Final Stand - Former Ukrainian Commanders Bleak Warning to Ukraine & NATO | Ukraine Map Update

TN News
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6 Video Views·Jul 12, 2026
G'day Legends,
I hope you're doing well,
Today we talk about the war in Ukraine, and the battle for Kostiantynivka.
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Video Summary
AI GeneratedThis analysis examines the Russia-Ukraine war as a conflict of mutual denial and attrition. It critiques the feasibility of domestic Ukrainian missile production, analyzes tactical aerial and maritime strikes, and argues that neither side currently possesses the means for a decisive strategic victory, highlighting Ukraine's critical dependency on Western support and NATO's industrial decline.
G'day Legends, I hope you are having a fantastic day. I hope your Friday is going well leading
into a brilliant weekend. I do not know if I'll see you for a few days as I'm traveling this
weekend so we need to keep this video a bit shorter. But Legends, we do have a lot to go
over. We have more updates on the Patriot Air Defense Systems with Trump saying that he will
give Zelensky the licenses. But do we really trust what Trump has said? We really need to
see what Raytheon and Lockheed Martin say about that. How many times has Trump declared victory
in Iran? And as far as I know there's bombs still being dropped against a country which apparently
has already surrendered and has already been militarily destroyed at least 50 times over.
We'll look at strikes, just the important strikes, the ones that I see as tactically,
operationally or strategically important today. Remember we don't just focus on everything going
both Russian and Ukrainian strikes. We'll look at the maps, we'll look at Kostiantynivka, we'll look
at some geolocations. For the last months all we've heard is a flag going up is not consolidation,
it's not control. And when the flag goes up of who you cheerlead for, suddenly it is control and it
is consolidation. What I say is the battlefield is a mess at the moment with drones, with
infiltration, with the desaturation of forces, increased saturation of drones. We must apply
some level of threshold. Legends the world right now feels as if it's constantly on edge. Ukraine,
Iran, domestic, international friction, everything appears to be on edge and potentially boiling
over. There's new crises after the last ones have even been resolved. And the hardest problems
often isn't the war themselves, it's the informational environment that has become
a contested battlefield. That problem is what today's video sponsor Ground News
solves. Ground News is a platform that aggregates thousands of stories daily,
organizes them in a way that most outlets won't. For every story you'll see the political bias,
the ownership structure, the reliability, the rating of every source who's covering it. You get
the full picture, not just someone's curated slice of it. So let me take you to their homepage
and I'll show you exactly what I mean. So this is the Ground News homepage. This is curated for
me. So of course I research a lot about Europe and a lot about Ukraine. So let's just click on
this. The captain of the Shadow Fleet tanker detained by the UK has been charged. So instantly
you get a center position of what has actually occurred here. Then you can look at the left,
the center, but then you can actually get a bias comparison. You can see what the left,
what the right, what they are saying. Then you can come to the bias distribution. And I guess
this is pretty even, but you can see there's more slight left papers and one sort of further right
news source covering this. You can see who is actually covering it, but this is where I find
really interesting. You can go through who's reporting on this and I always find it very
interesting to look at just the titles and how that title can change the narrative of the story.
We all miss things. And this is why I'm constantly brought back to at the top tab,
click on blind spot here and stories that you may have missed on the left, on the right.
