Xi Jinping is suddenly traveling abroad again—but back in Beijing, a series of unusual personnel moves is raising new questions about his grip on power. Zhang Youxia is officially out. Xi loyalist Zhong Shaojun has also fallen. Kong Shaoxun has been moved out of the Central General Office. He Lifeng has disappeared from public view. And Ding Xuexiang is taking on increasingly sensitive assignments. Now an explosive rumor claims a secret Beidaihe deal may have been reached over Xi’s future—including a possible exit at the 21st Party Congress. Is Beijing preparing for a transition—or is Xi buying time for another political comeback?
Hi everyone, welcome to Lei's Real Talk. Welcome to Lei's Saturday Night Live.
Alright, what a week. Well, let's talk about CCP politics since it's been a while.
Guess what, Xi Jinping is suddenly traveling again. At the same time,
people around him are being removed, transferred, disappearing, and promoted.
Now, an explosive rumor claims Xi and his political rivals have agreed on an exit deal.
So is this proof that Xi Jinping is still firmly in control or are we watching the beginning of
a transition? Let's find out. Alright, now before I begin, I just want to mention that we tried to
release a video in Lei's Looking Glass channel tonight and there were some technical issues.
I think there were some copyright issues. So like one minute after we released the video,
we had to take it down and then fix something. So those of you who were trying to figure out
what happened to the video, there's a technical delay. We're trying to fix,
Chris is trying to fix the problem before we can release that again.
So the video is about face reading or facial reading. Alright, let's talk about
China's fearless leader. So after returning from South Korea on November 1st last year,
Xi Jinping did not leave China again for more than seven months. Then in June,
he finally traveled abroad again, this time to North Korea. But even that trip was very short.
He spent less than 27 hours in Pyongyang. So for most of 2026, Xi Jinping barely traveled
internationally. And then suddenly everything changed. At the end of August, Xi Jinping
embarked on a 42-country trip, first to Kyrgyzstan for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit,
and then to Egypt. Oh, by the way, while he was in Egypt, there was an embarrassment.
Let me share with you a picture that I found. Where did it go? Here we go. Let me make this
bigger. So apparently, some Chinese discovered that the welcoming banner or welcoming poster
in Arabic called Xi Jinping the President of Republic of China, not the President of People's
Republic of China. You know who the President of Republic of China is. That's William Lai,
Lai Qingde in Taiwan. So yeah, this poster accidentally addressed Xi Jinping as the
President of Republic of China. I think it's utterly embarrassing. But anyways, let me come
back. So he's also expected to travel to India for the BRICS Summit, followed by a highly
anticipated visit to Washington and a meeting with President Trump later this month. So suddenly,
Xi Jinping is everywhere. The Financial Times has described this as a rare foreign travel flurry,
his most extensive stretch of international travel since the pandemic. So the question is,
what changed? Well, in the continuing debate over Xi Jinping's actual power in Beijing,
there are now several interpretations. One side says this proves Xi Jinping is firmly in control.
After all, would a leader facing a serious political crisis at home really feel comfortable
leaving Beijing again and again? That's their argument. The other side sees almost the opposite.
They asked whether this could be something like Xi Jinping's political farewell tour,
a final burst of international diplomacy before major personnel changes at the upcoming fifth
plenum, and ultimately the 21st Party Congress. And now there's an even more explosive claim.
Actually, there's more than one claim. There are several versions of one similar claim.
The core message or the core content of that is that Xi Jinping and his political rival,
or some of his political rivals, have already reached some kind of deal,
a temporary political truce over his future. So could there really be an exit deal for Xi Jinping?
I don't think we can answer that question simply by counting how many times Xi Jinping's plane
left Beijing or will leave Beijing. We have to look at what's happening back home,
at official announcements, at who's being removed, who's disappearing, and who's suddenly
being moved out of sensitive positions, and also at who is given more power. And most importantly,
we should look at the timing. Because just two days before Xi Jinping left China,
Beijing made a major announcement, and it's about a name that has been utterly, or that has been
driving the CCP politics for more than seven months. Yes, you guessed it right, Zhang Youxia.
China's National People's Congress formally removed Zhang Youxia as vice chairman of the
Now, after months of uncertainty, the Zhang Liu case has finally moved closer to a procedural
conclusion. The process had been stalled for seven months. On the surface, this looked like a major
victory for Xi Jinping, but was it? Because Zhang and Liu were not the only people taken down.
