An analysis of the South Korean stock market, exploring how a national index transformed into a high-stakes, two-stock bet on artificial intelligence via giants like Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. The video examines the mechanics of single-stock leveraged ETFs that amplified market volatility into a destructive feedback loop, the unique retail trading culture driven by young investors, and the structural lessons of Victor Haghani's biased-coin experiment on risk management and leverage.#SouthKorea#StockMarket#KOSPI#Samsung#SKHynix#ArtificialIntelligence#LeveragedETF#Finance#Investing#MarketVolatility
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Video Summary
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South Korea's KOSPI has faced extreme volatility, surging on AI-driven chip growth before crashing. This instability is fueled by \"financial nihilism\" among retail investors (\"ants\") and an over-concentration of the index in Samsung and SK hynix. The use of leveraged ETFs and capital flight to US markets have further destabilized the domestic economy and weakened the Korean won.
For the second year in a row the best performing stock market in the world is South Korea. Last
year the KOSPI rose 76% its best year in over four decades and this year at its June peak
it was up a further 112%. For comparison the S&P 500 is up less than 10% year to date and the MSCI
world is up around 20% so Korea is beating the rest of the world two years running by a margin
normally reserved for accounting fraud. If you'd put your money into Korean stocks 18 months ago
you would by any reasonable measure be delighted unless you'd been watching the news over the last
month in which case you'd assume that you were ruined because the best performing stock market
in the world is also right now home to one of the most punishing bear markets in the world.
Since peaking in June the KOSPI has fallen about 27%. It is somehow both of these things at once
the best and the worst place on earth to own stocks which shouldn't really be possible and yet
here we are. To understand how a market can be simultaneously the greatest bull market in the
world and a full-blown crash we need to go back a little. When South Korea's president Lee Jae-myung
ran for office his big headline campaign promise was KOSPI 5000. His central platform was quite
literally a target level for the national stock index. He's a former trader which possibly explains
this. At the time the index was trading around half that level and the pledge was dismissed as
cheap political theater the equivalent of a candidate promising that under his leadership
the weather would improve. Then on the 19th of June 2026 the KOSPI didn't just hit the president's
target it blasted straight through it and peaked at over 9,000 points nearly double what he promised
so he over delivered which is not a word one gets to use about elected officials very often
and then it all fell apart. Since that peak the market has lost a quarter of its value
and entered a bear market which brings us back to where we started down 25% from the peak and still
up almost 60% on the year. The KOSPI is currently more volatile than it was in the 1997 Asian
financial crisis and the global financial crisis in 2008. According to the FT Korean market
volatility has been so extreme that the stock exchange paused trading 37 times this year
compared with three times in all of last year. If you listen to the news you'd believe that the
Korean market has become a speculative casino run by irrational over leveraged day traders
pumping up local team stocks on internet hype. This explanation is wrong or at least it gets
the interesting part completely backwards. Because unlike the western meme stock episode of 2021
built on a bankrupt cinema chain and a dying video game shop, the companies at the center
of the Korean surge are highly profitable world-class industrial giants. Samsung Electronics
and SK hynix, two firms that between them control much of the global supply of high
bandwidth memory chips, the physical hardware that the entire AI boom runs on.
And their earnings are real. In the first quarter of 2026 Samsung's operating profit rose 756%
year on year to 57.2 trillion won. SK hynix saw revenue rise 198% and operating profit rise 405%.
These are not companies with a photo of a gold mine that they found on Pinterest.
They make the things that everybody wants to buy right now. The extreme price action here
is not the usual story of worthless companies being bid up by fools. It's something more
unstable and more interesting. A combination of extreme index concentration, some very aggressively
leveraged products and a retail trading culture with a risk appetite that makes Wall Street bets
look like a cautious public pension board. Before we dig into the Korean retail trading culture,
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So, the ants. If you look at who is actually trading in Seoul, the dominant force isn't
foreign institutions or domestic pension funds. It's an enormous hyperactive retail army known
locally as the ants. It's roughly the Korean equivalent of the Wall Street bets crowd
calling themselves apes. Except there are a great many more ants and for a long time
they were winning. Out of a population of around 51 million, South Korea has about 14
million retail investors, nearly 30% of the population, and they account for roughly half
of all trading volume in Korea. This compares to around 20% of trading volume coming from retail
investors in the United States. Foreign investors make up around 31% of Korean volume and domestic
institutions, the pension funds, the asset managers, the professionals, a mere 18%. So,
the smallest player in the Korean market, by some distance, is the group that invests for a living.