It'll continue to show stories that will be outside of what may be pushed to you. So legends,
if you head to ground.news forward slash O-A-M or scan the QR code, also the linked top comment,
you'll get 40% off the vantage plan. That's the unlimited access tier. That's the one I use. So
you can see and do everything. Thank you Grand News for sponsoring this video. And we must then
look at, or the main meat of the video today is going to be Valery Zheluzny. Of course, he was
former commander in chief of the Ukrainian armed forces. He's now the ambassador to the UK and he's
written an article in the Telegraph. And I think it's actually one of the most based analysis of
the war that I've seen at this point in time. Yes, it's got sprinkled with some more comfortable
language at some points, but it's about do not assume that Ukraine has won and Russia has lost
at this point in time. There's a lot of water going, a lot of strategic depth, and he pushes
back on what we say is not one element in a war like this is decisive. No, war is an art. War is
holistic, turning tactical victories into operational objectives, into operational objectives,
to strategic victories, and then ultimately into political outcomes. Okay, we need to look at that
Just this campaign will not be decisive. There's a lot of depth. We need to look at that. But there
is a lens veil we need to approach that article through. Zheluzny is likely Ukraine's president,
Zelensky's most competitive politician against him in time. This is two reasons why he was pushed
out of Ukraine into the UK. Ostensibly, it's the 23 counter offensive that completely failed.
Why do I say ostensibly? Because it wasn't his command that failed that offensive. It was
the West pushing for an offensive at least a year earlier than it should have been.
Not the correct mobilization, political decision, which Zelensky has been unbelievably correct on
We need half a million more men mobilized before we do this sort of thing.
And that he was growing in so much popularity, it became a threat to the leader. Therefore,
push him somewhere else. Be interesting to see once elections return, if and when they return
to Ukraine, what exactly happens there. But we will get to that in the end. Now, no particular
order here, but we have seen a Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft go down about 40 kilometers
behind the line. It's in Lugansk Oblast, just about here. Again, the actual area is somewhat
irrelevant, but about 41 kilometers back. Sentinel imagery has shown where this aircraft has then
impacted the ground. 41 kilometers, that tells us a bit. What we see is Su-35 primarily work
with Su-34 to drop those FABs, and they dropped them about this distance behind the line. So,
maybe he was flying in tandem, protecting the Su-34s, which we do know has been the case.
And the Su-34 is a more priority target than the Su-35. Those Su-34s are dropping dozens and
thousands of FABs unimpeded, and UAC, United Aircraft Company, are rolling off brand new Su-34s
at a way increased rate compared to the loss rate of them. But it's been interesting,
because this plane seemingly was ambushed. Now, no reports, but I've seen this reflected
everywhere, was that it was lured into Patriot range with other Ukrainian aircraft, said to be
F-16. One simulated a bomb attack, two others provided cover, likely with air-to-air missiles,
and there was a Patriot battery near the front line. When it came into range, of course, then
whack the Su-35. The pilot survived and has been evacuated. Now, that doesn't particularly mean
that he'll never fly again. I saw one of the pages say that there is a Su-34 pilot who's had
two ejections now at this point in time. So he probably started at six foot tall and is now like
my height. So another aircraft going down. How critical is this? Not really, given the depth
of these and the amount being made. In war, you have losses like this, same as F-16, MiG-29,
et cetera, Ukraine's using Su-35. We stopped tracking it because it became irrelevant,
was the losses of aircraft in the VKS versus what UAC is producing, and UAC is still producing
enough aircraft for the export market as well. But a Patriot took it down. Let's talk more about
Patriots. Now, of course, what we're talking is PAC-3, and PAC-3 is the one that you need,
that missile, not to take down the plane like this, but to take down ballistics like a Kinzhal.
Now, what we said was, yeah, will the licenses go through? The problem is not the license,
and many are forgetting this. Trump, with Zelensky, he said that, yep, we'll give you
the license to manufacture Patriots. Now, at the end of the day, the private industry
will be pushing back on this. Why? Because they don't want to lose the money for the most
weapon in the world right now is air defenses. Therefore, they can ask an absorbent price to
countries like the Gulf who have absorbent money. We'll actually see if this goes through. How many
times has Trump just said something, okay? But I've seen a lot of accounts saying that
due to this, Ukraine will have manufactured and to be firing in combat PAC-3 Patriot missiles in
30 to 60 days. That is fantasy land. What? To develop a system, any system, especially one
as complex as a PAC-3 interceptor against a ballistic missile takes years if actually
possible at all with the restrictions on this. That's three to six years would be a very,
very short goal. Germany bought licenses to produce a weapon system in 24,
and they're still not made. The German manufacturing industry has far larger depth
than Ukraine's and isn't facing missiles entering the roof. What I've said is the
choke point is not the license. The license is a pretty irrelevant part of this. It's the
tolerances in your manufacturing and machining for a system like this.
