LIVE: Sixth Circuit Hears John Doe v. Whitmer, Michigan State Police Appeals

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit hears arguments at 9:00 a.m. ET on July 21 in John Doe A, et al. v. Gretchen Whitmer, et al. and John Does, et al. v. Michigan State Police, et al. The related cases challenge Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act and whether its enforcement violates constitutional protections.
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis legal proceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examines the constitutionality of Michigan's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The court deliberates on whether SORA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, denies due process to out-of-state offenders, or constitutes an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
All rise.
The judges of the United States Court of Appeals.
Hear ye, hear ye.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is now in session.
All persons having business before the Senatable Court, draw near, give attention, and ye shall
be heard.
God save the United States and the Senatable Court.
Please be seated.
Good morning.
I trust that everyone can hear me and see me.
I'm handling this remotely, and I would appreciate the clerk calling the first case.
Case numbers 251413 and 251414, John Doe A. et al. versus Gretchen Whitmer et al., or
arguments not to exceed 15 minutes per side.
Mr. Jamieson, you may proceed.
Good morning, and may it please the Court, Assistant Attorney General Eric Jamieson on
behalf of Governor Whitmer and Colonel Grady, I reserve two minutes of my time for rebuttal.
While there are seven issues on appeal, my comments will focus on the two most pressing.
First, whether the SORA is an ex post facto violation when it is virtually identical to
the federal SORNA, which this court has upheld as constitutional, and when SORA removed the
provisions that this court took issue with in Doe's v. Snyder in his 2016 opinion.
And second, whether it's a due process violation to require sex offenders who are convicted
in other jurisdictions to register in Michigan as sex offenders when they already have an
opportunity for judicial review.
Before I address the legal arguments, I briefly want to set the stage.
Nearly 17,000 victims of the sex offenders on the Michigan registry were children under
the age of 13.
Nearly 15,000 victims of the registrants on the Michigan registry were children between
the ages of 13 and 17.
Studies show that nearly 80% of victims do not report their assaults to police, and the
ones that are reported to police, only about 6% lead to a conviction.
This illustrates the wild underreporting of sexual assaults to the police and explains
why criminal history data is an inaccurate way to gauge the frequency of sexual offending.
Let me ask you, what impact, if any, does Doe 1 have on the ex post facto analysis?
So in Doe's 1, the court found the old SORA to be unconstitutional.
In this court in 2024, in Doe v. Lee, explained that the provisions that it took issue with
were the exclusionary zones, which are no longer present in the new law, and the immediate
reporting of minor changes to information.
But it seems like Doe's 1 analysis, I agree, it struck down those parts, the 2006-2011
amendments, but it seems like its analysis addressed other parts of SORA that remain
in SORA today, even after the 2021 amendments, is that right?
It did address the law as a whole, and the, turning again to the SORNA, the SORNA is nearly
identical to the Michigan SORA.
It's identical in all material respects.
The personal information that's required to be reported is the same.
The frequency of reporting is the same.
The registration terms are the same.
The requirement to report changes to information in person is the same.
So what are the differences?
The differences between the two laws are minor.
SORA requires the reporting of aliases, or I'm sorry, SORA requires the reporting of
nicknames and SORNA requires the reporting of aliases.
SORA requires a payment of a $50 fee, SORNA requires no annual fee.
SORA requires the maintaining a driver's license, SORNA does not.
SORA requires the inclusion of the original charge if convicted of a lesser offense, but
that's only in the law enforcement registry, that's not in the public registry.
And SORA requires the criminal history of sex offenders.
SORA allows some offenders, tier one offenders and tier three offenders who committed their
offenses as juveniles to petition a court for removal from the registry, which is in
line with the Michigan Constitution, which requires notice to victims.
SORNA allows for the same registrants to be removed from the federal registry if they
meet specified criteria after 10 years for tier one registrants and after 25 years for
tier three registrants who committed their offenses as juveniles.
So part of SORA is that tier two and tier three, which are the huge percentage of people
that are affected, cannot get themselves removed early, correct?
Is that part of SORNA as well?
That's correct, your honor.
It is part of SORNA?
Correct.
The law is identical in that respect.
Okay, and when you're saying that we have upheld SORNA, are you SORNA, are you referring
to the Willman case?
Correct, your honor.
So did that case address the nuances of SORNA, or was it more generally a holding vis-a-vis
whether SORNA was an impermissible ex post facto law?
