Kevin Warsh's Planned GREAT RESET | How to Prepare & WIN.

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7 Video Views·Jul 6, 2026
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In this video, we're going to break down critical information on what T.S. Lombard warns us about
institutionally as what could absolutely destroy this economy, and it has to do with high inflation
and yet another mistake from the Federal Reserve. At the same time, we have Cathie Wood taking the
opposite opinion, that even though the current employment data we saw is recessionary, she thinks
that deflation is going to take over and our economy is absolutely going to boom and that
Kevin Warsh is absolutely the best thing since sliced bread. Okay, maybe I'm being a little
extreme there, but in my opinion, these are very important perspectives because they're going to
show you the same exact warning signs that you should pay attention to when analyzing your
portfolio. What companies do you want to be exposed to? What type of companies do you not want to be
exposed to? What investments are better than others? And this is the macro backbone that
helps us shape that worldview for the next decade. So without further ado, let's get into it. Let's
start with the Cathie Woodian argument. Then what we're going to do is we'll go back to the T.S.
Lombard piece and we'll go through this in detail of what's going on because it's almost a direct
response to Cathie. And then I'll give you my opinion and the critical takeaways. Those critical
takeaways will make the most sense if you pay close attention to what we're about to say because
these are the important parts. The very first and most important part comes from Cathie Wood's
argument on what the yield curve is actually telling us. Now, this is quite interesting
because the yield curve has recently been flattening. That's a way of saying that all
of a sudden we are seeing a decline in the difference between the 10 year treasury and
the two year treasury. And a lot of people look at that and say, hey, you know what,
why is this happening? This is quite funky. Cathie Wood's argument is that, well, what's
happening is the two year yield is actually going up on the short term. We're seeing that inflationary
pressure. But on the long term, markets are actually pricing in deflation. And so in other
words, she's saying the bond market is agreeing with her that deflation is coming. And the reason
she thinks that deflation is coming is because she believes that productivity by workers going
up is exactly what ends up driving deflation. And you're going to see two arguments on this.
To evidence her take on deflation, she also, of course, does what everyone who likes deflation
says, and that is they refer to trueflation. Well, but, Kevin, CPI might be 4 percent,
but look at trueflation. It says it's under 2 percent, which is under the target.
OK, that's fine. So let's write down the arguments on each side and figure out what we end up
thinking will be true and how to make money from this, because that's what matters.
So Cathie Wood says we're going to get productivity, a productivity boom,
which will actually drive prices down. She also says trueflation is already reflect reflecting
that inflation is actually lower than expected and that the Fed taking time sort of pausing
with these task forces forces is actually a good thing. So pause is good and dovish.
So that helps that deflation thesis play out so the Fed doesn't end up making a mistake.
That'll end up being a very important part in just a moment.
The bond market is also pricing in deflation. So Cathie says all this deflation is going to
end up leading growth to explode and that we don't have to be worried about our long term U.S.
debt because we're going to massively outgrow it. People are still on net buying and countries
are still net buying treasuries, even though she did acknowledge that China and India and Japan
have had to sell Japan, especially to stabilize their currency. She thinks you don't have to be
worried about that. Just focus on what we know. And what we know is these things are all good
for deflation and growth. Now, the thing that hits her in the face and she acknowledges it,
but she kind of glosses over it, is literally the employment data that we got on Friday, which,
you know, I was hoping she would have a really good analysis on this, but I don't think she
really had a good explanation on this. She argues that the U.S. household employment rate
on a three month average, so smoothing the volatility out a little bit, has gone negative.
And this negative read usually only happens in a recessionary time. You can see sort of the
line periods here where you have recession and then they're under the dotted line. So the shaded
areas representing recession here under the dotted line. And then now we're under the dotted
line, much more than that near under dotted line moment over here, and that this is problematic.
She does not have a reason for this, or she has a theory, but not a good reason for this.
Part of what is driving this so far, just so you could see the last employment numbers,
in case you didn't see them, we missed by about 50%. Part of that was driven by healthcare
employment growing slower than our usual trend of 38,000, we only got 22,000.
