Including the Responsibility of Economic Actors into Transitional Justice Processes

Global Affairs Academy
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Sep 3, 2026
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis presentation examines the challenges of integrating economic actors into transitional justice frameworks, using Colombia as a primary case study. It explores the tension between the necessity of holding corporate entities and landowners accountable for funding conflict and the practical legal hurdles of doing so within a negotiated peace process.
Well, first of all, I have to apologize for my slides
because I wasn't well organized enough
to actually have them ready when they were requested
and I'm really sorry.
I looked at them this morning
and I thought they are not as good as they should be,
but they are what they are, so apologies.
What I'm going to talk about is really a work
that I have been doing with colleagues in Colombia
over the past two and a half years.
And this is really, this is my personal,
I'm just finishing an article
and it's my personal reflection
so that we've just finished a book in Colombia
in Spanish on this.
And now this is just my personal take
on it, trying to make sense of some of the issues
that came out of this work.
So, well, I'm not really going to talk about
like everybody else about business and human rights.
So there is a link to business and human rights, of course.
But what I'm really concerned about
is more transitional justice
and in the context of transitional justice,
to what extent, well, corporate actors,
but in particular individuals,
because I'm going to focus on criminal liability,
criminal responsibility of economic actors
for their role in armed conflict,
to what extent that can be addressed
by transitional justice.
So maybe briefly, because I'm not sure
that everybody is familiar with transitional justice,
very, very briefly, transitional justice is really,
it's a, well, one can talk about the definition forever,
I don't have the time.
But what it is mainly about is a society
trying to come to terms with a period
of mass human rights violations,
usually either in transitions from a conflict to peace,
as in Colombia, or from repression to democracy,
like, for example, in Argentina, Chile,
and other countries in Latin America.
So in these situations, what we face, first of all,
is, of course, lots of problems
in terms of administering justice,
because this morning, the Colombian colleague,
I think, has just left,
but this morning, we heard about Colombia,
and we heard about the massive scale
of the human rights violations.
We are talking about millions of victims,
and we are talking about thousands of perpetrators.
And so, of course, if you think about that scale,
it's already clear that you cannot bring everybody to court,
you cannot really have criminal trials against everybody,
you can't really have reparations, full reparations,
as you would have under normal circumstances
for the harm you cause someone.
So you have to already,
there are lots of trade-offs involved
in thinking about how do you deal with this.
Colombia faces the additional problem
that this was a negotiated peace.
So as we again heard this morning,
those of you who were in this room
and listened to the Colombia presentation,
what we heard there is that,
and what, of course, most of you will know,
is that in Colombia, there was,
well, basically, in Havana,
there were several years of negotiations
between the Colombian government
and the largest guerrilla group, FARC,
so they negotiated this peace agreement,
which causes, of course, its own problems
because of the compromises
that you have to reach in this process.
So now the negotiating parties for the government
and the leaders of the FARC,
but what they came up with,
well, maybe let's talk about,
sorry, let's talk about the more general issues,
first of all, and then I'll come to Colombia.
So in general, and this is a problem
in the context of Colombia,
as we've heard about over these two years,
international law and transitional justice
as maybe part of international law,
although that's debatable as well,
and to what extent it is even law,
a special area of law,
but it's based on international criminal law
and international human rights law
and international humanitarian law,
so it has basis in international law.
Of course, as we know,
international law is very much state-centered,
and this is why normally transitional justice processes
focus on the role of state actors
and then in the context of conflict
on the role of the armed groups,
but it doesn't usually focus on anybody else.
And so we don't really have,
first of all, we don't really have
international precedents really telling us
how do we actually include these other groups
if we think they played an important role
in the conflict.
If they did, then there might be a good reason
to actually want to include them
and hold them to account as well,
but we really have very,
and this came to light very much
in the context of the Colombia work,
there is very little international experience
and very little international precedent.
In fact, I was invited,
and I felt like a total cheat.
I was invited several times to meetings
as a so-called international expert,
and I was always asked to talk
about international experience,
and I always had to say,
well, there is very little.
I'm so sorry,
but there is very, very little
you can actually draw on.
And including the academic debate
is very much at its beginning.
How can you actually include,
should you include,
and if so, how these actors
in these already very precarious
transitional justice processes.
But one of the reasons why in Colombia
this came up was because Colombia
really tried to negotiate a peace agreement,
whatever one might think about it,
but what they were definitely trying very hard
was to negotiate a peace agreement
that would stand up to international scrutiny.
So they, and part of that was the awareness,
and particularly in the context
of the inter-American system,
of the state obligation
to investigate, prosecute, and punish,
and that that includes all actors.
