Rob Henderson grew up in poverty in Los Angeles moving from foster home to foster home, seeing addiction, instability, and family breakdown all around him. He joined the U.S. Air Force at 17, entered Yale University at 25 with help from the GI Bill and completed his PhD at the University of Cambridge. He climbed “every rung on the American class ladder,” as he describes it.
But at Yale and other elite universities, he saw the spread of radical ideas—abolish the police, empty prisons, dismantle marriage, decriminalize all drugs—ideas that he understood would be devastating to the communities he grew up in.
And that’s how he came to develop his now famous concept of luxury beliefs: “Luxury beliefs are ideas and opinions that confer status on the affluent… while inflicting costs on the less fortunate members of society,” he says.
How is it that these ideas came to be so pervasive? And what are their true consequences for society?
Henderson is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, contributing editor of City Journal, and bestselling author of “Troubled: A Memoir of Foster Care, Family, and Social Class.”
Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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I grew up in poverty in Los Angeles, in foster homes.
And then I get to Yale and I'm seeing people, the majority of whom are raised by two married
parents, they denigrate the very values that fueled their own success.
In this episode, I sit down with Rob Henderson,
writer and senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute.
He's best known for coining the term luxury beliefs.
You'll see this with people who were raised wealthy, but then they say tax the rich,
or they are married personally, but then they say we need to dismantle marriage.
They personally never use drugs, or if they do, they do it in a very careful way.
But publicly, it's let's decriminalize everything and let people do whatever they want.
How is it that these ideas came to be so pervasive?
And what are their consequences?
This is American Thought Leaders, and I'm Jan Jekielek.
Rob Henderson, such a pleasure to have you on American Thought Leaders.
Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here.
Rob, your concept of luxury beliefs has been very helpful to me over the years now.
It's a beautiful little way of thinking about a whole range of, perhaps you could call it,
ideology. I want to look at how you actually came to understand this idea and build it out.
I know your background fits into this. Why don't you give me a picture of that?
Sure. Well, the luxury beliefs idea, I started thinking about it when I was in college,
developed it in grad school. Luxury beliefs are ideas and opinions that confer status on
the affluent and the credentials while inflicting costs on the less fortunate members of society,
people lower on the socioeconomic ladder. And a core feature of a luxury belief is that the
believer is sheltered from the consequences of his or her belief.
Hence, luxury.
Right. And the basic idea here is that, historically, elites exhibited their
status, their high social rank, with luxury goods, expensive material possessions.
And now, material goods are a noisier signal of social status. Now we live in an age where
anyone can get an iPhone. You can go to certain outlets and buy expensive clothes or clothes that
used to be expensive off the rack. And so, compared to 100 years ago, you look around,
who's rich, who's poor, it's harder to identify by appearance alone. And so now, what affluent
and credentialed people have done, cultural elites, they now exhibit their status through
luxury beliefs instead of luxury goods. And these beliefs signal certain kinds of information about
them. It sub-communicates what kind of family you grew up in, the kinds of socioeconomic status
you hold, what kind of college you went to, what kind of job you have, the amount of cultural
capital you possess. I arrived at this idea, I mentioned it started to form in my mind in college.
Before college, before I set foot on campus, my life was very different. I grew up in poverty
in Los Angeles, in foster homes, never knew my father. I was taken from my mother when I was
three years old. My mom was Korean, came to the US, her life very quickly unraveled, suffered
from drug addiction and lived through a series of foster homes and a bunch of sort of chaotic and
difficult adverse situations. I fled as soon as I could. I enlisted in the US Air Force when I was
17. And then with some hiccups and some setbacks along the way, I finally arrived at Yale at age
25 as an undergraduate studying on the GI Bill. And during this process, I sort of climbed every
rung on the American class ladder. I was born about as poor as you can be in a developed first
world country and then lived through a kind of series of working class, lower middle class homes
as a kid. Military, I started encountering middle class people. And then by the time I got to Yale,
I was around sort of upper middle class and wealthy individuals. And during these experiences,
opinions and beliefs would differ along the way. At Yale, I heard beliefs that I'd never
encountered before. Things like abolish the police. We need to end incarceration, empty the prisons.