Also removed in the same announcement were Zhong Shaojun, this guy, who was Xi Jinping's
longtime aide and former political commissar of the National Defense University, and another general,
General Ju Qiansheng, former commander of the PLA's strategic support force,
also a Xi Jinping ally who had been missing for quite some time.
Now, what really matters here is Zhong Shaojun, because he is no ordinary
ally of Xi Jinping. He spent more than 20 years at Xi Jinping's side. He was one of Xi Jinping's
most loyal or longest serving, most trusted aide. Despite having never worn a uniform,
he was parachuted by Xi into the Central Military Commission to manage not only his
military reforms, but also the commission's general office, effectively becoming one of
his most trusted aides, if not the most trusted one in the military. That is why his downfall
matters. There have been many reports of serious tensions between Zhong Shaojun and Zhang Youxia,
between these two. According to many accounts circulating outside China for the past couple
of years, Zhong Shaojun behaved aggressively towards Xi Jinping because he believed he had
Xi Jinping. And at one point, Madame Xi, Peng Liyuan, was behind him. So there are numerous
claims that Zhong Shaojun humiliated Zhang Youxia publicly and infuriated the old general.
That was the beginning of Zhang Youxia's feud with Xi Jinping. Eventually, Zhong Shaojun was
transferred out of the CMC's general office and sent to the National Defense University by Zhang
Youxia to be its political commissar. Some observers thought that was one of the early signs
that Xi Jinping has lost control of the military to Zhang Youxia, when he failed to protect his
loyal aide. So when General Zhang was finally taken down, many people expected Zhong Shaojun
to return, because the logic seemed obvious. If Xi Jinping had defeated Zhang and regained
control of the military, then surely he would restore one of his most loyal aides, because
there aren't many left in the PLA. Instead, the opposite happened. Zhong Shaojun himself
has now been taken down, and that makes him a very important political indicator.
And there's another strange detail. Now, Zhong appears to have run into trouble as early as
last October, when he was replaced as a political commissar of the National Defense University.
It was a two-step process. He was first sent to the National Defense University.
He was kicked out of the general office of the CMC, and he was sent to the Defense University.
And then last October, he lost that position as well. But it wasn't clear where he went.
So for months, there were no formal announcement or information regarding his whereabouts.
Then suddenly, his case was announced together with Zhang Youxia's. You may wonder why.
Why announce them together? Well, I don't think that timing is meaningless.
The most commonly accepted interpretation is that after months of fighting at the top,
some kind of political bargain was finally reached. Xi Jinping was allowed to finish
the Zhang Youxia case. But at the same time, one of his own closest loyalists had to go.
In other words, Xi Jinping got Zhang Youxia, but he could not save Zhong Shaojun.
So that's why these two men were announced. They were both removed in the same announcement.
Therefore, Zhang Youxia's removal is not proof that Xi Jinping has completely regained control
of the military. It may actually show something much more complicated. Xi Jinping may have won
a sudden ambush attack, which is the description people use to describe how Xi Jinping took down
Zhang Youxia. But that doesn't mean Xi Jinping has regained control of the battlefield.
If this were only happening inside the military, we could stop there. But it isn't,
because at almost the same time, another interesting personnel move took place
much closer to Xi Jinping himself. And that brings us to this man. Okay, do you recognize his face?
His name is Kong Shaoxun. Until recently, he held two extremely sensitive positions.
He was a Deputy Director of the CCP Central Committee General Office,
and at the same time, Director of its Secretariat Bureau. Then at the end of August,
he was suddenly transferred out of Beijing and sent to Gansu as its Deputy Provincial Party
Secretary. So on paper, it looks like a small promotion, but politically, I'm not sure it is.