So it does not just include state actors.
It doesn't just include the crimes
committed by the armed group,
but if there are other actors
who had a role to play
and had an important role to play,
the state obligation extends to them as well.
And so this is why from the very beginning,
already during the negotiations in Havana,
the question arose how to do it.
Now, very, very briefly,
because Colombia is interesting
because they have, they already,
they have an ongoing transitional justice process,
the justice and peace process.
I don't really have time to say much about it,
but this started in 2005,
and this is a peace process
that focused on the demobilization
of the paramilitary group,
and it offered paramilitaries
who demobilized alternative sanctions
of five to eight years of imprisonment
for truth and reparations,
very simplified version of this.
But what happened in,
so it was only limited to them.
It excluded everybody else.
Now, one of the problems with that
was that in the context,
so they got these alternative sanctions,
but against these very, very broad confessions.
So during these very, very long confessions,
they came up with all sorts of information
about all sorts of other actors.
So they might have, they might say,
you know, we did this, that, and the other,
but all of these different economic actors,
partly companies, partly small business,
partly landowners, all sorts of different groups,
they actually paid us.
They partly, they asked us to do this.
They gave us logistics.
They were the beneficiaries of the land grabbing
and the land displacement, et cetera.
So a lot of information came out,
but because they were not included
in the transitional justice process,
the problem was that the transitional justice,
the specific tribunal set up
with these alternative sanctions,
they didn't have jurisdiction over them.
So they then had to refer these cases
to the ordinary jurisdiction,
which caused, well, a fragmentation.
I'm a bit reluctant to use the word after this morning,
but it caused a fragmentation of the process
and lots of problems with it,
and partly because, of course,
for the economic actors, because they were excluded,
there were no incentives whatsoever to confess.
To the contrary, because to them,
ordinary criminal sanctions would apply.
So that was the situation when they thought,
in Havana, they thought about how to deal with this.
And basically, one of the reasons,
so one of the reasons why they, in Havana,
did think about including them
was because the information was there.
In the justice and peace process,
a lot of information had come out
about the important role of these actors.
So the question was how to deal with them
rather than whether to deal with them.
And very, very briefly, because I am conscious of time,
these are just a few of the aims and of the objectives
of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace,
which is the criminal justice component
of the transitional justice,
the current transitional justice system,
the one that followed the peace agreement with the FARC.
So they want to satisfy the victim's right to truth,
offer truth to the Colombian society,
protect the rights of victims,
contribute to achieving a stable and lasting peace.
And already we can see there are quite a few tensions
between these various objectives,
even if we leave outside the more complexities
like bringing in other actors.
Now, when the Special Jurisdiction for Peace was,
when it was first established
and when the peace agreement thought
about how it envisaged it,
it was given jurisdiction over everybody.
Everybody who had any role in crimes
that had a relationship with the conflict,
with the armed conflict,
was under the jurisdiction
of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace,
including then, of course, economic actors.
So once that came out in December 2015, this was decided.
So then we spent about two years trying to figure out
how this could possibly be implemented,
because as I said,
there is very, very little international experience
on what does that actually mean.
So they have jurisdiction,
but if you see this inclusion of these actors
in the context of the Colombian peace process,
which gave largest possible amnesties
to the guerrilla fighters,
and to then at the same time included everybody else,
question was, what does that mean?
So what it seemed to have meant,
and I'm saying all of this in the conditional
because quite a few things have changed since then,
what it was meant to mean at the time
was that they should get furthest reaching waves
of criminal prosecution against truth and reparations,
and only really in the situation of their most,
where they were the most responsible
for the most serious crimes,
then they would actually face criminal sanctions,
but they would get exactly the same possibilities
of alternative sanctions as the primary perpetrators.
Now, then this caused enormous fractions,
and of course, economic actors
are a very powerful sector of society.
They did not like the idea at all that they were included,
which is interesting because actually,
I always thought, you look at me.
How am I doing for time?
You're okay, you've got another five.
Oh, fantastic, I was just misinterpreted here.
Okay, perfect, great.
So basically, I thought this is actually good for them.