In the US, institutional investors make up 80% of equity trading volume.
Over the last six months, the professionals have been leaving. Foreign capital has pulled
about $95 billion out, but the ants have stepped in and committed an additional $80 billion. So,
as the foreign money heads for the exit, the retail army has been standing underneath,
arms outstretched, promising to catch everything on the way down. And for most of last year,
they did. We'll come back to how that works out when the thing falling gets heavier.
Now, it's easy for Western commentators to write these traders off as reckless gamblers,
but if you look at what young Koreans are actually facing, their behavior is at least
internally consistent. South Korea has famously rigid expectations about the order you're meant
to do things in – the prestigious job, the apartment, the marriage, then the children.
The trouble is that the average Korean man now marries at around 34 years old, and in Seoul,
only about a quarter of people in their 30s own their own home. So, the apartment,
which is supposed to come before the wedding, increasingly arrives after it, if at all.
When you've been priced out of the housing market entirely, putting 10% of your salary
into a savings account doesn't feel like a slow path to a home. It feels more like trying to
inflate a hot air balloon with a bicycle pump. My friend Dimitri Kofinas has a name for the
mindset this produces – financial nihilism. Once the ordinary ladder to the middle class
has been pulled up out of reach, gambling on markets stops feeling like the reckless option
and starts feeling like the only option. If the sensible, patient strategy has a payoff of
approximately zero, the reckless one doesn't have to look good – it just has to look better than
zero, and a lot of things clear that bar. The academic Owen Lamont, a portfolio manager who
started Harvard, Princeton, Chicago and Yale, has been watching this from the other direction.
A while back he wrote that the U.S. market was Korea-fying, slowly turning into the retail-driven
team-stock-chasing market Korea has had for years. More recently, he upgraded the diagnosis
and started calling it the squid game market where ordinary people take enormous risks
hoping to become overnight millionaires, with broadly the survival odds that the title implies.
Because the Ants hold this much of the market, they have developed their own subculture built
around what they call team-stocks, a much older concept than meme-stocks, and for the Ants,
the team rather than the actual business is the entire investment case.
The most famous example came in 2012 and involved a company called D.I. Corp.
D.I. Corp. makes semiconductor testing equipment. It had released no news of any kind and nothing
about its business had changed, but the firm's co-CEO was a man named Wonho Park,
whose son is the South Korean rapper Psy. That July, Psy released Gangnam Style and for a while
it became the biggest thing on the planet. Korean retail investors poured into his father's firm.
The stock rose about 800% in three months, eventually trading at 60 times earnings,
while its direct competitors traded at 9. A semiconductor testing company went from a
market value of $38 million to $334 million because the chief executive's son was doing
a horse dance on YouTube. I like to imagine Mr. Park watching that video for the first
time with a certain amount of embarrassment, his grown son doing a horse dance for the internet,
and then watching his share price go vertical and slowly making his peace with it. Perhaps his son
hadn't brought shame on the family after all. Perhaps his son was a genius who'd understood
before the rest of us that this is now how the world works. What makes today different
is that the ants are no longer pumping up obscure testing firms. They've pointed the exact same
leveraged hyper-aggressive playbook at two of the largest and most systemically important
technology companies on earth. And to understand how a retail army can destabilize companies of
this size, you have to start with the concentration built into the index itself.
The Cosby wasn't always like this. For most of the last decade, it drifted sideways,
made up of fairly unglamorous companies, car makers, ship builders, arms manufacturers,
makers of televisions and fridges. Many were being undercut by Chinese rivals,
and many were run by the sprawling, opaque, family-controlled conglomerates Korea is known for.
It was not a thrilling index. It was an index you owned because you felt you ought to.
Americans have spent the last couple of years worrying about concentration in the S&P 500.
At its peak, Nvidia made up around 7% of the index, and this was discussed as a genuine
national vulnerability. In Korea, at the June high, the two stocks, Samsung and SK Hynix,
reached a nearly 60% weighting in the Cosby, up from around 40% 18 months earlier.
