Tehran captures US undersea drone as Trump blitzes Iranian oil tankers | Iran war news today

I'm Roland Oliphant and this is Iran The Latest. It's Wednesday the 9th of September 2026. On today's episode, the United States and Iran trade their largest missile strikes in their current round of tit-for-tat escalation, hitting targets in both Jordan and the Gulf. Meanwhile, the Iranians say that they have captured a US submarine drone and oil finally surges past $100 a barrel as the markets allow themselves to panic just a bit about the consequences of the ongoing fighting. But first, we can't ignore it. There's been an extraordinary couple of days of diplomacy between Israel and the United Kingdom. Yesterday, Ed Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, said that Britain would impose import bans on goods from illegal Israeli settlements in the move that he said was meant to protect or restore the two-state solution. The Israeli response came late last night and it was absolutely furious. Not only did they ban several British MPs from entering Israel, but they said they would shut down the British consulate in Jerusalem. An extraordinary step, a step that has only been taken in this century against Britain by Iran and Russia. It is by any measure something of a diplomatic crisis. And interestingly, the United States, a close ally of both Israel and Britain, seems unsure what to say about it. Here's Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State. Well, they alerted us to it. We don't have any announcements. Obviously, those are decisions that they make. And we and the president has expressed this in the past. We don't want to see anything destabilizing going on right now in the West Bank with so much going on in the region. We think it has implications as well on our ability to make progress with regards to Gaza and the 20-point plan and the border peace that we're very committed to. Obviously, we're not going to do what the UK did. We saw their announcement today, but I don't have any comment on it right now. Well, I would say that the president has not commented on this. As I said, neither have I at this point. We were made aware that they were going to make this decision. We heard their arguments as to why. But look, we share the goal of stability. We don't want to see some uptick in violence or an uptick in conflict or tensions in the West Bank at a very tenuous time in the region. There's always tenuous times. But beyond that, I don't think as at this moment, we don't have any further comment on the UK decision that I think was announced just a few hours ago. So what does all this mean? Does Britain respond to the Israeli response? And what does the American apparent confusion say about all this? David Blair, the Telegraph's chief foreign affairs commentator, has been thinking about this. Here are his thoughts. Israel has landed Ed Miliband with a wrenching dilemma. Ever since General Allenby captured Jerusalem more than 100 years ago, Britain has had an official presence in the Holy City. But not for much longer, because Israel has ordered the closure of the British consulate in Jerusalem in response to Miliband imposing sanctions on settlements in the occupied West Bank. So here's Miliband's conundrum. He could hit back and expel Israeli diplomats from London, but only if he's willing to risk the Israelis clearing out the British embassy in Tel Aviv. Or he could do nothing and let Israel get away with shutting down an entire British diplomatic mission. Only two other countries have done that in the 21st century. Russia, which closed the British consulate in Saint Petersburg in 2018, and Iran, where a regime mob stormed and looted Britain's embassy in Tehran in 2011. So Miliband has to decide what happens next. For now, at least, he doesn't have to worry about condemnation from the American administration in Washington. Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, declined to comment on the British sanctions on Israeli settlements, perhaps because America shares some of Britain's frustrations with Benjamin Netanyahu's government. But now Miliband must choose whether he's willing to risk making Israel pay a further price. David Blair there with his thoughts on the latest from the Anglo-Israeli diplomatic pantomime. We'll be bringing you all the rest on that story as it develops, as I'm sure it will over the coming days. But now to our main guest. Nikolai Kizhanov is an associate research professor at the Gulf Studies Center of the University of Qatar. He's an expert on Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, Iran's economy, and he was also, interestingly, once a Russian diplomat posted to its embassy in Tehran. That gives him a unique perspective on the internal dynamics of that relationship. Just how close is the Russian-Iranian alliance and what is the overlap between Russia's war in Ukraine and Iran's war in the Gulf? Before that, we started off by talking about the latest strikes overnight. Five Iranian oil tankers were