Exposed: Why Israel Secretly Bombed American Targets

In the summer of 1954, a series of small bombs exploded across Egypt. The attacks targeted cinemas, libraries, post offices, and American and British cultural centers. Egyptian authorities searched for those responsible, while rumors spread throughout the country. The answer led back to Israel. The bombings were part of a covert Israel military intelligence operation known as Operation Susanna. The operation was to convince Britain and the United States that Egypt was unstable at a time when British forces were preparing to leave the Suez Canal zone. Israeli officials feared that a British withdrawal would strengthen Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and increase the likelihood of another war. Military intelligence responded with a plan built on deception. If successful, Egypt would appear incapable of maintaining order and British forces might remain in place. Instead, the operation collapsed. Members of the network were arrested, two operatives were executed, and Israel denied involvement for years. The controversy spread through the Israeli government and eventually became one of the most damaging political scandals in the country's early history. What was the Levant Affair? Who authorized it? What were the real objectives? Was anyone held accountable? Hello, I'm Colin Heaton, former history professor, Army and Marine Corps veteran, and welcome to this episode of Forgotten History. The beginning of the toughest 26 days in Marine Corps history. The 36th President of the United States died this afternoon. When the United Nations proposed partitioning Palestine and recognizing Israel's independence in 1948, Egypt, then ruled by King Farouk, was among the fiercest opponents. Farouk feared a hostile state on his border. After Arab armies, including Egypt, attacked Israel and failed, Israel seized additional territory. A UN peacekeeping force was introduced but the conflict remained frozen and Israel had a plan. By the late 1940s, the Jewish community in Israel numbered around 100,000, comprising Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and Mizrahi Jews. They were relatively prosperous and disproportionately represented in the middle class, mainly in Cairo and Alexandria. After the 1948 war, Zionism gained popularity, sparking anger from Egyptian officials and society. After Egypt's defeat, attacks on Jews increased and a third of the community left Egypt for Israel. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, both Egypt and Israel were in their formative stages. Israel worked to build its state and integrate new immigrants after decades of British rule, while patrolling borders against Palestinian raids. Egypt, meanwhile, was modernizing under the Free Officers Movement, which overthrew King Farouk in 1952. Gamal Abdel Nasser soon emerged as the dominant figure in Egypt's new government, ushering in a new era in Middle Eastern history. Despite initial optimism, Israel soon viewed Nasser's regime as a mortal threat. Egypt was drifting into the Soviet sphere of influence, while the West, primarily the US and Great Britain, remained neutral on the issue. While Nasser publicly welcomed a truce, he privately prepared for war. He invited former Nazis to modernize his military, especially his rocket program at Helwan, and continued arming Palestinian fedayeen militants who raided Israeli border towns. These attacks infuriated Israeli officials, who demanded Egypt stop them. Nasser ignored their concerns. Israel decided it would take matters into its own hands. The Levant Affair was hatched and would go down in history as a cautionary tale of just how far a sovereign state could weaponize intelligence and use deflection as a tool. It was a botched false flag operation, a political scandal, an intelligence disaster, and one of the most controversial episodes in Israel's early history. But the details surrounding the event are incredible. To understand the Levant Affair, you have to understand the Middle East in 1954. The new nation of Israel was only six years old and was surrounded by enemies. It had just fought its first war for survival in 1948 and emerged victorious. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion worried that if the British left, that would free Egypt to launch another attack. The major problem was Egypt, led by Nasser, a rising Arab nationalist who wanted to remove British influence from Egypt and assert Egyptian control over the Suez Canal. Britain still had troops stationed in the canal zone, but negotiations were underway for withdrawal. For Israel, that mattered. Israeli leaders feared that if Britain left Egypt, Nasser would become a stronger, more independent, and more dangerous person along with his Arab allies. Minister Pinhas Levant and other cabinet ministers believed another war was inevitable, and without Western influence could not be stopped. So, Israeli military intelligence launched a covert plan. Levant worked with IDF intelligence to infiltrate Egypt. Colonel Benjamin Ghibli, head of military intelligence, wanted to go further. Undercover agents from Unit 131 were tasked with attacking Western targets in Egyptian cities, pretending to be members of the Muslim Brotherhood, opponents of Nasser's regime. Unit 131 comprised of 12 people trained extensively by Israeli handlers and consisted of Jews recruited in Egypt, not Israeli citizens, to strengthen their cover. Many of the recruits were young members of Egypt's Jewish community who believed they were serving a larger national cause. Some had connections to Zionist organizations, while others were approached through existing networks already known to Israeli intelligence. Their value came from their ability to blend into Egyptian society without attracting attention. The operatives received training in surveillance, clandestine communications, and the handling of explosives. Instructions were passed through handlers operating