It's tooling up to make these. Factories, blades, all this unbelievably complex equipment.
Actual engineers to do it need massive teams, critical rare earth minerals, which are absolutely
in shortage all around the world due to decisions of someone. And not only that, it's ignoring that
this will become a priority target for something like a Kinzhal hypersonic welcoming itself to the
factory. What we need to look at is Ukraine's industry has been incredibly impressive. It's
been very flexible, but that these are still relatively simple weapon systems. Look at the
Flamingo missile. It's caused a lot of damage, but it took a lot of time. There was a lot of
corruption surrounding it, and that it hasn't been made in huge quantity either. The scalability
has always been a problem, and that wasn't a complete standalone. This was still an analog
off a far older, far more simple system. The U.S. produced about 650 PAK-3s a year. Russia's firing
about 900 ballistics a year. The U.S. isn't catching up with this at the moment. They want
to in the next couple of years. U.S., Japan, Germany, they're desperately trying to
output these. The U.S. is continuing to drain their stockpiles in the Gulf. So as impressive
as Ukraine has been in this, the license is not really the choke point in here. And will we see
ever domestically made PAK-3s in the next years if this war doesn't extend? If we see the claim,
I'd say it might be more assembled rather than purely made. And the other point is,
on that engineering front, how many high-skilled workers are just sitting around? You've got,
of course, hundreds of thousands of million people who serve in the military overall.
And then in the other industries, building drones or this or that, Ukraine is at total war. Russia
has launched a war. Russia itself is not at war. It's not a completely mobilized population.
People say that would be a good thing if that happened. And I say, no, it's not for Ukraine.
But it's not every person's working for the objective of the war, which in Ukraine,
it is more so like that. How many sets of hands, if you need 5,000 people to get this off the
ground, is that really available? And there's a lot of other systems having a lot of success.
Look down in the Sea of Azov. So this was on July the 8th. Nine more tankers have been hit.
And this takes up to 19 oil tankers down in the Sea of Azov. Whether these are full, whether
some of them are actually not sanctioned, some of them apparently have been owned by
American company Chevron, irrelevant too. But we're seeing a shitload of strikes down in here.
How do we measure the effect of this? We need to measure the effect of this by the ability to
wage and continue and sustain war, much like the logistics strikes down in the South. We see
the outcome as the analysis, not the strike in of itself. And then overnight, more were struck,
14 for the fourth consecutive day, bringing to 35 oil tankers. So a lot of strikes down in
the Sea of Azov into Russia's inland sea through Rostov-on-Don. Absolutely keep an eye on that.
Massive strikes and these are climbing. Now we need to look at this too, because of course we're
well aware of the mid-range campaign, but we need to talk about Harkin. We've seen a lot of
Ukrainian pages saying Russia's massively increasing their fibre optic range. There
was a post today saying Russia's actually, from a Ukrainian drone operator, saying they're actually
building some successful countermeasures against long-range radio control. But Harkin, well look at
this. Russia's primary sort of mid-range campaign at the moment is against gas fuel stations,
servo stations for an Australian. We see this flying through and striking at the Bowser here.
