This Dronescapes documentary tells the declassified history of the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk and its secret prototype, the "Have Blue" demonstrator. It also features an exclusive interview with Skunk Works test pilot Harold "Hal" Farley Jr. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. Air Force faced a crisis. Advanced Soviet radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems threatened to make conventional, non-stealthy aircraft obsolete. A revolutionary solution was needed. The top-secret challenge was taken up by Lockheed's legendary Advanced Development Programs, better known as the Skunk Works. Their answer was not a faster or higher-flying plane, but one that could be invisible.
This film traces the origins of stealth technology back to "Project Have Blue." We explore how Skunk Works engineers, using pioneering computer modeling, created a bizarre, faceted airframe nicknamed the "Hopeless Diamond." This design was intended to deflect radar waves, making the aircraft nearly undetectable. Through rare, restored footage, witness the secret test flights of the Have Blue prototypes at the clandestine Groom Lake facility.
The centerpiece of this documentary is an exclusive, in-depth interview with Hal Farley Jr., the first test pilot to ever fly the Have Blue prototype. He provides a unique, firsthand account of what it was like to pilot this unstable, groundbreaking machine and push the boundaries of a technology that would change warfare forever. We then follow the evolution from the successful Have Blue demonstrator to the operational F-117A Nighthawk. We chronicle its secret service, its stunning public reveal, and its decisive role in conflicts like Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Storm, where it flew with impunity through the most heavily defended airspace in the world.
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Video Summary
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This video details the development of the \"Have Blue\" prototype and the F-117 Nighthawk, highlighting the evolution of stealth technology and the unique operational culture of Lockheed's Skunk Works. Through the perspective of a former test pilot, it explores the technical hurdles of low-observable aircraft and the leadership principles that drove aerospace innovation.
To build Half Blue, we needed $10 million.
One can't imagine what goes through your mind when you have to ask the board of directors to invest $10 million
at a time when the corporation was considering declaring bankruptcy.
The investment brought the company several billion dollars of sales
and a reputation of technical superiority and stealth technology.
The advantages of low observables or stealth technology
have been a military matter of considerable interest for decades,
applicable not only to aircraft, but to all other forms of military equipment as well.
Attempts to camouflage or reduce the visibility of hardware and personnel
have been ongoing since the beginning of recorded military history.
During World War II, the application of camouflage paint patterns
was studied with considerable intensity.
Scientifically conducted research helped generate patterns
that genuinely reduced an aircraft's visibility both in the air and on the ground.
Polished aluminum, for instance, was criticized for its notable ability
to reflect sunlight and increase the detection distance of a target aircraft.
Dull, non-glare, matte-type paints eliminated the problem,
but not without increased expense and some cost in performance.
The exigencies of war curtailed extensive research
into the development of airworthy non-radar reflective structural materials,
but some attempts were nevertheless made.
The Germans in particular placed emphasis on lowering the radar return of select aircraft,
including the notable Horten 229.
This extremely advanced all-wing jet fighter,
built primarily of wood over a steel tube load-bearing structure,
in some production models was to have utilized a wood sandwich ply
with a core material of granulated charcoal.
Presumed to have absorbed radar energy,
the charcoal was calculated to reduce the aircraft's radar return
by a not insignificant margin.
The war ended before the technology could be fully exploited.
Countermeasures were slow to develop initially,
with little focus on reducing radar visibility
or countering radar energy during the 1950s and 1960s.
It wasn't until the Vietnam War
that effective electronic countermeasures were pursued.
The threat of radar-guided missiles required a reassessment of technology,
leading to the development of ECM pods and chaff dispensers.
Lockheed gained experience in anti-radar features
through programs like the U-2, A-12 and SR-71.
In 1974, DARPA requested studies for a low-observable fighter,
excluding Lockheed,
but they were eventually included through the Skunk Works efforts.
Lockheed refined external shaping techniques using ECHO-1,
a computer program predicting radar cross-sections, or RCS,
based on mathematical formulas.
They employed faceting, creating a three-dimensional aircraft
from flat panels to reduce RCS.
Validation testing was conducted with a model called the Hopeless Diamond,
demonstrating lower RCS than previous designs.
In August of 1975, Lockheed, along with Boeing and Northrop,
received invitations from the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency
to participate in a highly competitive project
known as the Experimental Stealth Testbed.
The objective of this project was to develop and test
an innovative aircraft design
with exceptionally low observability characteristics.
