JMO Lecture | Michael Schmitt: International Law and the Use of Force (The Jus ad Bellum)

Global Affairs Academy
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Aug 17, 2026
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the speaker's own and may not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other branch or agency of the U.S. Government.
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedProfessor Mike Schmidt explains *jus ad bellum*, the international law governing the legality of resorting to force. He details the UN Charter's prohibition on force, the exceptions for Security Council mandates and self-defense, and applies these frameworks to modern conflicts, including the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and the Russian intervention in Ukraine.
Good morning, everybody.
My name's Kevin Brew.
I'm a Navy captain.
I'm a lawyer.
But the beautiful thing about the International Law
Department, I'm a JMO moderator, too, for Seminary 18.
But the beautiful thing about the Naval War College
is we have an international law department.
So we have a bunch of really smart lawyers
across the bridge of size with some brilliant, experienced
academic professors and lawyers.
And so we invite them over, and we have the opportunity today
to hear from two of them, two of the finest gentlemen I know.
And I would first like to briefly introduce
Professor Mike Schmidt, who I first met, I think,
when we were coming back from an Information Operations
Conference in 1996 from Maxwell, when the Air Force put together
this IAO.
We're like, what is that, really?
So I've known Mike for a long time.
Mike's been the Stockton Chair, Professor of Law,
as well as the Chairman of the International Law Department.
20-year Air Force, sat in your seat
was the number one graduate in 1996 in a similar class.
He was the Dean over at the Marshall Center in Garmisch,
was also a Professor of Law up in a university
up in England, Durham.
And then we made his way back to Newport.
So we've been fortunate to have him here.
He's been part of many working groups, cyber,
things of that nature.
But I think at this point, I'll just turn it over to Mike.
And he'll enjoy walking around.
And please do ask him questions.
Kevin.
All right.
I don't often get that.
They don't do that in Europe.
Could you please turn the volume down a little bit
before I'm completely deaf?
Kevin has asked me to come in today
and talk about international law and the use of force.
And a particular aspect of international law
and the use of force, known by its Latin term,
use ad bellum, Latin because lawyers
need to justify their fees when they charge you.
The use ad bellum must be distinguished
from another body of law known as the use in bello.
Now, the use ad bellum, and that's
what I'm going to talk about today,
is about when may states use force.
When may a state, for example, resort to self-defense?
When may a state come to the defense of another state
when that state has been attacked?
When may a state, for example, engage
in a humanitarian intervention because there's
some sort of trauma occurring in another country?
When can a state engage in, for example, drone operations
in the event the other state has consented
to those drone operations?
That's what we're going to talk about today.
We're going to go through the stations of the cross
with regard to this body of law,
and then look at a number of controversial case studies.
I'm not going to talk about the use in bello,
which is also known as the law of war,
or international humanitarian law,
or the law of armed conflict.
And that's how may states fight once they're in the fight?
Irrespective of whether or not they're there legally,
what are the rules of the game?
Who can they shoot at?
What can they shoot at?
What weapons may they use?
How must detention be conducted, and so forth?
That's a different body of the law.
It comes from different treaties.
It's not the subject today, but I'll
be happy to answer any questions you have about that as we go on.
Now, if we're talking about the use ad bellum,
then the mother of all rules, the rule in the use ad bellum,
is this.
It's found in the United Nations Charter,
which sets forth the core rules on the use of force.
It's Article 2, subparagraph 4, known by lawyers
has the 2-4 rule.
The 2-4 rule is very simple.
It says, look, if you're going to be a party to this body,
the United Nations, then you have
to agree to refrain from using force against other states,
against their territorial integrity,
against their political independence,
or most importantly, most importantly,
you must agree not to use force contrary to any purpose
of the United Nations.
Now, that last clause is the most important one.
In 1945, what people thought Article 2-4 was about
was about invading other states.
That's why it says territorial integrity
and political independence.
It was the aftermath of World War II.
But today, that's not what we're worried about.
We're worried about the other clause,
because what the other clause means today
is that you may not use force consistent
with international law unless there
is an exception found in the United Nations Charter.
Now, there's two other things to note with regard
to this particular article.
In 1945, the law was that you may not use force.
But if you look at the article, what the article tells you
is that you may also not threaten to use force.
It's a violation of the law to threaten
to use force against another country.
Now, be a little bit careful, because of course,
we threaten to use force with some frequency.
And we're not doing so unlawfully.
You may not threaten to use unlawful force.
So you may not say to a country, give us this territory,
or we will invade the territory and take that territory.
That would be unlawful.
But you could say, if you invade that territory,
we will come to the assistance of the state that's
been invaded in collective self-defense.
We can make that threat, because that threat is lawful.
There's a right of collective self-defense,
which I'll talk about in just a moment.
The other thing you should note is
that this is a provision which appears in a treaty that
governs reactions and interactions between states.
And so this rule is limited only to states.
It's a rule that says states violate international law
if they use force.
It has nothing, nothing to do with non-state actors.
It has nothing to do with terrorist groups.
So when al-Qaeda attacks us, that's
not a violation of this rule.
That's a crime.
And that's how it will be treated.
So this is a rule that only exists to tell states,
you can't do this particular thing.
Now, as I've mentioned, there are exceptions to this rule.
And there are two.
And they are found within the framework of the UN Charter.
We'll talk about each of them.
The first is an authorization from the Security Council
to use force consistent with the UN Security Council
resolution, a mandate.
And the second is self-defense.
You may use force to defend yourself.
