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J. Loveless et al, Complete Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2022). D. Ormerod & K. Laird, Smith, Hogan & Ormerod’s Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2021).
English criminal law is a system of laws and principles that govern the punishment of individuals who commit crimes in England and Wales. It is based on a combination of statutes and common law principles.
The theoretical elements of English criminal law include concepts of punishment, evidence, defence and prosecution, and criminalisation. These elements shape the foundation of the criminal justice system and guide the application of criminal laws.
To establish criminal liability, certain elements need to be proven. These elements include the actus reus, which refers to the physical act or conduct of the accused, and the mens rea, which refers to the mental state or intention behind the act. Various defences are recognised, such as incapacity, compulsion, and mistake.
English criminal law covers a wide range of specific criminal offences, including murder, manslaughter, sexual offences, non-fatal offences, and property offences. Each offence has its own elements and requirements for establishing guilt.
It is important to note that the information provided here is a general overview and should not be considered legal advice. The application and interpretation of criminal law can vary depending on the specific circumstances and jurisdiction.
Disclaimer:
At no point are these video lessons intended to provide any sort of legal advice. These are for educational purposes only!
AI Generated·May contain errors
What I want to do in this lesson is move on to the next major topic in the subject of the criminal
law. We're going to be talking about specific criminal offences for the next few weeks and
months, focusing first on the various different homicide offences that exist. Now we're going
to only spend one lesson essentially on each of these offences because they're relatively easy
to understand and they're relatively non-controversial in the way in which the law is applied.
We'll begin in this lesson by talking about murder and then we'll move on to the various
different varieties of manslaughter which exist in the next few lessons. So homicide offences is
something that we're going to outline as well in this lesson, essentially what it means to
commit a homicide and the sort of class of offences which exists. So in answering that
question then, sometimes people would like to conflate the idea of homicide with the idea of
murder. This is a false comparison, they are not the same thing, and the reason why they're not
the same thing is because homicide is a more general classification. It refers simply to the
killing of an individual. This may be lawful or unlawful and it could be murder, but it could
also be other kinds of unlawful activities. And by lawful and unlawful there are circumstances where
the killing of another individual, i.e. the committing of homicide, is actually lawful. For
example, in the context of an armed conflict when shooting against a lawful combatant, this would
be a lawful means of committing homicide. In terms of unlawful, there are other kinds of unlawful
activities which could be considered homicide which are not murder. For example, things like
manslaughter, things like genocide, things like assisting suicide. These are all examples of
homicide-related acts which are not the same as murder but which are still unlawful.
So murder specifically refers to the killing of another individual
with what is known as malice of forethought. So we're going to get to Lord Coke's actual definition
of murder in a second, but what should be noted is that there is no murder act, there is no statute
on the books that outlines very clearly what murder is and what murder isn't. Instead, murder is a
common law offense, and this means that it is not specifically attached to a statute or statutory
provision. And so the result of which is we get the definition first elucidated by Threadwood Coke
in the 17th century, and ultimately this definition is fundamentally a definition of murder which still
applies to this day. The language has been updated and we've sort of made various different changes to
how it is described in modern parlance, but in terms of the key components and in terms of the
key elements of murder, they are all present in the 17th century definition as cited by
Threadwood Coke. So ultimately the definition of murder is cited as follows from 1797.
It says the following, it says that murder is when a man of sound memory and age and the age
of discretion, sorry, unlawfully killeth within any country of the realm any reasonable creature
in reum natura under the king's peace, with malice aforethought, either expressed by the party or
implied by law. So as the party wounded or hurt, etc., die of the wound or hurt, etc., within a year
and a day after the same. So some parts of this definition are, as you can probably understand,
pretty redundant in terms of the language and in terms of the elements that are required, but there
are elements of this definition which is very, very, very much applicable to today's modern
understanding. Age of discretion, of course, means the age at which criminal liability arises. A man
of sound memory, of course, rules out the idea of a defence of diminished responsibility and or
defence of insanity. The idea of a reasonable creature refers to a natural person, which again
obviously is controversial in some circumstances. Under the king's peace refers to the idea that we
shouldn't be prosecuting individuals for murder in wartime, and this obviously falls into the
concept of lawful homicide under the killing of a lawful combatant in an armed conflict.
And then the concept of malice of thought, either expressed by the party or implied by law, relates
to the mens rea of the offence of murder. So all of these things are elements which are still
required, and they give us both an actus reus and mens rea of the offence. The actus reus for murder
is relatively easy to understand. If we look back at the Koch definition, we can find the actus reus
elements. We see that the defendant will cause the victim, a reasonable creature, i.e. a person,
to die, to killeth. This is done under the king's peace, again excluding the lawful killing of
individuals during an armed conflict. When it comes to the mens rea of the offence, again equally
in the Koch definition we can find the mens rea. The traditional language is to kill with, quote,
Today this is essentially translated to an intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily
harm. So when somebody commits murder, it doesn't necessarily have to be a requirement that the
individual wanted to actually kill to end that person's life. You can be convicted of murder if
you intend to cause grievous bodily harm to an individual, but in doing so you resultantly murder
them as a result. You end up killing them as a result. Let's begin to talk about some of the
cases then that illustrate some of these points. In 1985 we have the case of Crown versus Maloney.
In this case we see a stepfather and a stepson, Maloney, and they had a very close relationship
with each other and they decided to both enter into a shooting contest, looking to see who could
draw their guns quicker. Now they did so while they were drunk, so obviously probably not a wise
suggestion to do so even sober, never mind while you're drunk. In doing so the stepfather was
accidentally shot and killed. The questions that we have to ask therefore is whether or not the
actions by the defendant was an intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm to his
father-in-law. Given the fact that this was a shooting contest looking to see not who can shoot
each other but who can draw their guns quicker, we can come to a conclusion that it's probably the
case that they were not intending to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, as a result of which
their murder conviction was overturned and reduced to that of manslaughter. The House of Lords would
also clarify the issue of intent when it comes to the criminal law. They say that in order for a
person to be convicted of murder they must have an intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm.