Now, Kong Shaoxun was not well known to the general public until 2022,
at the closing ceremony of the CCP's 20th Party Congress. Remember this picture? Yeah, you do,
right? This is one of the most famous political pictures of 2022. So Kong Shaoxun was the key
official, seen here in this picture, responding to Xi Jinping's instructions to escort former
CCP leader Hu Jintao out of the podium or out of the hall. That extraordinary scene made
Kong Shaoxun famous overnight. Whatever exactly happened that day, it demonstrated one thing very
clearly. At one of the most sensitive political moments imaginable in Beijing, Kong was someone
inside Xi Jinping's immediate administrative system, trusted to carry out a delicate task
right beside him. That is why his transfer matters. The Central Committee General Office is not just
any administrative department. It is one of the most important nerve centers of the entire CCP
system. It controls the flow of information into the top leadership. It coordinates top-level
documents and meetings. It manages the schedules of senior leaders, and it connects the party
leadership with the government, the military, and other core institutions. Inside the General
Office, the Secretariat Bureau is even more sensitive. It handles the circulation of top-level
documents, prepares materials for Politburo meetings, coordinates leadership schedules,
and manages internal communications across the top of the system. So when someone in both the
deputy director of the General Office and head of the Secretariat Bureau changes hand,
it means something. That means the person sits extremely close to the center of CCP's political
power has changed, and this guy, Kong Shaoxun, has just been moved out.
Now the timing makes the move even more interesting. The fifth plenum is approaching.
This is expected to be an extremely important meeting, potentially shaping personnel
arrangements heading toward next year's party congress. One of the highly anticipated
agenda of the meeting is the succession plan, who will succeed Xi Jinping.
The detailed organization of such an important meeting falls heavily on the General Office
and the Secretariat Bureau. Now, Cai Qi may formally sit at the top of the General Office
because he is the director of the General Office, but he doesn't, I mean, Cai Qi has many titles,
many hats to wear. He doesn't actually do the work. Much of the actual work is handled by
the deputy director. So Kong was one of the most important people involved in that.
Then, only weeks before the fifth plenum, he was suddenly sent to Gansu, far away from Beijing.
What does that mean? Was this simply a normal rotation, or was someone quietly
removing a trusted Xi Jinping official from the center of power at an extremely sensitive moment?
Well, it's hard to say at this point, but there's a very simple way to judge it.
Watch who replaces him. And that brings us to another name. And this name is this guy,
Jin Shanwen. Now, just after, almost immediately after Kong Shaoxun's
transfer or promotion to Gansu was announced, there are rumors circulating that Jin Shanwen
will be the one moving into the General Office of the Central Committee to replace him.
Of course, that has only been a rumor and not officially confirmed.
But the personnel change on September 1st made that rumor more believable,
because the organization where this man, Jin, currently works is called Central and State
Organ Working Committee. It suddenly added a fifth deputy secretary. So what does that matter?
Well, because the organization, or this organization, is supposed to have four deputy
secretaries, and Jin Shanwen is one of them. He only joined this agency last July. So when a fifth
deputy is suddenly added, people ask, why? You already have four deputies. Why do you add a fifth
one? So it naturally raises the possibility that one of the existing deputies might be preparing
to move somewhere else. And that supports the claim that Jin Shanwen is moving. And if Jin
really does move into the general office, then this personnel change becomes politically interesting,
because Jin's career background is very different. Most of his career was spent inside the trade
unions. It's called All-China Federation of Trade Unions. And during those years,
he worked under several senior leaders associated with the pre-Xi Jinping political establishment,
including Wang Zhaoguo, who was a very powerful figure going way back when, and then Li Jianguo,
and then Wang Dongming. Now, these names aren't familiar with you. We probably have not heard
about them. That's fine. But if I tell you who they are closely tied to, you'll recognize the
names immediately. Those three names are closely tied to these three men, Hu Jintao, Li Ruihuan,
and Wen Jiabao, three heavyweights of the reformist faction. Because of those connections,
Mr. Jin is perceived as someone with stronger links to the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao era political network
than to the Xi Jinping's traditional inner circle. The appointment itself, if it happens,
would be worth watching closely, because then the story would no longer be
that Kong Xiaoxin got a provincial promotion. It would become a trusted official from Xi Jinping's
general office was removed out just before the fifth plenum, and someone from the reformist
political network moved in. That would be much harder to dismiss as routine personnel rotation.
And taken together with what just happened in the military, a broader pattern begins to emerge.
One of Xi Jinping's closest military loyalists is gone. A trusted official inside his political
nerve center has been moved out. And now we have to ask whether those people around Xi Jinping
are also beginning to move, because the next case is even stranger. One of Xi Jinping's
oldest economic allies has simply disappeared for more than two weeks from public view.
So now let's move to this guy, and you recognize his name immediately. Yes, He Lifeng.