And we'll look at the article that governs that.
Now, I've got a third bullet up here.
And that's humanitarian intervention,
which we'll also talk about.
However, humanitarian intervention
is not found within the framework of the Charter.
In fact, it's not found in any treaty whatsoever.
But there's a good argument, I happen
to buy it, that humanitarian intervention is today
lawful with strict criteria.
But again, we'll talk about that in a moment.
Let's begin at the beginning with Chapter 7.
Can you open it for me?
Oh, God bless you.
Army Ranger.
OK.
Let's talk about Chapter 7.
This is a mandate under the Security Council.
It's called a Chapter 7 authorization.
And the reason is, is in the UN Charter,
it happens to be Chapter 7.
By the way, you should distinguish this
from Chapter 6, which you will probably
learn about in the coming week.
Chapter 6 is about operations that are not forceful,
peacekeeping operations.
Chapter 7 is what's known as a peace enforcement operation.
In other words, you're going to use force.
And that force may be used without the consent
of the state where the operations are underway.
So the very first step in a Chapter 7 operation,
in fact, the very first article in Chapter 7, is Article 39.
Article 39 is very, very important.
Because Article 39 is the article
which tells the Security Council when
it can begin to handle a situation somewhere
out there on the horizon.
The Security Council can address situations in three cases.
When there is a threat to the peace,
when there is a breach of the peace,
and when there is an act of aggression.
A breach of the peace and an act of aggression
is not a distinction you need to really know about.
It's a lawyer distinction.
Basically, it means a state's using force
against another state.
The other provision, threat to the peace,
is very, very important.
And the reason is, is because threat to the peace
is not defined anywhere.
So in answer to the question, what
is a threat to the peace?
Such that the Security Council can then
begin to take the situation, then
begin to address the situation.
The answer is, a threat to the peace
is whatever the Security Council says it is.
So if it says, for example, if they
pass a Security Council resolution that
says law professors who wear pink shirts
are a threat to international peace and security,
that's good enough.
That is, in fact, as a matter of law, albeit not fact,
but as a matter of law, that's now a threat to the peace.
And what that means is the Security Council
can start dealing with the situation,
can start remedying the situation,
can authorize the use of force to force them out
of the pink shirt and into a light blue shirt.
This would be perfectly lawful.
The other thing you need to note about this article
is the last clause, maintain or restore
international peace and security.
The Security Council was seen to be the policemen in 1945.
I mean, you would go to the Security Council,
and the Security Council actually
would have military forces.
That never happened, but would have military forces,
and they could send those military forces in action
in the event there was insecurity
in the global environment.
So in Article 39, whatever the Security Council decides,
whatever measures the Security Council authorizes
may only be for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.
The Security Council cannot authorize measures
to punish someone unless the Security Council
can articulate the connection between the action
and trying to maintain peace and security.
So for example, the Security Council
has authorized a tribunal to handle war crimes
in the former Yugoslavia, another tribunal
to handle war crimes in Rwanda.
That's not technically punishment.
That's the Security Council acting
to maintain peace and security.
The Security Council cannot retaliate for an action.
So the only thing the Security Council,
and we'll see it was very important in the first Gulf War,
the only thing the Security Council can do
is take an action or authorize an action
that's designed to let things settle down
so that diplomacy can do its magic.
Now, that's Article 31.
And what I'd like to do is, as we go through the articles,
show you a couple of resolutions from the first Gulf War.
And the reason is, is the first Gulf War
was the war where we actually used,
Chapter 7 has our legal justification.
So that was Article 39.
Iraq invades Kuwait on the 2nd of August, 1990.
And on that very day in New York,
the Security Council meets.
And the Security Council, in Resolution 660,
we'll see 660 again,
the Security Council says there's been a breach of the peace.
In other words, there's been a use of force
by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
That's very important because what that resolution was
was a resolution that said, we have the stick.
We're in charge now.
We're taking control of this situation.
And we'll be the ones authorizing action.
Now, after Article 31, once the Security Council has said,
listen, this is a situation which threatens peace
or breaches peace or is an act of aggression,
once the Security Council says that,
then their next step is found in Article 41,
which very importantly,
only authorizes non-forceful measures.
So 39 says we have a situation, we're in charge.
41 says, okay, now we have to consider
non-forceful measures.
These may include on the PowerPoint
is actually from the charter.
These are examples set forth in the charter.
The most common, economic sanctions.
Now, in the first Gulf War, these were tried.
There was a resolution that was passed
imposing economic sanctions on the Iraqis,
particularly with regard to oil exports.
That did not work very well.
So another resolution was passed
saying that we could use force in maritime operations
to intercept illegal trade
that the Iraqis were engaging in.
That did not work very well either.
But in that case, the Security Council,
after taking the 39 action,
took several Article 41 non-forceful actions.
The next and perhaps the most important article
is Article 42.
Article 42 is the use of force resolution.
What Article 42 tells us is that the Security Council
has determined that the Article 41 measures did not work
or alternatively, that if they try Article 41
non-forceful measures, that's not gonna work.
And the most common case would be a case
where one state has invaded another
and they want to authorize defensive operations
and it just wouldn't make sense to say
as the conflict is ongoing,
let's impose economic sanctions, maybe that will work.
So it basically says you have to try non-forceful measures
unless the situation is such
that it would be really dumb to do so.
And if that happens,
if the Security Council affirmatively
makes that determination,
then they may authorize military action.
And that's non-consensual military action.
