Ukraine đã tấn công hai cây cầu trọng yếu ở vùng lãnh thổ bị chiếm đóng, giáng thêm một đòn mạnh vào mạng lưới hậu cần quân sự của Nga. Các cuộc tấn công nhắm vào các cửa khẩu quan trọng được sử dụng để vận chuyển quân đội, đạn dược, nhiên liệu và vật tư dọc theo hành lang phía đông nối liền Donetsk, Mariupol và Crimea bị chiếm đóng. Trong video này, chúng ta sẽ xem xét các cuộc tấn công cầu đã làm gián đoạn các tuyến đường tiếp tế của Nga như thế nào, tại sao máy bay không người lái của Ukraine ngày càng hiệu quả hơn trong việc chống lại cơ sở hạ tầng trọng yếu, và những cuộc tấn công này tiết lộ điều gì về chiến trường đang thay đổi vào năm 2026. Quan trọng nhất, chúng ta sẽ tìm hiểu điều này có ý nghĩa gì đối với hệ thống hậu cần phía nam của Nga, hành lang đường bộ đến Crimea và quỹ đạo rộng hơn của cuộc chiến. Các chủ đề được đề cập: Những cây cầu nào bị tấn công và tại sao chúng lại quan trọng; Các cuộc tấn công đã làm gián đoạn hậu cần quân sự của Nga như thế nào; Tại sao máy bay không người lái của Ukraine đang thay đổi chiến trường; Điều này có ý nghĩa gì đối với hành lang Donetsk-Mariupol-Crimea; Nga có thể cố gắng khôi phục hoặc bỏ qua các cửa khẩu như thế nào.
AI Generated·May contain errors
Video Summary
AI Generated
Ukraine is executing a coordinated campaign to isolate Russian forces in the south by systematically destroying critical bridges, logistics hubs, and fuel supplies. By severing supply chains and targeting repair efforts, Ukraine has crippled Russian mobility, created severe fuel shortages, and significantly reduced Russia's ability to capture new territory.
Ukraine's campaign to isolate Russian forces in the south has entered a new, aggressive phase.
After weeks of targeting rail lines and ammunition depots,
the focus has shifted to a more immediate threat,
the physical bridges that keep the occupation forces fed and armed.
The goal is clear, sever the connection and break the supply chain.
On the map, it looks like just one highway.
A single road stretching across occupied southern Ukraine,
connecting Russia to Mariupol and ultimately Crimea.
But on the battlefield, this corridor is one of the most valuable supply routes in the entire war.
Every day, fuel, ammunition, armored vehicles and reinforcements flow through this narrow corridor,
crossing a handful of bridges that kept Russia's southern front alive.
And on the night of the 1st of July 2026, one of those bridges simply stopped existing.
The Ukrainian defense forces destroyed a key road bridge on the Russian-controlled Donetsk to
Mariupol highway, cutting a logistics route that Russian forces depended on to move personnel,
equipment, supplies and ammunition.
In a single strike, one of the most important supply arteries in southern Ukraine was broken.
Within hours, satellite imagery and drone footage exposed the scale of the destruction.
A roughly 90-meter, four-lane highway bridge had collapsed in both directions,
wiping out one of the main links between Donetsk and Mariupol.
A critical route that had supported Russia's occupation for years had disappeared overnight.
But this was not an isolated attack.
Just days earlier, a separate highway bridge near the town of Novazovsk,
further along the same southern coast, had also partially collapsed after a Ukrainian attack.
Two major crossings, severed within days of each other,
on the one corridor Russia cannot afford to lose.
And the strangest part of this entire story is not even the bridges themselves.
It is who ended up confirming the damage to the rest of the world.
The damage was not first confirmed by Ukraine, but by Russia's own occupation authorities.
Speaking to Russian state media, Volnovokha district head Konstantin Zinchenko
acknowledged that the bridge on the Donetsk-Mariupol route had collapsed
and that traffic would have to be diverted.
So how did the destruction of a bridge near a village few people outside Ukraine
have ever heard of send shockwaves across Russia's southern front?
The answer begins with the strike itself.