After a thorough evaluation process,
Lockheed was selected in April 1976
to proceed with the detailed design, development and testing of the aircraft,
which was famously named Have Blue.
The single-seat subsonic aircraft
was designed to achieve both high maneuverability
and low observability.
A significant feature of the aircraft
was the inclusion of a large two-position flap known as the platypus,
which automatically deflected downward
when the angle of attack exceeded 12 degrees,
enhancing the nose-down pitch control.
The initial engine runs were accomplished
on the first Have Blue aircraft on November 4, 1977
at Lockheed's Burbank facility.
In order to maintain security,
the aircraft was parked between two semi-tractor trailers
over which a camouflage net had been installed.
On December 1, 1977,
with Lockheed test pilot Bill Park at the controls,
Have Blue lifted into the air.
A new era in military aviation had just begun
and only 20 months had passed since the contract award.
As previously noted,
the primary objective of the test program
was to demonstrate VLO technology.
Towards this end,
Have Blue 1001 would demonstrate loads flutter,
performance handling qualities,
and stability and control.
Have Blue 1002 was designated as the PCS test vehicle.
Have Blue 1001 accomplished 36 flights
over the next five months
and successfully expanded the flight envelope sufficiently
to allow the RCS testing to be performed.
Have Blue 1002 joined the program during 1978
and flew for the first time on July 20
with Air Force pilot Norman Ken Dyson at the controls.
This aircraft differed from the other variant
in that it possessed a real airspeed system
and did not have a drag chute installed.
It also incorporated nosewheel steering
to improve ground handling
and was adorned with all the coatings and materials
required to perform its intended task.
Following some airspeed calibration flights,
this aircraft completed 52 flights over the next 12 months
and successfully conducted low-observable testing.
The final phase of testing
in a simulated integrated air defense environment
was completed during July 1979.
The aircraft demonstrated its low-observable capabilities
against ground and airborne systems during these tests.
Its low acoustic signature was also verified.
The Have Blue program was a low-cost demonstration
of a radically new concept in aircraft design.
The program accomplishments included,
from a technical standpoint,
the lowest RCS aircraft in the world
by several orders of magnitude,
VLO infrared signature,
visual signatures,
acoustic signature
and complex aerodynamics.
In conclusion,
it was determined VLO tactical and strategic aircraft
could be designed, produced and operated,
leading to the next project,
the operational Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk.
My name is Harold Carlson Farley Jr.
and I was raised under the name of Carlson.
When my wife gets serious, she calls me Carlson,
but everybody else calls me Hal.
And I got that from the military as being Harold to Hal.
Skunk Works.
Back in 1943, I believe it was,
the United States Air Force realized
that the Germans were fielding a new jet airplane
called the ME-262,
a twin-engine jet that was capable of reaching
our long-range bombers, the B-17s.
So they felt that they needed a jet airplane.
We needed a jet airplane for the Air Force.
And so they contacted Lockheed for the job.
I'm not sure exactly what their motivation was
to come to Lockheed,
but Kelly Johnson was a pretty well-known airplane designer
and had been instrumental in the P-38,
which was a first front-line fighter in the war.
Anyway, they came and they said,
we need an airplane in five months,
a jet airplane in five months.
And Kelly Johnson,
who was a well-thought-of young engineer
who had a very strong personality
and a great amount of leadership capability
and a very strong, very strong man,
he said, I'll take on the job.
It has to be done by my rules.
He had 14 basic sets of rules.
I can't name all 14 of them,
but two or three of them are important.
One, he gets to select the very best people
he has in the whole company.
Number two, he reports directly
to the company president.
Three, nobody else interferes
with the project at all.
It's his project and he's the boss
and the rest of the people
in the Skunk Works are workers.
So anyway, those are the rules
that he set up for taking on that project.
And it took the Air Force a month
to deliver the proposal,
but in the meantime,
he'd already started working on the airplane,
knowing full well he was going to be doing it.
And they managed to deliver the airplane
in 143 days.
That comes out a bit shorter than five months,
four months and some days,
which was pretty phenomenal
when you think about it,
and it was a pretty advanced airplane.
It was the XP-80
and made its first flight in 1943
and the pilot at controls
was a fellow by the name of Milo Burcham,
who was later killed in an accident.
That was how the Skunk Works
got its start and its reputation
of being able to do a job quickly,
on time, and under cost.