And leisure and hospitality actually went negative 61,000 in June, despite the soccer games,
right, the World Cup, reflecting, quote, weaker than usual seasonal hiring, kind of weird.
And then obviously over here, we have the civilian labor force plummeting by 702,000 workers.
And this is now worse than where we were in June of 2025. So we are now year over year down about
1 million workers in our economy. If you compare those two red numbers here,
and the labor force participation rate has been falling. She says that maybe this is because the
government is really bad at analyzing what entrepreneurs are doing, like people just,
oh, I'm going to take AI and I'm going to go run a startup. And that, you know, hey,
you know, everybody can make money. And the Bureau of Labor Statistics is really bad at
evaluating that these are people who haven't left the labor market, they're just running startups.
Yeah, I don't think so. I think that's actually, this is where I'm going to come in with my
opinion. I think that's a wrong opinion. I actually think that labor data that we're
seeing right here, and so we'll put this in as green for sort of a Kevin color,
I actually think is a deflationary argument. So we've had this labor market that's
like boomed coming out of the fourth quarter, we were really slowing down last year.
And the opposite of what Goolsbee told us has happened so far, we hit a level like zero on
breakeven. And we've really come out of that. But history will tell us if normal history continues,
which is what Goolsbee said that usually, you don't just stop at a line, and then you turn up,
you keep going down with the labor market. So far, labor has recovered. But this last labor
report was bad again. So I'm going to put labor over here. And we'll say sort of labor asterisk,
because the data is noisy, but we know the labor market drives everything. Because if the labor
market drives us into a recession, we're going to get massive deflation. It doesn't matter what
the other arguments are, right? A small note on Kathy's take of like, just use AI and create a
startup. I actually think it's really hard to do that. I think you need 10s of millions of dollars
to actually be able to pull that off well. I think we're doing that at reinvest, but that's
in part because I think we went from a lot of workers working GNA stuff in the office, legal,
accounting, paperwork, leases, whatever, research on paperwork related stuff, markets for real
estate or whatever, that kind of research AI can do now in some extent. And that spending for us
has been moved to software developers, right? We cut our GNA expense like 60, 70%, a fraction of
the workers there, but we still spend roughly the same because now we're blowing money on,
I shouldn't say blowing, we're spending money on workers who are, in my opinion, are creating
productive tools. That actually is part of Kathy Wood's productivity argument. If you're spending
X dollars on salary, just to keep the lights on, you know, general and administrative expenses,
that doesn't grow the business. But if you're spending, now, if you're shifting that money
from there to people who can grow the business by creating new products or services, then the
business can grow. That's a productivity boom argument. The problem is what you'll actually see
is T.S. Lombard on the side over here thinks that productivity could actually be inflationary.
And the reason they say it could be inflationary is because the gains of productivity don't
necessarily have to go to the workers. They could end up going to the company. Now, in fairness,
if the company is paying stock comp, that should trickle back to the employees, but you could see
both of them actually are on opposite sides of the same argument. Oh yeah, productivity,
but that's going to drive prices down. Over here, T.S. Lombard will end up saying that
productivity can actually drive prices up as companies can preserve their margins.
Why can companies preserve their margins? Well, it has to do with this argument here,
that you're seeing AI release substantially more applications than ever before on the App Store,
but reviews for apps and apps with significant usage have actually both been declining,
suggesting it's actually not that easy to start a company and gain traction with artificial
intelligence, that there's a lot that goes into that. And maybe the best beneficiaries
would be the biggest companies, not the smallest companies. So Cathie Wood really runs this circle
around, wow, everything is booming. Productivity is going to boom. Ignore this horrible jobs report,
this loss of a million workers over here. Let's ignore that because that's weird,
even though that is a deflationary argument, right? Let's ignore that and kind of gloss over
that and just, wow, we're going into a boom and Kevin Warsh is going to wait to raise rates and
hopefully he never does. That's good for us. Okay. Yeah. Those are deflationary takes. That's
fine. Then Cathie brings up the growth argument. She brings up this idea about the ramp capital
study. Remember how I did the breakdown on the ramp capital study where David Sachs comes out
and basically pulls the White House narrative of, oh, see, a narrative violation. Entry level head
count rises 12% for high intensity adopters of AI and firms making the largest AI investments
grew employment by 10% following adoption. Okay. We did a whole video breaking this down.