As I mentioned a moment ago,
the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement
is under Chapter 6, you need the consent of the state
where the operations are ongoing.
Under Chapter 7, you obviously don't need consent
because you're going to use military force
against the state that's in violation of the law.
But again, again, look in Article 42
and it tells us that the only purposes
are maintaining or restoring
international peace and security,
maintaining in a situation where you're dealing
with a threat to the peace
and you want to make sure something doesn't break out
or restoring in the event you're dealing with a situation
in which there's already been military action
and you want to get the folks to knock it off.
Here's the resolution from the First Gulf War,
it's a very, very famous resolution,
Resolution 678.
Very, not only famous, but a very interesting resolution.
First, it authorizes member states
who are operating with Kuwait to use all necessary means
to restore international peace and security
if the Iraqis don't get out of Kuwait
by January 15th, 1991.
Now let's look at that a little bit.
First, it's authorizing member states
cooperating with Kuwait.
This was very, very, very unusual.
Anyone know why?
There was a particular reason
that they came up with this language.
The reason is because they did not want Israel to use force
because a coalition had been formed
that included states like Syria.
If you were old enough to remember the operation,
the Syrians provided lots of troops in the First Gulf War.
And so the Security Council was extraordinarily worried
that if the Israelis became involved,
this would rupture the coalition that had been formed.
And so they put this text in and told the Israelis,
this doesn't give you authority to do anything,
which was very, very important
because once the hostilities were really going,
remember, the Iraqis were trying
to drag the Israelis into the conflict.
They were launching Scud missiles against Israel.
So this was a very important political provision.
The other thing that is interesting
is that January 15th, 1991,
there's absolutely no requirement in law
to give the other side an opportunity
to move back into compliance with international law.
But in this case, that's exactly what happened.
And in fact, the operations did not commence,
I think, until January 17th,
two days after the deadline had expired.
Then you have the text, all necessary means.
All necessary means is UN speak for use military force.
So when you see a resolution,
and in the resolution it says all necessary means,
this is a green light to use military force
to accomplish whatever purpose, it's called the mandate,
is set forth in the Security Council resolution.
In this case, it's to accomplish
or it's to implement Resolution 660.
Resolution 660 said there had been a breach of the peace
and you guys have to leave Kuwait.
And so this is the authorization to use military force
to expel, in this case, the Iraqis from Kuwait.
And then finally, the restore international peace
and security became very, very important.
Because if you remember the way the war went,
there was an extended air campaign
and then a very, very brief ground campaign
and the Iraqis were being pushed north.
So they were pushed out of Kuwait
and they were being pushed north in Iraq.
And President Bush determined
that once they were out of Kuwait
and once their military capability
was significantly degraded,
then international peace and security had been restored.
So in answer to the question,
why did they not march on Baghdad?
It's because President Bush, the elder Bush 41,
made the call that, well, I think that the resolution
only allows us to restore international peace and security.
There are no Iraqis in Kuwait.
The Iraqi military has been beaten up pretty bad.
I think we've restored international peace and security.
Now, that didn't work so well.
As you know, the Iraqis then seized the opportunity
to move against the Marsh Arabs in the south
and the Kurds in the north.
And so the United States and coalition partners
like the United Kingdom and France
then conducted extended no-fly zone operations
in both the north and the south.
And of course, then there was a war in 2003.
So in retrospect, it did not appear at all
as if international peace and security had been restored,
but the president and his advisors made the call
in April of 1991 that it had been,
and therefore they had no further legal authority
to continue north.
All right, the second exception found in the charter
is self-defense.
It is found in Article 51 of the charter.
This was a key when the charter was being framed in 1945.
This was a key, and the reason is that states
like the ideal of this security council thing
that would have authority to respond
to threats of the peace, breach of the peace,
and acts of aggression.
But they were born at night, but not last night.
They were cautious.
They wanted to retain the right to defend themselves.
So this article is the article which cinched the deal.
Okay, we'll create this security council,
but wait a minute.
We want to be able to defend ourselves
in the event the security council does not work,
which in fact, arguably still today doesn't work.
It certainly didn't work during the Cold War.
It gave states a right to individual self-defense.
State A has attacked me.
I can respond to State A.
But it also gave the right to collective self-defense,
meaning one state can come to the defense of another.
That is, for example, the basis for NATO.
If you look at Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
it specifically references Article 51 of the charter.
NATO is a collective defense operation
created in the aftermath of Article 51 of the charter.
There has been some controversy
about the collective defense provision.
The United States provided some assistance
to countries like El Salvador
against the guerrillas in the 80s.
In providing that assistance,
they conducted military operations against Nicaragua.
Nicaragua took us to the International Court of Justice
where we made an argument,
realized we were going to lose,
withdrew from the case,
and then the court held against us.
But the important provision
with regard to collective self-defense was,
we said, well, what we're doing
is engaging in collective self-defense against Nicaragua
because Nicaragua is supporting guerrillas
against Honduras and El Salvador.
And the court said, oh, okay, that makes sense.
Can you show us the request from El Salvador, Honduras?
Can you show us the request
where they ask you to come to their defense?
So we quickly made a phone call.
They wrote out a request, gave it to us,
and the court said, nope, that doesn't work.
The request must be prior to the use of collective,
or military force in collective defense.
So today, pretty much everyone acknowledges
that you can act in collective self-defense,
but the state which you're acting on behalf of
must make a request to you in advance.
Now, you only have the right to engage in self-defense
or collective self-defense
until the Security Council becomes
what lawyers call seized of the situation.