How much damage? Well it depends if it lights anything on fire down below, I guess. But
regardless of that, Harkin to the closest area. So let's just go centre-ish to here. You're talking
32 kilometres. That's a long way. And what we have seen and have heard, and that's a good example,
is Russia's fibre optic drones out around 40 kilometres have become more and more successful
and have proliferated all along the front line, away from just specialised units like Rubicon. So
keep an eye on that. Let's have a quick look at the maps. We'll come down into the area of which
there's just so much grey zone, so much unknown. And I believe Suriakis, correct me, calls this
the kill zone of infiltration. That there are Russian and Ukrainian forces intermingled in
here in different positions and stable control is difficult to get a read on. But we look at
Novo Katske here, just down from Ivanovka. Remember, we've been reporting through
neutral mappers that these areas have come under the control or are at least under contest by
Ukraine. These maps here under OPSEC haven't been able to show that. And this is where we see a
geolocation today. Now, the military unit, the Ukrainian military unit, who shared this footage,
they then deleted it soon after publishing of a flag being raised due to, of course, the OPSEC in
this area. What I'll say is I actually do think that Ukraine likely controlled Novo Katske,
but that's based on mappers and on write-ups. But it's so funny to see all these people who will
see a Russian flag go up here and say, these are flag waving operations, it means nothing.
But when it's the other flag, suddenly it is complete control. The front line has moved.
This is that footage here, and this is the geolocation of said area. Okay, only one map
for you today, and that is Kostyantynivka, which is following the same paint-by-numbers we see
again and again and again of Surisky's cargo shorts. You create a pocket, you get stuck in
the pocket, you have an opportunity to withdraw, you don't withdraw, and attrition goes through
the ******* roof. We've spoken about this tactic again and again. And then what do you do once
there is elements that are vertically or physically enveloped, is then you deploy your
best forces in here, who likely take high losses, to try and pull those out. AMK has written this,
that Ukraine has redeployed assault forces to Kostyantynivka for clearing operations.
Northwest remained grey-zoned without Russian consolidation. Ukrainian-Russian soldiers hold
overlapping inter-military positions, that's of course here and down in the south as well.
Ukrainian forces likely intend to clear this area from Russian infiltrators, to re-establish a
corridor into the northern parts, and then allow remaining trapped forces inside the city to
withdraw. Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to consolidate in eastern Kostyantynivka and
make new advances southwest of the city. So closing up on that center according to AMK.
And I'm telling you, this part right here, AMK could have, Control-C, Control-V,
name the city that has fallen, of getting enveloped, either operationally, physically,
or vertically enveloped. You guys know what the difference is. And then huge deployment of
resources in to try and unblock that when there was opportunities to leave prior, but you run into
a hard road of optics versus strategy. But what we need to look at too, is history and doctrine.
It does show over the entire battle sequence of an area, that the offending and defending troops
take different losses at different times. But on a siege like this, when the most amount of casualties
are actually enacted against, is when the collapse or withdrawal of the defending forces
then attempt to move out. This is why I've been critical of withdrawals, because the Ukraine,
this is all about having a positive attrition ratio and getting caught in these envelopments,
again, getting caught on the flanks and then having an incredibly costly withdrawal as we
have seen from, you name it, we've seen it. It's not going with the battle sequence. And this is
where the attrition at different points has different amounts. So if you talk for like the
Battle of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk, say if this enters, that yeah, the ground fighting in here,
the defending forces may take less losses. But at the moment, if these are just getting hounded
and pounded by FABs and drones, there's going to be a lot more casualties on Ukraine's side
than Russia's side down here for that battle. And the battle sequence starts well before a
single force actually enters. On entry, yes, there's going to be fire losses and there's
different areas. But that withdrawal throughout history has been one of the most costly parts.
A character which some love, some hate. He's seemingly loved by Ukrainians in Ukraine and
hated by a lot of the individuals gaslighting as Ukrainian supporters, but they're Russian
haters online. And people haven't actually pushed back on the points of this article.
They haven't done that at all. All they've done is ad hominem attacks and call
Zelensky a retard. So yeah, that's analysis, going, don't listen to him, he's retarded.
That, you know, that completely destroys his argument far better than actually
arguing counter to his point. I'll post this on his ex and then we'll go to the actual article.
