Who could replace Xi Jinping? Three names are emerging: Hu Chunhua, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Qiang. Each candidate could put China on a very different political track. But all three come with serious risks—and that may be exactly why Xi still has a strong chance of staying in power for a fourth term.
No matter how determined Xi Jinping may be to remain in power indefinitely,
his opponents will eventually force him to confront the limits that no leader can escape—age,
health, and mortality. Xi Jinping can remove rivals, he can rewrite political rules,
he can refuse to name a successor, but he cannot prevent the succession question from emerging.
His opponents will use it against him in the name of the party's longevity,
and that is why the struggle over who comes after Xi is likely to become an increasingly
important part of the internal power struggle. And recently, three names have appeared more
frequently in discussions about his possible successors. Okay, first of all, I just want
to tell you, these are not confirmed. These are just information I gathered through people's
speculations, rumors, online discussions, so on and so forth. So let's go over them one by one.
The first is Hu Chunhua. He's now 63 years old. He's widely regarded as the leading candidate
from the reformist camp. He is one of China's most experienced senior officials, having served
in both the central government and several major provincial-level positions. He was a prodigy of
former leader Hu Jintao and was once widely viewed as Hu Jintao's chosen candidate to eventually
succeed Xi Jinping. Precisely because of that background, Xi Jinping has spent years trying
to sideline the younger Hu and searching for reasons to bring him down, but he hasn't been
able to. This is because, like Hu Jintao, Hu Chunhua is a technocrat from an ordinary family
without the powerful political connections enjoyed by many princelings. Unlike the princelings,
Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua have to be extremely careful with their behavior, lifestyle,
and affiliations. His conduct has to remain spotless. Otherwise, he likely would have been
taken down during one of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaigns. For people who want
to see major changes to be brought to China, they hope to see Hu Chunhua to become the next leader
of China, because he's not corrupt, or I should say, I don't know, but he's less corrupt and
relatively open-minded. However, recent rumors have circulated that Hu Chunhua has presented
three conditions for accepting the top job. First, there must be an investigation into the death of
former Premier Li Keqiang. Second, there must be an investigation into the sudden arrests of
Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Third, Xi Jinping and members of his inner circle must be held
accountable for corruption. According to these claims, Hu has no interest in becoming China's
next leader unless these three guarantees are provided. However, that presents a problem.
The conservative factions are said to be deeply uneasy about these demands. Remember I told you
about the three-way deadlock within the power struggles? There's the Xi Jinping camp, there's
the conservative camp, and there's the reformist camp. So the conservatives fear that any
investigation into Xi Jinping's inner circle will not stop there. It will spread to other
senior party families because corruption is deeply embedded throughout the system.
The conservatives are concerned about the political vision associated with Hu Chunhua
and former Premier Wen Jiabao. Both have been linked to calls for political reforms,
which could threaten the privileges enjoyed by the Communist Party's so-called red families.
Now, Hu Chunhua does have some weaknesses. The biggest one is his current position.
He was kicked out of the Politburo at the 20th Party Congress by Xi Jinping.
And the moment his mentor Hu Jintao discovered it in his folder, a drama unfolded in front of
the world's media in which Hu Jintao was escorted out. Technically, not being in the Politburo
means Hu is left outside of the party's formal center of power. He now holds only a largely
symbolic role in the CPPCC, even though he appeared more active last year. After Zhang
Youxia was arrested in January, his visibility significantly reduced. Okay, so that's him.
And the second candidate is Ding Xuexiang, the youngest member of the Politburo Standing
Committee. Now, under the CCP's traditional procedures and protocols, Ding may appear to
be the most institutionally legitimate successor because of his age advantage and the protocol
that the next party leader would normally be expected to come from the current Politburo
Standing Committee. Now, Ding worked for Xi Jinping as his aide in Shanghai and was promoted
to Beijing and served the director of the president's office or the secretary general's office
and the director of the general office of this party's central committee, which is the role
currently filled by Cai Qi. Ding is widely regarded as a Xi Jinping loyalist. Politically,
Ding began his career in Shanghai and was once associated with the Shanghai faction,
aka political network linked to former leader Jiang Zemin. Now, you probably remember
the deputy leader of that faction is Zhen Qinghong, who is now an influential figure
with the conservative camp. So that history could make Ding Xuexiang totally acceptable to both
Xi Jinping and powerful party conservatives like Zhen Qinghong. But Ding also has a serious
weakness. Nearly his entire career has been spent in administrative positions. He has never governed
a province or managed a major regional economy. To many reformists, putting Xi Jinping's former
chief of staff in charge will be a little different from extending Xi Jinping's rule
for another five years. So he would therefore, I mean, Ding Xuexiang would therefore be unacceptable
to the reformist camp and to a large part of the party bureaucracy. Many officials may not respect
him as the country's top leader because of his limited governing experience and narrow political
exposure. Now, a week ago, a short video surfaced on Chinese internet showing Ding Xuexiang sitting
next to Xi Jinping at a conference. What caught people's attention was the contrast between the
In this clip, Ding Xuexiang appeared calm, confident, and authoritative, while Xi Jinping
looked unusually tense and uncertain. The caption, one of the captions on the video said,
he looks more like the party secretary. While the purpose of this clip is unclear,
it may have been intended to boost Ding Xuexiang's image and quietly present him as leadership
material. But in Chinese politics, that kind of publicity can be extremely dangerous.
