Something Really Strange Just Happened at the 30-Year Bond Auction

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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThe speaker argues that the recent rise in 30-year Treasury yields is driven by the natural process of yield curve \"un-inversion\" rather than inflation, government debt, or \"bond vigilantism.\" The current upward bias in long-term rates is attributed to the Federal Reserve's hesitation to cut short-term rates aggressively, which deviates from historical normalization patterns seen in 2001 and 2008.
The 30-year long bond price at its highest yield since 2001,
so over a quarter century, which has to mean something, right?
What people take it to mean is that long bond rates continue to go up
and therefore it must be a signal, especially with short-term rates
starting to move down again and the yield curve steepening,
the long bond rate going up must be a signal about something.
Markets, vigilantism waking up, inflation risk,
the Fed not doing its job the way it used to do before,
Kevin Warsh being too wishy-washy, the removal of forward guidance,
a number of different things.
But none of those are actually true.
We do know what's happening on the yield curve
and we can see what's happening on the yield curve.
In fact, I'm going to show you what's happening on the yield curve
that will explain why the 30-year long bond rate is going up
even though the rest of the economy,
the rest of the marketplace is going in the opposite direction from inflation,
including other central banks and the bill market.
We got a lot to get into here.
So we'll start with the 30-year long bond.
The auction was yesterday.
Like I said, highest yield since 2001, so 25 years.
People going nuts about this.
We've already talked about how the 30-year long bond market rate is up
most since, you know, 19 years, 2007.
So the idea is that this must mean that the U.S. government
is finally reaching a point where deficits and debts actually matter.
Therefore, the canary in the coal mine for bond vigilantism,
the final return after decades of being missing a bond vigilantism,
has to be the 30-year long bond
because it can't be the rest of the curve
because the rest of the curve is behaving very differently.
So we're going to isolate the 30-year and make something out of it
when the 30-year, simply doing what the 30-year always does in these situations,
regardless of the U.S. government's debt.
But yesterday's auction wasn't even that bad to begin with.
There's a lot always made about these auctions
for understandable and very transparent reasons,
but you look at the internals, it really wasn't that big of a deal.
And we've seen this a number of times before.
We've seen these horrific auctions that show up or poor auctions that show up
and they don't mean a damn thing.
Yesterday's bid to cover, not really that much different.
In fact, it's pretty much in the same range as it's been.
The horrific auction that I'm showing you here is the one from 2023,
which I'll get to in a second
because I think it provides a pretty good illustration,
as does an even better one,
a truly horrific 30-year bond auction back in 2011.
But you look at these auctions,
there's really nothing in them that suggests some major change
in the stance of the marketplace with regard to U.S. Treasury debt.
The sale of debt through the auction process,
which is secondary to the secondary market,
which prices off of fundamentals, as we will see.
So supposedly yesterday's auction was a big deal
because it priced at the highest yield since 2001, as I said.
So why did it price at the highest yield since 2001?
If I keep saying it's not because of the Treasury market's debt
and the government's deficits,
which by the way, I wish it was.
I wish we did have bond vigilantism
to get the government under some kind of control,
but that's not what's going on here.
What's going on here is what we see happening.
The pattern is the same,
even if the execution is different this time.
Let me explain here.
But let's talk about the auctions first.
The 30-year bond auction from 2023 offers a pretty decent parallel.
And we remember back in 2023, in August of 2023,
Fitch downgraded the U.S. government debt.
The Federal Reserve was hiking rates.
Inflation talk was everywhere.
Everybody was absolutely sure interest rates had nowhere to go but up.
And it seemed for a while there like that was the case,
except if you ignored the fact
that the yield curve was historically inverted,
which most people did.
So inflation risk, Fed risk, U.S. government deficit risk.
It was going to be bond vigilantism.
And so you had this bad auction in November of 2023.
And notice what happened.
After the auction came in terrible,
which was supposed to be a big signal canary in the coal mine.
This is the market waking up to U.S. government debt
or waking up to inflation risk or something,
some mainstream explanation.
Instead, the bond rally started,
including the bond rally in the 30-year long bond.