We're increasingly seeing assessments by analysts, including European and American ones,
that Russia has lost the war and the end is near. The reason for this is the direct
interpretation of the events by Ukrainian and European information space, which is full of
successes on the battlefield, strikes on logistics and critical infrastructure,
the media focusing on tactical achievements. And this is natural. So what he's saying is,
a lot of your analysis is influenced by the informational space, but we may need to take
a step back. Yeah, **** an oath. More details about whether really the prerequisites to expect
an imminent end to the war, where there can be winners in it, and why NATO's current approaches
have no prospects. So of course, from a highly popular individual and growing in popularity as
well. So let's have a quick look through this. Now I just had to copy and paste this because
I'm ******* behind paywalls. Paid media is just silly. Sorry, who pays for this ----?
But a growing number of Western analysts now argue Russia has lost the war and the war is
approaching its end. The Russian position has just eroded away and he says that this is a
dangerous misreading of the war. It reflects a tendency to interpret events through the lens
of individual battlefield successes rather than a wider strategic picture. As we have said,
no single aspect is decisive. Trump just learned this lesson. He thinks that strategic strikes
will be decisive. No, it's holistic. It's all the way from tactical, Ivan at the front fighting,
all the way through to political decisions and the art between these two. And so I've said,
America is the best country at warfare. They're very incompetent at war. America's great at
bombing ----, at killing people, at dropping troops in. But what has America failed to do
for decades is take that and produce a favorable outcome every time. It's actually really been
unfavorable. Modern warfare no longer rewards tactical victories the way it once did. Advances
in drone technology, strike capabilities and surveillance have transformed the battlefield,
making decision breakthroughs extraordinarily difficult for either side. So you're not going
to have these big breakthroughs due to a little amount of forces can really wreak havoc. No longer
a war of swift maneuvers, it's a war of attrition. I'd say it was never a war of swift maneuvers.
Every tactical game now comes at extraordinary cost. Ukraine's increasingly effective strikes
against Russian logistics and critical infrastructure have imposed real costs on
Moscow. Absolutely. But these attacks are expensive, technologically demanding,
and ultimately reciprocal. It comes back. Russia retains the ability to strike back with equal or
greater force. Neither side can rely on this form of warfare to produce a decisive strategic outcome.
I agree on that. And the strategic depth is deeper than you think. This is where, though,
my read is the same, but I need to add a bit of nuance. Russia can absolutely strike back with
significantly greater force when it comes to missiles, long range drones, from Garam through
to your ballistic and cruise missiles. Objectively can strike back with greater force. The problem
is Russia can't strike Ukraine's industry or Shverpunt. They can't strike the center of
gravity of Ukraine's industry because it's not in Ukraine's borders where Ukraine can strike
the Shverpunt of Russian industry, energy, etc. That sits in the borders of Russia.
Ukraine's doesn't. Ukraine's is out in the West. So absolutely, Russia has more aerial strength,
but there's a lot of targets which they're not prepared to use that against, or at least we've
seen. We may be moving closer to actually strikes across different borders. I think
Ukraine striking in Belarus would be a really, really silly move. The battlefield, therefore,
reaches something close to equilibrium. Russia lacks the military capacity to conquer Ukraine
outright, yet everyone in Europe will tell us they're about to conquer Warsaw. Equally, Ukraine
does not currently possess the means to liberate all occupied territory by force alone. The
military balance has become one of mutual denial rather than decisive victory. I could nitpick in
that, but I somewhat agree. To conquer all of Ukraine, we haven't seen Russia with the capability
to do so, or really the intent of everything. But Ukraine doesn't possess the means to liberate
occupied territory of all of it, but even large parts of it. Look at the 23rd Offensive, look at
Kursk, etc. That was a few thousand square kilometers at best, not 111-ish thousand.