We should promote polyamory. We should dismantle any kind of conventional or traditional ideas of
marriage. We need to decriminalize all drugs. And all of these ideas that are popular among elites,
they had an effect on the communities that I grew up in. And I saw a lot of suffering,
a lot of addiction, a lot of abuse, a lot of neglect and abandonment and so on.
And as a student, both in college and then later at the University of Cambridge for my PhD, I read
a lot of papers on the sociology of class, the psychology of social status. And I encountered
some shocking statistics. One, for example, if you go back to 1960 and you look at the number
of kids in the US, same in the UK, by the way, the number of kids who are raised by two married
parents in 1960, it's identical across the socioeconomic spectrum. Rich kids and poor
kids alike, 95% of the kids were raised by two married parents. You fast forward to 2005,
when I was a kid and I was in high school, for upper and upper middle class kids,
it declined slightly from 95% in 1960 to 85% by 2005. So a slight decline, 95% to 85%.
If you look at poor and working class kids, it dropped from 95% to 30% by 2005. So 30%.
And so now if you visit a lot of working class, blue collar, impoverished areas,
seeing kids in what the idea of the family is, that's an anomaly. Now, I was in foster
homes. I think about my friends who I grew up with, but another friend who was raised by his
single father, two friends raised by single mothers, another friend raised by his grandmother
because his mom was addicted to drugs and his dad was in prison. That's kind of the norm now
in these communities of kids in these fragmented, unstable family environments.
And then I get to Yale and I'm seeing people, the majority of whom are raised by two married
parents who personally have lived very traditional kinds of lives. Their parents and their families
valued education and family, hard work, integrity, punctuality, law-abidingness.
They lived like they were conservatives. But then when I heard them express their views,
it was, again, sort of, let's move beyond marriage, defund the police. If you want to
use drugs, that's okay. A very sort of hands-off, nonjudgmental attitude about how you should live
your life. And so if you want to understand the luxury beliefs idea in a sort of concise
and intuitive way, I say that the luxury belief class, they walk the 50s and talk the 60s.
They walk the 50s and talk the 60s.
They walk the 50s and talk the 60s, meaning they live their lives as if they are 1950s
Republicans in the white picket fence, love God and country, work hard, go to college,
go to work, pay your taxes, do the right thing. Personally, that's how they live their life.
But then if you ask them about their opinions on various important sociocultural topics,
it's either kind of a laissez-faire, you can do what you like, a practiced indifference,
or it's often the opposite of the way they live their life. Like, yes, I got married. I did this.
I did that. But you shouldn't have to do this. And we need to find a way to dismantle this
structure. And so you'll see this with people who were raised wealthy, but then they say,
tax the rich. Or they are married personally, but then they say, we need to dismantle marriage.
They personally never use drugs, or if they do, they do it in a very careful way.
But publicly, it's let's decriminalize everything and let people do whatever they want.
And so that's the idea. There was a book a few years ago called
The Meritocracy Trap by the Yale Law Professor Daniel Markovits. And in this book, he uses this
unforgettable phrase. He uses this phrase, non-practicing libertines. That's how he describes
the new elite, non-practicing libertines. And what does he mean by this? He means
they are libertines outwardly. Again, if you want to live in a polycule and use drugs and
indulge in your hedonistic impulses, that's perfectly fine. But they're non-practicing,
meaning personally, they live the opposite of that. They're very careful and rigid
and conservative in their own personal lives. So what I would like is for the luxury belief class,
this segment of our elites who spread these ideas, to essentially preach what they practice.
If you're going to live like a conservative, maybe you should also share those steps that
fueled your own success. And that was one of the things that shocked me the most.
The people that I encountered in college, grad school, and now graduates of these institutions,
they denigrate the very values that fueled their own success.
There's a few ways you could think about what's happening. One way is that,
to use a term from this conference, we're here at ARC, the deconstructionists,
that they somehow captured the minds of the elites with these ideas. And so they're
performatively being expressed, purely performatively, even though that's not the
culture within the families themselves. Another way you could view it is that these people are
intentionally promoting things which are destructive, so that they can maintain
their high-level social status. Where do you think this lands?
It's a good question, this idea of intent. Do the people who espouse luxury beliefs,
are they malicious? Are they intentionally trying to erode the values that lead to success?