So where this auction was supposed to portend higher interest rates,
interest rates have nowhere to go but up.
Instead, it didn't matter at all.
Instead, what it really did happen is in the middle of 2024,
you had rates that are going down
and then suddenly rates kind of turned around at the long end.
And for the 30-year bond, they've been moving higher since 2024.
And that is our key clue here.
September of 2024.
Did something happen in September 2024
that always follows along with yield curve dynamics?
That's why the long bond is going up.
What happened in September 2024,
not the government's deficits and debts since then
or inflation risk that never seems to show up.
And it really is just about the curve that was inverted
and the process of un-inversion.
And the process of un-inversion was triggered in September 2024, as I said.
But before we get to that, let's go back to,
just to really emphasize this point,
let's go back to 2011.
Just like 2023, in fact, even bigger deal than 2023.
In early August of 2011,
S&P downgraded the U.S. government's debt for the first time ever.
This was a huge deal.
If you were alive back then or old enough, like me,
to remember what was taking place, this was a huge deal.
The U.S. government's debt was downgraded for the first time.
And we heard all the same things that we're hearing today.
You had inflation risk because everybody was convinced in early 2011
all the money printing from QE was going to lead to inflation.
You had these massive deficits.
At least, I mean, they seem quaint these days.
But compared to what we were expecting
or what we had experienced before 2008, certainly,
the deficits and debts that we got in 2011 were absolutely gargantuan.
So you had the downgrade, you had the deficits,
you had everybody talking about inflation.
And then you had a 30-year long bond auction
that came just a couple days after the S&P downgrade.
And it was truly horrific,
at least in the very narrow confines of the short run.
The 30-year bond started that day,
it ended up rising 28 basis points.
Secondary market from where it started that day to where it closed.
So 28 basis point, huge route in the 30-year long bond.
And as you can see, it barely shows up as a blip
because it didn't actually matter.
What did matter was the fundamentals.
The fundamentals at that time were not inflation.
They were instead more depression economics,
which means bond vigilance continues to be absent
even if the US government's deficits were continuing to explode and be huge
and the debts just continued to rise, all of that stuff.
All the stuff you hear today, truly horrific,
the long bond auction didn't make a single bit of difference.
Treasury auctions and the debts don't actually matter.
And the 30-year long bond that everybody says is a key signal
of some kind of regime change is not actually a signal of a regime change.
It's just what everybody says
because everybody follows the mainstream economics textbooks,
which frankly gets everything about bonds and interest rates
absolutely wrong, if not entirely backwards.
Or absolutely backward, if not entirely wrong,
whichever way you want to put it, doesn't actually matter.
So instead, if we look at the comparison of short-term rates
to long-term rates into 2011,
even before we get to the further downturn in the long-term interest rates,
the spread between the three-month Treasury bill,
sort of a proxy for front-end rates,
and the 30-year bond yield was 379 basis points.
If you look at the same spread compared to where we are today,
379 basis points in 2011,
with an overall outstanding debt of $14.3 trillion.
Here we are in 2026, the debt is now $39.1 trillion,
and the spread between the three-month rate
and the 30-year long bond is just 134 basis points.
So the thinking goes, if the market is expecting,
if the market is thinking deficits are unsustainable,
we've got way too much debt,
there's no way to absorb all that supply.
Therefore, the 30-year is signaling
that market is demanding more and more compensation
to own longer-term debt
because the outlook for the deficits is not going to change,
the outlook for the debt is not going to change.
It's just simply not true.
Look at the spreads here.
We had $14.3 trillion debt,
the spread of the 30-year over the short-term rate,
the three-month rate was 379 basis points.
The spread over the 30-year rate over the three-month rate here,
despite a $25 trillion increase in the debt,
is only 134 basis points.
The market is not demanding additional compensation
for holding treasury paper
that it sees now suddenly as getting more and more worthless.
It has got more and more worthless
and that spread has gotten less and less and less.
What I'm telling you is the mainstream explanation
for this is completely wrong,
if not backward, or completely backward,
if not wrong.
There is another reason why 30-year rates are where they are
and why they are doing what they're doing
and I already gave you the answer.