struck by US CENTCOM. They said in retaliation for an attempted ballistic missile strike by the IRGC on a US Navy warship. Then Iran carried out a ballistic missile attack on a US base in Jordan, the al-Azraq Air Base, according to the IRGC. They also said they struck some tankers in the Gulf. I'm just going to run through what happened. I'm going to start with what the Americans say. CENTCOM said in a statement that on September 8th, that's yesterday, after the IRGC targeted US Navy warships with missiles twice over the past two days, it destroyed five IRGC, it says IRGC, crude oil tankers. They're called the Caviz, the Charminar, the Horizon, the Riesco in the Gulf of Oman, and also one called the MT Derya near Karg Island. Marco Rubio characterized it as revenge or deterrence for what they said was an unsuccessful American strike on US Navy ships. He said Iran continues to try to hit US naval ships. Every time they do that, they're going to lose tankers. The Iranians then said they retaliated. The IRGC saying they launched a devastating missile attack on US forces at the al-Azraq base in Jordan. Jordan says it intercepted 18 of 20 ballistic missiles fired. A US official says that Iran strikes on Jordan were ineffective and all American troops are accounted for. Although the Iranians claim to have caused damage. We have all kinds of interesting kind of video footage of interceptors going up over Jordan, reports of unconfirmed reports of cluster munitions being used. The IRGC said today, on Wednesday, that it attacked 10 ships, including two US vessels and eight oil tankers, attempting to cross what it called a pretty bit of an unsafe area of the Strait of Hormuz. So it seems to me that that's just the latest kind of kinetic action of the past 24 hours, I suppose. It's been remarked and was remarked on the podcast yesterday, which my colleague was posting. It seems to show that Iran is escalating its response to America's escalation, in a sense. Is that how you see it? Well, there are several dimensions of this situation, I will say. On the one hand, definitely, we see a certain escalation. Both sides, they are trying to raise the stakes in this game. Because the attempt to reach out kind of negotiation solution, for now, well, let's say, definitely in the stalemate. Moreover, each of the sides declared that stalemate for, to a certain extent, fits their interests, which I would say is, to a certain extent, stretching the truth. Because the instability around the Gulf, it negatively affects both sides, the United States, in terms of the inability of the US administration to show that they managed to achieve a certain victory over Iran, and for the Iranians in terms of the economic situation. So the main goal, the main priority to lift the sanctions, sanctions pressure, hasn't been yet achieved. But on the other hand, I would say this escalation is just the part of the same old game that we have been watching since, I would say, April, when both sides were using carrots and sticks, changing the periods of negotiations with the controlled escalation, I would say. So I don't expect a situation going beyond what we've already seen. But at the same time... What do you mean, beyond what we've already seen? So I mean, there's a limit, you mean, to the amount of escalation? Absolutely. Where is that limit, then? Well, no one wants to return back to the situation of March 2026. So I will say they don't want to go into what we can really call a war. So right now, it's, for instance, in the Gulf, the JCCC countries, they are calling it tensions, which is quite interesting. Yeah, the word war, and at the same time, they're also trying to point that there is a reason for instability, these so-called tensions. I guess the main threshold here is not to return to the massive exchange of the airstrikes by both sides, the Iranians still to rebuild their economic infrastructure that suffered quite a lot. And I guess the United States, they clearly understand that their capacities are insufficient to withstand against the full-fledged attack by the Iranians, especially given the fact that we don't know the real capacities. So to wage this war, quite a lot of speculations about the fact that actually Iran has not demonstrated all its capacities, all capacities it has to retaliate to the United States attacks or to stage its own attacks. And from this point of view, we will see this continuation of the periods. Well, we had Mohsen Rezaei, not on this podcast, although that would be a very fascinating interview, if we could get around it. But he was saying yesterday, and Vinicius was talking about it, that we've got this new missile, which can now hit American ships, and we've got a new missile doctrine, which means we're going to, we're not going to retaliate, we're going to take preemptive action. You seem to be saying that despite that kind of rhetoric, there's still a clear cap on how far they're willing to go. I mean, you're sitting in Qatar right now. It doesn't look like you're in a