My sense is that most of the people who express luxury beliefs are sincere. They really do believe
that defunding the police would somehow lead to less suffering. They have been convinced somehow.
I would say there's about maybe 20% of the people who espouse these beliefs who are
very cynical and duplicitous. They intentionally express these views in order to acquire social
status or clout. And in the same way that many people will buy expensive material possessions,
not because they like the possession, but because they know it'll impress other people.
And similarly, there are people who express luxury beliefs not because they believe in that view,
but because they know it'll garner clout, it'll garner status, so they express the belief.
The motivation for the luxury good and the luxury belief are often identical.
But there are many people who convince themselves that the reason why they're partaking in these
activities is their motives are sincere. If you ask the guy, he buys a Lamborghini,
and he says, look, it just makes me feel confident that I drive a Lamborghini. It
makes me feel good. I like the car. That's why I bought it. I'm not trying to impress anyone.
But I think a part of you might suspect, well, I think all of that's true, but I think a part of
you also likes the fact that when people see you in that Lamborghini, they think of you in a certain
way. Same with luxury beliefs. They espouse the belief. They're sincere in it. But there's a part
of me that thinks somewhere deep down, there's also this sense of satisfaction you get from
espousing the belief. Your peers, your social circle, similarly credentialed elites applaud
you for it, and they say, what a compassionate and interesting and sophisticated person you are
for holding that view. Do you remember when you first
made this connection, when this concept became something real in your mind?
I studied psychology, and my interests were eclectic. I was having a lot of conversations
with students and graduates of elite universities. One of the first interactions I had that made
this idea click for me, I was having a conversation with a fellow student at Yale, and she told me
that, again, we got to move beyond marriage. And I asked her, how were you raised? And she said,
well, I was raised by two married parents. And then I said, you're going to be a very successful
person later on down the line. Do you plan to have a family? How are you thinking about your
own future? And she said, well, I'm going to get married and have kids because that's how I was
raised, and that's what I'm going to do for my kids. But I think as an ideal, we need to move
beyond this. And what I was hearing was, I benefited from this age-old institution that led
me to study at Yale. I plan to carry this benefit forward for my own kids, but my official public
stance is people shouldn't do this. And so I heard that and this interesting mismatch, and I started
to read a lot about sociology of class, Thorsten Babelin, Pierre Bourdieu. And there was an
interesting book just a few years ago called Wasps, the Splendors and Miseries of an American
Aristocracy. So wasp, meaning white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, this was the American ruling class
from roughly the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries. I'm sure you're aware of this,
but just for the viewers. Sure, of course. And so in this book, the author, Michael Knox Barron,
it's basically a sort of history of the wasp class, the ruling elite of America.
And he points out that what he terms high wasps, kind of the tippy top of the wasp
elite structure, they would intentionally champion ideas and support certain causes because, and this
is a quote, because of the secret knowledge that it would abhor the Bulgarians. In other words,
they would support these views, not because they believed in them necessarily, but because there
was a certain glee and satisfaction at the fact that the masses wouldn't like it. It was a way to
achieve distinction. So if you are a normal, ordinary person and you think police are a good
thing, how do I distinguish myself from you? How do I show that I'm a member of this rarefied
class? I'm a card-holding member of polite society. Well, I say, well, actually, we don't
need police. This whole idea of police is tawdry, it's declassé, it's lowly. And so this is a way
to elevate myself above the commoner by saying these things. And so those kinds of ideas around
class of this distinction, this pursuit of status, and you see historical examples of this.
