Ecuador Furious: $2.7B China-Built Dam Has 17,000 Cracks, Lasts Less Than 15 Years

China Observer
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The Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric Plant in Ecuador, once considered a flagship overseas project of the Chinese Communist Party’s Belt and Road Initiative, has been hit by another scandal. The corruption case surrounding the project, which had dragged on for years, has finally come to an end.
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The Coca-Cola Sinclair hydroelectric plant in Ecuador was once considered a flagship overseas
project of the Chinese Communist Party's Belt and Road Initiative, but now it has been hit by
another scandal. The corruption case surrounding the project, which has dragged on for years,
has finally come to an end. On August 28th, former Ecuadorian President Lenin Moreno,
aged 73, was sentenced to five years in prison. Due to his physical disability, he was allowed
to serve his sentence at home. The case also implicated Cai Ronggu, a former Chinese ambassador
to Ecuador and current Sino-Hydro representative in the country. The court ruled that he, along
with two other Chinese executives and local intermediaries, were among the masterminds of
the corruption scheme. They were sentenced to five years in prison. Moreno was convicted for
directly participating in bribery while serving as deputy to former President Rafael Correa.
His wife and daughter, two brothers and one brother-in-law were found to be accomplices
and were sentenced to between two and a half and three years in prison. All defendants were
ordered to repay three times the amount of their illegal gains within 90 days. Prosecutors said a
corruption network collected bribes between 2008 and 2018, equivalent to 4% of the project value,
or about US$76.1 million. The money was distributed through domestic and international
transactions to public officials, including Moreno and other beneficiaries. Sino-Hydro began
construction of the Coca-Cola Sinclair hydroelectric plant in 2010, with a cost of US$2 billion.
After completion, the hydropower station was handed over to Ecuador in 2016.
But after it began operating, it was exposed as a tofu-dreg project, referring to a poorly
built structure. The project was built by China Energy Engineering Corporation.
Previous inspections by Ecuador's audit authorities found that the dam was filled
with more than 17,000 structural cracks and suffered from serious design flaws and riverbed
erosion risks. The problems prevented the plant from ever operating at full capacity
and left it facing the risk of collapse at any time. This has become one of the most closely
watched details of the case. After the verdict, Moreno claimed he had never taken assent from
Chinese companies and accused former President Rafael Correa of launching a political purge
against him. But the judge stated in the ruling that the case was supported by more than 300
pieces of cross-border money laundering evidence and contract records, proving that the Chinese
bribery scheme was clearly established. Since beginning operations in 2016, the hydropower
plant has remained controversial due to issues including its location, construction quality,
corruption allegations, and inability to repay loans. The facility was found to have structural
failures while its mechanical equipment developed thousands of cracks, seriously affecting power
generation safety and efficiency. Even after some equipment was repaired, water leaks continued to
appear. An investigation by Infobae found that Sinohydro had concealed information about structural
problems for years and handed over the project despite knowing about the defects. In addition
to structural problems, the hydropower plant has also caused serious ecological concerns. Experts
have warned that the facility, which was originally designed to operate for 50 years, may actually
have a lifespan of only 15 years. It not only threatens the country's energy system, but could
also cause long-term and irreversible damage to the Amazon ecosystem. From January to June 2024,
the plant's actual electricity output was only 42 percent of its original designed capacity,
forcing the country to experience 19 power outages lasting more than eight hours each.
In August 2025, the Coca-Cola-Sinclair hydroelectric plant unexpectedly received
$400 million in compensation from the Chinese authorities, further drawing attention to the
flagship project. At the time, Ecuador's Minister of Economy and Finance, Saria Moya, told reporters
that the Chinese-built hydropower plant had not only caused losses at the corporate level,
but had also reduced government revenue. Ecuador rejected compensation solely in the form of
The plant holds major strategic importance for the Chinese Communist Party.
Beijing used this massive project as a way to expand its influence into America's backyard.