Well, the name Skunk Works
was from the Little Abner comic strip
where, I can't remember the character,
but he was up in the woods
and he would brew up this kookaboo joy juice,
some white lightning, I guess,
and it smelled bad.
And there were some odors
that were in the hangar area
of Burbank there.
And so one day,
one of the engineers answered the phone
and said the Skunk Works,
which was spelled S-K-O-N-K.
And everybody started calling it Skunk Works,
but the creator of Little Abner
said, no, you can't use that,
and went to court over it.
I guess we probably conceded.
I don't remember if there were
any details of that,
but we changed from Skunk Works
to Skunk Works and that stuck
with the skunk on the tail
of the airplanes.
The year I joined the Skunk Works
was 1978.
And I joined because I had been
working with a fellow,
Dr. Ken Stewart.
He had a Ph.D. in plasma physics.
And he and I had been working
on a new head-up display
for the F-14.
I was working for Grumman
at that time.
And he was also assigned
to the head-up display
for the new stealth fighter
that was being developed
at the Skunk Works.
I read in the newspaper
in the Los Angeles Times
a very short paragraph
that said a pilot had been injured
in the desert.
His name was Bill Park,
William Park.
And there was no details
in that little clip.
But I always remember reading that
there was something going on
up in the desert
that they're not telling anything about.
But they had to say something
about the accident.
It was my future boss
who was in that accident.
And he needed a pilot
because he had injured himself
pretty bad.
He had asked some people around
and Ken Stewart recommended me.
He called me one day.
He was very abrupt on the telephone.
He said,
you'd have to tell me
something about it.
Well, he said,
it's at the Skunk Works.
You know, the Skunk Works
is a magic word among pilots.
And I was immediately interested
when he said that.
I said, yeah,
I would be interested
if you could tell me
something about it.
He said, well,
I'll call you back.
And that was the end
of the call.
He said, I'd like for you
to come down for an interview.
He said, but I don't want you
to come to the company.
I want you to come to my house.
And so I said, okay.
He gave me the address
and it was down in Westwood.
And the house was
on the golf course
in Westwood
down in the high,
high rent district of L.A.
And it was a gorgeous home.
Bill came in
and we had our chat.
When I left,
I said, man,
those guys must pay a lot of money.
Turns out that Bill and his wife
were really good at real estate.
But that was
how I got introduced
to the Skunk Works.
It took about three months
to get a clearance.
I had a secret clearance
from Grumman,
but this was secret,
to be able to access the program.
So I was placed
in the penalty box,
they called it,
until the clearance came through.
And then when it came through,
they then could introduce me
to what it was
we were going to fly.
And I remember
Alan Brown was
one of the senior engineers
and he took me into a room
and the drawings were up
on the wall,
regular blueprint drawings.
And he said,
what do you think of that?
And as you know,
it's a very unusual looking airplane
and it's very highly swept angles.
And my first thought was
the darn thing must be
a re-entry vehicle.
It had to be something like that.
And then he explained to me
what it was for,
that it was to evade radar.
And I really didn't pick up
on how important that was
at the time.
I thought that was okay,
good to evade radar.
How well does it fly?
Is it a real fighter?
Can we shoot things down with it?
What a pilot wants to do
is be able to maneuver
his airplane well.
And it turns out the airplane
is pretty low performance
relatively speaking
to the current day fighters.
And so that's how I was
introduced to the airplane.
To the weapons system.
To work on the displays
with my old friend,
Ken from Grumman,
who was working down there
at Lockheed and at Grumman
at the same time.
Well, the first prototype
was on the floor.
What was available
was the wooden mock-up.
They had a complete wooden mock-up,
full-scale wooden mock-up
they were using to do
the wire runs in.
And they were using
this wooden mock-up
to place displays in the cockpit
to locate boxes
and see if they would fit.
We also had offices
right alongside that
and we had people
that were working on the displays.
And I was assigned
to the cockpit displays.
We had two other pilots
that were working on
other aspects of the airplane
as well with the engineers.
One, I had been a test pilot
in industry
for a number of years.
The other fellows
had come directly from the military.
It isn't that you can fly any better.
It's just that how do you deal
with engineering and the company?
And I was, I think,
better prepared to do that
than the Air Force guys
and another Navy guy
that came in.
I think that was one of the reasons.
And the other reason
is I worked like the devil.
I worked hard
because I wanted to be
the project pilot on it.