During the Middle Ages, spices were extremely expensive initially. They were hard to obtain,
only the elites could afford them. But then during the age of exploration, European explorers started
to travel to the Americas, to India. The cost of spice dropped dramatically, and suddenly ordinary
European peasants could afford spice. And in response, a lot of the elites and aristocrats in
Europe, they banned spice from the courts. Famously, King Louis XIV said no spice allowed except for
desserts. And this was in the 15th and 16th century. And so you had this thing, it was only
us elites get it. Oh no, no, no, the masses are using it now. Okay, so in response, no, we don't want that
anymore. It's always trying to be different from the ordinary person. And luxury beliefs are the
latest way that they do this. The difference here is that luxury beliefs are costly in a way that,
okay, they're using spice, we're not going to use it anymore. But if I say they believe in the police,
so we don't, so let's not allow them to have access to law enforcement. Or I have a lot of
impulse control and the ability to plan ahead. I'm in a fortunate environment. So the
possibility of drug use is very remote for me. But let's flood those other areas with,
if you want to order fentanyl on Amazon, that's perfectly fine. Because who am I to judge,
who am I to say one choice is better than the other? I keep going back to this idea. I mean,
again, the theme of this conference is, well, reconstruction from the continuing deconstruction
of Western civilization. And I can't help but wonder, it feels like some sort of ingenious
ploy, if you will, to kind of convince the elites of society to get on a program,
which would, in effect, be deconstructionist. Because, well, of course, those elites always
have a disproportionate impact on what really happens in the society. So do you think this
was a deliberate play by people who were into deconstruction to kind of inculcate this idea
into the elites so that then it would sort of trickle through society?
Yeah, it's interesting. I think a lot of these ideas are conceived in elite universities.
And many of the originators of these ideas, I think, yes, they do have this. The end in mind
is something like a socialist utopia, some kind of toppling of capitalism, the structure as it
exists. People are suffering from some Marxist notion of false consciousness, and we need to
wake people up. And so I'm going to spread these ideas. Anything that is potentially at odds with
conventional Western norms or values, it must inherently be good. So the propagators may have
some of that malicious intent. But I think as it spreads throughout elite media, and then through
the rest of the upper and upper middle class, most people are persuaded somehow that, well,
it's got to be a good idea. But otherwise, most people are actually well-intentioned. So there
would be no way for it to spread. That's why I think it strikes me like this sort of ingenious.
Yes. No, no, it is brilliant because they frame it in a way that sort of captures people's desire
to feel moral, and it captures the kind of uniquely elite desire to feel special,
to achieve distinction. So of course, you're a compassionate person if you believe these ideas,
but also you're going to be unique and different, and you're going to sound sophisticated and
interesting. You're going to come up with the sort of intellectual acrobatics necessary to
arrive at this idea that is at odds with what the majority of society believes.
But there's always this kind of implicit, snobbish attitude that maybe the masses don't
know what's good for them anyway, and it's us fine people who went through these institutions
that we know better. Many people have made the argument recently
that sometime this year or last year, we've kind of hit an inflection point. Some people call it
peak woke, right? There's just a drawback, and a lot of institutions that were kind of
caught up in this are starting to pull back from these policies that would basically codify,
enact a lot of the luxury beliefs that we've just been discussing. What do you think?
Have we reached peak woke? Yes. In sort of a broad sense, I think we have. Things are
obviously not as bad as they were in 2020 or 2021. Still, there are certain parts of society
where it's as bad as ever. I think academia is as woke in 2026 as it was in 2021. But for
elite media and for I think sort of the professional managerial class overall,
things have gotten a little better. We went through a very sort of strange and intense
period there in the early 2020s. The far left captured the institutions, and they saw their
moments to push forward. Maybe they saw that there was a little bit too much overreach,
and there was a backlash with the election of Trump, for example, in 2024. Now I think there's
a sort of a period of self-reflection. I don't think woke is permanently going away. It's in
kind of hibernation mode. This is something I think people misunderstand here, is that
in 2020, many activists were digging up social media posts from 2009 and saying,
oh, we're going to retroactively apply progressive moral standards today to something you posted a
decade ago. Today, people think, okay, we've passed peak woke. I'm going to say what I want,
speak my mind. But they're unaware, I think many of them, that just to throw a number out there,
say 2033, woke is going to come back, and they're going to find your post from 2026
and say, oh, we're in power again. We're in woke 2.0 or 3.0, and you posted something on
X or on Facebook or what have you from six or seven years ago. Now is the time for us to sort
of reemerge and reenact our preferred policies. I think it's just sort of a lull in the woke far
left movement. That doesn't bode well for the future. I mean, again, if you accept the premise
of this conference, that doesn't bode well for the future of Western civilization. I mean,
not to be overly melodramatic here. I know. Look, I'm broadly, temperamentally, I suppose, aligned
with conservatives. But I think a lot of them are incompetent, and they sort of fumble and
mismanage the power whenever they manage to acquire it. They manage to, what is the line,
they seize defeat from the jaws of victory. And there's still a chance. We'll see how things go
with the midterms of 2028, with how the universities continue to interact with the
administration. There are some kind of signs of reform. But look, that energy from 2020,
it didn't go away. That will sort of return. And then how do we handle it the next time?
