How Spain Finally Broke Down Argentina

0.00xg in 90 minutes in the world cup final for Argentina. Spain won 1-0 in the end and they have been crowned world champions. And in the 90 minutes and beyond only one team came to win in open play, and that team was Spain. But despite La Roja having 67% possession in normal time and 12 shots to nothing, they couldn't break through in the 90. So let's take a look at both sides tactics. For the most part, Argentina were looking to sit a little bit deeper, but there were occasions they looked to press higher up the pitch in their 4-4-2, with the Argentina pivots looking to push up from man to man to Spain's, to prevent them initially playing out. The risk of course was Olmo between the lines as the third man, and there were occasions where Spain were able to find him. But Argentina were willing to take risks when they were pressing, with their hyper mobile and hyper aggressive centre backs, who were expected to push up and move on to Olmo, to prevent him getting onto the ball easily, in effect acting as temporary third midfielders. The risk of course was this gap that they left in the back line, but neither Yamal nor Oyarzabal were willing to run into that space and exploit it. So Argentina were confidently able to commit a centre back in these pressing phases. But it was made more difficult when Oyarzabal was looking to drop deeper, as he could still look to create a 4-3, and it would be a lot riskier for Argentina to try and commit both of their centre backs high in the press. But when Argentina continued to press, more and more often, Rodri was looking to drop into the back line, to either force the 3 vs 2 overload here, or as we much more often saw, draw an Argentina midfielder like McAllister even higher up the pitch in the press. Particularly when Olmo was dropping deep, it would be a long way for a centre back to continue their press. So Argentina had to adapt their pressing shape, and it was up to Gonzalez to operate as the hybrid presser, as he was often tucked in more central and deeper than McAllister. So he could either tuck in onto Olmo, or press onto Porro. Great in theory, but all it did was heavily weaken the press, as now Gonzalez couldn't make up this ground. So Pedro Porro was consistently able to get onto the ball with time to get his head up and look to play up the pitch. So it wasn't long before Argentina gave up their press and retreated into their 4-4-2 mid block. And it's no secret at this point, that Messi will essentially do zero defensive work. And that was the case, and Laporte's role in the build up was vital, as whenever possible, he was tasked with driving up the pitch, down the left, right past Messi without much effort. Meaning two men could easily be taken out of the defence pretty easily. And this left hand side is where Spain could take advantage of Argentina, as at a minimum, it would be Ruiz coming across to try and create a wide triangle, alongside Baena and Cucurella. But defensively, Argentina combined discipline, alongside a strong understanding of where to shift to make themselves extremely difficult to pierce. Cucurella often looked for his underlapping runs, but De Paul was disciplined in tracking him. And there was a similar dynamic with Baena and Montiel, while the Argentina midfielders were also coming across to Ruiz to prevent that wide triangle creating any sort of overload. Alternatively, another approach we saw from Spain was when Cucurella was looking to remain deeper at times, as this would draw De Paul higher up the pitch. And rather than it just being a 1v1 out wide, Ruiz would come across to try and create the 2v1 overload. But again, Argentina were disciplined and knew their roles, and either a midfielder or a centre back would come across in these situations. Normally, a situation like this can be incredibly dangerous for the defensive side, as it opens up the switch to the far side for a potential 1v1, and a winger as dangerous as Yamal could be lethal in these situations. The reality however, is that Spain's temper was much too slow to exploit this, and rather than go for these direct switches, they would look to work it across the pitch, and with a team as disciplined as Argentina, they would be able to shift across well in time. So, Spain persisted down this left flank, looking for different solutions. Cucurella and Baena could both push high up, and this would create space here that Ruiz would look to drop into, and the Argentine midfielder would be reluctant to follow, as that would be leaving space centrally in the most dangerous zones on the pitch. So it created situations where Ruiz would potentially have the room to cross. But more often, Laporte's role as the free man on the ball was becoming more and more important. He would drive up the pitch, as Spain often tried to have 5 men wide, with Rodri also coming across, and the goal for Laporte was to get either Montiel or De Paul to commit to pressing him, which of course would free up another man higher up the pitch. And this was highly effective, as Laporte is good enough with the ball, meaning that the moment a defender committed and opened up space elsewhere, he could at least try to thread the ball through. But away from the left hand side, what was interesting is how ineffective Spain's central play was, as that's where on paper they had the natural advantage. But the reality is, Olmo, rather than consistently drifting to look for the spaces in the midfield, was glued high in the right hand half space, making himself much easier for the centre back to pick up. And the general strategy down the right was pretty similar for Spain, as now it was Paro, Yemal and Olmo forming the wide triangles, with these two rotating positions much more often, and we would see Spain use some of their pinning techniques Olmo from this position could keep the centre back occupied, whilst Yemal could stretch the centre back. So one-two passes around the defenders threatened to be effective if there was a third man runner. The reality is though, despite all this possession and trying so much in possession, Spain struggled to create clear-cut chances due to Argentina protecting the centre so well, and then shifting across effectively. But one of the reasons Spain had so much of the ball is what they did without it, as they were great in the press. So just before we examine that, the World Cup may be over, but the period between now and the new season is the perfect time to up your tactical knowledge. So if you want to do that for free, check out Football Fundamentals through the link in the description. Football Fundamentals is my 30-day program designed to teach you the very fundamentals of analysis from the ground up. Argentina took on a loft-sided shape when on the ball, essentially having no right winger and putting all the responsibility on the right back, as this allowed De Paul to move in central and be a central midfielder in possession. Spain, however, started with a 4-2-3-1, meaning this shape meant they were naturally man-to-man in the midfield. But they didn't want to be passive with their defensive shape, they wanted the ball back and quickly. And what's the difference between these two scenarios, where Spain's press worked, and this scenario where it didn't? It comes down to the relationship between Oyarzabal and Olmo in the press. When they were highly effective, Oyarzabal led the press and was able to direct the play from the goalkeeper in one direction or the other. And this would allow Olmo to fully commit to pressing the centre-back while keeping the pivot in his cover shadow. So now the Argentine centre-back was receiving under pressure and was much more likely to go long, leading to the turnover. But when it did not work, what we saw was this. Olmo committing to the press early, before Oyarzabal had directed the play. This in turn meant Olmo found himself pressing the centre-back or the goalkeeper, meaning the escape option outside of him was still open and the Argentine centre-back could then drive off the pitch. But Spain did an excellent job of, for the most part, using the first pressing approach. Spain are world champions, but was there anything else you noticed that wasn't mentioned? Drop it down in the comments below. I personally was surprised by just how passive Argentina were willing to be, even at 11 vs 11. This final did not match up to the epicness of Argentina's last final. If you want a reminder of what a legendary World Cup final looks like, take a look at this video, linked on screen now, after signing up for Football Fundamentals.