Now, Xi Jinping returned to Beijing on the morning of September the 3rd. Xinhua listed
three people accompanying him on the trip. His wife, Peng Liyuan, Cai Qi, his chief of staff,
and Wang Yi, his foreign minister, but not He Lifeng. And think about what this trip involved.
The SCO summit, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, major infrastructure projects, energy cooperation,
investment deals, China's economic relationship with Central Asia and the Middle East. In other
words, money was everywhere. Yet the men overseeing some of the most important parts
of China's economic and financial system was nowhere to be seen. He Lifeng's last confirmed
public appearance was on August the 19th, when he met with a Chilean foreign minister.
After that, nothing. By September the 5th, he had been out of public view for 17 days.
Now, a 17-day absence by itself proves nothing. Maybe he was not feeling well. Maybe he had
other things to take care of. But he's not an ordinary vice premier. He is a Politburo member.
He's one of Xi Jinping's oldest political allies. And he's one of Beijing's most important officials
in economic negotiations with the United States. And that makes another absence even harder to
ignore. At the end of August, G20 finance ministers gathered in North Carolina. Scott
Besant was there, but He Lifeng was not. China, oh, I got a super sticker. Angela,
thank you, Angela. Yeah, thank you very much. Anyway, someone asked, was he run over by a bus
from Jay Litka? We don't know. We don't know what happened to him.
Okay, so he didn't go to North Carolina for the G20 gathering. China instead sent Vice
Finance Minister Liao Min, along with Central Bank Governor Pan Gongsheng. That is notable
because He Lifeng is arguably the most important Chinese official dealing directly with Scott
on the economic relationship. So naturally, people began asking, where is He Lifeng?
But I think the most important question is, why has someone in his position suddenly disappeared
from public view at such a sensitive moment? And there's another piece of the story.
Five days before his last public appearance, Chinese authorities announced an investigation
into a senior official who is tied to He Lifeng. His name is Chen Xiaobo. I have a picture of him.
Chen had worked within the NDRC system, National Development and Reform Commission.
So he had worked within the NDRC system under He Lifeng for nearly six years,
including his final year as one of the commission's deputy secretary general,
while He Lifeng was the chairman of the commission. The official announcement said Chen
had voluntarily surrendered. Interesting wording. There's no public evidence proving that Chen has
implicated He Lifeng. That's important. But the timing immediately attracted attention.
August the 14th, Chen's investigation was announced. Five days later, He Lifeng makes
his last confirmed public appearance. And then he disappeared from view, five days apart.
Now in CCP politics, a sequence like this attracts attention. That's because the CCP has a long
established tactic of going after an official's inner circle before moving against himself,
the official himself. And there's an expression called Jianqunbian. It's a political slang
in China, meaning trimming the edges of the skirt. So what it means is first you cut away the people
around the target, then you move toward the target. And that possibility becomes even more
sensitive because He Lifeng's relationship with Xi Jinping goes back roughly 40 years.
They knew each other in Xiamen in the 1980s. And in fact, He Lifeng was one of the
few people who attended Xi Jinping's wedding with his wife, Peng Liyuan, his second wedding,
his second marriage. And He is one of the clearest examples of an official whose political
rise has been closely tied to Xi Jinping's own career. So what should we make of his absence?
Now, if he's simply working behind the scenes, we may see him again very soon.
Even if he has been temporarily kept away from public events for internal questioning
or review, he could still reappear quickly. But if that is what happened, the disappearance itself
would still matter. And if his absence continues, the problem matters even more because
it's almost impossible to dismiss. Because He is not just another member of Xi Jinping's camp.
He's one of the people managing the money. And in Beijing, control of money is control of power.
So now we have three new developments. A loyal military figure is taken down,
a trusted official inside the general office is moved out, and one of Xi Jinping's oldest
economic allies missed some important trips and has disappeared from public view. While some people
around Xi Jinping seem to be losing ground, one other figure appears to be moving in the opposite
direction. And that brings us to the man who, that's this guy, if you recognize him, that's the
man who is considered one of the three possible candidates to succeed Xi. All right, so on August
31st, let me go back to this, Xi Jinping met with Vladimir Putin during the SCO summit.
The meeting was highly political. Xi Jinping spoke about the strategic relationship,
the international order, and the future of the SCO. Putin pushed for more practical cooperation,
especially in energy, but no major commercial energy deal was announced.