It is un-inversion,
but just to emphasize this point,
it is not an auction matter.
The auctions don't matter.
I wish they did.
I wish that the US government debt did matter,
but it actually doesn't matter.
The market is doing something else entirely,
which is why you have these uncorrelated events.
Treasury auctions are poor,
yet treasury yields don't seem to reflect that,
except for in these certain short-run periods of time.
Yet, it seemed that way in late 2023
because the market was experiencing long-term rates
and short-term rates going up,
but everybody ignored the inversion,
which told you that eventually those auctions,
which didn't really matter,
really weren't going to matter moving forward
as rates did something completely different.
The yield curve did something completely different
than what everybody expected.
Everybody said the 30-year long bond was a signal
that interest rates had nowhere to go but up
and instead, the rest of the curve
and the curve dynamics said,
that is completely wrong if not entirely backward
or completely backward if not entirely wrong.
So, what is going on here?
Again, pretty simple.
We had an inverted curve back then.
It's, again, circling that 30-year long bond auction
in November of 2023.
So, you had rates that were heading a little bit lower
into 2024, at least compared to that part,
the peak in 2023.
You had short-term rates that eventually turned around
because the Fed finally realized inflation risk
had been diminished and that there were increasing risks
to the macroeconomy and the labor market,
which they were reminded of in the summer of 2023 or 2024
by the Japanese carry traders and a whole bunch more.
But the Japanese carry traders really punctuated
that growing risk over credit markets
and what we're seeing in private credit.
They were warning you about that,
plus the flat average labor market
and economy that showed up there.
And what people don't realize is
that when the Fed capitulates,
when it finally gets out of its inflation story,
I mean, it never really truly did,
but it finally shifts in its thinking
from the risks are tilted toward inflation
to the risks are more balanced
or the risks are to the downside
in the economy and labor market,
they start cutting interest rates.
And the bond market receives that Fed capitulation
as this is the signal.
We're going to start un-inverting the yield curve
because if the Federal Reserve is capitulating
and starting to cut rates, even though it doesn't want to,
what that means is the weakness, the bond market,
the inversion, the previous inversion had been pricing
is finally happening.
If the Fed sees it, it must be real and it must be imminent.
So we see in cycle after cycle,
I'll give you more examples as we go through here.
We see in cycle after cycle is
the curve un-inverts and steepens,
un-inverts and steepens every time the Fed starts cutting.
Not because the Fed is controlling the interest rate,
because the Fed is the signal
that even if these idiots can see it,
it must really be happening and it must really be imminent.
That's what people believe.
People believe the Fed,
this is one of the things that confused people back in 2024.
The Fed started cutting rates.
Remember, they started cutting rates by 50 basis points
and long-term yield rose.
And what the hell's going on?
It must be bond vigilantism.
It must be inflation.
It must be something.
No, that was the consistent pattern.
And what we're seeing here in 2026 is simply the aftermath,
the prolonged aftermath of the same steepening,
unwinding, normalization, un-inversion process.
This is curve dynamics, not bond vigilance.
So we have the curve that is the difference here.
The reason why people are getting confused is
that the Fed is the one that's acting and behaving differently.
I'll get to those examples previously.
If the Fed was behaving more consistent with previous cycles,
what we'd see in the un-inversion normalization process
is the Fed would be cutting more aggressively, more steadily,
not necessarily in a straight line,
but there would be more,
the Fed would have gotten lower much faster than it has.
And in that case, the long-end interest rates,
not just the 30-year,
but also the 10-year and all the other ones that go along with it.
Long-end wouldn't continue to steepen out by going up.
It would have steepened out by going sideways to lower.
And again, I'll show you the examples here.
I'm not making this up.
I'll show you the examples about how this normally goes.
So we're seeing the steepening process
where the Fed is not cutting in the same way that it does.
It's not getting out of the way of short-term interest rates.
And because it's holding up short-term interest rates,
the yield curve still wants to steepen.
So it is steepening with an upward bias.
It's steepening with upward bias
because the Fed is in the way of the front end.
It's not inflation risk.