The Lords also made the argument that foresight of the consequences in and of themselves without a
direct intention may not be sufficient for a conviction of murder. So even if you had some
reasonable foresight that one of the consequences of the events that is taking place is the death
of another individual, the killing of another individual, if that still exists without the
prerequisite intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, then this means that that still is
not sufficient in and of itself for a conviction of murder. It was also made clear that the key
consideration here should be the defendant's purpose and whether there was an intention to
bring about a specific result which would give rise to criminal liability. So a good way of
showing or trying to show intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm is seeing what the specific
result which was ultimately intended to have been achieved actually was. If the specific result was
the death of a victim or the severe injury of a victim which would constitute grievous bodily harm,
then this can be sufficient for showing an intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.
In the case of R.M. Maloney, however, this wasn't the intent. There was never an intent on the part
of the parties to actually kill each other. They were trying to see who could draw their guns
quicker and owing to their general negligence and owing also into their general drunkenness,
they were unfortunately in a situation where one would kill the other. In 1975, we also have
the case of Haim and the Director of Public Prosecution. The defendant in this case was in
a relationship with a man. When this relationship ended, the defendant became increasingly jealous
of her ex's new partner and fiancé. She would then pour petrol into her new partner's letterbox
and light it on fire, set it on fire. The resulting fire would end up getting out of control,
killing the new partner's two young children in the house. The defendant was then tried for murder.
Now, the issues here was the question of whether or not he could be convicted of murder
since she did not have an intent to kill the two children when performing said act. Well,
the jury could convict for murder but the House of Lords would and also would uphold the conviction,
should I say. Now, why is that the case? Given to the fact that it may not have been the case that
the individual in question had the intent to kill the two young children, why was it the case that
the House of Lords still upheld the conviction? Well, the jury could convict of murder and the
House of Lords would uphold the conviction. They would uphold the conviction for a number of
reasons, all hinging on whether or not the defendant knew or not the probability, should I say,
that the children were in the house at the time of the act. And it was that foresight which, as
stated previously, was not in and of itself sufficient but still very much a key consideration
that was important for making a determination as to the guilt of the defendant in this case.
The case of Crown v. Woolin from 1999 also illustrates another example. You see in a fit
of rage in this case, the defendant would kill his three-month-old son by throwing him into a
hard surface. At trial, the judge directed the jury to convict if they were in the mind,
or of the mind, that derealized the, quote, substantial risk in the action which was
committed by the defendant. It was held that the conviction was to be reduced to manslaughter.
The reason for this was this idea of substantial risk. It was incorrect for the trial judge to
direct the jury by suggesting that the standard was a standard of, quote, whether or not there
was a substantial risk and whether or not the defendant realized there was a substantial risk.
Because what this does in taking the ordinary language of the phrase substantial risk
is confuse the concept of intention with the concept of recklessness. And in doing so,
you are confusing the concept of murder with the concept of manslaughter. And so one of the
key delineations between murder and manslaughter is a delineation between intent and recklessness.
And so as a result of which, having a conviction of murder for a jury direction which would be
better suited in the context of manslaughter is one that essentially confuses the situation.
The jury must instead ask three questions relating to the issue at hand. The first question being,
is the result for which criminal liability exists one which was virtually certain,
a certain consequence of the actions of the defendant? The second question is, did the
defendant know that his actions would be virtually certain, as a consequence of,
be a virtually certain consequence, should I say? And then finally, the last question is,
given the evidence, would the jury be satisfied with finding the intent of the defendant?
Finally then, I want to talk about the concept of coincidence or coincidence of mens rea and
actus reas, because it's not just enough that you have to satisfy both the actus reas and the mens
rea of an offence, but it is also the case that they have to coincide with one another. In most
cases of the criminal law, the murder, the concept of murder will require a coincidence of the actus
reas and the mens rea. It doesn't mean that they have to occur at the exact same time, but just
that there is a continual act that is taking place such that this coincidence is satisfied.
Now, one of the challenges to this is the case of Thabo Mele from 1954. In this case, the defendant
had intended to kill the victim by hitting them on the head, and had done so. They had hit them
on the head with the intent to kill them. In fact, what had actually happened was that they hadn't
killed them by hitting them on the head, but they had only knocked them out. Now, when the defendant
had then rolled the victim off a cliff, the defendant believed that at the time the victim
was dead, because he believed that by hitting him on the head he had killed him. It was only then
that the victim would actually die from his injuries and exposure at the bottom of said cliff.
Now, the argument that was presented by the defendant here is that there could not be a
conviction of murder since there wasn't a coincidence of actus reas and mens rea. At the time
of the attack, at the time of actually hitting the victim on the head, there was the prerequisite
mens rea for murder, because the defendant had intended to kill the victim, but there wasn't
the actus reas, because in doing so the victim hadn't actually died. But then, when the victim
did eventually die, owing to exposure and injuries from falling off the cliff, there was the actus
reas, but there was no mens rea at the time. And so, arguably, it is the case that there was a lack
of coincidence, which would result in a lack of murder charge. It was held, however, that this
argument would be rejected, suggesting that you cannot divide a case like this up into a separate
series of acts. Instead, what actually happened was the entire series of events in their entirety
represented one continuing act, allowing for the prerequisite coincidence of actus reas
with the mens rea of the offence.