Until The Very END! The Tragic Story of Alaska Airlines flight 261

Airlines in the World
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Center, Alaska 261, we are in a dive here, but we've lost vertical control of our airplane.
As a pilot, there are a few situations you hope that you will never ever have to experience
and one of them is obviously a total loss of controls of your aircraft, with no checklist
available to help you solve it.
This is going to be a bone-chilling account of one of the most consequential aviation
accidents in modern history, but it's also a story of airmanship and a willingness to
keep flying the aircraft no matter what.
Stay tuned.
The story of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 took place on the 31st of January 2000, but that's
not when this story actually started.
What happened here had its core deep inside something I call organizational creep and
in order to understand that, we will have to go back many decades, all the way back
to the certification of the aircraft involved and after that we must also take a look at
the company operating it.
The accident aircraft was a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, which is a variation of the original
DC-9 introduced back in 1965.
The DC-9 was in production up until 1982 and was then followed by the MD-81, 82, 83, 88
and then finally the Boeing 717.
But even though the later types carried many upgrades, the core design and systems could
still be traced back to the original DC-9.
The part of the aircraft which will become important in this story is the empennage or
the back wing of the aircraft.
It consists of the vertical fin which together with the rudder stabilizes and controls the
aircraft around the yaw axis and is therefore referred to as the vertical stabilizer.
On top of the vertical stabilizer, the horizontal stabilizer is located.
Now the horizontal stabilizer and elevators control the aircraft around the pitch axis
or in other words, they are the controls who can point the nose of the aircraft either
up or down and this pitch control is done primarily in two different ways.
If the pilot wants to get the aircraft to, for example, climb, they can pull the control
yoke backwards which will mechanically activate little control tabs on the back of the aircraft
elevators.
These control tabs will then move down to force the main elevators up with the help
of aerodynamic forces and that movement will in turn start pitching the aircraft nose upwards.
The elevators provide the primary pitch control, but pulling continuously on the yoke would
be very tiresome during long periods of flight and on top of that, the amount of push or
pull needed would also change depending on the configuration of the aircraft, speed and
changes in weight.
So there needs to be a way to neutralize those forces somehow.
And this is where we come to the use of the movable horizontal stabilizer, which is basically
the entire horizontal back wing which the elevators are mounted on.
The movable horizontal stabilizer on the MD-80 is about 40 feet wide and it's, like I mentioned,
mounted on top of the vertical stabilizer via two hinges in the aft spar and in the
front via a single jack screw assembly which can raise or lower the angle of the stabilizer's
leading edge.
By doing that, the aircraft can be trimmed out, so the control forces are alleviated
for the pilots and this is also how the autopilot primarily controls the aircraft in pitch when
it's engaged.
Now, I will get a bit technical here, but this explanation is absolutely crucial for
you to understand what ultimately happened to this aircraft, so stay focused.
To control the amount of stabilizer movements, the pilots or the autopilot can do so in a
few different ways.
On the control yoke, there are two switches, fondly known as pickle switches, who, when
they are pressed simultaneously, will activate a primary electrical trim motor which is mounted
with its gearbox assembly connected to the front spar of the horizontal stabilizer.
There's also a set of standby switches on the central pedestal who can activate a standby
electrical motor mounted on the same location and this is also the motor that the autopilot
is using.
Now, in case of an electrical failure of both of these switches, a pair of trim handles
next to the throttle quadrant, known as the suitcase handles, can also be used to activate
the main motor manually.
But what does these motors do then?
Well, when any of the two motors are activated, they will start to rotate a torque tube inside
of an ACME screw which run through an ACME nut connected to the vertical stabilizer below.
This means that as the ACME screw rotates in either direction, the screw will either
lower or raise the angle of the stabilizer in a uniform and smooth way, similar to the
way that you lift your car up with a jack screw when you need to change a tyre.
Now obviously there are constraints to how much this screw is allowed to move and that's
achieved by programmed maximum and minimum trim values that will stop the electrical
motors from running when those values are reached.
But if those would fail, there are also mechanical stops at the top and bottom of the ACME screw
who serves as ultimate guarantees that the screw won't move beyond the ultimate maximum
and minimum positions.