bomb shelter or anything. But I mean, you know, the tensions in the Gulf. So the latest from the UK Maritime Trade Organization is going to monitor things. They've got a report this morning. I'm just going to read it out. We've received a report from a third party of an incident 24 nautical miles northwest of Port Rashid in the UAE. A master of a tank has reported sighting a vessel listing while at anchor, possibly indicating water ingress following an attack from an unknown projectile. Vehicles are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity while authorities are investigating and so on. We saw the, you know, both sides are now saying they're hitting tankers. I mean, how's that going down? And what's the mood where you are? I suppose, that's one of the questions. Well, no one, of course, is happy about what's happening around. The fact that the Gulf countries, they felt the prey of the conflict. It wasn't, it wasn't, it is the conflict, they didn't want to start and they didn't want to pay for it. But they are paying quite a big price. Of course, the volume of these payments is different. So, on the one hand, we have Oman and the UAE who managed to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz and their incomes, to a certain extent, way higher than before March, February, March 2026. So, they are indeed, like, enjoying a certain increase in the incomes because of the rise in the oil prices. But at the same time, such countries like Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and even Saudi Arabia, they experienced substantial losses and substantial restraints in terms of their financial stability. So, the reserves are so far enough to keep on the economies moving, keep on the social life moving as if it's a regular usual case. But the longer the conflict is going, of course, the bigger are the concerns about how long will it take to return to normal life once the agreement is achieved. On the bright side, however, what I can hear here in Doha, there are certain expectations that on the one hand, there will be an agreement with the Iranians. On the other hand, the Gulf states are currently discussing options to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz and to join efforts, something which is really unheard of, to minimize the impact of this war on their economies and their life. The oil prices, actually, I think it's gone above $100 for the first time in quite a while. So, we've been noting for the past, I know, the past few weeks, really, we've been kind of saying, oh, look, look at that oil price. It's hovering around $85, $90. It's higher than it was, but it's definitely not, you know, a crisis price. We're not even where, you know, it used to be 20 or 30 years, however long ago it was. But suddenly now it is up this morning on the back of all these tensions. How significant is that, do you think? The indication of this morning, well, it was definitely a sign that neither Iran nor the United States want the other thing that just one side is controlling the Strait of Hormuz. So, for the Iranians, it was a way to show that the kind of success in convoying Arab oil from the Gulf declared by Trump is a kind of, well, a success, but success which is not durable and which is not sustainable. So, they reminded that they are still in control and they still have an ability to create certain troubles. However, I also would like to emphasize that the Strait of Hormuz, it has now been completely closed. So, if we have a look at the passage of tankers and, of course, in the abnormal conditions, we could still see that a certain portion of oil is coming out. So, the main problem is usually experienced by the LNG exporters, first and foremost by Qatar. But as for the Saudi Arabia, as for the UAE, of course, they are using the circumvention routes. But, for instance, the Emiratis, according to what we read in the press and the media, they are quite effective in using the American convoys, the transportation with the switch trackers via the Gulf, and they are quite effective in terms of the ship-to-ship transfer that allowed them to maintain at least something around one million barrels a day passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Yeah, we've touched on this, which is, you know, it does demonstrate that the Iranian plan, which is to throttle the Strait and then hold hostage, is not quite working. The Americans have somehow managed to loosen that grip in a way, which is an interesting development. I wanted to come on to weaponry, why I really got in contact with you in the first place, which was this story last week about Russian weapons and Iran and the relationship there. But before we get there, because it's kind of, it's slightly related to it, speaking about technology in the Gulf, there is this story that the Iranians say that they have, they've captured, or they've recovered, an American undersea sea drone. Iranian forces said yesterday they've captured a US Navy sea drone, and the IRGC Navy has now published a video of it