It's not anything else.
It's not bond.
It's not deficits.
It's the Fed that's in the way of the front end.
If the Fed wasn't in the way of the front end,
it would look like it did back in, say, 2001.
So in early 2001, January 2001,
Alan Greenspan's Fed started cutting rates aggressively
in response to weakness
that was apparent in the bond marketplace before then.
But the Fed finally realized
that the recession that was developing,
the dot-com bust, was a real threat.
And so they panicked and started cutting rates aggressively.
Short-term rates went down, not in a straight line,
but pretty close to a straight line.
But they went down quite a lot, quite quickly.
And look how the steepening process played out,
exactly as I just illustrated for you,
at least in the hypothetical.
Short-term rates go down a lot.
The yield curve steepens out
where the 30-year long bond doesn't go down.
The 30-year bond rate doesn't plunge.
It kind of goes sideways to slightly lower.
If the Fed was doing in 2026 what it was doing in 2001,
aggressively cutting interest rates,
the short-term rates going down,
the long end wouldn't be rising.
It would be going sideways to slightly lower,
just like it did in 2001.
That's the normal, un-inversion,
normalization, steepening process.
Same thing in 2008.
Again, look at it, very similar.
The Fed starts cutting in September of 2007,
aggressively lowering interest rates,
not just a couple of rate cuts here,
then pause, then more rate cuts, and then pause.
You know, the 2024-2526 cycle is unusual
in that it's being extended out,
which is part of the problem here.
So if the Fed was following the historical cases,
which normally, when it panics,
it panics for those economic reasons
that we're still seeing here,
you know, job losses and rising unemployment,
which I'll get to in just a second.
The Fed was cutting rates more aggressively.
Look at what happens with the 30-year long bond.
Again, it doesn't fall.
The 30-year long bond was sideways to slightly lower.
So if the Fed was doing what it did in 2001
or 2007-2008, we wouldn't be seeing
a rising long-term interest rate.
We would be seeing a sideways
to slightly falling interest rate.
It's a steepening process.
So again, if we had the 2026 view of the,
if the Fed in 2008 and 2007 was doing
what it's doing in 2026, what would happen?
You would have almost exactly the same chart
that we see today.
See how the 30-year long bond rate
was kind of moving up sideways
to slightly higher through 2007.
If the Fed had only cut at a leisurely,
intermittent pace in 2007-2008,
then you would have seen the long bond rate behave
just as we're seeing it do right now.
It's the un-inversion normalization process,
not any of the other reasons you see
all over social media and in regular media too,
because everybody follows the economics textbooks
instead of historical cases,
empirical evidence, and rational thinking.
That's economics for you.
And you can see this play out
not just in the difference
between the front end and the very long end.
You can, any number of curve shapes.
You can look at the two-year, 10-year shape,
the two-year, 30-year spread,
bull steepening, un-inversion.
There's a process here.
Look at even the late 2008.
After the Fed fully capitulated in December 2008,
when it cut rates all the way down to zero
and launched QE, what happened?
The curve steepened out even more,
where long-term rates were rising.
To this day, people are confused and confounded,
including Fed researchers and economists.
The curve is behaving exactly as it does
under these circumstances.
It is steepening out in various ways
based on short-run circumstances.
And the short-run circumstances in 2026
continue to be a Federal Reserve that for now,
for now, looks like it's going to continue
to stay in the way of short-term interest rates.
And so long-term rates that still want to steepen out
have to steepen out with a slightly upward bias,
which is why it is slightly upward,
not aggressively upward.
Again, 2001, you can see the same thing.
The two-year, 10-year spreads
or all the other spreads,
you get the steepening
and occasionally flattening back and forth.
But overall, normalization and un-inversion
explains what's going on in the yield curve.
So it's no accident this goes back to September of 2024.
The normalization process once began,
once the Federal Reserve finally capitulated
and started cutting rates.
Even back in 2001 and into 2002,
see how you had the similar process
that we're going through right now?
The Fed that had started cutting rates
and then thought by the late, late 2001
that it was done.
The dot-com recession was over.