But yes, mutual denial of areas. Now, if the measure is whether the Kremlin achieved its
original political objectives, then clearly it has not. But defeat requires more than failure
to achieve initial ambitions. Russia continues to fight, it occupies substantial Ukrainian territory,
and has shown no intention of ending the war on terms that would be an omission to defeat,
because that would be very hard politically at home in Russia as well and the Russian forces.
But it's going to be difficult for Ukraine as well if then territory is de jure handed to Russia.
He says, nor can Ukraine yet claim outright victory. Yes, I say neither can claim victory,
and the war is ongoing. But what is an achievement that the Kremlin has? And I think that
some of this is actually larger long-term than maybe some of the initial objectives.
So the initial objectives of basically defuncting the Ukrainian state, taking over,
whatever. That's one thing that hasn't been achieved. You've seen the resilience of the
Ukrainian people. But what has been destroyed? In my opinion, I think NATO has been destroyed.
And I don't think that the 70-year-old in the Kremlin is to blame for that at all. I think it's
the 70-year-old in Washington. But with these actions and everything, NATO has been massively
undermined. Massively, to the point of which I'd say, **** no, would I rely on America in Europe?
Australia might be different. But in Europe, Trump has the shits here. But not only that,
due to this war and secondary things like Nord Stream blowing up, the European economy long-term
is in ******* dire straits. The German economy is losing 10,000 industrial jobs a week.
BYD has rocked up and said ******* ni hao, goodbye. It's got like in big trouble long-term.
And Nord Stream has been a big part of that. I actually think we're going to hear more about
that in the future, especially with AFD doing one of these ones, unless there's all these cardiac
arrests. This just happened. Kyiv has prevented Russia from achieving its principal aims and
inflicts severe damage on the Russian economy and military. Severe damage on the economy,
severe damage on the initial standing military, but the military is likely more powerful and will
be in years to come than it was. Same as Ukraine will after a huge rebuild. But it remains heavily
dependent on Western financial assistance while facing mounting domestic pressures of its own.
Ukraine domestically, look at Lviv, protests against TCC, against the conscription forces.
Now heavily dependent, not entirely dependent. Now Ukraine may make some systems at home, etc,
fine, yes, but the use of GPS, the use of satellite imagery, the use of tooling, etc,
Ukraine is still entirely dependent on Western assistance, especially after this war financially.
Moscow understands this. This strategy increasingly rests on rapid advances,
but on exhausting Ukraine economically. So it's not rapid, it's a tritting down
militarily, psychologically. Russia still possesses deep reserves of manpower, industrial capacity
in several sectors, including ballistic missile production, air defense alone, cannot offset that
advantage. What I ask is, has Zheleznyan been watching our ******* show? Because this is what
we have been saying, is this is not going to be decisive. As impressive as something blowing up
is, Russia has a huge reserve of strategic depth in industry, in energy, and in manpower.
And this is seen in the Kremlin as going from a special military operation to a patriotic
endeavor against, how did Putin put it in his decree? I believe he said, I may be misquoting,
the liberal satanic West. So the war, I think, has changed. And what I say is,
if it's existential for Russia, when have we seen something existential for Russia previously?
We saw the loss of 30 million people. Well, this war, if Russia is in question, the depth that we
could see mobilized could be massive. And we still haven't seen those mobilizations.
Now, he talks about this of attritional war, and I think Zheleznyan is one of the only voices I've
actually really heard who obviously understands the doctrine behind attritional war. And this
is a great article here from Delwine, Assessing Offensive Efficiency in War and Attrition. We're
going to talk about this more. But in the current informational context, it's become increasingly
difficult to produce a reliable analytical assessment of Russian offensive going on
and Ukraine. Because it is, is it actually showing forces here? We need to look at because
it is attritional. Offensive warrants cannot be measured by territorial gains alone.
It's a relationship between ground losses, sustained and imposed and operational value
of areas being contested. So not just this kilometer square, but where? Is it a common
square in Constantinople or down in the South? Because they're not as important as each other.