In 2007, left-wing politician Rafael Correa was elected president of Ecuador. Correa was an
economist who studied in Belgium and the United States. During the 2006 presidential election,
he proposed establishing modern socialism. After taking office, Correa announced that Ecuador would
pursue the same 21st-century socialism model promoted by Venezuela, which he rebranded as
socialism of good living. In foreign policy, he opposed U.S. intervention in Latin America. Correa
had an ambitious hydropower development plan, and the Coca-Cola-Sinclair dam project was the
centerpiece of that strategy. The project is located on the Coca River in Ecuador's Napa
province, near the Reventador volcano about 62 miles east of the capital Quito. Its main purpose
was electricity generation. The plant has an installed capacity of 1.5 million kilowatts,
with a designed annual output of 8.8 billion kilowatt-hours. That accounted for more than
38 percent of Ecuador's total electricity generation of 23 billion kilowatt-hours at the
time. Was some power also planned for export to Colombia? In 2009, the state-owned Coca-Cola-Sinclair
company signed an engineering, procurement, and construction contract worth nearly $2 billion
with China Hydropower Engineering Consulting Group. The company was a wholly-owned subsidiary
of China 3 Gorges Corporation. In June 2010, a loan agreement was signed with the Export-Import
Bank of China, providing $1.7 billion in financing to cover most of the contract cost.
Construction officially began in July 2010. For Beijing, signing the main construction contract
for the dam was highly significant. It was the first reservoir and dam project won by a Chinese
state-owned enterprise in Latin America. Securing the project gave Beijing a foothold in Latin
America, allowing it to expand its presence from that base. This foothold later helped pave the
way for the China-Latin America and Caribbean Community Cooperation Framework. It is worth
noting that Beijing won the project largely because of massive loans provided by Chinese
state-owned banks. According to media reports, China provided Ecuador with around $19 billion
in loans. The money was used not only for the hydropower project, but also for bridges,
highways, irrigation systems, schools, health clinics, and six other dams. On July 17, 2014,
Chinese and Latin American and Caribbean leaders met in Brazil and adopted a joint declaration,
announcing the establishment of China-Selac Forum. They proposed holding the forum's first
ministerial meeting in Beijing as soon as possible. In January 2015, the first forum
ministerial meeting was held in Beijing, officially launching the platform. In many ways, the Coca-Cola
Sinclair Dam became a breakthrough project that opened the door for deeper cooperation
between China and Latin America. However, the dam project did not progress smoothly.
On December 13, 2014, a major collapse occurred at the construction site,
killing 13 workers, including 3 Chinese employees and 10 Ecuadorian workers. Another 7 workers were
injured. The accident occurred during construction of the water diversion channel. Later, on the
evening of April 1, 2014, an explosion also occurred at the Sobladora hydroelectric plant
in Ecuador, which was also being built by a Chinese company. On January 7, 2015, President
Rafael Correa made a state visit to China, where he was welcomed by Xi Jinping, and the two
countries formally agreed to establish what they called a strategic partnership. However, problems
soon followed. On April 16, 2016, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck Ecuador, causing heavy casualties.
Ecuador's vice president, Jorge Gloss, declared a nationwide state of emergency
eight hours after the earthquake. The progress of the dam project was also affected.
On November 18, 2016, the dam was finally completed, 10 months behind the contractual
deadline. The total project cost also continued to rise, increasing from more than $2 billion
to $2.3 billion, and later to $2.6 billion and then $2.7 billion. Chinese state-owned enterprises
won contracts with extremely low bids, then repeatedly demanded additional payments during
construction. Critics say this has been a common pattern in Chinese overseas projects.
Just two years after completion, the dam began attracting media attention.
Reports said that large parts of the reservoir supplying water to the project were filled with
small trees and shrubs. Because sediment buildup became too severe, boats were sometimes stranded.
Dam workers said sediment accumulation caused by design flaws was only the latest in a series of
problems. As early as 2014, engineers had already noticed cracks in stainless steel equipment
manufactured in China. Reports said a senior engineer brought the relevant records to
President Correa and requested a briefing to explain the problems. The engineer was fired
just days later. According to government data, the dam's mechanical equipment developed 7,648
cracks due to substandard steel materials and improper welding by Sinohydro. Sediment buildup
also became a major issue because it damaged critical equipment. At the time, Energy Minister
Carlos Perez-Garcia said that repairing the plant could require billions of dollars.
He said, We are not going to pay. We are not going to pay. We are not going to pay.
I'll say it three times because it is important. He also said, China took advantage of Ecuador.
The strategy of China is clear. They take economic control of other countries.
Less than one year after the completion of the Sinclair Dam, President Correa,
who had led the project, also began facing serious troubles. After leaving office in May 2017,
he was soon accused of corruption and bribery. Correa later went into exile in Belgium.
On April 7, 2020, Ecuador's National Court of Justice convicted Correa in absentia
and sentenced him to eight years in prison for corruption.