Willman addressed the question of SORNA.
It didn't go through the minor distinctions between Michigan law and SORNA that wasn't
before the court and in looking at what was before the court in terms of the SORNA registrations,
they are the same as the SORNA registrations in Michigan and the court in Willman relied
on Feltz from this district, which Feltz committed his offense in 1993, he spent 15 years in
prison and then was violated for failing to report under SORNA.
Can I ask you something?
So there are two things I guess I'm curious about differences, not in the laws themselves.
One is the Michigan Supreme Court has weighed in on SORNA and has suggested or held that
it's a punishment.
What do we do with that, number one?
And number two, what about the differences in the record in Willman versus the record
here?
Does that matter, the evidence that's actually in the record?
Sure, Your Honor.
So to address your first question, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that the Michigan SORNA
is punishment in different contexts than what's before the court today.
They were addressing it in a cruel or unusual punishment context and the Michigan Court
of Appeals and published opinions have held that the Michigan SORNA, the new Michigan
SORNA is not an ex post facto violation.
So that is binding law.
And then with respect to your second question in terms of the differences between the record,
the record in this case is voluminous.
The briefing alone spans hundreds and hundreds of pages, there's thousands of pages of the
record.
But I submit most of the record evidence is sort of beside the point.
We're not arguing about whether you can use criminal justice data to show the reconviction
rate or the re-offense rate.
And in Willman, it was sort of a straightforward analysis, but any of the conclusions in Willman
can still be applied to this case because there's no question, like one of the issues
is it's retroactive.
And there's no question that the Michigan SORNA is retroactive, federal SORNA is retroactive.
And if it applies to someone for life, someone's difficulty in reporting when they're 80 or
90 years old would be the same, and you don't need to develop a record on it.
It's evident on its face.
And the only way this court can find that SORNA violates the ex post facto clause is
if SORNA does.
And SORNA looked at, or sorry, Willman relied on US v. WAS, which was a challenge to the
punishment for the underlying offense.
And the court reviewed the Mendoza factors and concluded that SORNA was non-punitive
in purpose and effect, that it was not an ex post facto violation.
The court also relied on US v. YOUNG, which challenged the SORNA registration requirements
as increasing punishment for the underlying offense, and again found that SORNA was not
an ex post facto violation.
So it sounds like you are really tying your argument to the Willman case.
Correct, Your Honor.
That if SORNA is constitutional per Willman, that SORA is not materially different in any
way.
Correct.
Would you like to address, you have four minutes left I see, would you like to address the
question about the non-Michigan convictions?
Yes, thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, registrants with non-Michigan convictions are not entitled to another hearing.
The due process is flexible.
When they committed their offense, they were convicted as a sex offender.
They were on notice.
If they moved to another jurisdiction, they would probably still be considered a sex offender
in that jurisdiction.
And under Michigan law, under the Michigan Constitution, Article 6, Section 20.
Do you agree that somebody who moves in from out of state has an interest in not being
misclassified?
So I should be in two, you put me in three.
Do I have a liberty interest in that?
Perhaps Your Honor.
I mean is there a consequence to being in, I mean there's a consequence to being in one
or two or three, right?
Otherwise you wouldn't have them.
Yes, there are distinctions.
So if there's an erroneous determination, I'm not, again, I'm not saying that I get
a pre-deprivation hearing or whatever.
I'm just saying don't I have some interest in not being misclassified?
Yes, registrants would have an interest in not being misclassified and they have the
opportunity to challenge MSP's determination about their registration obligations, which
is guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution and reflected in the statute in MCL 600-631,
which is...
How exactly can they challenge?
They can file an appeal of MSP's decision.
In the Michigan courts?
In the Michigan courts, correct, Your Honor.
So does that go to the trial court or where, how exactly would that process work?
I believe it would go to the circuit court, Your Honor.
And as cited in the briefing, there's the N. Ray Harder case, which is an out of state
offender, or I'm sorry, he was convicted in Iowa, he came to Michigan, he filed a petition
in the circuit court, which the circuit court denied his petition and went to the Court
of Appeals and the Court of Appeals upheld his registration obligations in Michigan.
And as noted, many of the lead plaintiffs in the case, they've been able to go to court
and seek relief.
So these registrants who move from out of state, they're able to go to the courts and
get direction and challenge MSP's determinations about the registration obligations.
But that's all after the fact.