Maps remain useful, but they're increasingly insufficient. That we need to look at the
realities of this between main efforts, secondary efforts, and that the pace of
advances does not necessarily imply a reduction in offensive efficiency in attritional war.
I'd love someone like Zheleznyan to read that article too, because I think there's a lot he'd
agree with in it. The decisive variable is international support. Ukraine's ability to
sustain the war depends heavily on continued backing. Not heavily, entirely on backing.
Even just loans, energy. Here, there are worrying signs of strain. Political changes in Washington,
persistent divisions in Europe to raise legitimate questions about whether
Australia's level of support can be maintained. You'll hear a lot of,
as Zheleznyan puts brilliantly, carefully choreographed demonstrations of solidarity.
------- chef's kiss. There's a lot of that choreographed demonstration of solidarity,
shaking hands with Zelensky, we're wearing Macron's blue ******* sunnies. That doesn't
matter if you're on the front line, you don't have a ******* artillery shell to put up the
******* spout, okay? It needs real systems and everything is delivered late and a lot of the
time ineffective. This is why the war can no longer be judged primarily on movements along
the front. The line of contact remains militarily important, of course, tactically, particularly in
a future settlement, but it no longer is the sole determinant of strategic success. The conflict is
expanded into a contest over logistics, industrial capacity, critical infrastructure, air defense,
and ultimately societal resistance. But it's been like this for years. What I'll say is,
I don't read that much of Zheleznyan, but if it's only people realizing this now,
it's pretty ******* late to assess this is an attritional war. We saw in 2022,
that was when Russia went, ****, we're not going to have sweeping maneuver victories here.
This is going to go attritional and we saw withdrawing in sectors to better positions,
building the fortifications through 22-23 that really ran aground, that let the 23 offensive
run aground upon it, changed from a militaryman in charge of defense overall into an economist,
because as Zheleznyan correctly points out, this is one of overall resilience and absorption.
An attritional war is ultimately one of strategic depth, absorption of losses, and nerve,
or as he would say, societal resistance. Territory has become a complicated concept.
The development of long-range strike capabilities and drone warfare has steadily
undermined the value of Crimea and persistent attacks here has had logistical pressure.
Shortages to civilian supplies illustrate physical occupation no longer guarantees
strategic security. Yes, there has been more friction on Crimea, absolutely,
but it doesn't mean that there won't be security. If the war ends, that will all reopen to Crimea.
The main one is actually water down in Crimea, but that will definitely be a deal, those
canals, because it went to the UN and what UN's highly politicized, that's why it didn't get
through. But yes, it has shown that mid-range strike, but this does not mean that Crimea has
lost its strategic position. It shows how important it actually is and there's not about
to be troops storm into Crimea because it's going to collapse. Even if every single civilian left,
okay, and there's a military garrison there, how are you storming that? As you know, amphibious
landings are never very costly and they wouldn't be costly in a drone age. These pressures strengthen
Ukraine's position in future negotiations, but they do not eliminate the risk facing Ukraine
itself. Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure continue,
and given the air defense lack of ballistics, they're going to continue likely at higher effect
as well. Even if the number of missiles may slightly decrease, if all the ballistics are
reaching, big problems on impact. Final slide. Wars of attrition do not produce clear winners
in a conventional sense. They're decided by endurance. Like I've said, you could win an
attritional war without ever making a ******* kilometer. The decisive question is not who
captures the next village or destroys the next ammo depot. It is a society who can continue to
bear economic, military, and psychological burden of a prolonged conflict while maintaining
international support necessary to sustain it. That, rather than any individual's tactical
success, they determine how and when the war ends. Too many analysts remain focused on the
daily move in the front line. They risk missing the largest strategic reality. Again, bang,
he's completely correct on this, but this is the problem. So just as Ukraine has an advantage
having their industrial center of gravity remain outside of Ukraine in the West, the problem is
they're not pulling the ******* strings on it. It's in democratic countries which are getting
imposed massive costs on, and you could just elect a new leader and that's gone overnight.
