Cyber privateers are increasingly targeting US critical infrastructure, posing severe risks to national security and operational safety.
In the first half of 2026, North Korea-linked groups logged more documented advanced persistent threat incidents than China and Russia combined. That is not a crime wave. It is statecraft.
This episode examines the rise of cyber privateers: hacker groups that operate for profit, under contract, or with a state’s tacit protection—and why China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have refined the model. We look at Lazarus and the $1.5 billion Bybit heist, Russia’s sanctuary-and-tasking system, China’s “Premier Pass-as-a-Service” access-sharing, and the older pattern behind it: criminal networks used for deniable state work.
Then the historical parallel—letters of marque, mercenaries, Blackwater, Wagner—and why the 1856 Declaration of Paris abolished privateering.
Finally: the Western response. The August 2026 U.S. presidential memorandum authorizing vetted companies to act against foreign cyber-enabled criminal groups. Senator Mike Lee’s Cyber Letters of Marque bill. UK “deputisation” proposals. Singapore’s little-known statutory certificate.
Is the pendulum swinging back—or are these only tightly supervised experiments?
The instrument exists. The open question is how far the West will go.
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00:00 The Modern Axis Cyber Privateers 10:34 The Historical Privateers 16:23 Western Response 21:56 Is the Pendulum Swinging Back?
AI Generated·May contain errors
In the first half of 2026, North Korea-linked groups alone accounted for 99 documented
advanced persistent threat incidents. Russia's activity rose 30% and expanded beyond Ukraine,
while Chinese groups, recording maybe fewer public incidents, continued long-term pre-positioning
inside critical infrastructure and refined the model of shared tooling and access across clusters.
Iranian activities surged in response to the regional conflict. These are not isolated
criminal campaigns. They form now a durable feature of contemporary statecraft.
What we are watching now is the rise of a new class of actor that occupies the space once filled
by privateers and mercenaries. These so-called privateers are hacker groups, sometimes purely
criminal, sometimes hybrid, often operating with the tacit or explicit support of a state.
They deliver strategic effect at low direct cost and with built-in deniability. The foremost
practitioners sit in four countries, China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. North Korea runs the
Lazarus and related clusters treat cryptocurrency theft and related operations as a structural
funding stream for the regime. In 2025, they stole more than $2 billion in digital assets,
including the $1.5 billion Bybit heist. The same operators run long-running social
engineering campaigns under names such as Operation Dream Job, deploying zero days,
and infiltrate Western technology firms with fake IT workers and occasionally share tools
with pure ransomware groups. The North Korean state receives hard currency that it doesn't have.
The operators receive resources and a measure of protection. When they become too noisy,
the protection can be withdrawn. This is the classic privateer bargain. Russia operates a
sanctuary and tasking system. That is, ransomware groups and related clusters enjoy near impunity
as long as they avoid Russian targets. Some receive tasking or protection from the Russian
intelligence services, and others simply benefit from the safe harbor. The result
is high-volume occasional blowback when Western enforcements succeed and continuous low-level
pressure on Western targets. China runs the most institutionalized dual-use system.
Pure-state, advanced-precision threats focused on long-term intelligence collection and
pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure, like Vault Typhoon and Seoul Typhoon as the most
visible examples. Alongside them sits a contractor ecosystem and groups that blur the line between
state-tasking and for-profit crime. Tool and access sharing across Chinese clusters has become
sufficiently routine that researchers describe a premier pass-as-a-service model, not just sharing
tools or techniques, but handing over live persistent access to already-compromised
networks so that another group can take over operations. The priority remains strategic
intelligence and technology transfer, with financial crime as a parallel or secondary activity.
The last one, Iran, remains more reactive and regionally focused. These operations mix
state-directed sabotage, influence activity, and looser networks of proxies or subcontractors
that surge in response to kinetic events. The model is closer to a proxy militia maybe than
to classic privateers, but the logic is the same. Useful for signaling and harassment,
less reliable for sustained high-end collection. However, specialization is becoming a structural
feature across those ecosystems, not only inside the Chinese clusters. Access brokers focus on the
initial compromise and handoff. Long-dwell collectors prioritize persistent access
and intelligence extraction. Revenue-oriented groups concentrate on cryptocurrency theft
and extortion, and disruption specialists prepare or execute effects against industrial systems.