Generally, doesn't procedural due process require notice in the hearing before a deprivation?
Due process is flexible, and in this case, if someone is in Ohio, they were convicted
in Ohio and they want to move to Michigan, the laws on the books are able to look and
determine if they want to make that move to Michigan.
But it's not clear at all what crimes in Ohio or what crimes in Iowa will constitute in
the MSP's judgment a tier 1 versus tier 2 versus no tier versus tier 3 kind of situation.
There's not an FAQ, Your Honor, but the Michigan statute, there's two independent provisions
which would require registration in Michigan.
One is if it's substantially similar in another state or if they have a conviction from another
state.
So a registrant who sexually assaults someone in Ohio is on notice if they move to any other
jurisdiction that other jurisdictions have sex offender laws.
So they were convicted in another jurisdiction in front of a jury or they took a plea.
They knew that they were getting convicted as a sex offense, and then they decide to
move to Michigan.
So it shouldn't be a surprise then that they have to require in Michigan, they have the
opportunity for judicial review, and Michigan is not an outlier.
States across the country have similar provisions.
And for the reasons discussed, the defendants ask that this court reverse the district court
with respect to the ex facto claim and the due process claim.
Thank you.
Any further questions?
Thank you.
You may proceed.
Good morning.
Mary Mockerman for the plaintiffs.
This case is not about whether sexual crimes cause grave harm and can be severely punished.
It isn't about whether Michigan can have a registry.
It is about whether Michigan can have this registry.
Can Michigan subject people, in many cases retroactively, to sweeping counterproductive
restrictions on every facet of their lives for decades after they cease to present any
more risk than non-registrants, all without any individual assessment or possibility of
removal ever?
It cannot.
In light of the conversation so far, let me focus on the ex post facto claims and then
move to the non-Michigan claim and finally address any other questions the court may
have.
Can I ask you this?
Do you think SORNA violates the ex post facto clause?
So this case is not about SORNA.
This case is about applying Michigan's, applying the Mendoza-Martinez test to Michigan's registry.
And so I'd like to talk about Willman and how Willman isn't helpful, much less ...
Put Willman aside.
Okay.
Do you think SORNA violates the ex post facto clause?
I think that it would depend on the circumstances, right?
This court is held in Willman.
There's actually some significant differences between SORNA and SORNA.
I'd like to get to those.
But SORNA itself, we're not saying that there can't be, the federal government can't require
registration where there's federal jurisdiction.
If ...
But SORNA, as it is today, as it's on the books today, do you think it violates the
ex post facto clause?
I think it would depend on how the claim is brought.
Because if you had, for example, a registrant who was an individual who was prosecuted for
violating the vehicle three-day reporting requirements, those provisions were added
after many of the SORNA cases were decided.
And so that would be different than a basic registration provision.
I also think it depends on the facts.
I want to emphasize that those one here, this court has set the framework.
The framework is applying Mendoza-Martinez to the facts in the record.
And other courts of appeals are looking at the same thing.
What are the significant differences between SORA and SORNA?
So I would point the court to our statement of response to plaintiffs, excuse me, to defendants
facts paragraph 35, which goes through those in detail.
And it talks about all of those differences.
There are both significant substantive and structural differences between SORA and SORNA.
And I want to emphasize the structural ones.
Michigan's law creates a registry.
There's a way to go.
You go report to the police.
And then that information is put on the internet.
SORNA doesn't work like that.
SORNA, there is no federal registration system.
So what you have to do under SORNA depends on the state that you're in.
In some states, you may get a risk assessment.
In some states, you might be on for 10 years or 15 years.
What you have to do under SORNA depends on how the state implements or whether it implements SORNA.
So it looks very different in different states.
There's a big structural difference between the two statutes, which is part of the reason I'm hesitating to answer your earlier question, Judge Mathis,
because it really depends on what it looks like in a particular state.
There are significant differences.
So why isn't any challenge to SORNA necessarily a challenge to all of those states that are swept in under SORNA?
I'm not sure I'm understanding the question.
You're saying that SORNA depends on whatever the state is, right?
Whatever the state system is.
And if I bring a challenge to SORNA, why am I not necessarily challenging SORA, the SORA of the state?
Because everything in SORNA depends on how the state runs its own system.
So a holding that upholds SORNA necessarily upholds every other state.
No, I don't think so, because states vary tremendously in what they do.
Some of them have risk assessments, some of them have exclusion zones.