The crossing sat on the H-20, R-280 highway,
near a small village called Kremenivka in the Volnovokha district of occupied Donetsk region,
spanning a narrow river called the Maly Kalchik,
which some Russian sources refer to as the Kalka.
The bridge had already sustained partial damage from an earlier strike,
but it was still standing and still carrying traffic
when Ukrainian forces returned to finish the job.
That return strike is what changed everything.
The images that surfaced within hours told the real story better than any statement could.
The strike caused several spans on both carriageways of the bridge to collapse,
with the supporting piers also sustaining damage.
This was not the kind of hit that Russian engineers could patch
with steel plates and a weekend crew.
Structurally and functionally, the bridge was finished.
Ukrainian analyst Petro Andriushenko, who closely monitors infrastructure in occupied areas,
reported on social media that the bridge used by Russian occupation forces
had been completely destroyed.
To understand why one collapsed bridge could matter this much,
you need to understand exactly what it was carrying.
This highway is the primary route Russian forces use to move personnel,
ammunition, weapons, and fuel between Donetsk and Mariupol,
two of the most important cities Russia has occupied since the war began.
Destroying that crossing does not simply remove a road,
it blocks one of the most efficient routes Russia relies on
to sustain its military presence in the area.
Instead of using the direct highway crossing,
convoys now have to pass through the village of Kremenivka,
adding 15 to 20 kilometers to every trip.
That may not sound like much, but on an active battlefield,
those extra kilometers come at a cost.
Every additional mile on the road means more time,
more fuel, and more opportunities for Ukrainian reconnaissance drones
to detect and track Russian convoys.
As long as the bridge remains out of service,
every supply run becomes slower, more expensive, and significantly more vulnerable.
The disruption was serious enough that local occupation authorities
acknowledged the damage and began directing traffic onto detour routes.
While Kremenivka was still making headlines,
a very different picture was already forming farther along the same coastline,
and it started with a nickname Ukrainian drone units
had given to one particular stretch of road weeks before either bridge went down.
Pilots operating along the M-14 and R-280 highway
had started calling it the Highway of Death,
and they earned that name the hard way,
running near constant drone patrols over the route
and picking off trucks, fuel tankers, and ammunition convoys almost daily.
The damage from those patrols was already staggering before a single bridge fell.
Ukrainian commander Robert Magyar-Bravdy
reported that military cargo traffic along the R-280
dropped by roughly 71% in just a two-week stretch in June,
which means Russia was already losing most of its ability to move supplies along this road,
using trucks that somehow still made it through.
Once you understand that number, the bridge strikes stop looking like a new idea
and start looking like the obvious next move.
If the trucks on the road are already being hunted,
the smartest target left standing is the road itself.
That is exactly the highway carrying the bridge at Novoazovsk,
and it is why Ukraine went back to finish what it had started there weeks earlier.
On the night of June 29th,
Ukrainian drones struck the bridge over the Husky-Yalanchik River
near Novoazovsk for a second time.
The attack caused a partial collapse and left the crossing unusable for normal traffic.
The occupation-appointed administrator of the town, Vassil Ovcharov,
later acknowledged that the bridge had been severely damaged
and said authorities still did not know whether it could be repaired
or would need to be completely dismantled.
What makes this strike sting even more
is what Russia had already invested in this exact crossing.
Back in 2024, Russian engineers rebuilt this bridge
specifically to carry a heavier volume of military cargo,
treating it as a long-term fix for a road they expected to rely on for years.
Two years of planning and construction gone in a single night
on a highway that was already bleeding trucks it could barely afford to lose.
And the damage did not stop at the bridge deck.
Ukrainian analyst Petro Andriushenko,
who tracks this stretch of occupied territory closely,
warned that if Ukraine also disables the remaining bypass roads around Novoazovsk,
the detour left for Russian convoys will add well over an hour and a half to a single journey.
On a highway already losing most of its truck traffic to drone strikes,
an extra 90 minutes per trip is not an inconvenience.
It is the difference between supplies arriving in time
and a frontline unit waiting for ammunition that never shows up.
So by the start of July,
Russia was staring at two separate crossings gone on the exact same corridor
layered on top of a highway that had already lost most of its truck traffic
to weeks of relentless drone hunting.