In other words, they take control of the situation.
That has never happened.
The Security Council has never said,
okay, okay, okay, we got it.
Your self-defense, turn it off.
Now, if you're engaged in military operations,
we'll have to authorize those operations
through chapter seven.
That's never happened, and because of political reasons
within the P5, the permanent five members,
I doubt that will ever happen for the foreseeable future.
Now, that Article 51, that's all the law.
You saw the entire article.
So the question is,
what does that right of self-defense mean?
When can you engage in self-defense and so forth?
The International Court of Justice
has answered this question
in a number of very famous cases,
one involving nuclear weapons, for example,
and the International Court of Justice has said
there are two criteria
for the lawful use of self-defense.
The first is necessity.
The principle of necessity is very simple.
It means that you resorted to force in self-defense,
you resorted to force in self-defense
against an armed attack
because there was nothing else you could have done.
In other words, you can't resort to military force
if there's some other means of resolving the situation,
and that use of force must be proportionate.
Now, be a little bit careful
because your military officers,
when you think of proportionality,
what you think of is the use in Bellow rule,
the law of war rule,
which has to do with civilian casualties.
You may not engage in a military operation
if the likely civilian casualties are excessive
relative to the anticipated military advantage.
That's a rule of the law of war.
That has nothing to do with this.
Civilian casualties are irrelevant
when we're considering this particular rule.
What proportionality means in this context
is you may do no more than required to defend yourself.
So if there is a border incident,
a serious border incident,
of course you can defend your borders,
but this doesn't mean you can invade
and conquer the other country.
So your response must be sensible
with regard to defending yourself.
Now, sometimes that may be grossly excessive
relative to what they did to you.
And sometimes you can defend yourself
by using much less force than they used against you.
The answer is you can only use that force
that's necessary for you to effectively mount a defense
and no more.
The bullet on immediacy,
which is also known as imminency,
is something that the International Court
has never addressed,
but it deals with when you can conduct defensive operations.
It actually comes from a very famous case
in the 19th century
that involved the British Armed Forces
coming into the United States
to seize a vessel called the Carillon
that was being used for an incertainty.
There was a rebellion in Canada
called the McKenzie Rebellion.
And so the Brits came into the United States,
seized this vessel that was being used in the rebellion,
and then, because the Brits got a lot of class,
then what they did was they set the Carillon on fire
and sent it over Niagara Falls with everyone watching.
So it was a pretty good message.
If you're talking about signaling, that works pretty good.
But at any rate,
this body of law emanates from this case,
this 19th century case that everyone knows,
and it says this.
Look, you can defend yourself.
You can even defend yourself before they attack you
because you don't have to take the first shot.
But there's gotta be some relationship
between the time you act and the need to defend yourself.
In other words, you can't defend yourself too early.
You can't just look out there on the horizon and say,
I think those guys are dangerous,
and therefore I'm gonna strike now.
That would be unlawful.
You have to get to the point
where they're going to attack you,
and then you strike to defend yourself.
I'll talk about it in just a moment in a little more detail.
The other piece of the when can you engage in self-defense
is after the fact.
So you've been attacked, and you want to respond.
You want to act pursuant to Article 51.
You want to defend yourself,
but you gotta act kind of at a time that makes sense
that you're still defending yourself
and not just striking back, okay?
I mean, if you want to understand these rules,
you should think of just your regular,
I know most of you are Americans,
but it applies to every country in the room.
I mean, the rules of self-defense on the streets of Newport.
If I'm in the streets of Newport,
and I see you down the street,
you're a very dangerous-looking guy.
You look deadly to me.
I become frightened.
Can I then shoot you as you come down the street?
Of course not.
That's too early.
But if you come to me, okay, what's that?
It's not proportional.
That's also not proportional,
but I assumed he had a gun, a big gun, a really big gun.
He's from Texas, okay?
I am too, so it's not a shot against Texans.
However, if you come towards me,
and then you make threatening gestures,
and it looks like you're gonna hit me,
can I defend myself?
Of course I can defend myself.
It's exactly the same way with states.
And now, you have attacked me, okay?
And because you're much tougher than I am,
you knocked me to the ground.
I'm unconscious.
I'm lying there.
Can I then wake up, say, who was that guy?
Well, that's Bill.
He lives down on the point.
So I drive to your house, and I strike you.
Is that self-defense?
No, it's not self-defense in Newport.
It's not self-defense in Belgium,
and it's not self-defense in international law.
That's punishment.
That's retaliation.
But in the course of you attacking me,
can I strike back?
Yeah, or if you knock me to the ground,
and you're still there,
can I stand back up and strike you?
Of course, exactly, exactly, exactly analogous
in international law.
Now, with regard to self-defense,
this was, of course, the classic example.
We've talked about Chapter 7 in the First Gulf War,
but the First Gulf War, before the resolution passed,
the emir of Kuwait actually wrote a letter
to the president of the United States and said,
can you come to our assistance,
rather, in collective self-defense?
We've been the victim of an armed attack.
Under Article 51, can you come to our assistance?
So we see these two tracks.
The war starts, or the conflict starts out.
In August 1990, it's all about self-defense.
In November of 1990, Resolution 678 is passed.
Now it switches to a Chapter 7 operation.
Now, this timing thing has become relatively controversial
because of the 2002 National Security Strategy
issued by Bush II, Bush 43,
issued by his administration in the aftermath of 9-11.
In fact, the National Security Strategy
was to have been issued much earlier.