It wasn't even declared by that point,
but the dot-com recession would be over with
and therefore rates would have to go,
we'd start to see recovery and rates would normalize.
So the two-year rate goes up,
10-year rate goes up,
the 30-year bond rate kind of goes sideways
to slightly higher.
The yield curve flattens out yet again
before falling all over again
because economic fundamentals outside of the short run.
Rates continue to go lower over the long run
because growth and inflation expectations
not everything else that you hear from the Federal Reserve
or Alan Greenspan at the time
or the mainstream media.
Normalization, steepening,
that's what's going on in the yield curve,
not debts, not inflation.
So go back to the 30-year long bond.
Look at how the rate of change is itself changing.
Yes, the 30-year long bond rate is going up still,
but the rate of change in the 30-year long bond rate going up
has changed in a couple different spots
and these are not accidental spots, late 2022.
And again, in the middle of last year.
So the market is responding to fundamental forces
that the mainstream isn't aware of
because the mainstream follows Jay Powell,
now Kevin Warsh, along with economists
instead of following the actual marketplace
and understanding yield curve dynamics
and what interest rates really are.
And as the Federal Reserve shifts more and more toward,
yeah, rate cuts, not hikes, as we'll see here,
as the Fed shifts back toward the Pringles can,
the 30-year long bond rate gets flatter and flatter and flatter
as we get closer and closer and closer to something
that looks more like a normal normalization process
where the Fed isn't hanging on the short-term rate,
preventing it from going lower.
And if the short-term rate starts to go lower more quickly
or even just further going down more further lower,
can't speak here, even going a little bit lower,
30-year doesn't go slightly higher.
The bias shifts to sideways and slightly lower,
like we've seen every other time.
Why do I say the Fed and its rate hikes
and maybe they're not even going to happen
or the Fed getting closer to Pringles?
Well, the short-term marketplace is kind of getting past
the whole trichet risk thing.
If you look at the bill market, bill yields, they moved up.
So the four-week, three-month bills, those rates moved up,
especially throughout July as it looked like,
you know, peak trichet, peak Casey Jeff
or really Cleveland-Beth has become the leader
of the hawkish group here
because Casey Jeff no longer has a vote on the FOMC.
But either way, hawkish members at the FOMC,
you remember the July meeting, we had the three dissenters.
So it was peak hawkishness on the committee.
And the bill market reflected that hawkishness
by rising short-term rates.
Maybe the Fed will actually get to a rate cut.
Not necessarily to, but maybe they'll get to a rate cut
because they'll fool themselves into thinking inflation risk,
which doesn't exist, as we were reminded of this past week
with the CPI and the PPI, by the way.
So we might get some, we might get a rate cut out of the Fed.
So bill rates, which are not hedges,
these are not derivative, this is cash money.
This is the big real market players,
the biggest players in the marketplace
and the money markets themselves saying
there is a small possibility the Fed raises rates
in the short and intermediate term.
That's the three-month rate and the four-week bill.
Maybe the Fed does a rate hike in July,
which of course we know they didn't.
You can already see that the bill rates are flattening out.
But the bill rates never really reflected
all that much, that big of a probability
as far as rate hikes go anyway.
You look at where rates would be
if, at various places along the way,
bill rates tend to be above IOR
and substantially above the floor, the RRP floor.
And so if the Fed was gonna cut rates,
or hike rates, excuse me, by 25 basis points,
we would expect the three-month rate
and the four-week rate to go up where I've just circled.
And instead, they never got anywhere close to that.
So what that was is the bill market saying
there is a small, maybe even growing chance
the Fed hikes rates in the near and intermediate terms,
but we're not really buying it
because the conditions really aren't there.
There is no evidence for second-round effects
of energy shock pricing.
There's no evidence, especially core CPI rates
or some of the other ones, services prices
that suggest there's a spillover there.
So no evidence for inflation,
just like there was zero evidence
for tariff inflation last year.
No surprise there.
Meanwhile, we get more and more evidence
that we're going right back
into the same summertime flat beverage job loss market
that we had last year.
So balance of probabilities,
maybe the Fed gets a rate hike,
but even that chance is dwindling as we move forward.