That alone would be a bad week for any army.
But the real story is not that Ukraine hit two bridges close together.
It is that this exact pattern, strike the road, strike the bridge,
then strike whatever shows up to fix either one,
was already playing out across the entire Crimean peninsula, and it had a name.
Between June 6th and June 13th alone, Ukrainian forces struck seven road bridges,
one railroad bridge, and two temporary crossings between occupied Crimea and the Kursan region.
That is 10 separate crossings hit in a single week,
which tells you this was never about knocking out one bridge for a headline.
It was a sustained, coordinated effort to isolate an entire peninsula,
one crossing at a time.
The clearest proof of exactly how deliberate this campaign had become
came from the commander of Ukraine's 1st Assault Regiment,
who explained the shift in tactics directly.
He said his unit was now transitioning to actively patrolling Russian logistics routes
from inside occupied Crimea itself,
specifically to intercept and block any attempt Russia made to restore a damaged crossing.
That is a serious change in posture.
Ukraine was no longer just striking targets and moving on.
It was staying in the area, watching and waiting for Russia to make the next move.
That patience paid off almost immediately at Shonhar,
the main road link into Crimea from mainland Ukraine.
After Ukrainian forces blocked the bridge there in early June,
Russian engineers responded the way they always had,
floating a pontoon crossing into place within five days to keep traffic moving.
Satellite imagery confirmed that the pontoon was fully operational and back in service,
and Ukrainian units were watching the exact same footage just as closely.
Inside 24 hours of that pontoon becoming operational,
it was gone, destroyed along with a nearby railway bridge,
a border checkpoint, and a convoy of trucks caught crossing at the same time.
Russia had barely absorbed that loss when the same pattern struck an even bigger target,
the North Crimean Canal itself,
a waterway that stretches more than 400 kilometers across the peninsula
and carries over 10 railway bridges and roughly 100 road crossings along its length.
Ukrainian forces had already been probing this exact stretch for days,
striking railway bridges near Rozdolna and Vladislavivka on June 18th and 19th,
quietly testing defenses before the real blow landed.
That blow came on the night of June 22nd,
when Ukraine's special operations forces struck the railway bridge over the canal near Rozdolna,
tearing apart the tracks and collapsing one of its spans.
What happened next is where this story becomes genuinely interesting.
Resistance operatives on the ground inside occupied territory spotted Russian repair
crews arriving at the site early the next morning, hauling in specialized equipment
to fix the damage, almost certainly unaware that Ukrainian eyes were already on them.
They never got the chance to finish.
That same night, drones returned a second time,
striking the repair equipment directly and bringing down what was left of the bridge for good.
Ukraine's special operations forces confirmed the strike publicly not long after,
stating flatly that the railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal no longer existed,
and adding a line that landed less like a celebration and more like a warning
aimed straight at Moscow, calling it simply the first one gone.
Ten crossings in a single week near Kherson, a pontoon destroyed within a day of going live,
a repair crew struck before it could even finish unloading its equipment.
Put those three moments together, and you are no longer looking at three separate incidents.
You are looking at a single method, repeated with almost mechanical precision,
and it means every bridge Russia still has left standing on this front is sitting inside the same
trap that already closed on Chonhar and Rozdom, which raises the question nobody in Russian
command wants to answer next. If the roads are dying and the bridges keep disappearing faster
than they can be fixed, what does that actually mean for the soldiers who still have to reach
the front line every single day? The answer to that question started arriving on the very same
night Kremlinivka fell, because Ukraine's general staff confirmed that bridge was never the only
target struck that night. In the same coordinated operation, Ukrainian forces also hit a railway
bridge over the Tepla River near Nizhniy Tepel in occupied Luhansk region, along with a separate
logistics crossing near Novo Karatuvet in Donetsk region. One bridge falling can look like a single
lucky strike. Three crossings falling in the same night across two different regions looks like
something far more deliberate, an attempt to choke off Russian movement across several sectors of
the front all at once. The destruction had reached such a devastating level that, on July 1,
Ukraine's defense minister stepped forward to reveal how it was crippling Russia's war machine
and leaving its troops on the ground increasingly isolated and vulnerable.