As a matter of law, it should have been issued much earlier,
but because of 9-11, they wanted to rethink
our National Security Strategy,
so it was not issued until September of 2002.
Now, traditionally, the timing on self-defense
had been understood to be a question of timing.
It was what we call in law a temporal standard.
So a month would probably be too early.
A week, maybe not so wrongful.
You could probably defend yourself in anticipation
of an armed attack being launched against you
the day before the attack was launched.
So it was all about, did those guys act too early
in terms of hours or days or months?
It was about looking at your watch
and about looking at the calendar.
This was the classic understanding
of anticipatory self-defense, responding to an action,
or not responding, anticipating an armed attack
and acting before you took the first shot.
Now, President Bush, in the strategy,
kind of rethought that.
And what he said, in what I find to be
an extraordinarily sensible, logical argument,
was, yeah, that was fine when military forces
lined up on the border.
When they had to mobilize troops,
they had to ride trains to the front, et cetera,
that was what the law was designed to do.
But that's not the way the world works today.
Today, we may be struck by a non-state actor,
for example, without warning.
And that blow could be catastrophic
because of weapons of mass destruction.
And so he said, the old standard,
it doesn't make any sense because the first warning
I have of an armed attack occurring, or about to occur,
is when it actually does occur.
That doesn't make sense.
So what he said here is that we're
going to act against emerging threats
before they are fully formed.
Again, very sensible.
But this caused a big, big, big brouhaha
in the international law community.
I mean, everyone went nuts when he said this.
This was classic Americans, especially that Texan guy,
Bush, redefining international law.
Who do they think they are?
Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
In fact, I believe that what they were doing
was just applying the existing body of law
in a more sensible way to the current circumstances.
And we always do that.
So for example, in the cyber realm,
I do a lot of work in the cyber realm,
we are producing documents and manuals and so forth.
But we're doing so based on existing law
and saying, OK, we've got existing law.
Let's apply it to this new situation.
Let's do it in a way that makes sense.
So what he was doing was making sense.
So I wrote an article which has caught on.
I think the State Department has adopted it entirely.
Defense Department knows about it.
And this is my standard.
My standard is, you can act in self-defense
in the last feasible opportunity,
last window of opportunity, in the face of an attack
that's almost going to certainly occur.
That requires the confluence of three things
when you're going to act in anticipation of the attack.
First, the guy you think's going to attack you,
the state you think's going to attack you.
They have to have the capability to attack you
or it must be almost there.
Obviously, I'm thinking of Iran.
Secondly, it's not just about them
having the capability to attack you,
but they have to intend to use that capability.
Otherwise, states would be invading states
all over the world on the basis of self-defense
because the other side looks like they could attack.
You have to wait.
Before you act militarily, you have to wait
to the point where that other side is going to use it.
And then finally, final opportunity,
even if they have the capability
and even if they intend to use that capability,
you gotta let all the non-forceful means
kind of play themselves out.
In other words, you can't act militarily
until the point where you believe,
reasonably believe, that if I don't act now militarily,
it's gonna be too late.
That's the moment at which
your right of self-defense matures.
Now, there is a third exception, maybe,
and it's humanitarian intervention.
The word, the term humanitarian intervention
is found in no international law treaty at all, at all.
However, I would argue that, oops,
I would argue, I would argue that there is state practice
which shows us that states have now accepted
that there's a legal right to engage
in humanitarian intervention
in certain very limited circumstances.
What is that state practice?
Well, the UN Security Council
has approved humanitarian interventions
on a number of occasions,
most recently with regard to Libya in 2011
with Unified Protector and Odyssey Don.
Now, that doesn't tell us everything
because what I told you earlier was
a security council could say there's a threat to the peace
and launch a response,
so that was lawful under chapter seven.
However, it shows you that they're very sensitive
to the notion of humanitarian intervention,
and in fact, on two cases,
in two cases involving interventions by ECOWAS
in East Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone,
there was no authorization to intervene by ECOWAS,
but after the fact,
the president of the security council
wrote letters praising the action,
then giving them authority
to actually monitor the situation.
So this, again, seems to suggest the acceptance of,
in clear cases, the right of humanitarian intervention.
Then, as you know, we engaged in operations
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999
because of what Milosevic and then the Yugoslavians,
today the Serbs, were doing vis-a-vis
the Kosovo Albanians in the area of Kosovo,
in the region of Kosovo.
We engaged, and although there was no
security council resolution
because the Russians and the Chinese
would not come on board, nevertheless,
we're talking about pretty mature states,
pretty, pretty, states that are pretty committed
to the rule of law.
I mean, regardless of what people think
about the United States,
I think it's pretty clear that Luxembourg
is not seen as a violent lawbreaker
on the international scene.
You have to remember that the operation
was approved by all the members of NATO.
At that time, there were 19.
So here we see 19 states that are pretty lawful
engaging in a humanitarian intervention.
And then there have been cases
where the international community did not engage,
did not conduct a humanitarian intervention.
And what happened?
Massive criticism.
Of course, I'm talking Rwanda and Darfur.
So in my view, today you can make a colorable argument
that there is a right of humanitarian intervention.
The question is not whether there's a right
of humanitarian intervention,
it's when does that right mature?
Do you have to wait till a genocide is ongoing?
Can you intervene when you think a genocide
is about to be launched?
So these are the questions, not whether the right exists.
Now, let me talk about some case studies
that will apply the rules that we've just talked about.
So the use of force framework
is not particularly complicated.