There's a whole variety of different things that states do.
And so there are significant differences in any state.
In many states, I will note, most states have actually not substantially implemented SORNA.
The majority, 32, have not.
And even those states that substantially implement SORNA, many of them have differed on retroactivity.
The retroactive-
Wilman involves Michigan.
The district court that was involved in the Wilman case was the Eastern District of Michigan.
So aren't we bound by Wilman, then, under your theory,
if the SORNA answer depends on the SORA of the state?
No, not your honor.
Wilman is not helpful, much less controlling.
First of all, Wilman does not apply at all to the second count,
which is the retroactive extension of registration terms, because it simply does not address that.
Second, Wilman does not change the test.
The test is Mendoza-Martinez applied to the facts in the record.
And to judge Nalbanyan's earlier question, I'd point you to Caroline Products,
which says when you, where the court said,
if a law's constitutionality is premised on a certain set of facts, and you can disprove those facts,
you can challenge that law, and that's what we've done here.
So that's the, Wilman doesn't change the test.
And then the third point is that when you apply the test, which is Mendoza-Martinez on these facts,
of course, courts can look to other similar laws and
consider whether there's a helpful analysis or guidance there.
The most helpful analysis is on other laws that look at Michigan statute.
So that would be those one, Betz, Lyman, and
the Michigan Supreme Court's recent decision in Cardoz.
Those are helpful.
Wilman, by contrast, is not at all helpful, because it doesn't go through a Mendoza-Martinez analysis.
It simply relies on Feltz, which is about retroactivity, not about whether or not SORNA is punishment.
And the government-
So DOE's one, obviously, was the prior SORA in Michigan.
Did the amendment in 21 cure the problem that the DOE's one court,
our court, found in the earlier version?
Absolutely not.
If you think about SORA as being 100, if you think about punishment as 100 points,
SORA 2011 was maybe 1,000 points.
It would, you know, the legislature went in, it did remove the exclusion zones.
The 2011 amendments are, however, almost entirely intact.
So it sort of brought it back down a little bit, but we are still way above 100 points.
And so the question is, we're not saying that Michigan cannot have a registry, but Michigan, this registry is excessive.
This registry is excessive because it consigns people, 92% of people are on for life or for decades.
And there's, they, excuse me, 95% of people are on, 92% of people are on for 25 years or life.
Even though the registry data shows that recidivism drops dramatically over time.
And as the district court found, most registrants pose the same risk as non-registrants after ten years.
And after 20 years, that's true, even for those initially highest risk.
It's excessive because it denies the vast majority of people any opportunity for
removal ever, even when they're old, infirm, or have lived successfully in the community for decades.
It's excessive because it moved the finish line and retroactively extended the registration terms to-
Can I ask you a question about count two?
You, my understanding is that SORNA has a similar provision, and
your argument is it just wasn't addressed in Willman, or SORNA does not have that kind of provision.
I thought it did.
The retroactive extension where people have pled, SORNA does not,
I mean, SORNA was imposed once retroactively.
What we have here in Michigan is where people make a plea decision, and then they get extended.
And we know from the record, if you look at the Yantis Declaration, the Chartier Declaration,
SORNA is so punitive that it is often more important than incarceration in people's plea decision making.
And what the state has done in count two is move the finish line.
And so, while SORNA is punishment as a whole, but it's even more punitive,
even more excessive when you apply the Mendoza-Martinez factors to taking someone who's
in reliance on a plea decision, said, okay, I'll take it, 25 years.
And then they get retroactively extended to life.
That goes to the core purposes of the ex post facto clause,
which are to prevent the government from retroactively changing the rules of the game.
So, let me ask you a variation on Judge, I'm going to wade into troubled waters here,
but let me ask you a variation of Judge Mathis' question from earlier.
If we held in your favor and agreed with the district court that SORNA was punishment
under the Mendoza factors, okay, then would SORNA also fall
within those factors and be punishment necessarily?
No, not necessarily.
I think there are significant differences, and I point you again to paragraph 35
in our response to defendant's facts that sets-
Can you give me a couple other ones besides the,
whatever the structural one that you talked about?
The structural- What kind of tangible, what are you going to hang your hat on?
The structural one is important, the way in which the regulations, so the early cases have
to do with sort of basic reporting requirements, and under SORNA, now we're dealing
with additional things that were added by regulation,
all these additional reporting requirements, they're not in SORNA itself.