Because in 2020, all the institutions folded. You even saw conservatives sort of falling in line
with the whole sort of BLM, Antifa, all that kind of stuff, at the very least paying lip service to
it. So will the next time that energy arises, will it be different?
Give me some examples of this. What is it? Seizing defeat from the jaws of victory. Give
me some examples of what you mean when you say that. There are examples at elite universities
where I understand, with people like Trump, with J.D. Vance, and with many other members
of the administration, that these elite universities, removing funding, often when you
hit them in their pocketbooks, that's when you can start to persuade them. But I think they may
have overshot the mark by reducing funding for science, for example. Not fake social science,
but actual hard STEM sciences in physics and chemistry, mathematics, medical technology,
and so on. I think that went a little bit too far. And even a lot of people who may have otherwise
been allies or had been broadly aligned within the academy, when they saw the administration
start to do this, strip funding from sectors that had nothing to do with wokeness, that ended up
backfiring and they lost a lot of people that would have otherwise been on their side.
I see. Interesting. So it's not going far enough, it's going too far in most cases?
Is that going too far? I think it was just a very unstrategic move. It was a blunder,
unnecessary. I don't even know if I would say going too far. But I suppose there is a case to
be made that making mistakes like that is better than the opposite, which would be doing nothing.
So I've heard versions of that argument, too. I'm curious if you have some thoughts. You gave
a list earlier of these different luxury beliefs. Do you have a sense of which one you think is
the most damaging or that needs to be challenged first?
Oh, man, there's a lot. Or a few, or a handful.
If I had to choose one, I think a lot of the difficulties that we see would be around the
family. This idea that either all family structures are equally likely to allow children to succeed
and flourish, or the belief that we need to actively dismantle the very family structure
that is most likely to lead to success, which is two married parents. So I think if we can
fix that one, we may indirectly start to repair some of the others. Because when you have kids
that are in environments full of neglect and an absence of role models and aspirations and goals,
the behavioral gap between people who are at the top and the bottom of the socioeconomic spectrum,
the gap in terms of marriage rates, law-abidingness, punctuality, employment rates,
all of these kinds of things, they used to be very small. And they started to diverge in the
early 1960s. And what could be responsible for this? Because in 1960, there were poor people,
this can't be the result of economic factors alone. If you compare poor people in 1960 to
poor people in 2026, their lives look very different in terms of employment rates,
law-abidingness, crime, likelihood of getting married and staying married versus
remaining single or divorced, incarceration, drug addiction. And much of that starts in the home
with the family, with stable communities. But the framework around luxury beliefs is important,
which is the people who are successful in their lives, I think they need to be more honest
about the practices that led to that success. And that's the meta idea of luxury beliefs.
That's right. You've written about status anxiety in that vein,
and just how the realities of modern culture amplify that. Tell me a bit about that.
So status anxiety, it's an interesting idea. So people ask, well, what is social status?
And a simple way to think about it is respect and admiration from your peers,
the people whose opinion you care about. Do you feel admired by them? Do you feel respected by
them? And there have been some interesting findings in social psychology, which have
indicated that that type of status, do I feel respected and admired by my peers, that is a
stronger predictor of happiness than socioeconomic status, how much money or how educated you are.
There's a small to moderate correlation between income and happiness, but a stronger effect of
admiration and respect. That's what I mean by status. And people have varying degrees of desire
for this kind of status. I sometimes compare it to hunger. Hunger is a universal thing that we all
feel, but some of us experience it more frequently and more intensely than others, this desire for
food. Now, we see this also for status. Now, it's a human universal. We all want to be liked and
admired to some degree, but some of us feel it more frequently and more intensely than others.
And there's a question here, well, who experiences this anxiety, this longing for status the most?