this morning. They say it is an Anduril Dive LD drone, it certainly looks like one if you compare it to what's on the Anduril website. The US military has acknowledged the incident, but downplayed saying it was defective, that it lacked secret technology. The drone malfunctioned more than a day earlier while surveying regional waters in support of ongoing operations. That's Navy Captain Tim Hawkins, a spokesman for CENTCOM, speaking to the Washington Post. He said it's an older model, used commercially available technology, and had no exquisite defense technology for anyone to exploit. The Dive LD, I'm just getting into this because I find it fascinating. The Dive LD, you can look it up on the Anduril website, it's 5.8 meters long, 1.4 meters wide, it's an autonomous undersea vehicle, can operate continuously at sea by itself for up to 10 days, to a depth of 6,000 meters, which is pretty impressive, I think it's pretty impressive. And they say it can be used for intelligence preparation of the operational environment, or IPOI, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, ISR, mine warfare, MW, precision placement, which is delivering a weapon payload or force to a specific location. It's also advertised for commercial uses, environmental monitoring, undersea pipeline surveys, all those kinds of things that I suppose commercial oil firms or other maritime companies might use. I'm wondering how significant you think that is, given the technological aspect of this war? And obviously, the kind of arm, the technological arms race that underpins all of it? Big things, they have small beginnings, right? So I trust that the Iranian drone program, they started from with the capturing of certain sometimes quite old drones used by the US Army in the region, plus, of course, the help of the Russians, that is hard to deny here. And any technology of that kind that ends up in the Iranian hands, be it an outdated, old, available in the market, it's definitely a way to strengthen their own capacities, because we should not forget about the sanctions existing around Iran, that are limiting access even to this country, even to the not that much new technologies. So in this case, it's also telling us about the growing capacities of the Iranians to capture these drones. I mean, yes, there are news about that they were malfunctioning, they were preceding the capturing of it, but who knows how and by whom they were caused. Of course, we're also must keep in mind that the war, the current warfare has absolutely changed its logic. So the main emphasis on the use of drones of any kind is quite important these days. And I'm afraid that soon we will see at least good copies of this drone in the hands of the Iranians. It might require them months, it might require them years. But in the end, I'm afraid it might have quite a long lasting repercussions. Let's use that then to come on to the reason I got in touch with you about a week ago. Was that Vladimir Putin and Massoud Pazashkiani, the Iranian president had met at the SCO summit in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. It was I think their first face to face meeting since the Israeli American-Iranian war began in February. Vladimir Putin said all the kind of boilerplate supportive things about Iran that you would expect. And then he also said, we're providing you with all the goods you need. What goods might that be? And then right on cue, the Financial Times published this piece the next day, giving an example, which was apparently Russian help in developing a ramjet powered hypersonic or supersonic cruise missile, something that they themselves don't have, the Russians do have. I was wondering if you could help our listeners really get into the meat of this relationship, because we hear a lot about Iran and Russia being allies, about Iran has sent Shahed drones to Russia and Ukraine, Russia providing some support to Iran. Maybe start, is there a way that you can kind of summarise the nature of the Iranian-Russian relationship? Just how close are the ties between Tehran and Moscow at the current time? Well, that's a good question, because we'll hear a lot from the Russian or Iranian side calling this an alliance. And a lot of analysts in Europe and the States, they start on repeating this word, or they are saying that now we have the confirmation that it's a real alliance. In reality, these relations, they are based on a pragmatic interaction that allows them to be durable enough to stand against the external pressure. And at the same time, it provides a lot of freedom within this bilateral track for the both sides to choose what they exactly want to get from these relations. The best example here is the recent agreement on strategic cooperation that was signed between Russia and Iran last year. It definitely builds up a kind of a 20-year-long roadmap for cooperation. Moreover, it institutionalises these relations. But at the same time, when it comes to the military cooperation, it's emphasised as an important, but at