And I was selected.
That's what I think was the reason.
In order to be able to
be the project pilot
and the first flight pilot,
the competition for that
is intense.
You want to be the guy
that gets the job
and you work hard.
We were flying at the time.
We were flying airplanes
like T-38s.
So you're being evaluated
by the boss
and also the customer.
It is something that
I don't know how to describe
it any other way.
It's an intense process.
The secrecy,
the classification of the program
was at the same level
as the Manhattan Project.
That was how secret it was.
We were successful.
If you recall,
we spent many years
working and actually having
the airplane in operational readiness.
And not many people
knew anything about it.
So it was highly classified,
remotely developed,
a lot of time away from family.
We spent usually
six day weeks
and we would leave home
and come back after
Friday or Saturday night
because we were separated
that much.
My wife knew I was flying.
I mean, that was my job.
But that was all I could tell her.
I couldn't tell her
what I was flying,
where we were.
We had a special arrangement
of secure telephones
so we could call home
through the office
fairly regularly
and not have to worry
just to check in
and have a hot water heater
broken down or whatever.
Yeah, it was pretty strenuous
on the family life.
People that I associated with
knew about the Skunk Works.
They know you're going to say,
I can't tell you.
There's nothing I can tell you about it.
I can say this.
The Air Force were flying A-7s
as a cover airplane.
They had a squadron of them
at Nellis Air Force Base
which were supposedly
a spy system
and they were kind of secret.
But that's where the Air Force was.
They used the A-7
as their cover story.
Our cover story was just simply
we just didn't talk about it.
The security that was established
within the Skunk Works,
the security or the
classification culture
of the Skunk Works
was developed by Kelly Johnson again.
And back to a little bit
about that initial airplane
that started the Skunk Works.
One of the requirements was
it had to be top secret.
And one of the reasons for that
is it keeps other people out.
That was one of the tools
to keep other people
from becoming involved
with the program,
from becoming a bureaucracy.
So the Skunk Works security
was established
out of common sense.
For example,
if you put a guard out
or if you put
secret or confidential
on a drawing
of an airplane,
you're going to know it's a secret.
Something's going on
if somebody gets a hold of it.
They didn't stamp
any of the things classified at all.
They didn't have any guards outside.
They made it as normal
as possible
so as to not attract attention.
They went so far
way back
that they took all the names
off of the parking places
because they could find out
who was working there.
The enemy could find out
who was working there,
the enemy being the Cold War
and Russia.
The Skunk Works operated
out of Burbank
and has operated out of Burbank
all the way back to the P-38,
to the U-2,
to the SR-71,
to F-117.
It's a big old
World War II hangar.
The airplanes were
assembled there.
The wings were taken off of them
and in the case of the F-117,
they flew a C-5,
which is the Air Force's
huge cargo airplane.
They'd fly it in
in the middle of the night
and they would take the phone calls
for the noise abatement
because there was always
somebody in the neighborhood
and they would take a beam
out of wood,
two by fours,
and drape a tarp over it
so it would not show
any part of the shape
of the airplane whatsoever
and they put it on wheels
and they would wheel it out,
put it in the C-5
and then they would
fly it off to where
we would test the airplane
and it was reassembled
and then tested
and we had a trucking company
that was named some weird name
and it was on the back
of those trucks
that they hauled the SR-71
fuselage and wings
to the test location.
The first flight was a success,
I'll say that,
because we took off
and we landed,
but there were some
problems that we encountered
and some things we discovered
that needed to be fixed.
One of the problems
was the distance of computers.
At the lower speeds,
it's about neutrally stable,
which is almost flyable.
One of the bits of information
that goes to the computers
to help fly that airplane
is the air data
that goes in the probes
on the front of the airplane
and the engineers were afraid
that the vibration of those
probes on takeoff
and in turbulent air
would lose the air data
on the initial takeoff.
So what we did was
we put a bunch of lead
in the front of the airplane
and made it positively stable,
thinking that I could manage
the airplane,
it was still not real stable,
but it was stable enough
that we felt that I could
fly the airplane satisfactorily
up to 10,000 feet
and then turn on the air data
information to the computers
and have those things
turned off again
and bring the airplane back.
That was the plan
and that's what we did.
We took off,
ballasted with lead in the nose
so that it was slightly stable
on takeoff,
which was fine.
The rotation and everything
was good in pitch.