The video is actually called the jobs, exposing the AI jobpocalypse.
Highly encourage you watch it. Like the video as well. Exposing the AI jobpocalypse. Basically,
one of the key takeaways, and there's a lot in this that I think you should watch, but one of
the key takeaways is that the companies that actually gained employment were tech companies
and mostly VC funded companies. The other companies didn't actually see any kind of
increase in hiring. And the study was only on ramp users, which are typically more likely to
be startups or newer companies anyway. So we don't know how many jobs are being lost at legacy
businesses. It's a problem. Cathie Wood didn't go into those details. I thought that was actually
disappointing for ARK Invest. I think they could have gone a lot more granular into the data and
they didn't, which usually they do. And so I was disappointed by that. I'm not bagging on them.
I'm just saying, hey, I feel like you could have done a little bit more research on that. I feel
like you kind of read a tweet from David Sacks and took it for gold, which you should never take
a tweet for gold because we all know most short form, super short form content is engagement
farming. It's deep dive videos or research. That's usually where the thinking is. And that's what
we're doing here, too. This is hard, right? We've got these deflationary arguments. Well, what does
T.S. Lombard say for inflationary arguments? And how do we put all of that together? Look at this.
T.S. Lombard says that many pundits believe that AI is a powerful deflationary force.
That thesis is wrong, particularly during the current build-out phase, where hyperscalers
are engaged in massive infrastructure projects, the equivalent of a major stimulus program. Now
watch the labor market, because if employment reaccelerates, the debate will be settled
in favor of the hawks. But that ends up being a big oopsie doopsie at the end of this document.
Stand by. So the first thing that T.S. Lombard comes in and says is that the build-out of
artificial intelligence is inflationary. And this is true. I don't think anybody can argue that.
In fact, if you look at the Congressional Budget Office for the CHIPS Act
or for the Inflation Reduction Act, these infrastructure building projects were known
to be inflationary up front, and they are expected to be deflationary in the long-term future.
In fact, a great way you could see this is by looking at chart 16 from T.S. Lombard.
They say that memory prices, basically as a proxy—I should write proxy instead of whatever,
and there we go, misspelled that—memory prices as a proxy for compute demand. This here,
showing a chart of memory prices skyrocketing, and they're using this as a proxy for compute demand,
in my opinion, is kind of wild, first of all, or insane, because memory prices are kind of unique.
Memory prices don't actually build out as fast as other components in a capitalistic economy.
That's because memory is basically a commodity, and it comes down—everything in profitability
for memory and really chip manufacturing comes down to something known as capacity utilization.
This is kind of like what the defense contractors do as well. They have to engineer some sort of
shortage on purpose. They want to build a backlog, because if they have a backlog,
they know there's going to be work for their workers tomorrow. If they're always filling
backlog 100%, they don't know if a new contract is going to come in tomorrow.
So they purposefully keep their factories at 100% or they lose money.
Micron lost billions of dollars in 2023. Now they're making billions of dollars.
That flip-flop is exhausting for those companies, because they have to fire people,
and then they lose quality workers, and then they have to try to hire them back,
and the boom times and all that is inefficient, and it takes time. The boom and bust cycle sucks.
So they try to prevent that. Yet, ironically, Micron is adding a crap load of capacity.
Mark these dates. This capacity expansion is insane. I'm going to come back to those dates
as well. Know that SK Hynix and Samsung are doing it as well. But I'm going to write down
capacity expansion, which, I mean, I guess you could really call it supply, right?