Researchers tracking operational technology threats have documented exactly this division
of labor. Some groups excel at rapid exploitation of edge devices and pass access to others better
equipped for deeper penetration or destructive effects. The result is higher tempo and lower
individual risk for any actor, and greater overall efficiency. Precisely the kind of role
differentiation that historically appeared among privateers and mercenary companies once the
practice matured, but we'll get to that later. Cooperation among these actors is becoming visible
at both the group and state levels, though the picture remains incomplete. At the group level,
researchers have documented concrete operational overlaps. For example, in mid-2025, infrastructure
previously used by Russia's Gamma Radon was found hosting malware linked to North Korea's Lazarus
groups. It was the first publicly reported instance of shared command and control between these two
clusters. Chinese groups have institutionalized internal sharing of tools and compromised access,
as we said. North Korean operators have also been observed sharing tools with pure ransomware
crews. These are not full mergers, they are pragmatic exchanges of infrastructure and malware
and access that lower costs and compliance. At the state level, the picture is murkier.
Russia and North Korea have expanded political-military cooperation, including the
deployment of North Korean personnel to the Ukrainian theater and formal defense partnership.
Cyber collaboration appears to be an extension of that relationship, rather than a tightly
integrated joint program. Evidence of deep operational fusion between Chinese and Russian
cyber programs remains limited. Competition and parallel activity are still more common
than coordinated campaigns. Iran's ties to the others are primarily transactional.
Much of the deeper intelligence sharing, tasking arrangements, and mutual non-interference
agreements, if they exist, remain outside public view. What is clear is that the old assumption
of fully siloed national cyber programs no longer holds. Alliances of convenience are forming
at the bottom group level and more cautiously at the top state-to-state level. However, in every
case, the sponsoring state captures the strategic upside, deniability, outsourcing, continuous
pressure, and the ability to activate or distance itself as politics require. The operators absorb
most of the legal and operational risk while gaining resources and a degree of protection
that is real but unreliable. We have to note here that this pattern did not begin in cyberspace.
Russian organized crime and, in a different form, Chinese triad networks have long maintained
useful, if uneven, relationships with state security and political structures. In Russia,
selected criminal groups have enjoyed sanctuary protection and occasional tasking in exchange
for services that official organs prefer not to perform themselves, like intimidation,
illicit finance, and deniable disruption. In China, a similar relationship exists,
though sometimes more fragmented, but triad networks have at times served as instruments
of influence, enforcement, and other things, including overseas, while remaining officially
criminal and periodically suppressed. For the West, the dangers are already visible.
Critical infrastructure and intellectual property face persistent attrition. Tradecraft developed
by stapling groups leaks or is sold into pure criminal markets within 12 to 18 months.
Norms against the use of private force in the gray zone continue to erode, and attribution
remains imperfect, an escalation harder to calibrate than in the kinetic domain,
and the cost of defending against continuous low-level campaigns is high. The cooperation
between these groups and the states that sponsor them compounds these problems because shared
infrastructure blurs responsibility, and joint or sequential operations raise the tempo of attacks
and the political cost of formal retaliation remains elevated. This is not a temporary spike
in cybercrime. It is the reappearance in a new domain of an old instrument of state power,
one that authoritarian systems have refined, sometimes in parallel and sometimes in limited
concert, and that liberal democracies have largely preferred to avoid. The question is no longer
whether the instrument exists, it is how the West will adapt to it. States have historically
termed private actors when they needed force or coercion without the full political and
financial burden of official armies, privateers operating under letters of mark. Mercenaries
companies and, more recently, private military contractors all occupy the same functional space
that these cyber groups now fill. In the age of SAIL, a letter of mark authorized a privately-owned
ship to attack the commerce of an enemy state. The privateer kept the share of the prize.