Chapter seven, you need authorization
from the Security Council,
self-defense or collective self-defense,
perhaps humanitarian intervention.
As I mentioned at the outset,
if another state consents to the use of force
on your territory, that's generally okay as well.
So let's look at the case studies.
The first was Afghanistan, 9-11 Afghanistan
and self-defense operations against,
not the Taliban, not yet, but Al-Qaeda, okay?
Now, there was a problem.
Everyone remembers where they were on 9-11,
I was at the Marshall Center,
we were conducting actually a briefing like this
to some foreign general officers
and I was asked the question, what just happened?
And my answer was, it has a matter of law,
what we have seen was a horrendous criminal act.
It did not occur to me to say what we saw
was an armed attack under Article 51 of the Charter.
However, very quickly the international community
started treating this as an armed attack under Article 51.
The reason I said law enforcement
is because at least to me,
Article 51 was about one state against another.
It wasn't about non-state actors.
The UN Charter is about interstate relations.
However, the international community
took a different view very quickly.
We see two Security Council resolutions,
one in the immediate aftermath of 9-11
and one two weeks later.
You can never trust resolutions
that happen in the immediate aftermath of an event
because you don't know if it's just an emotive response.
But two weeks later after,
everyone had had a moment to reflect,
they pass another resolution, 1373,
which talks about the inherent right of self-defense.
And at this point, no one thought that a state had done it,
no one thought a state was behind it.
Everyone knew it was a terrorist group known as Al-Qaeda.
NATO and other allies, other groups came on board
and said we will assist you.
Do you remember NATO offered up AWACS
to the United States, for example?
NATO came on board, said we'll assist you
pursuant to the right of collective self-defense,
Article 5 of the Charter,
which remember refers to Article 51.
Moreover, 48 different states
immediately offered bilateral assistance
that ranged from using military forces to overflight rights.
And then finally, after we began operations
against Al-Qaeda in October,
after we began those operations against Al-Qaeda in October,
the Security Council continued to pass resolutions
reaffirming the earlier resolutions
that had referred to the right of self-defense.
And so it seems to me pretty crystal clear
that today it's lawful to use Article 51 authorization,
military force against non-state actors.
Now, I will tell you that the International Court of Justice
is a little bit nervous about this, okay?
They're nervous about primarily Americans
going around the world and intervening,
shooting up non-state groups around the world
on the basis of self-defense.
So in a couple of cases, one involving the Congo,
a conflict in the border between Uganda and the Congo,
and another involving the famous Israeli wall,
which is actually a fence,
but in those two cases, the Security Council has kind of,
I'm sorry, the International Court of Justice
has kind of walked it back and said,
no, no, you can't use Article 51 against non-state actors
unless the non-state actors were sent by a state.
I will tell you, a number of critical judges on the court,
key judges, the American, Burgenthal,
the British judge, Ross Higgins,
the Dutch judge, Kooijman,
issued fiery dissents in this case
and said, that's absolutely wrong.
Didn't you see what happened after 9-11?
The international community is on board
with this Article 51 being used against terrorist groups,
non-state actors.
You guys have ignored history, and I think they're right.
I think, I believe, as a matter of law today,
that you may use Article 51 against non-state actors,
and so do most states.
It's certainly the policy of the United States
that that is so.
If we look at that particular operation
and we apply the criteria, just by way of illustration,
we can answer the questions.
The first is, did it comply with the criterion of necessity?
In other words, did you have to resort to military force
or would non-forceful measures have worked?
For example, could you have used law enforcement
against al-Qaeda?
Well, that's an easy question to answer
because the largest law enforcement operation
in the history of mankind was launched
in response to the 9-11 attacks, and it didn't work
because there were follow-on attacks
and Osama bin Laden got away and so forth.
So clearly, by October, using military force was appropriate
because non-forceful measures would not have sufficed.
Was it proportionate?
Now, we got criticized because, in response,
we conquered the entire country of Afghanistan,
and people were saying, in the process
of conquering the country of Afghanistan,
you killed more civilians than were killed on 9-11,
et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
That's misunderstanding the principle of proportionality.
The principle of proportionality says,
you may do no more than necessary to defend yourself,
and in this particular case, we needed to,
I think we make a fair argument that we needed
to deprive al-Qaeda, other terrorist groups,
of a base of operations in Afghanistan.
So conquering the country was proportionate.
What about imminency?
Well, it was only a month later,
and that was an extremely rapid response in any event
to get to a place like Afghanistan,
and moreover, they were still conducting operations
against us from Afghanistan,
as demonstrated by the attacks that were led
or masterminded by al-Qaeda that happened
even after we entered Afghanistan.
Today, we are not there in self-defense.
You should understand that.
The law in Afghanistan today is not self-defense.
We are there at the request of the government
of Afghanistan in their, technical term is,
non-international armed conflict,
internal conflict with the Taliban.
Technically, if they ask us to leave tomorrow,
which, reading the papers, that could happen,
if they ask us to leave tomorrow,
we would have no legal authority to be there, okay?
So, completely different situation today.
Now, in October, when we conducted operations,
we contemporaneously conducted operations
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban,
and this was kind of problematic
because we had been attacked by al-Qaeda,
but not by the Taliban.
Now, the standard for treating the actions
of a non-state actor, a terrorist group,
has the actions of a state,
was set forth in a very famous case
that I mentioned earlier involving the United States,
it was the Nicaragua case,
and there they said, listen,
if a state sends terrorists, insurgents against you,
or if they're substantially involved,
then you can treat the actions of the terrorist
or the insurgents as if they were the actions of the state,
and you can respond in self-defense
against the state itself,
not just against the terrorist or insurgents.