Well, maybe counterintuitively, the findings are that the people at or near the top of the
socioeconomic ladder experience the most desire for status. So the people who already have it
want it even more. And so there have been a couple of different studies. This is a replicated finding.
When you ask people, first collecting their objective metrics of status, so income,
occupational prestige, level of education, how well you're doing in your life, people who are
at or near the top of those measures are the most likely to agree with statements like,
it would please me to be in a position of power over others. I enjoy when people look at me when
I walk into a room. It's important for me to have influence over my peers. And so these are the
people, you know, you think, well, who has this sort of insatiable desire? It's people who kind
of already are doing quite well. There's a sociologist, Emil Durkheim from the 19th century,
and he had this classic line, the more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received
only stimulate instead of filling needs. One way to think about this is if you are dispossessed,
impoverished, you know, you are materially deprived in some way, you have very limited
number of desires. Maybe you want shelter, you want warmth, you want food, you know,
very basic desires, a limited number. But once all of those needs are met,
you know, now what do you want? Well, you want respect, you want esteem, you want admiration,
you want approval. And that feeling is much stronger once all of your other needs are already
met. You know, being here at AHRQ, it's very interesting because, you know, I go to a number
of different conferences that are broadly interested in this topic, right? Even Epoch
Times, our tagline is truth, tradition, hope, right? It's there in your shot on camera, in fact.
And what strikes me with this conference at AHRQ, I want to talk about it a little bit here,
is that it feels to me like, you know, an audience that views itself as somewhat sophisticated or a
group that views itself as somewhat sophisticated, which isn't necessarily the case in most of the
other conferences that I'm going to, which are more kind of like a people's thing, right? I'm
curious what you think. Yeah. Yeah. Well, you know, I love AHRQ. You know, I've been to every
single one. I think that these conferences are necessary. I feel at home here. I mean,
I love the emphasis on classical music and art. It's like, really, it's been a joy to be here.
Oh, yeah. It's edifying. And it's a place where they have managed to collect a group of ambitious,
smart, interesting people who can sense that something is going wrong in the culture.
And even if everyone here doesn't agree on everything, they do agree that, you know,
there's room for repair, for reform, finding ways to help society flourish. And these are necessary
sort of events to bring these kinds of people together. I, you know, begrudgingly become
accepting, I suppose, of this idea that, you know, if you want to understand sort of class
conflict and this kind of thing, you know, it's often framed as, you know, it's the rich versus
the poor. It's the workers versus the capitalists. It's, you know, the 1 percent and the 99 percent.
Well, that's the communist framing, isn't it? Always.
It's often framed as, yeah, in the kind of Marxist framework. But if you look historically at how
societies actually change and who drives this change, it's, you know, sort of, one,
there's the existing regime of the existing elites, and they are deposed by a counter elite
or an aspirational elite. So this is Peter Turchin's idea. He's discussed this at length
of intra-elite conflict, intra-elite competition. And essentially, you know, so much of the battles
in society are waged between sort of two groups of people who have economic capital, cultural
capital, a vision for society. And of course, they often require support and they're bolstered
by support from the masses, from many people. But ultimately, you need sort of a group of unified,
intelligent, competent, capable people who sort of have connections into different nodes in society
in order to drive change. And, you know, this is another shortcoming, I think, that conservatives
have. Leftists are extremely good at that kind of ground game of sort of, you know, the long march
through the institutions and that kind of idea of playing the long game of sort of infiltrating K
through 12, higher education, the professions, HR, and so on. And conservatives have repeatedly
dropped the ball on this. And, you know, there's this classic line of, you know, the side that
wants to win is always going to triumph over the side that wants to be left alone. And conservatives,
you know, they want to be left alone. It's understandable. You want the small government.
You want to be sort of left to your own devices. But as long as there's a powerful faction out
there that wants to interfere with you, you know, that kind of, you know, just hang out at your
house and grill and be left alone is not really feasible. There's got to be sort of a counter
elite to shield you from those other kinds of elites. Well, so I went to this American dinner
last night. And, you know, of course, we were talking about the American Revolutionary War
and the Declaration of Independence. And it just strikes me in the vein of what you just said,
that those people, you know, the founding fathers and the people that participated
were people who both wanted to be left alone and to win. Yeah. Oh, that's a good that's a
good point. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, with the American Revolution, I mean, this is this is a perfect
example of this, of, you know, the American Revolution. You know, it's often pitted as,
you know, sort of sort of ordinary settlers or people in the American colonies. And they're
fighting against this, you know, aristocratic British elite. But the founding fathers themselves
were, you know, very aristocratic, erudite, educated men who themselves were financially
for their time very well off. And obviously, we won't know the specific statistics for this.