On top of that, there is also a primary trim brake switch in the cockpit which can be used
to stop any trim movement in case the motor will start to run away.
Now those of you with engineering eyes will likely already have noticed that there is
only one ACME screw and not in this system.
Shouldn't a system that carries primary control loads of the aircraft be doubled up for redundancy?
Well, the way that McDonnell Douglas initially approached the redundancy was to show to the
authorities that both the ACME screw itself and the torque tube inside the screw was individually
able to maintain the structural integrity of the system.
This means that if one of them would break, the other one would still be able to keep
the screw assembly together and therefore accomplish the redundancy needed.
As far as the ACME nut was concerned, it was shown to be able to operate with up to 90%
of the nut threads worn down, and its redundancy was accomplished by inserting more screw threads
than needed inside the nut, as well as double spirals of thread.
The ACME nut was made out of a slightly softer alloy than the screw, so any wear would naturally
happen to the nut first.
Initially, the nut was certified to have a service life of 30,000 flight hours, but pretty
soon after certification, inspections revealed higher than expected wear on the nut threads.
And because of this, inspections were put in place at regular intervals to measure this
wear and when it reached a predetermined value, the assembly was supposed to be replaced.
Now, as many of you will know, whenever you have mechanical parts moving up against each
other, there will be friction between them.
The more friction you have, the quicker the wear will be, and because of that, the ACME
nut and screw needed to be lubricated at regular intervals using a certified, aviation-approved
type of grease.
And this is where we get to the operator, Alaska Airlines, and the FAA.
Initially, after certification of the original DC-9, McDonnell Douglas recommended a lubrication
interval of the jack screw assembly every 300 to 350 flight hours.
This was then extended for the MD-80 family up to every 900 hours, but in 1996, a revision
of the overall maintenance intervals instead included the lubrication in every C-check,
which happened only every 3,600 hours or 15 months, whichever came first.
Now, Alaska Airlines followed these recommendations and extended the interval for lubrication to,
in their case, every 8 months, which was actually more conservative than the manufacturer's
recommendation, but obviously, that's only if the actual lubrication procedure was done
correctly.
When the airline applied to the FAA for this extension, it was immediately approved as
it satisfied the manufacturer's guidance at the time.
But it would later be found out that the inclusion of the lubrication in the C-check schedule
had not actually been approved by or even explained to the original engineers at McDonnell
Douglas.
It had just been roped in there with several other maintenance checks without evaluation
of every individual task.
Now, in terms of procedures, according to McDonnell Douglas, the greasing of the nut
was supposed to be done by pressing grease into a fitting on the nut until grease came
flowing out on top and below the nut.
After that, the screw itself needed to be properly greased up before the stabilizer
was moved full up and down a few times to properly lubricate all of the involved components.
This was supposed to take about 4 hours to do every time, but when the line engineer
who was the last one to deal with the accident aircraft was asked how he would do that procedure,
he said that it would take him about 1 hour to do it and he couldn't account for each
of the individual steps.
On top of this, because of the higher than expected wear to the ACME nut, a procedure
for measuring this wear had been designed using a tool that would tension the nut towards
the ACME screw and measure how much it would move.
This was supposed to be done using specific Boeing-made restraining fixtures to set the
correct tension, but Alaska Airlines had decided to instead make their own ones which both
looked and worked slightly differently from the Boeing designs.
These wear checks had been recommended to be performed every 30 months or 7,200 hours,
whichever came first, but Alaska Airlines had written in their manuals that this check
would need to be done every 30 months, but with no hourly limit.
This meant that with the busy flying schedule that Alaska Airlines were operating at the
time, it would take close to 9,550 hours between each of these checks and the accident aircraft
was coming up towards the end of these 30 months.
Can you see how the organizational cheese slices are starting to be crossed?
This takes us to the fateful flight on January the 31st 2000, but before I get into the details,
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In the afternoon of January 31st 2000, the accident aircraft with the tail number N963AZ
arrived on time to Licenciado Gustavo Diaz International Airport in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.