Same thing with term SOFR.
Term SOFR, this is distinguished from term SOFR futures,
even though term SOFR is derived from term SOFR futures.
We don't need to get into that here.
But it's a measure of short-term interest rates
and expectations for short-term interest rates.
And just like bill rates,
you don't see much enthusiasm for rate hikes
in the term SOFR futures, or term SOFR, excuse me,
well, therefore term SOFR futures.
Again, they moved up a little bit,
especially in July, peak hawkishness.
But ever since really beginning of August,
you got the payroll numbers,
you got weak retail sales today
that just came out and remind us of the mini cycles
that are taking place in the real economy.
Summertime looking like more and more payback.
All the negatives that we saw last year
are popping up again here this year.
So even term SOFR rates like bill rates
are moving and rolling over,
having never really bought into the rate hike
or imminent rate hike out of the Fed to begin with.
So there was a small probability
the Fed hikes rates and triches itself,
but even that risk is diminishing
as we get more and more negatives in the real economy
and less and less evidence,
which means less than zero evidence
for the inflation case.
Again, bringing this back to the 30-year bond,
you can see where the market isn't pricing inflation.
We know that from the TIPS market.
And we know that because of the spreads,
it's not suddenly bond vigilantism
waking up.
It is entirely about curve normalization processes,
which we're seeing here in the bills.
After a short run infatuation with triche,
after the energy shock and the Iran shock,
the marketplace is going back into,
back toward the Pringles direction.
And the more it looks like we're going to get
the Pringles out of the Fed,
the more that gets the Fed out of the way of the market,
the more the market can normalize and un-invert
in a more typical fashion,
more like what we've seen before.
So again, that's what the marketplace is actually saying.
And that's not what you hear anywhere else
because everyone else is convinced,
inflation, government debts,
everything but the truth about how interest rates
and bond markets truly work.
So you have the Fed over here
still talking about inflation risk,
which they're going to do in the short run,
at least the aggressive hawks,
even if the rest of the committee starts to peel off
and forced by reality to look at the alternative here,
which the rest of the marketplaces is already pricing.
And not just the rest of the marketplace.
You see around the rest of the world,
central banks that were once aggressively hawkish
have changed their tune.
I just put a couple of them up here on the screen
for you here.
You know, the Reserve Bank of India says,
yeah, it looks like inflation's in check,
which they really mean weakness,
but we don't see the second round effects there.
Bank of England, which came out of the energy shock
and aggressively,
they were one of the central banks
that looked like they were going to be the first
to hike rates.
They haven't hiked at all.
And now, you know, the last meeting
from the Bank of England,
they said, we're probably not going to hike at all
at any point.
So going from, hey, we have to hike
and hike really quickly to,
we're probably not going to do any rate hikes whatsoever.
Bank of England, Swiss National Bank.
The Swiss National Bank was flirting
with the idea of hiking interest rates
because of what they perceive of inflation risk.
Now they say, well, if we do hike rates,
it won't be till the middle of 2027,
if not early 2020.
So they're pushing out the idea of a rate hikes
and even some central banks you don't really follow
like Norway's.
Norway's central bank.
They want to hike rates too,
but tame CPIs and especially tame core CPIs say
no evidence for second round effects,
second round inflation effects from the energy shock.
We're getting more and more evidence of downside
in the real economy,
which puts Pringles back on the table,
not just here in the US dollar and US economy,
but also Pringles back on the table
all around the rest of the world
because it is globally synchronized.
So we were going through a globally synchronized
trichet freakout to a globally synchronized
realizing it really was trichet
and heading back toward Pringles all over again.
And when we go back toward Pringles all over again,
the big reason why is going to be the labor market.
Don't need to go through the details here.
We've done this before,
but again, the ups and downs in the economy
tend to fool people.
The mini cycles that we've talked about before.
Job market is looking more and more like it did last summer.
Not catastrophic,
but the type of job losses that are serious enough
to grab the attention of even inflation-obsessed
Fed officials and get them to thinking about
more and more the downside risk in the labor market,
not the upside risk in prices,
which continues to be absent and have zero evidence for it.