So capacity expansion, aka an increase in supply. So take a look at this. A wafer fab coming out in
mid-27 for DRAM. Advanced package manufacturing, high bandwidth memory in 27. Another fab in
Boise, Idaho, wafer manufacturing, end of 28. Singapore wafer fab, second half of 28. Taiwan
wafer fab, 2028. New York, the first of four mega-fabs to be built on this particular site
should complete by 2030. So they can pick up those New York tax credits and leftover chip sack
credits. Smart. But this is a massive manufacturing expansion. One, two, three, four, five, six.
They've got about 15 plants right now. So this is somewhere around a, well, and you would expect
that these new plants would be more efficient. I would estimate that this probably increases
their capacity by about 50%, even though it's about a 35-ish, 37-ish percent increase in
facilities. Probably increases their capacity by about 50%. That's deflationary when you build that
out. And it sort of assumes that the CapEx build-out is going to be inflationary and have
infinite demand forever, which I don't think is the best assumption, but whatever. So going back
to the TS Lombard piece, I don't think anybody can argue that the AI build-out is not inflationary.
It's definitely inflationary. We know that. But an argument that they make, which is very
interesting, is what they call the J-curve, which is also inflationary. The J-curve is basically
where here we are not using AI. We're not using AI. And then all of a sudden, oh, now we're using AI.
And we're actually not really good at using AI yet. So we're actually going to go through this
inefficient period of time where the green dotted lines are like your base level of efficiency.
And then you become more inefficient at first, which is inflationary, right? You're spending
money token maxing where you really shouldn't be spending money token maxing. And then only
when you realize it and then become more efficient, do you actually net-net become more efficient.
But that this phase right here between these two green lines is inflationary. Okay, so now we have
to write that down on our list over here. We're going to call the build-out inflationary productivity.
Each side has their argument. We're going to call the J-curve inflationary. Okay, J-curve,
not to be confused with Jerome Powell or my son, Jay. In addition to this, they say that delaying
interest rate hikes, the mistake they say that Warsh is doing will actually end up booming
employment more and stoking inflation even more. Delayed hikes. Now, they have been a fan of
raising rates for a while. In fact, the very day after this report came out, the jobs report came
out, and then they had to sort of mea culpa, oh, taken at face value, this was a great employment
report for the doves. Now it was driven by bad reasons, which are recessionary, a plunge in
labor force participation. This is not good. But darn, I guess that's going to delay rate hikes
even more, which is actually what they argue. They say like any reason the Fed uses to delay
rate hikes will just drive more inflation. Now, they do, in fairness, gloss over that we've had
40 years of disinflation. There's a reason for that, right? Most of that was driven by
globalization, manufacturing in China, and it really reduced goods prices for us, which is
a positive. The last five years of inflation have heavily been driven by, well, six years of COVID
panic. Obviously, then we had Russia and Ukraine as a war. We had the Red Sea supply chain shortages.
For a moment, we had a banking crisis. The Fed basically unlimited backstop. And then, of course,
we had the Iran Hormuz situation. There've been other inflationary shocks. The tariff shock is
another good one, right? These are a lot of inflationary impetuses that the market has
really stood up against so far. I mean, obviously, we've seen inflation elevated, but the economy has
mostly held up so far, which is impressive. But how much more can this freaking economy take,
right? Anyway, so they argue that the Fed's going to boom employment by delaying rate hikes even
more. And by doing that, they're going to accelerate the wealth effect. Basically,
company stock prices go up. They generate the wealth effect that leads to more business spending
and more consumer spending because stocks are up. Now, in addition to wealth effects, so basically,
people, stocks up, people want to spend more money. T.S. Lombard makes the argument that
artificial intelligence is going to become more concentrated by big companies, basically,
like Google and Meta and Microsoft. And those companies are going to be able to collude against
or with each other against us by taking our geographies, our browsing histories, our needs,
our pain points, and actually charging us more for those products. So I'm going to write that down
as a collusion argument, which would be really bad. Collude, we'll call it collude and consolidate.
So collude and consolidate, basically consolidating gains into big companies,
companies that have millions of dollars, right, or billions of dollars, frankly.