Then just two days later, something unusual happened. Ding Xuexiang,
Politburo standing committee member and executive vice premier, arrived in Russia,
in Vladivostok. And that evening, Vladimir Putin personally met with him. The next day,
Ding co-chaired the China-Russia Investment Cooperation Committee and participated in
major energy discussions. The details of those negotiations are not really the point.
The politics are, because Xi Jinping had just met Putin. And within 48 hours, Putin was sitting
down separately with Ding Xuexiang. And Ding was not there simply to carry a message. He was not
there to take notes. He was there to handle an important negotiation directly with Putin.
Usually, Xi Jinping sets the political direction and meets with his counterpart. Then officials
like Ding Xuexiang follow up with Putin's subordinates. They turn that direction into
actual discussions or negotiations involving investment, energy pricing,
long-term strategic commitments. But in this case, Putin negotiates with Ding 48 hours after meeting
Xi Jinping. Why couldn't Xi Jinping directly talk with Putin about those issues when they met?
That is what makes Ding Xuexiang's meeting with Putin interesting. He is a Politburo Standing
Committee member and vice premier. He's not the premier. He's not the foreign minister.
And he has not traditionally been Beijing's main Russia negotiator. Yet Putin personally received
him immediately after meeting Xi Jinping. That tells us something about the authority Ding Xuexiang
is carrying now. Or look at it from another perspective. Perhaps Xi Jinping's real power
in international affairs is now a little questionable. So people ask,
is Ding Xuexiang being tested for something bigger? For years, Ding was Xi's chief of staff
and political aide. He worked beside Xi. He managed the machinery around him.
And he earned an extraordinary degree of personal trust.
Now he's no longer the man managing Xi Jinping's schedule. He's no longer his secretary. He has
responsibility for science and technology, energy, major strategic projects, and increasingly
important international assignments like this. He goes to Russia. He meets with Putin two days
after Xi Jinping just met him, met Putin. So, none of that proves that Ding Xuexiang has been
chosen as a successor or the successor. But it does show that Beijing is giving him more
responsibility. And the key question is not just why did Ding Xuexiang go to Russia? It is
how much authority did Beijing allow Ding Xuexiang to carry with him when he went to meet with Putin
and why? Why was he given that responsibility or authority? Because there's a big difference
between representing Xi Jinping and being trusted to make decisions in Xi Jinping's place.
So, when we put all these four developments together, I mean, these four developments
are not rumors. They are concrete, official announcements. I mean, the only exception is
Kong Shaoxun's replacement. The only thing that's not official is the replacement for Kong Shaoxun.
It's not officially confirmed. Other than that, all of this are real facts.
So, the picture becomes very interesting. Zhang Youxia is formally out, but so is Xi Jinping's
loyalist, Zhong Shaojun. A key Xi Jinping associate has been moved out of the general office
and possibly replaced by someone from the opposing faction at a critical time,
right before the fifth plenum. Then He Lifeng, the economic czar, has disappeared from public view
after one of his old associates has, quote unquote, confessed. And Ding Xuexiang is suddenly
being given more assignments on the international stage. Taken together, they raise a much bigger
question. Are we watching a routine reshuffle around Xi Jinping or are these the early signs
of a much larger redistribution of power? And that brings us back to the rumor I mentioned
at the beginning. According to several political commentators based outside China,
senior CCP factions have reached a compromise during the summer Beidaihe meeting in August.
They alleged that they've reached five main points in the agreement. First is that Xi Jinping would,
in principle, not seek another term at the 21st Party Congress next year. A future successor
will be discussed within the top leadership and then moved through the party's formal decision
making process. Second, the party would restore a greater degree of collective leadership.
Major decisions would once again require broader poli-bureau discussion rather than being
concentrated so heavily on one person's hands. Third, the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli
would be brought to a close. They would still be punished, according to this version of the rumor,
but the purge would not continue expanding outward and there would be no large-scale campaign to
hunt down everyone connected to them. Fourth, there would be no political reckoning against
Xi Jinping himself. And then the fifth one is future investigations into current or past
senior leaders, meaning at the national level, and their families will require
collective approval from the poli-bureau rather than being decided by one person.
So that's one version. And so if you put all these five points together,
the alleged bargain is actually very clear. Xi Jinping gives up another term,
his opponents give up revenge. That's essentially the core, the essence of this agreement.
