way to pump it out.
Statewide, the models describe something far harder to target,
what the models say the coast becomes.
The USGS models California's shoreline
across roughly 1,760 kilometers of coast, about 1,090 miles.
It is not a single prediction.
It is an ensemble of four numerical models,
each linking breaking wave height and wave period
to how fast rock or loose sediment erodes,
then weighted according to how well each performs
against observed change.
The mechanism underneath is simple.
As sea level rises, waves break closer to shore.
More of their energy survives to reach the base of the cliff.
Erosion rates climb.
The projections split by what gets protected.
With no intervention at all,
the modeling suggests somewhere between 24% and 75%
of California's beaches could be completely eroded by 2100.
The likely case is narrower than that range implies.
With about one meter of sea level rise,
which the state considers likely,
roughly a quarter of the coastline would lose its beach entirely.
A three meter rise, treated as low probability,
is what pushes the number toward three quarters.
For the bluffs specifically,
Southern California bluff tops along nearly 300 miles of coast
could retreat an average of 62 to 135 feet by the end of the century,
depending on how much the sea rises.
The honest part of that modeling is what it refuses to claim.
USGS states plainly that the future behavior
of heavily engineered shorelines,
sea walls, revetments, sustained nourishment,
is difficult to predict
because structure lifespan and human decisions
are inputs nobody can supply.
The uncertainty in the forecast is partly uncertainty about us,
and the failures continue in the meantime.
At Steamer Lane in Santa Cruz,
another large section of cliff dropped into the ocean recently.
The city's assessment was that it was consistent
with normal coastal erosion along that shoreline.
Santa Cruz is now working with consultants
to study erosion at Lighthouse Point,
where a sea cave runs beneath the western side of the headland.
That word, normal, is the whole problem.
This coast retreats by design,
so the three threads land together.
Sensors can now see failures forming hours ahead,
though not yet as an operational warning system.
A transportation board reviewed a 30-year plan
and produced a toolbox instead of a decision,
with relocation handed to a study that hasn't begun.
A city cut its landslide speed by more than half
and still renews an emergency every 60 days.
Watch three things next—
whether the Scripps findings become a real alert system,
whether the state relocation study actually starts,
and whether that $305 million clears permitting
before winter swells arrive.
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and tell us in the comments on DiscoverTube.
Sensors, sand, armor, or relocation—
which one gets funded first?