So collude and consolidate, inflationary thesis. It's probably one of their least supported with
evidence. I think that's more of just sort of like a fear of theirs. And then this is where
they get to an interesting point as they actually say that artificial intelligence does something
for labor that a lot of people don't think of. They refer to this as the augmentation of labor.
I think this is actually a very interesting argument. The way I imagine the augmentation
of labor is kind of like this. So we had a company that has a bunch of G&A people.
Now we've moved that to R&D and they can use AI and create more products and services faster,
which means the company is able to make more money, which obviously becomes really impactful
for when a company starts reporting that they're making money from an AI, but there's a delay to
that, right? It takes years for that to show up in the actual earnings reports and for people to
start seeing a compounding growth effect. What's remarkable about that is there's this lag time,
basically, where people put on this tool belt and then it could take two or three years for those
gains to actually show up. The tool belt is really what they mean by an augmentation of AI.
To simplify it, let's imagine you were a cop and you did not have a duty belt, it's called,
so you didn't have a tool belt at all. So anytime you needed your radio, you had to go back to the
car. Oh, you need a different weapon, you have to go back to the car. You want to get the taser,
you got to go back to the car. Need a handcuffs, got to go back to the car. Need a reload, got to
go back to the car. You're limited by what you can hold in your pockets. Then you give cops these
giant duty belts and you get strapped clicking and now I've got my gun, I got my cross-straw taser,
and I got my body cam, and I got all these attachments. You're like a walking machine of
components and tools. I got my baton right here, I got my flashlight right here, I got my handcuffs
back here, whatever. My radio's tapped over here, whatever. I think of AI as kind of like that.
You're a cop without a duty belt and then you're a cop with a duty belt.
And it kind of takes time for that augmentation to show up in numbers, but you know that
productivity boom is happening. Now, in fairness, there's really no data that says over the long
term, margins are going to expand and companies will not reduce their prices. They say there is
no guarantee that companies will reduce their prices because of the augmentation of labor.
Instead, margins at companies might go up. You can't really prove that in my opinion,
and I think that's why they don't prove it. Historically, our economy is a market economy.
More businesses with lower barriers to entry because they're augmented by tools are able to
generate more wealth for more people and prices generally come down over time. That's my opinion.
Their argument is, nope, companies are just going to get richer and make more money.
That's the tool belt thesis they have. That's why it's in the inflationary side.
We know that over time, technology creates jobs and expands the wealth effect. GDP per
capita per head goes up. ATMs, for example, led to more tellers, easier to make bank branches.
Looms made it easier to make cloth. The labor it took to make cloth fell by 98% in the 1800s.
Cloth usage skyrocketed. AI skyrocketed. How many radiologists we employ? Jensen Wong always
says that. Spreadsheets actually skyrocketed the number of accountant and analyst jobs that we had,
net more than the bookkeepers we've lost. 60% of employment in 2018 was made up of
jobs that did not exist before World War II. That means there's a greater than half chance
the job you have today did not exist before World War II. A YouTuber certainly didn't exist back
then. App developer and software didn't exist back then, right? We're doing all of those.
Developing AI, I mean, we've been working, well, back then we called it big data or neural nets.
We were working that starting back in 2018 before this was a formal enterprise, reinvest.
But anyway, it's actually like there's no doubt in my mind that long-term
trained America is going to do well. I don't think there's a debate there.
I think the debate is, are we going to see rapid deflation or are we going to see inflation?
Whose argument is correct? That's the big question. Because evaluate this for a moment. We
got a lot of information here. Productivity causes deflation. Productivity causes inflation. The
build-out causes inflation. Yeah, but pausing is dovish. And the bond market says we're going to
get deflation. And the last labor market report was bad and capacity is expanding. In fact, your
very own chart 12, T.S. Lombard, tells us that most of that excess capacity that you say is
inflationary actually ends in 2028 and 2030. There it is. Long wait times on AI supplies.