Standing in Kiev beside Sweden's defense minister, Pol Jansson, Mikhailo Fedorov was asked directly
about the consequences of weeks of strikes across Crimea and the South. What he said next exposed
the brutal truth. Every destroyed bridge was trapping Russian troops on a battlefield that
was becoming harder to escape. According to Fedorov, in certain sectors along the southern
front, Russian infantry now have to walk 30 kilometers just to reach their own positions.
That distance, close to 19 miles, is not a short stretch behind friendly lines.
Carrying full combat gear, a soldier covering that ground needs somewhere between six and eight
hours, which means an entire working day can disappear before that soldier has even reached
the fight he was sent there for. Under normal circumstances, that march simply would not happen
this way. Both Russian and Ukrainian units are usually driven most of the distance by vehicle,
only walking the final stretch on foot, and typically at night, specifically to stay hidden
from drones hunting anything that moves in daylight. What Fedorov described is a clear
sign that Russia's logistics are under growing strain. The collapse of key bridges has disrupted
the routes military trucks rely on, forcing soldiers to walk distances that should never
have to be covered on foot. The marching soldiers, though, were only the most visible piece of a much
larger breakdown, one that Russian commanders were unintentionally confirming through their
own actions. At Shonhar, once the original bridge and its pontoon replacement had both been destroyed,
Russian forces tried shifting supply trucks onto an alternative route through Armyansk,
hoping a second path would keep convoys moving while engineers worked on repairs elsewhere.
Commander Filatov of Ukraine's 1st Assault Regiment confirmed exactly what happened to
that backup plan, stating plainly that the movement through Armyansk had been completely
stopped as well. Our unit had struck a convoy of Russian trucks carrying fuel and ammunition near
Armyansk. There were about 50 vehicles, and some of them were destroyed. Russia was not
just losing bridges at this point, it was losing its backup routes to the exact same tactic
in real time. And Armyansk was not an isolated case either. Around the same stretch of June,
Ukraine's unmanned systems forces struck the road bridge over the Henichesk Strait,
the crossing linking Crimea directly with the Kherson, while Kremlin-installed authorities
separately reported crossings near Henichesk and the Arabat Spit shutting down as well.
Piece by piece, every alternative route Russia might have leaned on to bypass the damage further
east was being closed off at almost the same moment, leaving fewer and fewer paths in and
out of the peninsula. The fuel side of this crisis reached even further than broken trucks
and blocked roads. Fedorov specifically pointed to growing problems supplying fuel for the
generators that power the ground stations controlling Russia's own drone operators.
And that detail matters more than it might first sound. According to George Barros,
Director of Innovation and Open Source Tradecraft at the Institute for the Study of War,
some of Russia's fixed-wing drones use AI to help resist jamming and can identify certain
targets with a degree of autonomy, but that autonomy still depends on ground-based uplinks
staying powered and connected. A control station running on a generator with no fuel left cannot
function, which means every fuel convoy Ukraine destroys is not just stranding trucks on a road
somewhere. It is quietly blinding the exact systems Russia depends on to see Ukrainian
drones coming in the first place. Crimea gave the clearest picture of just how far that fuel
emergency had already spread by early July. Local authorities had tried rationing fuel to
civilians through a QR code system, then cancelled the plan entirely, and by the time Fedorov spoke,
it had reportedly become impossible to purchase fuel at all in parts of the peninsula.
Fedorov summed up the entire pattern in a single line that captures the situation better than any
individual statistic could, describing a large number of crises now beginning to accumulate,
each one making the last one harder to solve. None of this was unfolding by accident. Fedorov
tied the whole campaign directly to a 40-day operation ordered by President Volodymyr Zelensky
on June 25, designed specifically to pile enough pressure on Russia to force real movement toward
peace talks. Bridges, fuel depots, backup routes, and generator stations were never separate
problems happening to line up at once. They were pieces of one deliberate strategy, and July 1st
was simply the day that strategy became visible in the exhausted legs of Russian infantry walking
toward their own front line. So, if soldiers are marching 30 kilometers just to reach their own
trenches, the next question is unavoidable. What is actually happening to Russia's ability to
advance while all of this unfolds behind it? The clearest answer comes from Deep State UA,
a group that has tracked territorial control along the front line in painstaking detail throughout
the war, and the number they published removes any doubt about whether this campaign is actually
working. In the first half of 2025, Russian forces captured roughly 1,832 square kilometers
of Ukrainian territory. In the first half of 2026, covering the exact period when this bridge
campaign was tearing through Russia's southern supply lines, that number collapsed to just
770 square kilometers. That is a drop of well over half, achieved without a single new western
tank crossing the border, and without Ukraine launching any new ground offensive of its own.