So the ups and downs in the economy,
the mini cycles, pulling forward demand,
artificial highs, the payback to payback to emerging.
Remember the household survey is a thousand times worse
than what you see here in the Establishment Survey.
That's still there in the background.
And remember the narratives here.
The narrative that has been driving the Fed hawkishness
is the idea, perfectly illustrated by the official unemployment rate,
that you have a resilient economy, resilient labor market.
When you add energy shock, energy prices going up to it,
resilient economy, energy shock,
what ends up happening is higher energy prices
get passed along to consumers.
And because the labor market is resilient in their view,
those consumers can pay the higher energy costs
as well as the higher cost of other companies
that have to raise prices in response to energy prices.
That's the second round effect.
So resilient labor market, energy shock,
therefore you get inflation.
And you look at the official unemployment rate,
it does look like that's the case.
It's a resilient labor market.
But it only looks resilient
because we've had millions of people drop out of the labor force,
which they've ignored because they try to excuse it
as all sorts of other things,
including immigration enforcement and some non-economic factors.
But when you add back those labor force dropouts,
or at least two-thirds of those labor force dropouts like you should,
the actual unemployment situation shows not a resilient labor market,
but a fragile one.
And therefore it aligns more closely
with what we're seeing across the marketplace
as well as the rest of the macroeconomic data,
including the establishment survey
going right back into flat beverage after the artificial high
that months ago I told you was going to be an artificial high
because of everything we're talking about here.
But when you have a fragile labor market,
that's combined with an energy shock and higher oil prices,
you don't get inflation, you get downside in the economy.
And when you get downside in the economy,
you get Pringles out of the Fed.
And when you get Pringles out of the Fed,
you get a more normal normalization on inversion process in the yield curve,
which is where we're really going here.
So we have the Fed that continues to stand in the way of short-term rates
because the Fed is not acting the same way that it has in past cycles.
Now, to be fair, this cycle has been very different than previous ones.
Like, you know, again,
the labor market doesn't look like a recession certainly in 2008,
but even in 2001,
but it is still losing jobs and there's still nobody hiring.
So there is still weakness that we have to contend with
and there is still rising unofficial unemployment,
therefore slack in the economy.
But the Fed has been cutting rates
as it slowly comes to realization that's the case
and does so in piecemeal fashion rather than more all at once
as it has in previous cycles.
So we get the uninversion that is unusual in the respect
that it's the curve is steepening ever since September 22.
That part is consistent.
The Fed starts cutting rates.
That's the signal things are changing.
So that part was true,
but the Fed the Fed's rate cuts
and holding up to shorten the yield curve has shifted the uninversion process
slightly to where the long bond rate is biased slightly upward
as the yield curve steepens out.
And the yield curve has a long way to steepen out too.
It's not even all that steep,
which is another signal as the Fed shifts back more toward Pringles.
Once again, then rate cuts come back into view.
You get a more normal uninversion process not going all the way back to 2024.
This would be from 2026 forward
where you don't even have the upward bias in a long bond rate anymore.
You get more of the sideways downward bias,
which is consistent with those previous cycles
and the more aggressively the Fed cuts rates in the front end,
the more you'll see the downward bias show up in the long end.
It doesn't mean that long rates are going to plunge like we saw in 2001 in 2008.
They can go sideways to slightly lower while short-term rates actually plunge,
but the closer the Fed gets back to Pringles,
the less of an upward bias you'll see in the long bond rate,
which will mean everything we talked about here will be long forgotten.
The auction back in the auction from you know,
this past week will be just as forgotten as the one in 2023
and certainly the one back in 2011 because it's not about deficits.
We wish it was. It's not about deficits.
It's not about bond vigilance.
It's not inflation. It's not inflation.
We know what's going on.
The Fed is holding up the short end as it tries to normalize
and uninvert after historic inversion
and the historic inversion is the most important part of everything we just talked about.
So that's what's happening in the bond market.
Not what you hear in the mainstream.
It is curve dynamics.
Thanks for joining me. I'll see you all again very soon.