The petitioning process for tier one is different.
There are a whole series of differences between,
but the biggest one really is the structural difference
between the way the statutes are constructed.
And I want to emphasize that what- Why does that make it more like punishment
in Michigan and not under SORNA?
The structural differences.
Yes, the one thing you're pointing to, why does that make it more like punishment
in Michigan and not under federal law?
So, again, we're not challenging SORNA.
We're not saying that there can't be a federal registry.
I understand that.
I just want to know, what is it about the structural differences
that makes the one punishment under the Mendoza factors and the other one not?
I mean, I would point the court to 28 CFR 72.7 sub G, which goes into explains
and gives examples of how this works in practice.
And I think also just to sort of confront this question, what the court has
to do is look at the record in this case.
That is what Smith requires.
That is what Doe's 1 requires.
We don't think- We think that these differences are significant and that Wilman
and SORNA- Oh, that SORNA and SORNA can co-exist.
Could somebody in the future bring a claim?
I don't know.
I don't know how that would turn out.
I have no idea because there's differences in federal severability law.
There's differences in the history of the particular statutes.
But this court's task is to look at Michigan's law on this record.
Could you address the question about application to non-Michigan convictions
of people who move into Michigan?
Certainly.
The district court correctly held that requiring out-of-staters to register
without an independent decision maker and without any due process whatsoever violates due
process and it also found that treating Michiganders worse
than non-Michiganders violates equal protection.
Only the due process issue is before you
because they haven't appealed the other question, the equal protection question.
Defendants say that a post that you can go to court.
They have not pointed to a single example of this actually happening.
Harder is not a case like that.
I mean, harder you can go to court but you can't file an APA claim,
which is what they're saying.
It's complete speculation.
APA claims, to our knowledge, have never happened.
The MSP's own legal advisor testified that you can't use the APA.
Shepard's, which is a Seventh Circuit case, rejects the APA as a remedy.
So no one, to your knowledge, no one who has an out-of-state conviction has actually filed a
case in the Michigan Circuit Court, which is where your opponent said they should go?
They, there have, there has been at least one case
where someone brought an affirmative piece of litigation.
But that is not, that was not an appeal from the APA.
It's complete speculation that you can use the APA.
And as the Seventh Circuit said in Shepard's and as the Supreme Court said
in Logan Zimmerman Brush, post, a lawsuit is not a substitute
for actual due process, a post-decision lawsuit.
I just want to close.
I have a question about this because I'm confused.
Why, I, the district court really didn't seem to analyze what the liberty interest was.
And I'm not, I'm not understanding how you can figure out what processes do
until you figure out what the actual deprivation is.
And I understand part of that because if I'm a district court and I've already found
that this is punishment, retroactive punishment under the Expos Facto Clause,
I mean, at that point there's going to be some process that's due, right?
Because you're saying this is basically like criminal punishment.
But, I mean, still, technically, don't you have to figure
out what the exact liberty interest is?
And then figure out whether you get pre-deprivation, post-deprivation,
a judicial hearing, an ALJ.
I mean, all of that depends on that first finding, doesn't it?
So, the defendants have conceded that there's a liberty interest here.
And this court has decided that in Hart, the Seventh Circuit decided that,
addressed that same issue in Shepard's.
Or to give you an example.
But not everybody has the same liberty interest, right?
Some of these, some people are on the registry.
Some of these tier one people are not on this public registry anymore, right?
They don't have the same interest that somebody that's actually
on the registry does, right?
And the tiers aren't necessarily designated on the registry.
I mean, there's a lot of, there are a lot of things going
into who's got what interest, what it is.
And what, for example, the consequence of like a misclassification would be.
Don't we need to, doesn't all that need to be fleshed out?
Somebody has to figure out what the interest is, if any.
And then you deal with what processes do.
I mean, I think everyone, I think everyone has an interest in making,
in not being wrongfully classified.
So you can have people who shouldn't be on the registry at all,
if they're misclassified.
People who will be on for life, public versus 15 years non-public.
But what I think you're getting at is sort of what is the,
what is the amount of process that is due?
I mean, everybody has a liberty interest.
It might be stronger for some than others.
So the question is, what is the process that is due?
And on that point, Your Honor, what I would,
and I think this is a general point on remedy.
If the court agrees with us on liability, we would encourage the court
to consider holding judgment and sending us to mediation on remedy questions.
There are complicated remedy questions here.