A video meant to promote Ding could just as easily destroy his political career.
If Xi Jinping sees a subordinate being portrayed as more commanding and more leader-like,
he may see it as a threat. But regardless, this video was circulating. Let's go to the next one.
The third candidate is current premier Li Qiang. Now, like Ding Xuexiang, Li is a member of the
a plausible successor. In fact, he ranks second in the party hierarchy. On paper,
moving from the number two position to number one would appear to be a natural transition.
Now, he also has one major advantage over Ding Xuexiang. He has substantial provincial
leadership experience. He served in senior positions in Zhejiang and later became party
secretary of Shanghai, giving him a much stronger governing resume. And when compared with Xi
Jinping, Li Qiang is generally seen as more pragmatic, flexible, and open to compromise.
One example often cited is Shanghai's approach during the early stages of the COVID pandemic.
Under Li Qiang, the city initially avoided some of the most draconian measures imposed elsewhere
in the country. What makes Li potentially attractive is his reputation as a relatively
easygoing political operator who can work with different factions. It's said that he doesn't have
a big ego and is a happy-go-lucky kind of guy. Now, should Hu Chunhua be rejected, the reformist
camp might accept Li as a compromise candidate. He may not represent fundamental political reform,
but he could be seen as someone capable of adapting, negotiating, and working across
factional lines. Each of the three possible outcomes would point China in a very different
direction. If Hu Chunhua emerges victorious, Xi Jinping and his family will be in big trouble.
It could signal the beginning of major political reform. Xi Jinping's record and possibly the
hidden dealings of other senior leaders and red families could be exposed. This is a highly risky
and treacherous road with mounting pressure. It's the right path to take, but the question is,
are there enough people inside the system who have the courage to support this path?
Now, if Ding Qixiang takes power, China could end up with a smaller and politically weaker version
of Xi Jinping behind the wheel. Because Ding lacks authority and experience, rival factions
could immediately begin trying to undermine or remove him. His position might become even more
unstable than Xi Jinping's. I don't think he'll last very long. If Li Qiang succeeds Xi Jinping,
the system could also enter a turbulent period because Li is viewed as more flexible and less
domineering. Competing factions may all try to influence, pressure, or control him. He may last
longer than Ding Qixiang, but he would inherit an almost impossible mission, reviving a deteriorating
economy while containing an increasingly vicious internal power struggle. In the end, he will go
down as well, in my opinion. At this point, we need to ask a very practical question.
Do any of these three officials actually want the job? We don't know, but I have my doubts.
Hu Zhenghua has already raised the stakes extremely high. Whether he can actually succeed
Xi Jinping is impossible to know, but he certainly understands the risks. He has survived this long,
and he may not want to gamble everything he still has on a succession battle he could easily lose.
As for the other two candidates, Ding Qixiang and Li Qiang, they probably know that they would be
little more than transitional figures, placeholders until someone younger, more ambitious, and more
determined eventually pushes them aside. Do they really want to become China's next top leader?
If they are smart, probably not. Who knows? But if they're extremely
motivated by people's calling, then they might. That brings us to the fourth scenario,
maintaining the status quo. In other words, Xi Jinping remains in power for a fourth term,
not because people still like him, but because no one else wants to inherit the mess.
Xi Jinping and his followers certainly have every reason to keep him in power indefinitely,
because the moment he steps down, a successor, especially someone like Hu Zhenghua,
or it doesn't have to be Hu Zhenghua, someone with the ambition to make big changes one way or the
other, could demand full investigations into the many allegations surrounding Xi Jinping's rule.
He could lose everything. He could lose his political protection, his family's security,
and possibly even his personal freedom and his family's wealth. In my view, as long as the
collective leadership believes its priority is to preserve the regime, Xi Jinping still has a strong
chance of securing a fourth term. The reason is very simple. If you step back and ask yourself
the question, of the four candidates, including Xi Jinping, who is the one who wants the job the
most? The answer is obvious. It's Xi Jinping. Also, none of the three alternatives is an obvious fit
if the collective leadership wants to preserve the regime, because Hu Zhenghua could trigger too
much political disruption. His rise might reopen old grievances, provoke investigations, and
intensify the struggle between rival factions. Ding Xuexiang and Li Qiang, meanwhile, are
essentially softer, weaker versions of Xi Jinping. If they would continue much of the same system,
then what would be the point of replacing him? From the party's perspective, keeping Xi Jinping
may appear less risky than installing a weaker successor. At least with Xi Jinping still at the
top, the leadership can preserve the appearance of unity and project a single coherent front to
the outside world, even if the struggle behind the scenes is becoming increasingly brutal.
So, the possibility that Xi Jinping remains in power for another five years should not be
underestimated. In fact, it may still be a very likely scenario. But under any of these scenarios,
the succession battle will determine far more than who takes the highest office. It will decide
which faction controls the party and what direction China takes over the next five years.
And precisely because the stakes are so high, the infighting will not stop until the very end.