Ending in 2028 and 2030. Boom. You can see it right here. You kind of draw a line top to bottom
and you can see where those things end. I remember even earlier, more like the end of
27 over there. Okay. The J-curve. Well, the J-curve of that inflationary turnaround, we're
already kind of seeing that roll over. Companies that, you know, that was really what I would call
the token maxing phase. We're past that. So the build-out is going to be deflationary.
The J-curve period will turn deflationary. Delayed hikes. All right. We can argue about that.
This colluding and consolidating, it's a risk. You know, that's why we have antitrust laws. This
is a fair risk that the gains are going to consolidate amongst the biggest companies.
Actually, one of the reasons why I think companies like Meta and Microsoft and Google or even Amazon
probably going to be the biggest winners of this cycle. I think the biggest losers through this
are going to be the companies that are bought at peak prices because of the AI build-out
drive. That ends up fading. You know, that compute side, the NeoCloud, the CoreWeave side,
that ends up collapsing in the next decade. The rich cash-generating companies, they're the ones
who make most of the money. In fact, the worst recessions are debt-driven. Think great recession.
Long, painful to get out of, took a lot of money printing to get out of. Much lighter recession was
actually the dot-com bust. Dot-com bust was only eight months long. Obviously, a lot of stocks fell
a lot, but that was mostly an equity-led recession. People's stock values went down.
Debt recessions where people get wiped out of their homes are very, very long and painful.
So far, this build-out has really been driven by not even the cash on companies' balance sheets,
though in part, it's mostly been driven by cash flow. That's why I say as soon as these companies
snap their fingers and say, you know what, we're not going to spend as much money on CapEx anymore,
all of these inflationary concerns evaporate. So I think the build-out is inflationary,
but I personally think the moment Meta says we're going to reduce our CapEx,
the build-out disappears. Wow, I was not expecting it to do that. The build-out disappears
the inflationary pressures. I think it's because it's out and it's drying out. That's what it is.
The build-out inflationary pressures go away. Oh, this is no good. Oh, that's like a reinvest
color though. That's kind of nice. The J-curve we think is sort of a temporary issue. The collude
and consolidate fine, the tool belt, the augmented labor. Augmented labor only works if people are
being hired. If companies start turning around and firing people and nobody's getting absorbed
because you're in a recession, it doesn't matter how augmented you are, you're going to be out of
a freaking job. So let's think about this for a moment. The red flags that we want to watch for
are U-turns, changing points in the economy. Where have we recently seen one?
Meta, three months ago, Mark Zuckerberg told us that there was a loop. I'm going to pull it up
because I think it's actually really important. There's a loop of CapEx spending. And what that
means is, hey, if we have a neural net that we're building now, well, next year, we're just going to
have to make a better one. So we're going to have to keep spending on CapEx to support the newest
and next and greatest models. There it is. We have our next set of more advanced models in
training right now, and that work will, I think, just continue. I mean, that's a loop and I don't
think we're going to be done anytime soon. Okay, that was right here on April 29th. Well, here we
are two months and a week later. Mark Zuckerberg says AI agent tech progressing slower than
expected. And this is where Mark Zuckerberg expects more significant AI benefits within the
next three to six months. This is basically the monetization. That bets on restructuring the
company haven't come to fruition yet, and they will, and that'll lead to more money, which is
great. EPS up. He's trying to really pump the stock up over here, and they have been laying
off employees. But the point is, they're focusing now on efficiency gains, positioning Meta to
capitalize on efficiency gains from artificial intelligence work. Okay, now that's important.
Why is it important? Because it's an early flip. It's an early rotation in, okay, CapEx is
potentially starting to slow. In fact, I wrote a lot of this down. Look at this. The rapid arrival
of deflation would obviously be a recession, right? But ignore recession for a moment. What
really matters more is identifying the keys coming up to that. It's CapEx slowing down at
hyperscalers, growth rates turning negative for the producers of memory, compute costs go down,
layoffs ensue, and then, you know, worst case, it takes a decade of money printing to actually get
people back to work. Now, we think people broadly will benefit in the long term from AI. But in the
short term, and I suggested this at the beginning, both could be true. You could have inflation right
now, and you could be walking into a recessionary setup. And then you want to decide who wins,
and when does it potentially show up? We talked about when the CapEx, when the capacity of supply
comes online. We haven't seen the CapEx peak yet. That is critical for your long term investments.