But I've read that historian say something like only a third of the people in the American
colonies actually supported the American Revolution. You know, very few ordinary people
wanted to wage this war. And yet the founding fathers, you know, they saw their opportunity.
They saw their opening. They coalesced. They united. They gave this sort of shared ambition
and managed to triumph in this case. And I think that is kind of a model of how these
things actually tend to go, that, you know, historically, ordinary people, you know,
they're either uninvolved or sort of tepidly interested, but then the elite sort of encounter
elite sort of spotlight and foreground certain issues and get them to care about it.
We talked about peak woke, and you say you think it's just kind of simmering and
waiting to roar back. So I'll ask the question maybe in a slightly different way, like luxury
beliefs now, right? Are they here to stay with our elite classes? Or is this something you see
or at least reduce them? I mean, maybe by people like this, because clearly there's a lot of
elites which have a different view of the world here.
Well, I liken the idea of luxury beliefs to fashion. And so there's this cyclical nature
of what's fashionable and trendy today, you know, a year from now, two years from now,
it'll be out of date. It won't be trendy anymore.
It feels awfully fickle.
Yes, yeah, yeah.
I mean, these are these are these have profound impact on our society, on our
socioeconomic status of people of the most vulnerable people, right? I mean, this is this
is no, this is what probably got you thinking about this stuff in the first place, right?
Yeah. So I mean, I think maybe the specific beliefs will shift over time. But the underlying
drive for status for distinction, that will remain and it will continue to express itself
in the form of luxury beliefs. So look, I started writing about this publicly in 2019.
September, the first essay I published on the idea of luxury beliefs.
And I was asked at that time, what's the next luxury belief? And I said, Oh, you know, I have
no idea. I think I probably tossed out a couple of ideas that never came to fruition, not good
at predicting the future. But the very last thing I think I would have ever predicted was, oh, in
six or seven months, you're going to see, you know, the cultural elite coalesce around this
idea that we need to abolish the police. That would have never occurred to me. And then six
months later, it's you know, in the headlines of the New York Times, yes, we literally mean
abolish the police and you're seeing people in the streets marching in favor of it. And then there
were many cities that did reduce funding for law enforcement and led to a temporary increase in
violent crime. And now it's the class A and a lot of people are embarrassed by that whole thing.
If you bring up deep on the police with a lot of left leaning people, they start to get a little
uncomfortable and say, well, we didn't really mean that. Because now it's unfashionable. And
you know, we're gonna move on to the next thing. No one will be held accountable for it. That's,
you know, that's, that's the tragic thing about this. So never, never any accountability for
luxury beliefs being enacted with disastrous consequences. I mean, was anyone held accountable
for the lockdowns? You know, like, did anyone? No, but no, but we're still holding on some hope
I hope there will be. But, you know, I wouldn't I wouldn't bet on it. You know, once in a while,
there is, you know, we need that to listen, this whole we're again, right, everything we're all
about sort of renitting the fabric of society somehow that's being deconstructed. Don't we
Yes, yeah, I mean, to an extent, I think there's also something to be said for,
you know, the accountability is pointing out mistakes of others. And then there's the other
piece, which is creating a positive aspirational vision, and focusing more on, okay, all of these
things happened, a lot of disappointments, a lot of elite failure, but let's move on and
move forward with a different path. And in order to persuade people of that path, just to, you know,
kind of point out, oh, by the way, remember all those failures and how no one was accountable.
So you can use that too, as a sort of a fuel for your movement.
I've really enjoyed this conversation. A final thought as we finish?
No, no, I've really enjoyed this as well. So thank you.
Well, Rob Henderson, it's such a pleasure to have had you on.
Thank you.
Thank you all for joining Rob Henderson and me on this episode of American Thought Leaders.
I'm your host, Jan Jekielek.