The sponsoring government gained disruption of enemy trade, intelligence, and pressure at minimal
direct cost and with plausible distance from the action. The line between privateer and pirate
was thin and often dependent on which flag was flying and whether the commission remained
valid. The model worked for clear reasons. Private actors brought specialized capacity
that states could not always maintain at scale. Profit aligned incentives with results.
Deniability reduced political exposure and the arrangement was flexible. Commissions could be
issued, expanded, or revoked as circumstances changed. Specialization emerged naturally.
Some crews excelled at scouting and intelligence, others at boarding and prize-taking, still others
at long-range disruption. The system was efficient precisely because it divided labor and externalized
cost. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the same logic reappeared in the form of private
military companies. Firms such as Blackwater, later Academy, provided security training and
operational support in conflict zones where governments preferred not to deploy regular
forces in large numbers or for extended periods. The advantages were familiar. Surge capacity,
specialized skills, and a degree of political distance. The disadvantages were equally familiar.
Accountability problems, mission creep, and domestic political blowback when operations
went wrong or became too visible. The Wagner group represented the more extreme, less constrained
version of the same instrument, tightly linked to Russian state interests, yet formally deniable for
a long time. Cyber inherits the core logic and amplifies several of its features because barriers
to entry are lower than those for maintaining a private warship or a battalion of contractors,
and the prize is no longer physical cargo but data, persistent access, disrupted system,
or stolen crypto. Attribution is also imperfect by design, which strengthens deniability,
and operations can be scaled or paused with less logistical friction. And as we saw in the first
part, specialization has already appeared, yet the cyber domain also introduces important differences.
Escalation is harder to calibrate. Effects can cascade through shared infrastructure in ways
a captured merchant ship never could. Third-party systems and cloud providers sit in the path of
almost any serious operation, raising collateral risk. And the speed of cyber activity compresses
decision cycles. And because the same tools and techniques move quickly from state-linked groups
into pure criminal markets, the boundary between authorized privateering and uncontrolled predation
is even more porous than it was on the high seas. Western reluctance to revive this instrument of
privateers has deep roots. The 1856 Declaration of Paris abolished privateering among the major
powers precisely because a licensed private force had become destabilizing, difficult to control
once at sea, and maybe corrosive to the emerging norms of state responsibility. And liberal democracies
in the 20th and early 21st centuries generally preferred a clearer monopoly on the use of force,
stronger legal accountability, and the avoidance of norm erosion. And the common perception of
post-9-11 experience with private military companies reinforced those instincts. The
capability was useful, but the political and legal costs were real. Cyber makes the temptation
stronger. Lower barriers, higher deniability, continuous rather than episodic pressure.
Yet the institutional preference for controllable state instruments remains. The result of this
is an asymmetry. The authoritarian systems have refined the privateer model in the cyber domain
and in limited ways began to cooperate across it, while liberal democracies have largely chosen to
absorb the costs of defense and law enforcement, rather than systematically license their own
private defensive capacity. But that choice is now under pressure, and the question is whether
the pressure will produce some tightly supervised experiments or something closer to the older,
more independent privateering tradition. So despite a long-standing preference for state monopoly
on the use of force and the historical rejection of privateering, the scale and persistence of
the threat that we have described are forcing adaptation. Western responses still prioritize
resilience, sanctions, law enforcement disruption, and state-directed offensive cyber effects. Yet
alongside these traditional instruments, experiments in controlled outsourcing of private
capacity have begun to appear, and the most concrete step so far is in the United States.
On August 12, 2026, the White House issued the National Security Presidential Memorandum title
Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime. It directs the National
Coordination Center to establish a program under which vetted U.S. companies may conduct
cyber surveillance operations and cyber effects operations against foreign cyber-enabled
transnational criminal organizations. These are defined as foreign groups that conduct
cyber-enabled crime against U.S. interests and that are not an institutional part of a foreign
government or wholly operated under a foreign government direction. But the definition leaves
room to maneuver. Operations require written approval from directors from the Department of
Justice and Homeland Security, and participating companies must post a forfeitable escrow of at
least $1 million, undergo vetting, and operate exclusively under federal supervision. And also
actions that would produce critical outcomes like loss of life, serious injury, or use of force
are prohibited. The memorandum is explicit that companies do not receive independent authority
and act as agents of the government, but this is the first formal U.S. authorization of private
sector offensive cyber operations of this kind. It is intentionally structured to be much narrower
than the classic privateering, but a more expansive model has appeared in proposed legislation.