The Cosby isn't really a diversified basket of a nation's industry. It's a leveraged bet
on two chip stocks wearing the country as a costume. The concentration got so extreme,
it started to trip over other people's rulebooks. Many American funds are legally required to stay
diversified. Rules that cap how much of a fund can sit in a handful of dominant names,
so that a single stock going wrong can't hurt investors too much. Goldman Sachs worked out
that if Samsung and SK Hynix's combined weight climbed just one more percentage point,
foreign funds bound by those rules would be forced to sell around $2 billion of Korean shares.
Not because they changed their minds, but because the index had become too top heavy
for them to legally hold. The market had, in a sense, become too successful to own.
And it was into this arrangement, an entire national index balanced on two names,
that Korea's financial industry decided to introduce leverage.
In late May 2026, brokerages launched 16 single stock leveraged ETFs tied to Samsung and SK
Hynix, each promising retail investors twice the daily return of the underlying shares.
These joined an even larger offshore product, a Hong Kong listed leveraged SK Hynix fund that
nine months had swollen to around $13 billion according to Bloomberg, the biggest single
stock leveraged ETF anywhere in the world. Bear in mind, these are shares that already
routinely move 8 or 10 percent in a day. The ants looked at that volatility and decided
it wasn't quite enough. They needed a version with more juice.
Now to see why regulators started to sweat, you need to understand how a leveraged ETF
actually works. I promise it's worth it. The whole story hinges on this one mechanism.
If you own an ordinary share and it falls 10 percent, you lose money but you don't have to
do anything. The position just sits there, worth a bit less, but judging you. A leveraged ETF
is less relaxing. Because it promises to deliver exactly twice the stock's return every single day,
it has to reset its exposure at the end of each session to keep that two times ratio ready for
tomorrow. And the direction of that reset is the whole problem. When the stock rises,
the fund has to add more exposure at the close. It buys more stock. When the stock falls,
the fund has to shed exposure. It sells, pushing shares into a market that's already dropping,
right at the closing bell. So it buys strength and sells weakness mechanically every day with
no opinion about whether that's a good idea or not. On a derivatives desk, this is a short gamma
dynamic, which sounds like a medical diagnosis. The plainer way to picture it is as audio feedback,
bring a microphone too close to a speaker it's plugged into and the mic picks up its own output,
sends it back through the amp, the speaker throws it out louder, the mic catches that,
and within a second or two, the whole room is one rising shriek. A leveraged ETF is a microphone
held up to the stock it tracks. Every move it's supposed to follow, it instead amplifies,
and then it's forced to amplify the amplification. According to Bloomberg, on turbulent days,
the rebalancing from these products has swelled to as much as two-thirds of all trading in SK
Hynix. A remarkable share of the flow for a company worth well over a trillion dollars.
So the tail is not wagging the dog, the tail has hoisted the dog off the ground
and is swinging it in a circle to see what happens.
You could measure the force of it during this month's crash. Goldman Sachs estimated that SK
Hynix's double-digit drop on Monday obliged the leveraged funds to sell roughly $5 billion of
the stock at the close, just to rebalance. A single automated adjustment that came to about
18% of all trading in SK Hynix's shares and futures that day. Nobody chose to sell that
$5 billion of stock, the clock simply reached the hour at which the machine sells.
That predictability has rewired how professionals behave. In Hong Kong, market makers now spend the
early afternoon working out exactly how much the funds will be forced to buy or sell at the close.
They get in front of it, ride the wave and step out before the closing bell.
One trader described it to Bloomberg as easy money, a polite way of saying the retail investors'
forced trades have become a daily scheduled contribution to whoever bothered to do the
arithmetic. Underneath all of this runs a layer of plumbing most people never see.
The firms issuing these ETFs don't actually hold the extra shares, they rent their leverage from
investment banks through total return swaps. The bank agrees to pay the fund twice the stock's
daily return and hedges its own side by trading the real shares, which is a large part of what
drives those end of day flows. But the banks carry a nightmare of their own called gap risk.