We worked very productively
with this court's excellent mediation office last year.
And in those one, after this court made its decision on remand,
the parties stipulated to a judgment that allowed, you know, what we,
what the parties agreed could be retroactively applied
to those plaintiffs' provisions of SOAR.
We're not saying Michigan can't have a registry.
We're not saying Michigan can't register people from out of state.
But there has to, it cannot be excessive on the ex post facto clause.
There has to be due process and equal treatment
on the non-Michigan provision.
And so we would encourage the court to consider doing that as a way
to address the remedy issues if you have concerns as it sounds
like you do about remedy here.
Thank you.
I think we've taken you outside of your time.
Any further questions from any judge?
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
There is no meaningful difference between SORNA and SORA.
They rise and fall together.
And I would like to point out one of the issues with the SORA
or that the court took issue with in DOE's one and I think explained
in Lee was the immediate in-person reporting requirement.
And I'll note that since 1999, sex offenders had to report in person
for changes to their residence, their employment, or their schooling.
So that's been in effect since 1999.
That is not new with the 2011 amendments.
SORNA is retroactive.
It impacted pleas just like the SORA does.
As I already mentioned, Feltz, he was, he committed his crimes in 1993
and he was convicted in 1994.
And I'll.
Can you address whether this procedure,
whether this post-depredation process is some, is a realistic thing
that people can take advantage of?
It is a realistic thing, Your Honor.
Under the statute, this catch-all provision 600-631,
there are three different avenues for individuals
to seek judicial review of agency's decisions.
One is under the APA, and I agree with plaintiffs, this is not an APA case.
Two is as provided under law, and three is sort of this catch-all.
If there is no other provision, they have an opportunity to go to court.
And we don't have a record on how many people have used this
or if any people have used this, but that doesn't change the fact
that it's available to them.
And we've litigated a long time a different statute
and after litigating it for 30 years,
there's a new argument that came, sort of came to light.
It doesn't mean that that argument couldn't have been made a long time ago,
but it's a new argument brought forth.
There is a provision that folks can bail themselves under Michigan law.
Unless there are any other questions.
But do you agree that there's a liberty interest?
There is potentially liberty interest if individuals are correctly
or incorrectly identified as sex offenders.
In Hart, that he had a, or the court.
But what about two versus three?
What if you put me in three, but I should be in tier two?
Do I have a liberty interest there?
I mean, Hart was sex offender, not sex offender, right?
What about two versus three or one versus two?
That there could, I don't think we briefed this issue,
so I, you know, I'm hesitant to shoot from the hip,
but I'll just circle back to the idea that I think is uncontested,
that there are these provisions grounded in the Michigan Constitution.
But you think that post-deprivation process takes care
of whatever the liberty interest is?
Correct.
Despite the nuances and all of this stuff?
Yes.
Because they were given, they were convicted in another jurisdiction,
they were sex offenders in another jurisdiction,
they moved to Michigan, they're sex offenders in Michigan.
Unless the court has other questions, I'll rely on my briefs.
Thank you.
Thank you both for your arguments, and the case will be submitted.
And the clerk may call the next case.
Case number 251415, John Doe's et al.
versus Michigan State Police et al.
For arguments not to exceed 15 minutes per side, Mr. Matuca,
you may proceed for the appellant.
Good morning, your honors.
Paul Matuca on behalf of the plaintiffs.
This case presents a single issue.
Whether individuals are seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when they submit to the threat of criminal prosecution
and present themselves to law enforcement to answer questions.
To be clear, this case does not, at this point,
ask whether their constitutional rights are violated,
but rather whether they are seized.
A question down the line would be whether that seizure is reasonable.
The district court below relied exclusively on this court's decision
in MS Wilman to find that plaintiffs are not seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
However, as explained in our brief, the Wilman decision
did not actually apply, does not apply to the facts present in this situation.
A review of the briefing in the Wilman case, as done in our brief in this matter,
demonstrates that the arguments being made were a continuous seizure argument.
And this is, you know, clear from the district court in Wilman
saying there is no continuous seizure.
The reliance of the plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit on Albright v. Oliver
and the dissenting or dissenting and concurring opinions there.
And so the question presented in Wilman,
as it relates to the Fourth Amendment, is much different.
And that's also evident from the Wilman decision itself.
When you look at the cases that were cited, this court relied on...
The one thing, so I agree with some of what you're saying, but I do...