This is known as the effective control test,
which says the state must have effective control
over the group, which means that the state
tells the group what to do, go conduct this operation.
It does not suffice if a state is simply providing weapons,
for example, or training, or logistic support
to the terrorist group.
They gotta be saying, go do this.
But if they do, then you may respond with use of force
against both the state and the non-state actor.
Now, in Afghanistan, the Taliban clearly
had not risen to that level.
What they were doing was providing sanctuary,
and the United States said in its notification
to the Security Council that we were applying
our right of self-defense in Afghanistan.
What we said was, well, we're doing this
because Afghanistan has offered sanctuary,
a base of operations to Al-Qaeda.
I will tell you that's very, very controversial.
This notion of offering sanctuary to bad guys,
it is clearly wrongful.
It's clearly a violation of international law.
But whether it opens the door to other states
striking at you on the base of that sanctuary
remains very, very controversial,
and the United States is one of the few states
which continue to maintain this position.
What about Iraq?
You should be confused by breach of ceasefire
up on this slide, because what you probably believe
is it was about defense against the weapons
of mass destruction.
It was about defense against potential terrorists.
Saddam Hussein was supporting terrorists, et cetera.
That's probably what you thought.
In fact, the legal basis was completely different.
It was what is known as breach of ceasefire.
Negroponte was, at the time,
our ambassador at the United Nations,
and when he notified the United Nations,
President of the Security Council,
that we were engaging in defensive operations,
what he said, or operations, military operations,
what he said is, look, there was a resolution,
687, in April of 1991, and it was a ceasefire.
And the ceasefire had terms,
and the Iraqis have breached the terms of that ceasefire.
They've broken the contract, if you will.
So just like at your apartment,
if the landlord quits providing you water and heat,
deal's off.
It's exactly the same, and that's been the law
for well over a century in international law.
So we had a ceasefire.
It was in April.
They broke the deal, and they broke it
in what's called the material way,
which means it wasn't a little break.
They broke it in a big way.
They broke it in a big way, and so therefore,
just like your apartment contract,
I can say, on the other side of the deal,
I can say deal's off, fight's back on.
This was the legal basis for our operations in Iraq.
Just to go through the resolutions,
I've shown you 660.
660 says there's been a breach of peace.
678 says you get to, I showed you that,
it says you get to use all necessary means,
which you can use force, means you can use force.
In 687, I've just mentioned that.
There's a ceasefire.
The Security Council recognizes it,
and in Resolution 1441, the Security Council in 2002,
November of 2002, says, hey, there was a ceasefire deal
in 687, and you guys are breaching it
by virtue of your support to terrorists
and by virtue of your non-cooperation
with the weapons inspectors, and so there was a breach,
and so now that there has been a breach declared,
by the way, not by the United States,
but by the Security Council,
which at the time, I believe, was chaired by the Germans,
and of course, states which criticized us afterwards,
France would be an example,
they voted that there had been a breach.
So others determined there had been a breach,
and we simply said, okay, there's a breach,
so fight's back on.
This is, I think, I believe,
an unassailable legal justification for Iraq.
It does not answer the question
of whether the Iraqi operation was a good idea,
whether it was a politically astute thing to do,
whether it was appropriate when you were engaging
in the fight in Afghanistan to defy your forces.
It doesn't answer any of those questions,
but with regard to the question
of were U.S. operations in Iraq unlawful,
the answer is, I believe, clearly no.
Now, what about drone operations?
Very, very controversial,
still an ongoing debate in the international law community.
Let me tell you what I believe the law to be.
The first thing is that if another state consents
to your conduct of military operations in their territory,
in this case, drone operations against al-Qaeda
or al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations
or the Taliban in Pakistan, for example,
if another state consents, then it's lawful.
At least it doesn't breach the Usad Bellum.
It may be unlawful because of the way it's conducted,
but the fact that it's being conducted is not unlawful.
However, states don't always consent
or may, as in the case of Pakistan, withdraw consent.
When that happens and the terrorists,
the non-state groups that are conducting operations
against you, when they are on the territory
of another state, the first thing you need to do
is say to the other state, listen,
you have an obligation under international law
to police your territory, to make sure
that your territory is not used
to the detriment of other states.
Comply with that obligation if they,
and you have to give them an opportunity to do so,
albeit an opportunity that's consistent
with your right of self-defense.
In other words, if they're conducting
continuing attacks against you,
you don't have to spend a lot of time
waiting for the other side.
You don't have to keep taking hits
while the other side is fumbling around
trying to figure out whether or not
they want to address the situation.
But if, after giving them an opportunity
that is appropriate in the circumstances,
they are either unwilling to do so,
maybe because they sympathize with the group,
or unable because they simply lack
the military capacity to conduct those operations,
then you may penetrate their territory
for the very limited purpose of operating
against the group, defending yourself,
and before you do that, you have to comply
with the two requirements that I mentioned earlier
with regard to self-defense necessity.
In other words, only military options
will solve this problem for you,
and proportionality, don't mess with the local forces,
keep your operation limited, defense is limited
to that which you can do, which you need to do
in order to defend yourself, so don't go large,
go small, conduct the operation, and then leave quickly.
Another USADBELLUM question that has come up
is Stuxnet, okay, moving to the cyber realm.