The danger is that the stock falls so far so fast overnight that the fund is wiped out
and can't settle, leaving the bank holding the loss. To insure against this, the banks
buy protection from hedge funds using exotic derivatives called cliquets. The swap is the
leverage, the cliquet is the fire insurance the people selling the leverage take out in case the
just filled building needs to be evacuated. And you can read the anxiety directly in the
price of that insurance. As the market has lurched around, the annual cost for banks to buy cliquets
has climbed from roughly 3% in March to more than 10% by mid-year. The banks have started rationing
how much of this exposure they'll carry and warning the fund issuers that they may soon
stop minting new shares altogether. The institutional way of announcing that the
grown-ups would now like to leave. By now, the distortions have gotten extreme enough
to push the regulators into public contrition. The head of the financial supervisory service,
the body that had waved these products through in the first place, offered a line worth pausing on.
Looking back, I regret not doing everything I could to stop it. It's not every day a regulator
reviews his own recent work and files a formal complaint about it. The government has now frozen
all new listings of single stock leveraged ETFs and announced that from the 5th of August,
any retail investor who wants to trade them will first have to sit through mandatory risk
management training and put down at least 30 million won, a bit over $20,000, to open an
account. Which is to say, having built the casino, installed the tables and let the crowd in,
the authorities have decided that what the situation really needs is a short educational
film and a cover charge. When the machine behind the leveraged ETFs starts selling automatically,
it doesn't stop to ask who's on the other side of the trade. And this month, as the cost befell
nearly 9% in a single session, the people on the other side were almost entirely the retail ants.
The scale of what the rebalancing left behind is hard to take in. According to a widely cited
estimate from Goldman Sachs trading desk, more than 1.2 million retail leveraged accounts were
hit with margin calls during the crash. That's roughly 1 in every 30 working age adults in the
entire country. Margin called in a matter of days. Of those, somewhere between 320,000 and 360,000
people were wiped out completely, liquidated automatically by their broker's systems,
most of it at the close. And because some of the drops were so sudden, a number of those positions
gapped down through their maintenance levels before anything could be sold. So that when
the shares were finally dumped, the proceeds didn't even cover the borrowed money. Those
investors didn't just lose their savings, they woke up owing their broker money. Over the same stretch,
retail brokerage deposits across Korea fell by almost 30 trillion won, back to their lowest
level since February. Now it's important to note that these traders weren't fools who had been sold
an obvious fraud, and they hadn't misread the big picture. They were on the right side of one of the
great bull markets in modern history, holding shares in ferociously profitable companies at
the center of the entire AI build-out. They had the trend exactly right, they just got the bet size
wrong. My friend Victor Hagani ran a famous experiment that perfectly explains how ruinous
that one mistake can be, even for people who really ought to know better. He recruited 61 subjects,
gave them $25 each and sat them in front of a simple coin-flipping game. They could bet as
much or as little as they wanted, as many times as they wanted for 30 minutes, and they were told
in writing, in bold, that the coin was rigged. It would come up heads 60% of the time.
Now a coin that you know lands heads 60% of the time that you're allowed to bet on repeatedly
is not a gamble, it's a gift. Bet sensibly and it's pretty much guaranteed that you'll
walk away richer. And these people weren't people off the street either, they were economic students
and young finance professionals, the exact people trained to see this. This should have been the
easiest money any of them ever made. It turned out not to be. Even with the odds tilted firmly
in their favor, 28% of them went completely bankrupt inside half an hour. Only about 1 in 5
reached the maximum payout. The average player walked away with $91, which sounds fine until
you realize that the game was practically handing them $250. They lost on a game they could not lose
for one main reason, and it's something Wall Street has lived off of for a hundred years.