Senator Mike Lee's Cyber Letters of Mark and Reprisal Act, introduced on July 15, 2026,
with the House Companion Bill, would authorize the president to issue actual
cyber letters of mark and reprisal, and private persons or entities could be commissioned to
conduct limited cyberspace operations against designated for foreign cyber threats. This bill
sits closer to the historical privateer instrument. Presidential commissions under Congress's
constitutional power to grant letters of mark and financial incentives through prizes and greater
private initiatives. As of now, it remains at the introduced stage and referred to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, with at the moment no significant co-sponsorship, but it may end up
included, as these bills often do, in a larger like the NDAA. There are also discussions in the UK.
So far, they've been analytical. For example, the Russian think tank explored deputization,
time-limited, narrowly-scoped, disruptive operations by vetted private firms against
serious organized cyber crime, conducted under continuous government authorization and oversight,
and with legal indemnity from the Computer Misuse Act. Basically, this is an important point for all
of these things in Western countries. When you conduct cyber operations, you may need immunity
from prosecution or from lawsuits from third parties that have been collateral damage in your
operations. At the moment, Singapore provides the only existing precedent. Under section 23 of its
Cyber Security Act from 2018, building on earlier amendments, a minister may issue a certificate
authorizing a person or a firm to take actions that are necessary to prevent, detect, or counter
any threat to a computer or computer system. This process is opaque, with no public reporting
requirement, and it is unclear how frequently, if at all, this mechanism has been used. At the moment,
other European states have so far been hesitant to outsource such activities, at least publicly.
But taken together, these efforts reflect the same underlying pressure. Traditional state
instruments are necessary, but seem to be insufficient against the volume, specialization,
and sanctuary advantages of the groups we described in the beginning. However, at the moment,
all of these experiments also retain strong constraints, distinguish them from both the
privateer model and the more loosely supervised practices of the authoritarian systems that have
refined this instrument. The question now is how far operational necessity will push those
experiments, and whether the control mechanisms designed to prevent a return to the problems of
before 1856 will hold. So the question that follows is, are we witnessing the return of the
privateer model, or merely limited experiments under tight constraints? Evidence that the
pendulum is swinging exists on both sides of the strategic divide, because authoritarian systems
never fully abandoned it. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have refined hybrid ecosystems
that blend state direction, contractor capacity, criminal revenue, and selective cooperation.
For the West, the increasing cost of continuous attrition against critical infrastructure,
intellectual property, and financial systems has grown harder to ignore. And the traditional
tools remain essential, but have not closed the gap. So private sector technical capacity in many
niches already exceeds pure government capacity. The US August 2026 presidential memorandum,
Mike Lee's letter of mark proposed legislation, and the UK's discussed deputization all represent
explicit recognition that some form of controlled private capacity may be necessary. In that limited
sense, the taboo is weakening. Across these Western efforts, the institutional preference
for state monopoly on offensive cyber effects remains strong, and the historical lessons of
the 1856 Declaration of Paris still resonate. Private force, once authorized, has proven
difficult to restrain, be accountable, and contain legal risk, attribution ambiguity,
and escalation pathways. So the current picture is not a full return to private theory. As one
set of states has normalized and refined this instrument, the other Western set of states
is cautiously testing supervised versions. Whether these Western experiments will remain
tightly leashed, or evolve toward greater private initiative, may also depend on the trajectory
of the threat, and the effectiveness of the control mechanisms now being designed,
and the political tolerance for risk. The pendulum is moving. How far is still an open question.
That's it for this episode of Global Risk Profile. If you found this useful,
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Remember, the headlines may change, but the deeper patterns rarely do.
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