You know the facts, that somebody targeted
Iranian nuclear assets by using a,
using malware to damage 1,000 centrifuges.
There are allegations, there is speculation
that this was conducted by the United States
and by Israel in an operation known as Olympic Game,
I don't know the answer to that question, okay?
But let us assume for the sake of argument
that in fact a state, either us, the Israelis,
or somebody else, a state conducted this operation.
The question is, well, would that be a violation
of Article 2.4, is that an unlawful use of force?
There was a group, I was the director of the group
that conducted a three-year study resulting
in a document called the Talon Manual,
which is the law of cyber warfare,
and what we concluded is that if an operation
injures or kills persons, or damages or destroys objects,
then that operation is a use of force.
So in the Stuxnet operation, because the centrifuges
were physically damaged, that was, in my view,
if a state did it, clearly a use of force,
and could only have been justified
if there was Security Council authorization,
which there clearly wasn't, or if there was
a justification in self-defense.
There, I'm not so sure, I'm a lawyer,
so I can argue any side of the case you wish,
but I think you could make an argument
that if in fact the speculation about the United States
and Israel is accurate, then the Israeli action
could be justified in self-defense,
anticipatory self-defense, arguably,
because remember, Ahmadinejad, in charge at that time,
is making all these claims that Israel has no right
to exist, blah, blah, blah, and he's developing
this capability, and if he gets that capability,
then they may be at the point where the Israelis
can't take the capability out.
So you could make an argument that the Israelis
had a right to act in self-defense,
and that if the Israelis asked us to assist them,
then we had the right to do so in collective self-defense.
All very speculative, without knowing the facts,
I hesitate to offer a view.
I will tell you, though, that it raises
an interesting question in self-defense.
Let's assume a state did it.
Let's assume it was a violation of the use of force.
Let's assume that it wasn't justified in self-defense.
You can ask yourself a pretty good question
on whether or not uses of force are sometimes authorized,
even though it hasn't met the self-defense criterion,
in order to avert a greater use of force.
Because remember what was happening in this case.
The Israelis were saber-rattling.
The Israelis were saying, hey, we're gonna take
that capability out, we're gonna go to war with them,
we're gonna use kinetic means to destroy
the Iranian nuclear capability.
You can ask yourself a question of whether
international law should tolerate a lesser use of force,
because this is a relatively low-level use of force,
in order to avert a greater one.
But this question has not been answered
in international law.
And then finally, and then we'll move into questions,
the Ukraine.
There are two possibilities with regard
to the Russian operation's use of force.
There's clearly a use of force in the Crimea.
The first option is that it's lawful.
And this is the Russian argument.
And the argument goes like this.
Yanukovych was thrown out of power, if you will,
by a group of rebel forces.
And he asked the Russians to come in to assist him,
so that he could resume his position.
Now, this is not a ridiculous argument at all.
In international law, it is often the case
where one state will ask another state to assist it
in its internal conflict.
Don't forget, that's what we're doing in Afghanistan today.
That's the legal basis for our presence.
That's ISAF's presence in Afghanistan.
So it's not a completely crazy argument.
There are some problems.
And the biggest problem is that under international law,
when you're asking, who is the state?
What is the government?
What you generally look for is the entity,
not the good entity.
It's not about Yanukovych bad,
and these other guys are good, they're pro-Westerners.
It's not about that.
It's about who has the most effective control
over the territory.
So today, the Ukrainian Armed Forces
are responsive to the government in Kiev.
The government in Kiev seems to be exerting political
and governmental control over most of the Ukraine,
including the Eastern Ukraine.
It seems to me that if I'm asked as a matter of law,
which is the government that is in effective control
of the state, the answer today is,
it's the government in the Ukraine.
And most states are treating them
as if they are the legitimate government.
And if that's the case, Yanukovych doesn't have the right
to invite the Russians in.
And I happen to believe that is the case.
In my view, the Russian activity was a use of force
and an armed attack.
It was a use of force, certainly,
as soon as they crossed the border without the permission,
as soon as military forces crossed the border
without the permission of the Ukrainian government.
And it's an armed attack
because they're clearly using force.
They've seized Ukrainian military bases and so forth.
So in my view, the Ukrainians could clearly resort
to self-defense against Russian forces
to expel the Russians.
And in my view, the Ukrainians could clearly seek assistance
from other states, whether that be the United States
or certain European countries, to expel the Russians.
But that's just my view.
An interesting question which has not been asked
very much in the press,
but is very interesting to international lawyers,
is the Ukraine at war with Russia?
Now, this is a question of the use in Bello,
that other body of law,
but I just thought you would find it interesting.
In my view, there's absolutely not a scintilla of doubt
that the state of Ukraine and Russia are at war today.
And the reason I say that,
and by the way, at war is kind of a lay term.
The technical legal term is
in a state of international armed conflict.
And therefore, all the rules of the law of war,
all the rules of the use in Bello
with regard to detention and attacks apply.
Why do I say this?
Because the legal standard that's been set
for when does a war exist between states
is set forth in the second article
of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.
And it specifically says
that there is an international armed conflict
when the troops of one country
occupy the territory of another country,
even if there are no hostilities.
I mean, the provision actually says that.
So in my mind, there's absolutely no question.
And now we have had hostilities
because Russian forces have forcefully seized
Ukrainian military bases.
So using the lay term, not the legal term,
are Russia and the Ukraine at war today?
Absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
And with that, I think we'll open it up
and I'll be happy to take any questions that you may have.
Yes, sir.