The inbound crew had enjoyed a completely normal flight, with nothing out of the ordinary,
and that's also what they reported when they handed the aircraft over to the next
crew who was going to fly the aircraft back to Seattle via a short stop in San Francisco.
The new pilot said goodbye to the previous crew and started preparing the aircraft for
the return flight. In the new crew, there were three Seattle-based flight attendants
who were getting things in order for the 83 booked passengers and two very senior pilots.
In charge was 53-year-old Captain Ted Thompson, who had been working for Jet America and then
Alaska Airlines since 1982. Before he had started flying airliners, he had flown for the US Air
Force, and at the time of this flight, he'd flown a little over 17,750 hours of total time
and over 4,000 hours on the MD-80. He was flying together with 57-year-old First Officer Bill
Tansky, who also had some previous military experience, in his case from the US Navy.
He had accrued 8,140 hours, of which over 8,000 hours was flown on the MD-80, making him
very experienced on this type. The aircraft looked like it was in good flying conditions,
and there was no problems or history of problems from the last few flights that the captain could
see when he was looking through the technical logbook. First Officer Bill was going to be pilot
flying for the first flight with callsign Alaska 261 towards San Francisco, and then Captain Ted
would take over and fly the last leg home to Seattle. It was a beautiful day for flying,
with light winds and good visibility conditions. Once all of the 83 passengers had been boarded,
the doors were closed and the engines were started as they were pushing back from the gate.
The takeoff trim had been calculated to 7 degrees nose up, which was set without any problems,
and at 1337 Pacific Standard Time, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 took off normally from
Puerto Vallarta and started its climb towards the northwest. First Officer Bill flew the aircraft
manually up to around 6,200 feet, where he made sure that the aircraft was done properly trimmed
and then engaged the autopilot. After that point, as the aircraft continued to climb towards their
planned cruise altitude of 31,000 feet, the autopilot continued to trim normally,
using the slower rate of the standby electrical motor, just as it was designed to do.
But unbeknownst to the pilot, things had now started to happen in the very back of the aircraft,
inside of the acumen nut who was holding the jack screw assembly together.
For several thousand hours, the screw had been grinding down on the softer nut threads,
without hardly any grease to lubricate it, and now, only a sliver of the original thread was
left to guide the screw as the autopilot was turning it. When the aircraft climbed through
23,400 feet, the last stabilizer trim movement was indicated on the flight data recorder,
and after that, it froze on a setting of 0.4 degrees nose down.
Now, we can't know for sure what caused it to freeze up, but it is possible that the tips of
what was left of the acumen nut thread now became so weak that they had started to bend under the
load of the screw, which just caused the screw to seize up. In any case, the way the pilots would
have noticed this would have been by seeing that the autopilot was unable to keep the speed and
climb rate since it just couldn't move the stabilizer. Initially, the aircraft continued
to climb at an indicated airspeed of 330 knots, but then it slowly began to level off as it reached
around 26,000 feet. As this was happening, the speed started slowing down, and then it restarted
its climb again and the speed dropped further back to 285 knots. Around this point, the trim
annunciator warning light would have also illuminated, giving a clear indication to
pilots that something wasn't quite right with the trim system. So, First Officer Bill disconnected
the autopilot and took manual control of the aircraft. Now, we have no voice transcripts
from this initial part of the flight, since the cockpit voice recorder only gathered the last
30 minutes, but we can assume that First Officer Bill would have immediately noticed that he needed
to pull as much as 50 pounds or 22 kilos of force in order for the aircraft to keep climbing,
and when he tried to trim it, the stabilizer trim wasn't working. Like I mentioned in the beginning
of the video, the main reason for the stabilizer trim is to remove stick forces from the crew,
and since the aircraft was trimmed for a 330 knot climb and the speed now was back at 285 knots,
much more back pressure than normal would be needed to keep it climbing. During the next
few minutes, the elevators were deflected upwards to continue the climb to 31,000 feet,
and after they had levelled off, the amount of back pressure needed was reduced back to
about 30 pounds or 13 kilos. That's still a lot, but it's clearly manageable. This back pressure
was also then further reduced by a speed increase and a gradual reduction in fuel weight so that
eventually not much back pressure was needed at all to continue to fly in level flight.