Even when handed an edge, people don't bet calmly. They bet too big and then a perfectly normal run
of bad luck, the kind of probability guarantees will turn up, weighted coin or not, arrives and
clears out their whole stake before the edge ever gets a chance to work. That's the entire lesson of
Korea in one coin game. Leverage doesn't improve the thing you own. It doesn't make Samsung a
better company or the AI boom more real. All it does is shorten the amount of time you're allowed
to be wrong. Apply two times daily leverage to a wildly cyclical chip stock and you're not doubling
your returns, you're setting yourself up so that an ordinary routine dip empties your account,
long before the long-term story you were right about ever arrives. And it landed hardest on
exactly the people we started with. Of the accounts fully wiped out, something like 62%
belonged to investors in their 20s and 30s. The same young Koreans who'd been priced out of a house
decided that the patient road led nowhere and reached for leverage as the fast way in. They
were right about where the market was going, they just didn't survive the trip. If you step back
from the retail wipeout and look at the wider Korean economy, you run into a macroeconomic puzzle
that's been tormenting another group of investors, foreign exchange traders, all year long. Normally
a country running an enormous trade surplus has a strong currency. Money floods in faster than
it flows out and the currency rises. And Korea's surplus right now is enormous. It's selling the
shovels for the entire global AI gold rush, posting a record current account surplus.
By every line in the textbook, the won should be one of the strongest currencies on earth.
Instead, it's one of the weakest in Asia. The won recently pushed past $1,550 to the dollar,
its feeblest level since the depths of the 2009 financial crisis. A record surplus and a currency
trading like the country is in crisis. So where is all of the money going? The economist Brad
Setzer has a name for the answer, DRAM dollars. He compares it to the petrodollar recycling in
the 1970s when oil producers sold crude for dollars and parked the proceeds back in American
assets rather than bringing them home. The same thing is now happening with memory chips. When
Samsung and SK hynix sell billions of dollars of chips to American tech companies, they are paid
in dollars but instead of shipping those dollars home and converting them into won, which would
push the currency up, they increasingly leave them offshore to fund their own overseas expansion.
The result is a phantom surplus. Real on the balance sheet, but a great deal of it never
actually arrives in Korea, so it never turns into demand for the won. And at the same time,
the ants who aren't busy detonating their accounts on leveraged ETFs at home are doing something
that pushes the won down further. They're buying America. Korean retail investors have become some
of the most enthusiastic buyers of US tech stocks anywhere in the world, including,
with a certain poetry, NVIDIA, the company their own chip makers supply. Every time a saver in Seoul
buys a US share, they first have to sell won and buy dollars to do it. So the country is in effect
exporting its savings and importing pressure on its own exchange rate. That leaves the Bank of
Korea with a nasty problem. A weak won makes imported energy dramatically more expensive,
which feeds straight into domestic inflation, which is why last week the central bank was
forced to raise interest rates directly into a falling stock market because it had no choice.
The obvious escape would be to open the currency up, let it trade freely offshore,
and let global markets sort out the imbalance. But Korea won't do it, and the reason is a scar.
In 1997, during the Asian financial crisis, known locally as the IMF trauma, the won lost
half of its value in months, and the country needed an IMF bailout to avoid default.
That memory runs deep enough that Seoul still refuses to allow a fully convertible,
freely traded offshore won. That single decision is the main reason MSCI, the company that decides
which markets count as developed, still files South Korea, the best performing major market
in the world, under emerging. Not because it isn't rich or sophisticated enough,
but because a fund manager in New York or London can't freely trade the won at 2 in the morning.
So, Korea finds itself in a strange trap, a world-beating technology sector generating
billions in surpluses that never quite come home, a currency trading as if there is a crisis,
and a population busily converting its savings into dollars to buy shares in the American
companies its own factories are helping to build. If you want to know how all of this ends,
you'll have to stop looking at the traders in Seoul and look at the people actually buying
the chips. Samsung and SK hynix look invincible right now, and their earnings are real, but that
success rests almost entirely on the spending decisions of a very small group of American
companies – the hyperscalers. Amazon, Google, Meta and Microsoft. Between them,
they are pouring hundreds of billions of dollars a year into AI infrastructure,
and their appetite for memory chips is what turned two Korean firms into trillion-dollar companies.
So, stripped of the national flag, the entire South Korean stock market has become a leveraged
bet on the server budgets of about four American corporations. The consensus is that this spending
simply continues forever, because AI is the new industrial revolution, but the market is beginning
to twitch. This week, Taiwan Semiconductor, the company that actually manufactures Nvidia's chips
and about as close to the beating heart of the AI boom as you can get, reported that quarterly
profit had jumped by around 77%, to a record. It beat estimates, it raised its guidance,
it told the market in effect that the boom was entirely intact, and the stock went down.