Basically, Xi Jinping would be allowed a safe political exit. In return, the party would move
back toward collective leadership and place new limits on how much power one leader can exercise
on his own. Nobody gets everything. Xi Jinping keeps his safety and dignity. But did you notice
that in this deal, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli have been sacrificed. Many people believe the
two generals may have already died, which means that allowing their cases to drag on indefinitely
could become politically counterproductive. Yet the recent NPC decision to formally remove them
from the Central Military Commission appears to have been poorly received within the PLA.
Both men were widely respected, and some retired and active duty officers
reportedly believed that they were treated unjustly. So even if Xi Jinping and his
political rivals have reached some kind of temporary truce, how the military responds
is another question entirely. So this may therefore be less of a lasting settlement or agreement
than a permanent situation. Because in the end, no faction in Beijing can decisively prevail
without the support or at least the acquaintance of the military. So that's one version.
The other version that I heard today is similar. The only difference is that it did not address
the Zhang Youxia decision. So according to the second version of the rumor, they said that
the reformist faction did not agree with the current handling of the two generals.
It was a decision where agreement reached between Xi Jinping and then the
leftist faction of the party, headed by Zeng Qinghong. And they somehow controlled
Zhao Leji, the head of the MPC, or they had enough influence on Zhao Leji, so the MPC moved
head with it. But the reformist faction, a.k.a. Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao, did not agree
to handle the two generals case the way they did. And so that's the major difference
between the two versions of the rumor. So if the second rumor is true,
then there's no temporary truce. That means Xi Jinping's future is still up in the air,
because he aligned with the leftist faction within the party and hastily made an announcement on the
two generals when the central decision-making and coordination body did not even agree to
that decision. And so that only means that the political battles leading up to the Fifth
Plenum will be uglier. So that's my talk for tonight. Most of the things that I addressed
in the first 80% of the talk are fact-based, and then the last 10 minutes was about the two
rumors. So I separate them so that you know what's fact and what's rumor.
By the way, I want to mention that I don't know if the video in Lei's Looking Glass has been
released. I don't know if Chris has already released that. But if it hasn't, please make
sure to check it out. It's an interesting video about whether you could read someone from his or
her face. It's about the ancient art of physiognomy, face reading. All right, now I have an announcement
to make. We wrote a song. I have always wanted to write a song about the Himalayas, about the
mountains, because I made several videos about Tibetan culture, Tibetan Buddhism.
So I've always felt compelled to write a song. And then this Himalayan disaster happened on August
26. So our team produced a song to combine the two, to commemorate those lives that are lost
in the disaster, and also just to remind people what those mountains
really, really mean. So here's a three-minute song that we wrote. I wrote the lyrics.
Chris used AI to render the music. So it's a team effort. Okay, here we go.
Where did the song remove? Okay, here we go. Add to stage.
Carrying prayers we almost hear. We build our roads, we name the rivers, draw our borders on
the land. But the mountain keeps no boundaries, and the earth slips through our hands. We are small,
we are passing through, untested,
heaven has no need to name us. Earth has never called us kings. We are only brief reflections
moving through eternal things. What is strength before the mountain? What is pride before the wind?
All the monuments we raise returns to dust again. We are small, we are passing through,
mountains speaks, are we listening? So if this life is meant to teach us, may we learn to loosen
our hands. May the tears that fall in sorrow make us kinder where we stand. Today I must surrender,
let me melt like snow to water, flowing down gently to nourish love. We are passing through,
and when the mountain speaks, may we listen in.
All right, I hope you enjoy the song.
All right, well let me acknowledge the people who gave me super stickers. George Washington,
Lei, you are looking marvelous, very patriotic tonight. Oh, the color,
red, blue, and white, yes. All right, thank you. Well, thank you for the support. Let's see,
Exidio, Lei, you have an amazing, informative show. Thank you so much for your work. This is from
Louie Reyna. Well, thank you. Let's see, I'm just addressing some questions. Jason Teddy,
Lei, it does not matter what you believe about God or hell, and whom has earned it. It is what
God feels. I agree. Yep, true. All right, let's see, questions. Oh, Nicole is our,
Jeffrey Stockwell, Lei, tonight is your greatest insight and presentation. We're talking about
number one of 5,000. What's number one of 5,000? Did I mention one of 5,000?
All right, did I miss something? I just, there's a lot of numbers in my head. I'm still,
the numbers are still ringing in my head from Thursday's talk on Chinese banks. Anyways,
let me move on. Okay, there's talk about Carney, Canada. All right. Hey, I want to do a survey.