under false identities, and members of the network were taught how to maintain their cover if questioned by authorities. The operation depended upon secrecy. Most participants knew only the information necessary to complete their assigned tasks. The devices themselves were small and designed to start fires rather than produce mass casualties. They were often concealed inside everyday items and timed to detonate after buildings had emptied for the day. The objective was to create fear and uncertainty while avoiding the large loss of life that would bring immediate international scrutiny. Israeli leaders viewed the British presence in Egypt as a strategic buffer. British troops stationed near the Suez Canal limited Egypt's freedom of action and provided a measure of stability in a region that remained volatile after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Negotiations between Britain and Egypt threatened to change that balance. Israeli officials feared that a British withdrawal would leave Nasser with greater freedom to build his military, expand his influence, and prepare for a future conflict with Israel. Some within military intelligence concluded that if Egypt could be portrayed as unstable, Britain might reconsider its departure. Operation Susanna emerged from that calculation. Israel's Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was not informed of the operation. Officials involved feared he would shut it down if he learned of the plan. The plan was exceptionally risky. If the Americans or British discovered Israel was staging false flag attacks, relations could collapse. The idea was simple and reckless. The plan was to carry out attacks against western targets in Egypt, then make it look as if Egyptians were responsible. This operation was codenamed Operation Susanna. The cell was made up largely of Egyptian Jews recruited by Israeli military intelligence. They were not hardened James Bond professionals. Many were young, idealistic, and operating in dangerous territory. The targets included places like American libraries, British facilities, and cinemas. The operation depended on deception. Blame the attacks on Egyptian extremists or communists frightened the west and derailed the British withdrawal. The bombs were generally timed to go off after closing hours, suggesting the plan was aimed more at creating fear and political effect, and avoiding mass casualties. But regardless of precautions, this was still sabotage, and a false flag operation, and poorly executed. There were discussions within the Israeli intelligence community. They were concerned about civilian casualties being collateral damage, and if people had been killed, the planners would not have been able to control the consequences. On July 23, 1954, one of the bombs reportedly ignited prematurely in Alexandria. This unforeseen error had not been taken into account, and the Egyptian authorities moved fast, arresting members of the covert network. One agent even had a bomb explode in his pocket, en route to a target. Nasser went on a worldwide public relations offensive, openly blaming Israel. The premature detonation gave Egyptian authorities their first real break in the case. The investigators quickly connected suspects, uncovered additional evidence, and began dismantling the network. What had been designed as a covert operation capable of operating in the shadows, suddenly became a race against time for everyone involved. As arrests mounted, Egyptian security services gained access to members of the cell, safe houses, and communications linked to the operation. The secrecy that had protected the network began to collapse. Within weeks, much of the organization had been identified and placed under arrest. For Israeli intelligence, the greatest danger was no longer the loss of the operatives. It was the possibility that the entire operation would be exposed publicly and tied directly back to Israel. Some of those captured were brutally tortured as part of the interrogations, and Egyptian justice was swift. The trials began in December 1954 and ended in January 1955, with two men, Moshe Marzuk and Shmuel Azar, being sentenced to death and hanged. Others received long prison sentences. The Israeli Ministry of Defense archive records that two were condemned to execution, two were acquitted, and six others were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. But, as expected, Israel publicly denied involvement for several years. The fallout that followed was significant. Inside Israel, the scandal was called Hezek HaBish, or the Bad Business, or the Unfortunate Affair. The embarrassment and loss of credibility were the greatest self-inflicted wounds. The affair is named after Pinhas Lavan, Israel's defense minister at the time, and he was blamed for authorizing the operation. But Lavan denied it. The key dispute became, did Lavan give the order, or did military intelligence act without proper authorization? The other central figure was Colonel Benjamin Gibley, head of Israeli military intelligence. Gibley claimed Lavan authorized the mission. Lavan claimed Gibley and others had acted without his approval, and then tried to pin it on him. The political fratricide became more than an intelligence failure. It became a political civil war inside Israel's ruling establishment, a schism which exists today. As a result, Lavan resigned in 1955. Gibley also left his post, but the matter did not die. It kept coming back, because the question of responsibility was never cleanly settled in the public mind. Later, inquiries reportedly found evidence of perjury and forged a document. Charette was livid that the IDF had planned an operation behind his back. Gibley resigned after Lavan accused him of perjury, forgery, insubordination, and criminal negligence, and that later testimony suggested a document supposedly signed by Lavan had been forged. So, the scandal was not just the operation, but the subsequent cover-up. At