Where Russia is in, it really revolves around Moscow, and can be struck, at the end of the day,
they're pulling their own strings on industry that can be hit. So there's pros and cons here,
but the leverage and control that the West has on Ukraine, because of complete reliance, is
unbelievable. And especially after the war. You think the war is costly? The rebuild cost is going
to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, if not over the big T. In looking for an end to the
war, the conversation returns to NATO. Ukraine has every reason to appreciate the support that NATO
continues to provide, but respects the alliance should not prevent an honest assessment of its
shortcomings. The war in Ukraine has exposed uncomfortable questions about whether NATO is
equipped for conflicts of the 21st century. And yet, you can absolutely, Australia is not a NATO
country, we're aligned with NATO, but you can absolutely have an honest assessment of shortcomings.
Now, NATO has been weakened by the leaders within it. Putin or Xi, whether you're in Beijing or
Moscow, they would have a wet dream thinking that they could enact the damage on NATO that the NATO
leaders have done to themselves, especially Trump undermining NATO. They would be sitting there
going, ****, I don't think we had the military capacity to do that. So that's where it's been
weakened. But the weakness in NATO is threefold. One is internal loyalty to actually that defensive
clause. With that is hypocrisy and international credibility. What has undermined that,
the support, although Israel's not a NATO state, is the support to their, along with
hypocritical application of war hierarchy of suffering, you name it, that has reduced the
credibility of NATO internationally. Unfathomably is the complicity in that, even if not one of the
states seem as aligned with it. Two, more on the hard front, manufacturing industry, it's just
not there. North Korea produced more shells than NATO in 2024. Firstly, where the **** has our
been going? Secondly, big ******* problem, that's not going anywhere quickly as everyone detools
to get cheaper from somewhere else. And three is the demoralisation, demonisation of patriotic men.
If a war starts and Article 5 gets enacted, then you're in a great state war. I highly doubt that
people that emigrated in the last year en masse are going to feel the patriotism to sign up and
die for that state. Maybe so, and good on them. But a war like this is going to rely on those in the
state of which you've demonised. In Australia, if Australia gets ******* invaded, the government
who's been demonising guys that look like me for the past decade and a half is going to turn around
and go, hey, you there, we need you on the front line, young man. Again, Ukraine and Russia are
highly orthodox, conservative societies. We're going to look around and go, what am I defending?
That is the forgotten aspect of, I think, Western weakness. It's actually that. These other ones,
yeah, it can be fixed. Manufacturing can just pump numbers. The industry capacity of America
at war times, unbelievable. Germany, we've seen it before. This here, dangerous.
The central problem is not simply military capability, it's strategic culture. It's
created around the height of the Cold War, an overriding purpose to deter the Soviet Union
and avoiding escalation coming the organisation principle of the alliance. The mindset remains
deeply embedded. The institution designed for an era cannot assume are automatically fit. So it's
not just going to be deterrence anymore and preventing it. It must actually take a forward
step as well. The national warfare has changed, drone tech, precision strike, cyber warfare,
and rapid-rated technical invasion would demand a different approach to deterrence.
Of course, there's also the need for the ambassador to the UK, former commander-in-chief,
and of course, a large competitor to Zelensky. So that's a lens we need to apply as well.
But I think he brings up some brilliant points, some I may not fully agree on,
but some of which I think, given his position publicly, has to sprinkle in some favourable
language, but I think is one of the first rational, real attritional speaking voices.
And calling him just a retard online doesn't actually change the front line,
nor does it actually push back on any of his points, which I think are all rational,
reasonable, moderate, and doctrinally backed. Legends, you look after yourself,
have a fantastic day. I need to leave. I'll speak to you later. Thank you. Bye-bye.