We think that 2027 to 2029 could be where you should be prepared for that. And TS Lombard
actually gives a warning as to what that moment might be. Given these developments,
we think investors should expect a new Fed chair to eventually reverse his deflationary AI thesis,
not unlike the U-turn we saw from Alan Greenspan in 2000. Basically, where Alan Greenspan in 2000
said, hey, we're going to raise rates. And he flip-flopped. Instead of holding rates,
he decided to raise rates. And that ended up marking the peak of the dot-com mania.
The economy can handle higher rates in the short term, but 2027 could be much more challenging.
Huh. Now that's very interesting. So my take is that it basically takes decades to get new
jobs into reality. We inflate and inflate and inflate until we slowly begin to leak out of
this bubble. The CapEx rolls over to negative employment slows. That's where the pain happens.
And that's where I've put together this. I dare it. I don't want to call it a cheat sheet because
it's more like a messy sheet of notes, but some real bottom line takeaways on this and what to
think about when it comes to your money. So look at this. AI is good. History shows that long term,
it will create jobs. GDP per capita will go up and it'll be a success where it's a failure.
The failures will die off unless of course they're bailed out by the Fed, like, you know,
banks, uh, the bailouts, build out companies are usually the biggest losers.
Think about the railroad companies, the energy producers for the rail, uh, for the electrification
era, Cisco, RCA, you know, radios, this, these were all massive losers. So you have to be really
careful about the hype, uh, avoid, avoid the hype. And that doesn't make them bad companies
just because Cisco was hyped out in 2000 doesn't make it a bad company. It was just overpriced,
uh, and optimism that the spending would go on forever was misplaced because it never goes on
forever. It never goes on forever. The AI build out in the impression that memory prices will
skyrocket forever, dies with capex rolling over market compression, then creates negative,
a negative wealth effect that causes a substantial rise in unabsorbed layoffs.
That's my line. Okay. I'll take credit for that. Unabsorbed layoffs is a really key phrase that
people don't pay much attention to because right now you hear, Oh, 10,000 layoffs. And then the
unemployment rate goes down. You know, part of that is participation, people being removed from
the labor market. And the other is just, we're just not laying off that many people, but eventually
you get to the point where the cup of laid off people is full and you can't swallow the pill
anymore, so to speak. Uh, and so then you get unabsorbed layoffs and that's really bad. That's
when you really get a, a recessionary layoff, uh, or employment rates right now we're absorbing
because the stock market is at all time highs. You're not really driving efficiency needs at
companies, disciplined companies know this. And I think this is what, what I try to drive home
is, and these are the lessons that I think we teach on the channel here is I look at reinvest
my company, not as this is not a pitch for you. We're not raising money right now or anything.
It's just a way for you to know. When I look at our company reinvest, I look, I go discipline
in how you spend money and what you allocate to and how you grow the business is how you survive.
You go all in on some hype train right now. You sound really smart,
drop out of college to get into the hardware chip race, and everybody loves you. And you're a hero.
And then before you know it, a recession hits and you're bankrupt and nobody wants your stuff.
That is not how to build a long lasting company. That is a great lottery ticket. Yolo.
I don't think reinvest is a lottery ticket. Yolo for me, it is, is a slow, long-term
disciplined methodical way to invest and grow in a conservative and safe manner.
Hashtag no guarantees. Don't sue me as you see. Obviously that's the premise that I've
been building since day one with this company. And so avoiding that hype is critical.
This means we are right now in a place of unfettered optimism about the long-term future,
but we should also be hedged for a very real recession. So being hedged is having optionality,
having cash, having limited debt. You don't want to be the debt individual that goes bust and then
you'll lose it. Did you know twice as many people in the United States disappear themselves every
single year because of depression related to financial stress as people die in house fires?