If they go, most of them are going to get,
they are actually going to get out of this legal certainty
in the form of a waiver of prosecution,
the large majority of them would get it,
and maybe very, very few
might potentially face criminal sanctions,
but if they do, what they would get
is these alternative sanctions,
which are much better of what some of those got
who actually were, there were very, very few cases
in the ordinary jurisdiction
in parallel to the justice and peace process,
but there was, for example, a case
where several company directors were convicted
and they got punishments of 14 to 16 years,
which is, of course, quite a lot more
than what they would get here,
but they are such a powerful group
and they had such a powerful lobby
that they managed to almost derail
the transitional justice process in Colombia,
and in the end, in November 2017,
the Constitutional Court intervened
and the Constitutional Court had to actually,
it had to decide whether or not
the implementing legislation was constitutional,
and what they decided was it was unconstitutional
what had been decided in Havana
and was then part of this legislation
implementing the peace agreement,
and that now the Special Jurisdiction for Peace
only has jurisdiction over these third-party actors,
including economic actors, if they voluntarily go,
so now we have a system
whereby they can decide if they want to go,
they can go, they can confess,
they can pay reparation,
and then, depending on the level of the responsibility,
they either get a criminal sanction,
a lower criminal sanction,
or they get, in most cases, the waiver of prosecution.
If not, they can take their chances
in the ordinary jurisdiction
and there is widespread impunity,
and so it might be a good bet
unless there is a lot of information
about them in particular,
then it might be a good way,
but also, of course, we now again
have parallel jurisdiction
and we have some problems,
so coming to some first lessons,
of course, this is all happening.
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace
only started working on the 15th of March,
so it's a bit early to really have
a lot of proper lessons from Colombia,
so this is really just more about the process
and the discussions and the problems.
So, first of all, what we have is economic actors
did play an important role in the conflict.
What we don't really know
and what I think the jurisdiction
should try and figure out
is to what extent were they actually
responsible for the crimes
and to what extent were they actually coerced,
because, of course, a lot of,
in many cases in Colombia,
they can actually rightly say
there was extortion,
there was coercion, et cetera,
so we really need to be able
to distinguish very clearly,
but what we can learn from Colombia
then is if there was a special transitional justice process
like what they are doing now,
the main possibilities of dealing
with these economic actors are,
as far as I can see,
and would be interesting to see what you think,
are three.
Either we leave them outside completely,
as was done in Justice and Peace,
or we include them as they tried
and treat them exactly the same
as the state actors and the combatants,
or we have this hybrid system that we have now
and they have the choice to go either to this,
to take part in transitional justice
or stay outside of it.
These are probably the main ways of dealing with this.
So now just some,
and I might not have time to go through all of this,
or will not have time.
If you leave them outside
of the transitional justice process,
of course, it doesn't mean that, therefore,
they cannot be held accountable,
which is why I personally always thought
it wasn't beneficial for them,
because if they go,
then they get legal certainty,
but if they stay outside,
then, of course,
what we are dealing with here,
maybe just to give the context,
I'm just too focused on the legal side,
but if you think about, for example, financing,
so we're talking very much about complicity
in this context.
So we're talking about, for example,
that this is maybe the most well-known case,
Chiquita, and the allegations are
that they spend millions and millions
of Colombian pesos per month
paying both sides, in fact,
and they, of course, use this money
to carry out very serious criminal offenses.
So then the question is,
how do we actually deal with this?
But what we do know is
these are crimes against humanities,
and their involvement in that
will not prescribe,
there is no statute bar.
So, therefore, if they don't go,
30, 40, 50 years later,
people can still bring them to court.
This is what's happening in Argentina at the moment,
40 years after the military dictatorship,
there are criminal trials
against various company directors.
So that is part of the problem,
so, therefore, I always thought
it was actually positive for them.
Now, including them,
then, well, let's maybe not even focus
on the reasons why they are easier to just imagine,
but some of the problems is, of course,
first of all, the fierce resistance of these actors
who really have a lot of power
in these very fragile situations.
So then the question is,
is it really the best way of dealing with this,
that you include them from the outset
when they actually really can spoil the whole process,
which they almost, sorry,
can I just have half a minute?
Okay.
But then, also, a big problem
is the lack of clear legal criteria,
because we have a lot of experience
in thinking about how do we define
the responsibility of the direct perpetrators,
those who actually carried out the torture,
the killings, the displacement, et cetera,
but how do we actually define
the level of responsibility of those who gave money?
Is it really at the same level?
Is it something different?
So there are all sorts of open questions here,
and this is why I am still,
after all this time working there,
I'm still a bit torn about,
so at the moment, my personal lesson is more
that I appreciate the complexities and the problems,
because I really think there is a lot to be said
about trying to include them,
but at the same time, there is also a lot to be said
about thinking about sequencing
and actually leaving them outside,
and then thinking about, further down the line,
how to deal with these actors.
But what I do think is, and with this I finish,
that it is not an option simply not to do anything
and ignore their role.
The question has to be, how do we address it?
And Columbia can, I think, tell us a lot,
but obviously, we'll have to wait
and see how it develops.
Thank you.