The Cococoto-Sinclair hydroelectric plant was also linked to the case.
On January 23, 2023, the Wall Street Journal published an article
using the Sinclair Dam as a case study. The article said many Chinese Belt and Road
projects were struggling with construction defects, including a massive hydropower
plant in Ecuador. Some countries trapped in debt. The article noted that the Sinclair plant,
built near an active volcano, was Ecuador's largest infrastructure project in history.
The government-backed concrete giant was highly significant to Beijing.
Xi Jinping attended a video-linked ceremony marking the project's completion
and power generation in 2016. Today, Ecuadorian government engineers say the hydropower plant
has developed thousands of cracks, raising concerns that the country's largest source
of electricity could fail. Those concerns have since become a reality.
The Sinclair Dam project officially began generating electricity on November 16,
2016. In reality, the first four generating units began operating in April 2016.
By the time the Wall Street Journal published its report in January 2023,
the plant had already been operating for at least an average of six years and four months.
Program Minister of Electricity and Renewable Energy Carlos Bernal said that the dam project
had generated nearly 42 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. Based on the project's designed
average annual output, its generation over six years and four months should have reached about
55.7 billion kilowatt-hours. In reality, actual generation was only about three-quarters of that.
The project failed to meet its original target, which is arguably the biggest indicator of its
engineering problems. In an interview with Chinese state media outlet Xinhua, Bernal said that after
the plant began operation, hydropower accounted for 93 percent of Ecuador's total electricity
supply. He also claimed that the country reduced fossil fuel consumption and saved about $1.3
billion in annual import costs. However, this claim does not hold up. According to media reports,
in order to recover its investment, China obtained 80 percent of Ecuador's most valuable export
commodity, oil. Many agreements between the two countries were repaid with oil rather than US
dollars. In practice, China acquired the oil at discounted prices, then resold it for additional
profits. Ecuador relied on oil sales to repay interest on Chinese loans, making it impossible
to claim that the country saved money on fossil fuel imports. The Cococoto-Sinclair Dam was one
of the ten major reservoir and dam projects under China's Belt and Road Initiative. It was the first
EPC general contracting project secured by a Chinese state-owned enterprise and became a
breakthrough project for China's expansion into Latin America and the Caribbean. Today, the so-called
Three Gorges Dam of Ecuador has ended with China paying $400 million in compensation
and a former Chinese ambassador being in prison. Ecuador's two former presidents involved in the
project have also faced consequences. One fled abroad while the other was sentenced.
The project itself developed more than 10,000 additional cracks within just a few years,
generated far less electricity than designed, and has become a major example of a failed
infrastructure project. In this drama, there are no winners. This situation has also drawn
comparisons with the recent disaster in Nepal, which similarly dealt a major blow to China's
decade-long Belt and Road Expansion Strategy. To open a gateway to South Asia, China began heavily
developing Gironport in 2015, making it responsible for nearly one-third of trade between China and
Nepal. However, the recent floods instantly destroyed key bridges and border facilities
connecting the two countries, wiping out the achievements built over the past decade.
Beyond that, according to the Independent Power Producers Association, the floods and mudslides
severely damaged at least 12 operating or under-construction hydropower projects
in northern Nepal and along the Tibet border. Among them, several major hydropower facilities
in Roshua County, all with Chinese funding, technology, or links to the Belt and Road
infrastructure, were submerged by floods and mud. In addition, the safety of the proposed
Trans-Himalayan Railway route connecting Lhasa, Girong, and Kathmandu has come under serious
scrutiny. The disaster not only damaged China's Belt and Road ambitions, but also pushed its
strategy of using the South Asian Corridor to enter the Indian market into a prolonged slowdown.
Some have questioned whether China's investments of billions of dollars in the Belt and Road
may have contributed to the disaster or worsened its impact. The China-Nepal border region is
highly earthquake-prone and vulnerable to landslides because of its steep terrain.
Whether China's massive construction projects in this sensitive area were connected to the
landslide and whether the activities on the Chinese side of the border intensified the flooding
are questions that deserve investigation. However, Beijing responded aggressively to
these criticisms. Journalist Tengku Varadarajan wrote in a post,
China will be the death of everyone and everything downstream of it,
literally and metaphorically. Analysts say that from Nepal to Ecuador,
countries that once became deeply tied to China and actively participated
in the Belt and Road initiative are now experiencing similar setbacks.