the same time, it's also emphasised that the countries are not necessarily forming a military alliance. So it doesn't mean that each of them will be immediately fighting for the other. But at the same time, they are agreeing to help each other against what they call an aggression of the third side, which is quite interesting. So I'm not dealing with the same type of agreement that is between, for instance, Russia and North Korea, where it's really close to the military alliance in our classical understanding. North Koreans have sent troops to fight? Yes, exactly. But here, it's the reflection of the traditional complexity of these Russian-Iranian ties, where both countries, they have a certain background, historical background, which doesn't allow them to trust each other. Both countries, each of the two, it has its own goals and priorities. And sometimes, working close together, it's not always in their mutual interests. But at the same time, due to the external factors, due to the developments of the last 10, 20 years, or 30 years, they ended up being in the same anti-Western trench, where they have to help each other. And this help also has its own specifics. So we don't see Russia directly fueling Iran with weapons. But at the same time, it helps exactly in those areas that help to strengthen Iran's capacities to fight. So what do you mean? It doesn't supply weapons, but it helps the capacity to fight. Where does this story about developing this new cruise missile come into that? That's what exactly I mean. So we have quite a lot of stories in the past when the Russians were promising supply of new fighter jets to Iran. It took like, if I'm not mistaken, a decade before Russian promises to supply F-300s ended up in the proper agreement that was fulfilled by Russia. But at the same time, Moscow was actively supporting Iran with the access to the technologies needed to develop their own capacities on the one hand. And on the other hand, it was also providing assistance in those areas where Iran initially lacked its knowledge, its own experience, such as, for instance, the radio warfare. You mean electronic warfare? Electronic warfare, sorry. Okay. In Russian language, it's radio warfare. We were talking about jamming and... Yes, we were talking about the jamming and the history of Russian-Iranian operations in the drone construction. It hasn't started in 2022 when Russia got the Shahids. It started roughly about 2009-2012, if I'm not mistaken, when Moscow, according to the official statements by the Russian media, supplied Iran with a certain equipment that allowed the Iranians later on to catch and down quite a number of the American drones. They were operating from Afghanistan. There were some Navy drones also cached in the Gulf area. Afghanistan was one of the biggest cases when they managed indeed to get, if I'm not mistaken, these striking drones of the new model. But later on, these technologies, they allowed the Iranians to build up their own versions of drones that later on ended up being in Russia. And this exactly reflects the nature of this interaction, because Moscow, it cannot afford itself to be fully aligned or to be fully associated as a supporter of Iran. This is one of the questions, isn't it? Because from an outsider's perspective, you might say, look, they obviously share a common enemy in the United States. Obviously, they're basically aligned over Ukraine. Iran is supplying Shahed. So what's the basis of this reluctance to kind of be fully aligned? Why not? There are several factors, but just two, the most important from my point of view. First of all, it's not only about the United States. It's also about the other countries of the Gulf. Russia and Russian economy right now is heavily dependent on effective cooperation with the GCC states. And Russia doesn't want them to see Moscow through his cooperation with Iran as an Iranian ally or as a force that might change the balance of power in the Gulf. So that's why for Moscow, it's better to provide Iran with certain technologies, with certain data, maybe with some equipment, which is not considered as empowering Iran against the direct neighbors, like the GCC states. So that's why even in these conflicts, Russian statements, they were quite controversial and activities. So on the one hand, they indeed vetoed the GCC backed resolution against Iran and the United States Council. But at the same time, at the bilateral meetings, different levels, Russia was trying to send the message to the Gulf is that, look, we are not as a full fledged ally of Iran, and we're also unhappy about the instability which is happening in the Gulf. Right. So what leaps out at me is that the conventional kind of explanation, I suppose, before 2022, at least, throughout kind of the previous 20 years of Vladimir Putin kind of reign, administration, whatever you want to call it, was that it was about balancing this relationship with Israel. And hence the S-300 thing about kind of, okay, we'll supply Iran with S-300s, the