It was that the fact
that the airplane started
to yaw and it went out,
the wind breeze the other way
and that's very uncomfortable
on an airplane to feel
like you're skidding sideways.
So I realized that this thing
wasn't acting the way
we expected it to act
based on the wind tunnel
and simulation that we'd done.
Actually, I had three switches
for pitch, roll, and yaw
over on the left-hand console
and the yaw switch I had
extended because that was
the most critical one
and it worked fine.
There were no vibrations
or anything like that,
but they got turned on
a lot quicker than we planned
to do because we were going
to go to 10,000 feet
to turn them on.
Based on that information,
we realized that the fins
on the airplane,
the tail fins on the airplane
were considerably too small.
The wind tunnel data,
I don't know how
but the thing, the pole
that you put an airplane
in a wind tunnel on
contributes to stability.
I'm not sure that's the case.
At any rate, they came up
with a figure that they said
we were going to be more
stable than we really were
so the fins were too small
and that was the big discovery
on the first flight.
We flew the airplane
six more times in a very
limited flight envelope
to get the proper amount
of stability.
That was the big thing
learned on the airplane.
The minor problems that
we occurred are not minor
really.
We had overheat in the
tailpipes because the
tailpipes were rectangular
and in the corners heat
built up and they were
reaching limited temperatures
and we also had the
canopy unlock light
that came on.
That was of concern
because if the canopy
had come off, you get
a face full of wind
and it was marginal about
whether you could land
the airplane or not.
The other thing was
that we heard a big thump
and that was the blow-in
doors which were
spring-loaded and activated
so that it gave enough
air for the airplane
to open the inlets and
then the doors would
spring-load shut making
the airplane stealthy
because you can't have
openings in the airplane
and be stealthy.
When they slammed shut
there were two very
pronounced thumps that
I hadn't anticipated
and scared the heck
out of me.
There was no indication
in the control station
no, I've never had
a UFO sighting.
Okay, that's good.
How we worked together
at the Skunk Works
and with our customer
was absolutely critical
to the success of that
airplane. The airplane
was a huge success.
The program was a huge
success. In the world
of flight tests in the
last 30, 40, 50 years
there's always been
the company pilots
and the customer pilots.
The Air Force pilot
or the Navy pilot
that's going to be
getting the airplane.
Ever since I started
the testing business
I was a Navy test
pilot for a long time
and then I became
a civilian test pilot
for Grumman flying
F-14s and A-6s
and it was always
a scrap.
And I learned
from this experience
that cooperation
works a whole lot
better than adversarial
relationships.
Kelly Johnson's one
of his basic rules
was we need to be
allowed to test our
product otherwise
we will never be able
to advance our
products in the future.
So he felt like he
needed a corporate
knowledge in the form
of pilot experience
in the airplanes
that he built.
And the Air Force
has always felt that
they wanted to do
all the flying.
It's always been a
compromise.
If you have a
combined test force
typically the company
does fly the first
flight of the airplane
and does flutter
and does structural
and does all that
stuff but the
operational aspects
are done by the
customer which I
think is a good way
to do it.
But there's always a
little bit of a
conflict.
But we had a very
unique individual in
the Air Force.
A guy by the name
of Skip Anderson
who was running the
Air Force side of
the test force.
He had a very
unique way of
calming us
company pilots
down.
He provided
great leadership
and he worked
well with Ben
Rich the head
of the Skunk
Works and they
got along great
and we saw
that and we
all followed
suit.
And I give Skip
a lot of credit
for that.
We got along
very well.
John Beasley
was one of the
Air Force guys
and he was just
one of the team.
We were all
teammates.
One of the
criteria for
working at our
remote location
is you had to
get along.
If anybody
didn't get along
you were out of
there.
So teamwork
and cooperation
were fundamental
to the success
of the program.
What does it
take to make
a good test
pilot?
I think one of
the things is
the basic
flying skills
need to be
above average.
I think that
responsibility
to the company
and to the
product are
fundamental to
being a good
test pilot.
I think
involvement
with the
design and
development
of the airplane
is critical
to being a
good test pilot.
I think an
engineer
engineering
degree or
advanced
degree is
in this
day and
age the
kids that go
off to the
test pilot
schools they
arrive there
with masters
degrees and
a lot of
them go
away with
PhDs.
They're way
above me.
I only had
a bachelor's
degree.
It's hard
for me to
say I'm
telling you
about what
I think I
am.