So Wilman cites 34 U.S.C. 20913C,
which is an in-person provision.
And that would suggest to me that they are looking at, you know,
you showing up in person as at least part of the seizure claim.
Am I wrong about that?
Your Honour, I would agree with that.
But I think the issue is that is just part of it, right?
And I think that the Wilman court is looking at this over time.
And that's, you know, when we look at the Houtzenroeder case,
when we're talking about in custody for purposes of habeas,
that's a jurisdictional question to determine whether someone
is subject to such severe constraints on their liberty,
obviously people who are no longer incarcerated,
that the court should deem them in custody for purposes of habeas.
And the factors there, if you look at them in Houtzenroeder,
this court laid them out,
there's no overlap between the factors being analyzed in Houtzenroeder
and the very clear analysis required for the Fourth Amendment.
The first is whether through force or physical means someone is seized.
And the second is whether they should submit to a show of authority.
Here, we're not arguing that they're detained or they're seized
by application of physical force,
but rather that there is a show of authority
in the threat of criminal prosecution,
which requires them to appear before a court.
So you're saying there's a seizure every time I show up in person,
it's a different seizure?
Yes, Your Honor.
But I would also say that I would argue that it's just appearing
wouldn't constitute the seizure because that's not submission.
I would say also answering the questions.
Because for this seizure to be complete, one has to answer the questions.
So would the requirement that someone appear in court for a contempt hearing be a seizure, too?
Your Honor, I would say no.
And so there's a couple of categories of circumstances
where the government can compel someone's appearance in person.
I would, court is one of them.
But jury trials, so jury duty, you have to appear at court.
You can be punished if you're not, but that appears in the Constitution.
The draft, another instance where the state can compel you to appear and then do more,
the Congress has the ability to raise armies.
And when we're talking about witnesses in terms of court appearances,
that has to be part of the inherent powers of the judiciary.
Because under the Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause,
how is an individual going to get a fair trial and be able to confront their accusers?
That would include a grand jury subpoena, too?
Yes, Your Honor.
Which the Supreme Court has said is not a seizure.
And so you're saying, I still am not sure what the difference is then.
I mean, yes, a grand jury subpoena is necessary for the functioning of the judiciary
or the executive branch prosecution.
This process is something Michigan deems necessary for
the implementation of its sex offender registry.
Yes, but the sex offender registry is not a constitutional requirement.
And so when we're talking about the relationship between the Fourth Amendment
and seizure analysis, and things like appearing for jury duty,
serving as a witness pursuant to a subpoena, or being drafted,
those are all directly tied to constitutional requirements.
Whereas this is a civil regulatory scheme, as defendants have argued.
And that brings it into a different category, where we're not talking about
the just general functioning of the Constitution and maintaining that order.
But it is the state-
Why should that make a difference, though, for
purposes of whether this is a seizure?
Your Honor, I would argue that it makes a difference because the Constitution
already understands that people are going to appear for jury duty.
And I would have to imagine at the time of the framing,
they also understood people would be compelled as witnesses
under the due process and the confrontation clauses.
And so the structure of the Constitution kind of separates those
from the Fourth Amendment issues, which would address other things.
And in this case, and it could also be said, if this court were to say,
hey, those are seizures as well, they would immediately be found constitutional
because they would be a special needs exception that would apply.
And I think it's important to look to Terry v.
Ohio, where the Supreme Court warned, we're not going to try and
make these distinctions of stop and frisk or
a detention for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
The question is, is there a seizure under the Fourth Amendment?
And then we go to the reasonableness of that.
But we're not going to split hairs when the government accosts someone and
compels them to be present or stand there and answer questions.
And so for those reasons, the plaintiffs here are seized.
Something I'd like to point out is that the defendants, in their brief, they say,
hey, decades of precedent have upheld SORNA and
no Fourth Amendment violations have been found.
Yet, I haven't seen a single case addressing this specific issue on
the Fourth Amendment, and I don't think defendants cited any.
And so this, I believe, is a question of first impression
that hasn't been answered by the courts.
And if this court has no further questions,
I'd rely on the briefing and my rebuttal.
Thank you.
Morning, your honors.
May it please the court.
Assistant Attorney General Eric Jameson on behalf of the defendants.
My comments will be brief.
This court should affirm the district court's opinion for two reasons.
First, in-person reporting is not a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, and Willman is on point.
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures.