And like 4,000 people die a year in house fires in America, which is also really scary. But anyway,
in the 2001 crash, the Fed policy helped us out by March with easy money. In Feb of 2009,
we got bailed out by QE. December 2018, Jerome, you turned on rates, right? The Fed eventually
starts printing money. March of 2020, unlimited money printing. March of 2023, de facto FDIC
guarantee. But Warsh has a different history, and this is why discipline is even more important now.
This right here tells you that discipline is the most important right now. Warsh has a history and
a reputation of being anti-money printing and anti-balance sheet. That is the worst kind of
We have gotten really used to hyper-fast Fed puts where the Fed just bails us out. Well,
what happens when we cut rates to zero because the CapEx cycle has rolled over, the boom is over,
prices are falling, growth is negative, and jobs are rolling over? And then Kevin Warsh
cuts rates, but then it's like, hey, man, you need to turn the money printer on.
And then you know what he says? We've got a task force looking into the money printer.
We'll know when the task force decides. Oh, do you know when that might be? Because a lot of
people are bankrupt and companies are going under and the economy is in the toilet and GDP is
negative. You know, can you give us any hint as to when you might be actually able to bail out
the economy, please? I don't give forward guidance. Like, can you see how right now,
not providing forward guidance is dovish? But in a crisis, that could be the death of the economy.
Well, I'm not going to say the death of the economy, but it could be like the boot on the
neck of the economy while it's already in the gutter. That's where the companies that are
deleveraged win. No, you have to have the balls at the time of being deleveraged to win. There
were plenty of people in 2008 that had plenty of cash and they just didn't have the balls to deploy
it. My opinion is that hopefully, let's say later this year, just as an example, I'll just give you
my POV. Let's say later this year, we do another raise with some kind of yield. People really like
the yield. We've paid out probably nearly a couple million dollars in yield payments to people who
have invested in Househack just over the last couple of years here. And if we come up with
another raise where we offer yield again to folks and people who are able to invest in that round
and be part of our growth story, what's actually really incredible is I think we can build
a company that before the next sort of recession, we could potentially build a company that has
two to $250 million in assets. I'm not talking about market cap. I already think we're close
to a $200 million market cap. But if we had about, let's call it $250 million in cash assets,
mostly real estate, because that's what we do. We reinvest in the real estate.
$250 million of real estate could represent a down payment of about, call it 35% on real estate
when rates go to zero, when and if rates go to zero, which I think they will.
That would represent a down payment potentially on $714 million of real estate,
which is kind of crazy because you borrow a lot. Now, you have to be careful because obviously,
if you borrow at the wrong time, it's a problem. But it's really interesting because that's why
we buy deals below value, right? That's our goal is to buy real estate at a wedge.
If we had to buy wedge deals on $500 million of real estate, and then we got a 20% discount
on each deal that we bought, we think we would instantly be up $100 million of equity.
In other words, we would take half of today's company market cap and just add it on during
such an event. And I'm just being really transparent about those sort of ideas and
plans and sort of visions, but the rewards accrue to those who are unleveraged.
And then of course, when you get back to the boom side, it gets even more ridiculous.
So I'm optimistic on Train America, but I'm really, really cautious on what's overhyped,
people who are not disciplined scares me. And I want to get through with all of you who watch
my channel winning on the other side, deleverage and pay attention, be prepared.
Warsh will be hawkish in a bust, and that's going to suck. The companies that probably win big will
probably be the companies that are selling off right now, like Microsoft, Google and Meta.
I think they're going to have the cash flow to pick up a lot of money at the bottom,
because even if their growth stops, they generate so much freaking cash,
they're going to be able to go around and buy whatever they want. And that's where big money
goes. That's my take. That reconciles all of this. Thank you so much for watching. And it
was a long one. Hope you liked it. And we'll see you in the next one. Goodbye and goodbye.
Man, you have done so much. People love you. People look up to you. Kevin Paffrath there,
financial analyst and YouTuber. Meet Kevin. Always great to get your take.