The reason it went down is the interesting part. It wasn't that the numbers were bad,
they were spectacular. It's that alongside those numbers, TSMC also announced that it would have to
spend a great deal more on CapEx, and it warned that margins would come under pressure, and
investors looking at a company posting record profits decided to worry about the cost of staying
ahead. When a business this good gets sold off on the price of running to stand still, it tells you
that the market has started asking a question it spent three years refusing to ask. What does all
this actually earn? Because staying on this treadmill requires the hyperscalers to keep
spending at a ferocious pace, and they have been. The four biggest have already laid out around $376
billion in capital spending, with the wider industry on track for something closer to $725
billion. For three years though, AI has lived a heavily subsidized life. The Frontier Labs,
the open AIs and anthropics of the world, charged flat monthly fees, often well below what it
actually costs to run the models. It's a business that, so far, consumes far more capital than it
produces, and if you offer people near unlimited access to a billion-dollar supercomputer for
$20 a month, they'll cheerfully use it to write birthday poems for their cats.
But the investors funding all of this have started asking for their money back. To stop the bleeding,
AI companies have begun shifting from flat fees to usage-based pricing, effectively ending the
subsidy. And the result is roughly what you'd expect from installing a water meter in a house
that used to get its water for free. People use less, and companies suddenly staring at
metered AI bills have started shifting work onto cheaper models, including open-source Chinese ones.
The uncomfortable question hanging over the whole edifice is this, what if AI turns out to behave
less like high-margin software and more like electricity, a commodity where the models are
largely interchangeable and nobody has much pricing power. In that world, the value doesn't
vanish, it just doesn't go to the people who spent the money, it flows to everyone using the tools
as competition drives the price towards zero. The labs that built the models and the companies that
funded the infrastructure would have created something genuinely transformative and captured
almost none of the returns. If the hyperscalers begin to suspect that this is what's happening,
they won't put out a press release, they'll simply reduce their spending. They'll push the
next data center back a quarter or two just to see how demand develops. And if that happens,
the first tremor won't be felt in Silicon Valley, it'll be felt in Seoul. Memory chips aren't a
stable subscription-style software business, they're much closer to an industrial commodity.
And the memory industry is famously viciously cyclical. There are long booms followed by
brutal busts. Prices don't drift down gently when demand softens, they tend to fall off a cliff.
And a cliff is a bad place to be standing when your national stock index is two chip stocks wide
and strapped to billions of dollars of automated double and triple-levered retail ETFs.
Because those levered funds don't have opinions and they don't wait, the same machinery that
Amplified returns every step of the way up runs exactly as hard in reverse, forced to sell into
the fall at the close, mechanically, whether anyone wants them to or not. The way up was a
choice that millions of people made. The way down, if it comes, won't ask anyone's permission.
So where does that leave the people at the center of all of this? For most of this year,
being an ant paid off spectacularly. The market went up and up and the people who piled in with
borrowed money made more than everyone else. In Hong Kong, a 26-year-old who'd put his savings
into the leveraged SK Hynix fund told Bloomberg, with no apparent irony, that he had already had
the car and could now afford the Patek Philippe. That was the mood. The coin was weighted in your
favor, everyone could see it was weighted in your favor, and the only question anyone was asking
in the cafes of Seoul was whether it was too late to bet more. Then the machinery went into reverse
and roughly 1.2 million of them got the margin call. The president, the man who campaigned on
getting the KOSPI to 5,000 and then presided over it sailing past 9,000, appeared this week to say
that the market was, and I'm quoting him here, quite unstable and that after such a large rise
in such a short time it would need time and fluctuation to stabilize, which is the sound
of a man who ran on the number going up gently explaining that the number could also come down.
The line that I keep coming back to is from an ordinary retail investor quoted in the Financial
Times. He's 37. He didn't even use the leverage. He just bought Samsung and SK Hynix with his own
money back in February. He watched a paper profit of 60 million won sink to 20 and asked if he'd
sell. He said no. He'd hold on to the end of the year because even after everything he still
expected these shares to do better than leaving the money in the bank. And he might be right.
That's what makes this whole story so hard to look away from. If you found this video interesting,
you should watch my video on private credit next. Don't forget to check out our sponsor
using the link in the description. Have a great day and see you in the next video. Bye.