Israelis complain, so we don't and so on. But what you're saying is that today, actually, places like UAE, Qatar, Dubai, Saudi, are actually much more important to Russia. Because why? Because of economic access to the outside world under sanctions? It's the economic access to the outer world. It is the way to circumvent sanctions. So Fujairah became one of the hubs for the re-export of the Russian oil to Europe, not to say to the African countries, to India. It is a safe haven for those Russian tycoons and business who would like to live through the war outside of Russia, but without moving to the West. It is also the source of the investment in the Russian economy, which may be not all the big numbers, but they do matter in the absence of any other sources to fund the Russian economic development. It is also a way to get out of the international isolation, not to say that there are personal relations at the level of the regional elites inside Russia, like for instance, Chechen leadership and the UAE leadership. In the end, within the last 20 years, more than 20 years of Putin's rule, we see a pro-Arab lobby emerging in Russia, represented by quite influential people in and around Putin's inner circle. So all of this is strengthening Russian interests. And all of this creates heavy bonds between Russia and the GCC states. But the trick is that Iran is also important in its own way. And the two GCC and Iran, they are not mutually replaceable. So that's why Russia has to balance between them and has to demonstrate that these connections with Iran is not a fully fledged alliance. Though honestly, I would say Russia was not that much successful in that. Quite a lot of people here in the Gulf, they are actually accusing Russia of being too close to Iran. I see. So they're not convincing. There has been talk about Russia finding alternative ways to strike back at the West. There's always been all this talk about escalated hybrid warfare or sabotage warfare in Europe. And I believe Vladimir Putin himself is saying things like, well, you know, if you're going to help Ukraine strike our supply lines, we'll find ways, we'll supply arms to your enemies. One of those was, there was speculation that Russia would help supply perhaps missiles to the Houthis in Yemen, perhaps provide assistance to the Iranians as a way of hitting back at the West. How far do you think that's gone? Well, that was the second factor which is determining actually the Russia's will to have these special relations with Iran that are neither the full fledged alliance, nor the parallel forces, but the kind of transactional interaction. For Russia, it's quite important that America is getting sucked into the conflict, because lots of Russian behavior in the international arena, of course, now is determined by the situation in Ukraine. And one of the strategic thinking by the Russian leadership here is related to the idea that the more the United States are involved in the situation in the Middle East, the less they're thinking about Ukraine, the less attention is given to Ukraine, less weapons going there. So that's why Moscow, from my point of view, is interested in keeping this conflict simmering. So it doesn't want Iran, of course, to be completely defeated. And that's why it's supporting it with the weapons. But also, it doesn't want to be seen as an ally. So that's why it supplies weapons and technologies in a certain limited way. But to make sure that this confrontation keeps on simmering, the fire keeps on burning. And from my point of view, there is a clear parallel between the dynamics of the Russian-American relations and Russia's use of Iran and the Middle East as such, as a way of asymmetric warfare. In the last year of Biden's presidency, we saw that Moscow basically was actively exploiting the Middle East to harm the U.S. interests in an asymmetric response, which was fitting into the Russian military doctrine. Now, this assistance to Iran, I would say it's far way measured. And the intensification is usually happening when Russia is getting dissatisfied with the way how the U.S. administration is approaching the Ukrainian conflict. I see. So for Russia, bottom line, Russia sees this conflict as benefiting its position in Ukraine and therefore it's good that America is being drawn into it. So Nikolai, I'm wondering if you think that has any bearing on the Iranians unveiling this new missile they call the Qasem-Basir. They say it's a solid-fueled rocket. They say they tested it against American ships. This is a new capability. How much involvement do you think the Russians had in that? Do you think that's the kind of thing the Russians may have been helping the Iranians develop? Here we enter definitely a certain area of assumptions and suggestions, speculations, but I would say that's exactly what Moscow could do, both in terms of the building up the Iranian capacities to keep on fighting and also as a way to strengthen its cooperation with Tehran without creating immediate negative effect on its ties