How many of you think Xi Jinping will step down at the 21st Party Congress next year?
If you think he will step down next year, type one. If you think he will rule indefinitely,
type two. And if you think that something will happen to him even before the 21st Party Congress,
that's before next October, type three. Let's see what people vote. Okay, so type one,
if you think he will step down next year in October at the 21st Party Congress, type two,
if you think he will rule indefinitely, and type three, if you think he will step down due to
health or any other crisis before the 21st Party Congress in October next year. Let's see what
people, how people, what people say. All right, someone said Delvey Daniels,
Lei, I love the song. The lyrics and music collaboration is excellent for you and Chris.
Yes, well, thank you. I really appreciate Chris uses AI, and he often comes up with multiple
versions and send them to me all. It's really hard for me to choose which, I mean, there are some,
some are not so great, but oftentimes, you know, it's very hard to choose between two.
And there was another version that's more Chinese, it feels less Tibetan. This one has
certain Tibetan elements in them. And that's why we chose it because we've,
our team feels that it ought to be a Tibetan song, right? It should have a strong Tibetan theme.
The other version that I really like feels more like a Chinese song. But it just doesn't feel
right if we make it sound like a Chinese song. So we chose this one. Anyways, let's see. What
do people say about Xi Jinping's future? Let's see. Oh, two people say two. He will rule indefinitely.
One, two, two. Wow, there's so many two. One, two, three. Okay, there's some threes.
Wow, a lot of threes, a lot of twos, one and threes, three and two. Okay, so nobody believes
that he will follow the rule and graciously bow out at the Party Congress next year.
That seems to be the decision this team or we collectively have made. And I agree. I think
either he will do everything he can to hold on to power indefinitely, or some unknown circumstances
would arise, and he will be brought down. So, so you're right, either two or three.
All right. Nellie Gentry, I love the song. Eternal rest grant them. Oh, Lord. All right. Thank you.
Well, there's still people are still voting. Two, three. Wow. Okay, very, very few ones.
There are a lot of twos and threes. Okay, someone say Xi Jinping will disappear.
Someone said, I love the line that went something like we are small beings walking among eternal
things. Probably got that quote wrong, but love the prose. So fitting with the mountain.
Yep. Yeah, I the line, my favorite line is the last. The last one, you know, if, if, if one day
I must surrender everything I have, or everything that I thought I have, I would rather melt from
snow to water flowing down gently to nourish life that I think that that's my favorite line. That's
what motivated me to write this song. Anyway. Okay. Someone says, from John
Pham lore, China's entire political system from what I'm hearing is deliberate effort to stop
people from talking to each other. Stop any threat to Xi. Stop any threat to Xi? Yeah. All right.
Please play the song again. All right. Let me play the song again.
Let me play it again. Okay. Start from the very beginning. Here we go.
Carrying prayers.
We build our roads. We name the rivers, draw our borders on the land,
but the mountain keeps no boundaries.
Are we listening?
Heaven has no need to name us. Earth has never called us kings. We are only brief reflections
moving through eternal things. What is strength before the mountain? What is pride before the wind?
All the monuments we raise returns to dust again. We are small. We'll pass through
mountain speeds. Are we listening?
So if this life is meant to teach us, may we learn to loosen our hands. May the tears that
fall in sorrow make us kinder where we stand. And if one day I must surrender,
let me melt like snow to water, flowing down gently to nourish life. We are small.
We'll sing through. And when the mountain speaks, may we listen in.
All right. May all of you rediscover or discover the power of being insignificant.
That's an Eastern philosophical thought. Because in the West, it's all about presence.
It's about dominance, winning the competition. But in Eastern culture,
the power of being insignificant is more profound. So may everyone discover the
power of being insignificant. All right. That should be all for tonight.
I will be back. It's a winter late. You're best one yet. Okay. You really think so? All right.
I will not champion your culture. The part of it is wrong. Okay.
Well, there's the yin and yang to everything. They're both sides to everything. Everything
is about a delicate balance. There are times we need to be
domineering and powerful. But there are times we need to learn to be insignificant and small.
And if you've mastered the art of that balance, you are full of wisdom.
Okay. That's it for tonight. Okay. Enjoy the rest of your weekend. I'll see you next week.
Bye.