And as plaintiff's counsel pointed out, there is no precedent anywhere that says
that sex offender registry reporting is a seizure or
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Reporting is not a seizure.
Are there other cases that go your way that you would want to point us to?
Or no cases?
As far as I'm aware, there are no cases directly on point.
In either direction, but Willman says that
the law requires him to show up to update his information.
And it was not a seizure because it didn't prohibit his ability to exercise
his liberty to go different places, and it doesn't require him to obtain permission
first, which is sort of the traditional analysis for whether someone is seized.
This is a civil regulatory scheme, not unlike other civil regulatory schemes
that the state has, and requiring someone to show up to renew their driver's license or
do other-
But I mean, your friend on the other side is right, isn't he?
That in Willman, it really was about,
it doesn't seem like the argument they were making was every time I show up, I'm seized.
It's that the continuous operation of the system was a seizure, and
that seems to be a slightly different claim than the one that he's making now.
And the cases that are cited are like travel type cases.
They're not really about when an individual is,
like a tourist type analysis, or a guardi or whatever it is.
Like you're seized at this moment in time.
I disagree, your honor.
I think it's a distinction without a difference between whether it's
a continuous seizure or when they specifically show up.
SORNA and SORA, they both require individuals to show up to register.
Willman discussed sort of the framework of that.
They're required to show up and report information.
They're not prohibited from exercising their liberties to go where they want.
We depose the lead plaintiffs in this case.
And when we asked them how long it took them to register on an annual basis,
plus update any changes,
it was their answers were anywhere between one hour and five hours per year.
There's 87,000 or 8,760 hours per year.
So we're talking about a very small amount of time that registrants have to report
to update their changes, the Michigan law.
Yeah, but a stop and frisk can take ten minutes.
It still might violate the Fourth Amendment.
I'm not sure I understand that argument.
I mean, the question is, if I am compelled to show up and
I might get arrested if I don't show up, am I seized?
And I mean, I don't see a big difference between that and
some of these compelled cases like jury service or grand jury subpoena or whatever it is.
But that, to me, is a different question than does this entire system kind of seize me?
Which is what it seemed like when you look at Willman and
when you look at the district court opinion.
And you gotta do some digging in the record to see what exactly the claim was.
I mean, it wasn't a major claim, but that's what it seems like.
I'm just trying to figure out, and that doesn't mean that the holding in Willman isn't broad enough to cover this case.
But it doesn't really seem like it was the issue in this case, that's what I'm saying.
Yeah, I view it differently, Your Honor, and I think what is the overall scheme of SORNA or
SORA, it requires people to show up to register, that's the core of the law.
So the court found that it is not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
So it includes all of these component parts, showing up is part of that scheme.
And if the scheme doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment, okay.
Yep, and unless the court has any other questions, I'll rest on my briefs.
Thank you.
Thank you, Your Honors.
I would just point out that my brother counsel on the other side
referenced other regulatory schemes in Michigan, and I think it's important to address this.
The state can absolutely require you to show up if you want a new driver's license.
The state can require you to show up if you want unemployment or another benefit.
And the reason for that is, you are trying to get something from the state.
If you want a benefit from the state, the state can impose conditions on that.
With SORA, the condition is existence, or the benefit is existence, free existence.
Whereas the penalty is imprisonment.
In driver's license, you don't show up to get your driver's license, it expires.
You have decided to forego that benefit.
And I understand that the Supreme Court has held that jury duty is not a,
or grand jury duty, it's not a seizure.
I don't think that is controlling here, because this is a completely separate matter.
And it doesn't necessarily entail the jurisdiction of the courts or
the constitution in terms of application of this statute.
And for these reasons, Willman is not controlling on this case, did not answer these questions.
And the core of this case is the ability of the state to compel people to appear.
And this can be weaponized, unfortunately.
And that's why it's a Fourth Amendment issue.
Because the state can create civil regulatory schemes that are facially neutral,
but target people, and threaten them with criminal prosecution if they don't appear.
And they can make that burden so onerous, for their counsel saying,
well, they only took an hour or five hours to complete their registration.
What if they were required to register every month?
If it's still not a seizure, that doesn't matter.
If they are required to register every single day, if it's not a seizure, that doesn't matter.
We're not talking about the reasonableness of this.
And so, for these reasons, this is a Fourth Amendment question.
And I respectfully request this court reverse the lower court's opinion.
Unless there are any further questions, thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you both.