the time of the operation, Israel's prime minister was Moshi Charette. Charette was generally more cautious than David Ben-Gurion, Israel's founding prime minister, who had temporarily stepped away from office, but remained hugely influential. The Lavan affair became a weapon in Israel's internal political battles, but due to the international condemnation, Ben-Gurion wanted a full legal inquiry. He met some resistance, as others feared that reopening the case would tear the government apart. Eventually, it helped split Israel's ruling political camp. The fallout contributed to Ben-Gurion leaving Mapai in 1965 and forming the opposition party Rafi. The failed bombing plot in Egypt did not just damage Israel's foreign relations, it divided the nation of Israel, and that division exists to this day. So, who actually ordered it? Lavan said he did not, while Ghibli said he did. Later evidence leaned toward Lavan having been framed, or at least wrongly blamed, but the scandal remained murky, and in intelligence history, murky usually means somebody important wants the lights off. The second controversy is the language. Was Operation Susanna sabotage? Was it espionage? A covert action? A false flag operation? Or was it terrorism? The targets were civilian linked locations, such as cinemas, libraries, cultural centers, and the purpose was political intimidation and deception. Even if the bombs were timed to avoid casualties, the operation fits many common definitions of terrorism or state-directed false flag violence. Another controversy is the use of Egyptian Jews as operatives who paid the heaviest price. Some were executed, some spent years in Egyptian prisons, some were later honored in Israel, but for decades Israel officially kept distance from the affair. That created bitterness since these people had acted for the state and were abandoned publicly, and only much later received official recognition. Israel publicly honored surviving operatives in 2005, where President Moshe Katsav presented certificates of appreciation, ending decades of formal denial. Another controversy is whether the Lavan affair helped pave the road to the Suez crisis of 1956. Some historians argue the affair worsened tensions between Israel and Egypt, and helped push Israel toward more aggressive strategic thinking. When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, it marked his break with the West. Israel saw an opportunity to stop Palestinian raids and launched an offensive into the Sinai, followed by British and French operations to seize the canal. Although militarily successful, the Suez crisis was an embarrassment for Britain and France. Opposed by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Nasser himself gained international sympathy. A Stanford University linked summary of historian Leonard Weiss's work argues that the Lavan affair triggered a chain of events with long-term consequences for Middle Eastern power relationships. That does not mean Operation Susanna directly caused the Suez War, but it did deepen distrust, damaged diplomacy, and exposed the kind of covert maneuvering that defined the region in the 1950s. The Lavan affair damaged Israel in several ways and hurt Israel's credibility with Britain and the United States, as well as intensified Israeli-Egyptian hostility. The operation also exposed severe dysfunction inside Israel's early intelligence community. Most important, it galvanized the Arab world against Israel, setting the stage for future wars. The fact that Israel was willing to attack Western targets and blame Arabs in general, and Egypt in particular, in order to manipulate foreign policy, shocked United Nations. Every nation has its own intelligence services, presumably working for the benefit of their respective country. It also widely assumes, and probably so, that many of these agencies operate outside the bounds of their own national laws, not to mention violating international laws. Another issue that was widely discussed, even to this day, is what happens when intelligence agencies operate without clear civilian control. How much freedom should they have to shape the global narrative? Should they be held accountable? If so, how? Can a government deny an operation for decades, then quietly honor the people who carried it out? And, when a false flag operation fails, who takes the blame? The politicians? The intelligence officers? Or the expendable people on the ground? The Levant Affair is not just a story about Israel and Egypt. It is a warning about covert power. The people who designed these operations often survived the fallout. The people who carried them out often do not. In the end, Operation Susanna failed completely. The bombs did not keep Britain and Egypt. The cell was exposed. Two men were executed. Many were tortured and sent to prison. And, remember, Israel denied responsibility for decades, and the scandal helped fracture Israeli politics from the inside. The Levant Affair was a small operation with enormous consequences. It showed how fear, strategy, and arrogance can combine into disaster. And it left behind one question that still defines the scandal. Not just who gave the order, but how many people were willing to bury the truth afterward. The result was a political earthquake marking one of the darkest intelligence scandals of the early Cold War Middle East. The Israeli Ministry of Defense archive describes it as a failed covert operation conducted in Egypt in the summer of 1954 involving Egyptian Jews recruited by Israeli military intelligence to plant bombs in Egypt, American, and British-owned civilian targets. In essence, the Levant Affair is a cautionary tale of what not to do. Thank you for watching this episode of Forgotten History. If you liked what you saw, please click like, share, and subscribe. And, if you would like to assist with the ever-increasing cost of production, please consider becoming a channel member and joining our Patreon page.