Am I an
above average
pilot?
Yeah, I
am.
I can say
that honestly.
Am I one
of those great
stick and
rudder guys
like Bob
Hoover who
was a
phenomenal
pilot, is
a phenomenal
pilot?
I'm not one
of those.
But do I
get involved
with the
project?
I do.
I get very
involved with
the project
or did when
I was working.
Well, first
of all, if I
were talking
to my
grandson, who
they're all
growing up, my
great-grandsons,
I would say
first thing is
honesty.
Be totally
honest.
If you can't
be honest,
then you're
going to tell
somebody something
that you did
that you didn't
do.
And I learned
that really
early in test
piloting game.
Several people
had made a
mistake.
It was a
simple mistake.
They left a
switch in the
wrong place.
And if you
took off an
afterburner, you
were dumping
fuel and it
would light up
and you'd leave
this big long
torch behind the
airplane.
And I did
that.
And I came
back and I
convinced myself
that that switch
was in the
right place and
that I didn't
switch it, but
I did.
And so I was
embarrassed by
that.
I got caught
with my hand in
the cookie jar.
And that was
my real lesson
in honesty.
You have to be
honest as a test
pilot.
You can't, you
know, if you made
a mistake, man,
you got to tell
them because
otherwise they
might blame it on
the airplane or
they might, you
know, the
manufacturing
process may be
changed or the
engineering process.
I learned as I
mentioned in the
last bit of
discussion that
to work with
people, you
have to respect
them.
You have to
respect their
ideas and you
have to present
yourself as their
co-equal.
Honesty,
integrity, care
for other
people.
In the world
of test piloting,
once a guy gets
to be the chief
test pilot, it
is normal for
the chief test
pilot to go
out and fly all
the good stuff.
And that was
the way it was
at Grumman.
There was a
man by the
name of Corky
Meyer for years
was the chief test
pilot and any
time a goodie
came up, a first
flight or a bonus
flight, you know,
we got extra pay if
it was hazardous.
The lead guy, the
chief pilot would
end up going out
and doing it.
There was a
fellow there that
worked at Grumman
and I won't mention
his name, became
the chief pilot and
he did everything.
And the rest of us
were doing the
dog work.
And I said, you
know, if I ever get
to be chief pilot,
I'm going to share
the load a little
bit.
And those guys, I
got to be the first
flight pilot.
There's two other
guys that were very
lucky that I got to
be the first flight
pilot in the F-117.
Because I said, if I
got to be chief pilot,
as I said, I would
share.
And I had two guys
working for me that
were, we were very
close.
Dave Ferguson and
Tom Morgenfeld.
Dave was an Air
Force guy.
Tom was a Navy
guy.
And when it came
time for the F-22
to come along, I
had two guys
working for me
around the world.
And I was getting
to be, you know,
closer to 55.
And so I said, I'm
going to do what I
said I was going to
do.
And I gave Dave
Ferguson the project
pilot job.
I was the chief
pilot and director
of flight ops.
But he was the
project pilot and
would be flying the
first flight on the
F-22.
The day he went
out and flew that
first flight, I was
out there watching
it.
And I was saying,
man, I wish I had
made that promise.
I was very envious
of the day he got
to fly it.
I would have been
able to fly the
airplane if I had
just exercised my
rights as the chief
pilot.
And then the next
airplane, the F-35
that came along, Tom
Morgenfeld, got to
fly the first flight.
So each one of us
got a first flight.
And I'm kind of
proud of that.
We had T-38
Talons.
We had A-7s.
We had F-4s, all
of which we could
fly any time we
wanted to.
And that was
just a, that was
like the astronauts
had.
You know, they had,
their airplanes were
out there.
Anytime you wanted
to go fly, you
can go fly.
And it was good.
It maintained
proficiency.
It wasn't just a
good deal.
And we did a lot
of air-to-air stuff.
We'd go out and
fight each other.
That was very good
for confidence and
very good for
proficiency.
The F-14 flies
like a small
airplane.
It's a big
airplane, but it
flies well, flies
small.
I enjoyed the
A-4.
The A-4 is a
little sports car.
You know, it's got
270-degree-per-second
roll rate.
Put the stick
over and you're
through two
360-degree rolls
about that quick.
And, of course,
the F-117, which
turns out to be,
we tailored the
flight control
system so well
that it's very
easy to fly.
I mean, it
feels very