with the Gulf monarchies, and also as a way of certain gratitude for Iranians for their previous assistance. For the Shahids? Not only. Again, we are forgetting that the failure of the Russian blitzkrieg in Ukraine was a total shock for Moscow, and Moscow turned to be completely unprepared for the continuation of its aggression in Ukraine. And in that time, in the first months of this conflict, it was actively collecting military equipment, just the conventional weapons from all over the world where it could get it. And there are some evidences, for instance, that the Iranians were supplying even the military helmets and bulletproof vests to the Russian army for a while. Oh, good Lord. So help well beyond just the Shahids that we know about. Absolutely. Well, again, I'm not disclosing any secrets here. No, no, I know. I just think that generally the discussion is always, oh, the Iranians sent your heads. That's the main problem with these relations, that our attention is usually driven away towards big things like S-400s, Sukhoi fighter jets. But in reality, the backbone of this relation is a day-to-day cooperation in the training, in the technological development, in the exchange of data, in the exchange of experience of how to build the military production. In the 90s, the Russians were helping Iranians to build up their military-industrial complex. In 2022, the Iranians were helping Russia to deploy the Shahids' production in Alabuga, near to Kazan. And this is much more important than these big things. Right. So the small developments that are happening on the ground, and they are indeed creating quite a strong cohesion between the two countries. This is fascinating. And I think this really helps us kind of understand the dynamic between Tehran and Moscow in this war. So thank you very much for that. I want to finish maybe by talking about the, I think you said earlier in the conversation, there are kind of cultural reasons why they can't trust each other. And I'm quite interested in that. You did work at the Russian embassy in Tehran at one point, I think, many, many years ago, as you say, in ancient history. What are these cultural reasons that stopped Russians and Iranians trusting one another? I mean, I kept on traveling to Iran after I also left the embassy and left the ministry. So I know this country a little bit from inside, even beyond those four years that I spent in Tehran. And for me, it was always fascinating that in Iranian mind, there was always a mixture of attitudes towards Russia. So on the one hand, we have a natural affinity to the Russian literature, the Russian philosophy. You can find almost all classical Russian literature books being translated in Persian, easily bought in the street near Tehran University, which is famous for its bookshops. But at the same time, the political experience is creating a substantial mistrust, because Russia waged at least two wars with Iran in the 19th century. In the 20th century, it tried to occupy and to cut certain territories from Iran at least twice. And of course, the famous events of the Iranian revolution of the early 20th century, they couldn't be studied without the study of the Russian involvement. And then Moscow basically used brutal force to suppress the national movement in Iran. All of this left a deep imprint on the Iranian historical memory, which is quite fascinating. You can just take a cab in Tehran. And if a driver learns that you're Russian, you will immediately hear the whole history of the Russian historical crimes. Not to say that, for instance, my favorite example is the memory, which is embedded in the historical memory, which is embedded in the language itself. So for instance, when an Iranian needs to say that the deal was unfair, or the agreement was extremely unfair, they are saying, which refers to the Turkmanchai peace agreement of 1828 between the Russian Empire and the Qajar Persia, that allowed basically the Russians to completely rip off Iran on money. And it took a couple of decades for the Iranian economy to recover after this agreement. So when you have such a background, of course, you must be prepared that from time to time, people will be recalling that you are not a country that must be trusted. I find this interesting because, and I'm sure you know, it sounds quite similar to the Iranian attitude to Britain as well. Iranians are often raising the coup in the 1950s and various alleged crimes that, you know, the Brits have committed. Nikolai, I think we're going to have to leave it there. But what an interesting insight into the relationship between those two countries. Thank you so much. You're welcome. That was Nikolai Kuzhanov, Research Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Center of Qatar University and a former Russian diplomat. He made clear that that was a very, very long time ago. That's all for today's episode. We will be back tomorrow following all these rapidly developing stories, I have to say. Until then, that was Iran The Latest. Goodbye.