Independent analysts had already spotted the scale behind that collapse before the Deep State
numbers confirmed it. Jack Watling, a senior research fellow at Britain's Royal United Services
Institute, pointed out that Ukraine struck more bridges in June 2026 alone than in 2023, 2024,
and 2025 combined. That is not a slow escalation building gradually over years.
It is a sudden, sharp break from everything that came before it, concentrated into a single month.
The raw numbers behind that break are almost as startling as the bridges themselves.
Ukrainian OSINT group Tachny had already geolocated 55 strikes on Russian logistics
vehicles in April 2026, a figure that jumped to 130 strikes the following month,
with analysts noting the pace was increasing daily even then.
By mid-June, French OSINT analyst Clément Molin was tracking the campaign almost in real time,
recording 30 struck targets on June 19th, climbing to 47 on June 22nd, then 56 on June 23rd.
Across those five days alone, Molin counted 193 Russian trucks and infrastructure targets hit.
None of that escalation happened by improvisation either. The entire effort
traces back to what analysts now call the Middle Strike campaign, formally launched in April 2026.
By May 25th, the Institute for the Study of War had already recognized the shift,
assessing that Ukraine had significantly intensified its intermediate-range strike
campaign that spring, specifically to degrade Russian logistics at operational depth,
ahead of what the Institute described as a planned Ukrainian maneuver.
What looked like a sudden wave of bridge strikes in June was actually the final,
visible phase of a plan that had been building for months. By June, ISW's own monthly assessment
captured just how wide that plan had grown, confirming at least 47 strikes on Russian
assets spread across 41 different Russian federal subjects, plus another 31 strikes
specifically targeting Russian oil infrastructure, all within a single month. A campaign that started
by hunting individual trucks on one highway had expanded into a nationwide pressure campaign
reaching deep inside Russia itself. The consequences of that pressure were
visible on the ground in ways that had nothing to do with bridges directly.
A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Russian forces
had abandoned heavy military vehicles in his sector entirely, switching instead to motorcycles
and buggies just to move troops and supplies forward, because anything larger had become
too easy for Ukrainian drones to spot and destroy. An army built around tanks and armored columns was
being pushed onto machines built for racing across open terrain, not fighting a modern war.
Even voices inside Russia's own information space started admitting what was happening.
A prominent Russian military blogger, someone whose entire purpose online is cheering the invasion
forward, openly acknowledged that Ukraine's interdiction of Russian supply lines was
allowing Ukrainian forces to become noticeably more active in the Zaporizhia, Huliaipol,
and Orekiv sectors, areas that had been grinding in Russia's favor for months before this campaign
accelerated. When the people cheering for the invasion admit the supply war is being lost,
that is not Ukrainian messaging. That is a battlefield fact leaking through from the
other side. The Institute for the Study of War reached the same conclusion through its own
independent analysis, stating that Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign was
increasingly inhibiting Russian logistics across occupied territory, particularly in the south and
in ways that were already beginning to show up on the front line and slow Russian offensive
operations across the entire theater. Three separate sources, a Ukrainian field commander,
a Russian military blogger, and an independent research institute, all arrived at the exact
same conclusion from three completely different directions. And that leaves one question sitting
at the center of everything covered so far. None of this required new tanks, new soldiers,
or a single new ground offensive to pull off. So what was Ukraine actually using to tear apart an
entire supply network this fast, and just how little did it really cost to do it?
Drop your thoughts in comments. This is the Frontline Show. If you want to see how Ukrainian
forces are methodically hunting down and eliminating Russian border infiltration
groups in the Kharkiv region, click the video on your screen.