As this was going on, the crew would have also run through the stabilizer inoperative non-normal
checklist in their quick reference handbook, and that checklist would have told them to try
utilising the two standby systems in order to clear the problem and get the aircraft back in
trim. If that failed, the checklist instructed the crew not to re-engage the autopilot, because
the fact that the trim wasn't moving with any of the motors indicated that something else was
causing the jam, and it would therefore be inadvisable to keep trying to activate the
motors, which the autopilot would definitely do. In spite of this, after the aircraft had been
flown manually for nearly two hours along the route, the autopilot was re-engaged at time 1547.
The reduction of the aircraft's weight combined with the higher airspeed would have made the
stick forces needed small enough to enable the autopilot to be re-engaged, and it is possible
that the crew just wanted the extra capacity to continue to troubleshoot the problem.
Now, you might be wondering why the pilots didn't just turn around and divert back to
their departure airport as soon as they noticed the problem that they were having.
Well, with the information that they had at that time, a straight return would have led to an
overweight landing with higher than normal approach and landing speeds. And from a strict
handling perspective, the problem that they thought they had wasn't that bad, and the
non-normal checklist didn't advise them to land at the nearest available airport.
But that doesn't mean that the pilots didn't think about diverting. Actually,
this was the very thing they were discussing when the CVR transcript eventually started
at time 1549.49. The pilots were then still troubleshooting the jam stabilizer,
and the captain was in contact with the Alaska Airlines maintenance and operations frequency.
The engineers had been going through the maintenance history and hadn't been able
find anything, especially anything relating to the stabilizer. In any case, Captain Ted
advised maintenance and operations that they wanted to divert to Los Angeles International
Airport, LAX, instead of continuing towards San Francisco. And when operations heard this,
they were clearly annoyed by this fact and wanted him to clarify why they couldn't just continue
towards San Francisco instead. Now, this is the kind of thing that just makes my blood boil.
A pilot never requests a diversion unless he or she deems it absolutely necessary. A diversion
will always prolong the working day and it creates inconvenience for the passengers,
the crew and the company, so a diversion is not something that a pilot would just ask for
without proper cause. This seems to also have been the opinion of Captain Ted, who explained
to Alaska operations that he simply didn't want to fly past any suitable airport with this type
problem and that the winds and conditions in LAX normally were more suitable for landings with
issues like this. The operations controller said that he should of course do what he thought was
safest, but he also informed the captain that this might cause delays for the flight back to San
Francisco later on, as well as issues with getting landing clearance for an unscheduled international
flight into LAX. All of this just sounds like further ways to try and pressure the crew to
continue to their original destination, which wasn't lost on the captain who complained about
it to his co-pilot. One more thing that is important to remember here is that the flight
was still well under control at this point and no urgency or emergency call had been made.
This meant that the flight was treated just like any other aircraft in the airspace and
that might also be an explanation to the relaxed attitude of the Alaska Airlines operations
controller. The pilots decided to continue following their route until they got closer
to LAX and then divert. This way they could burn a little bit more fuel to reduce the landing
weight and speeds and it would also allow them more time to continue troubleshooting and make
a plan for their arrival. From the conversations the crew was having you can clearly hear that
these were two very experienced and well-trained pilots who were capable of thinking outside of
the box. They were even asking on the operations frequency if there was any instructor pilots
available as they might be able to think of something that the pilots had missed.
This is a very good idea but sadly there weren't any instructors available. Captain Ted also advised
operations that he intended to descend the aircraft down to a lower altitude and start
configuring the aircraft to see how it behaved. Doing this is an excellent idea when you're
dealing with flight control problems as it's much better to find out about potential additional
control problems at a higher altitude when there is more time to rectify them and then make a
plan for the landing. At time 15 59 and 44 seconds the captain handed over the controls to the
aircraft which was still being flown by autopilot at this point to first officer Bill. He then
changed the frequency over to listen to the automatic terminal information service at LAX
where the weather was good with winds almost straight down the runway, good visibility and
only some few clouds around. Once that was done he continued talking to the LAX operations about
getting the landing performance figures calculated for them as well as an update on the winds in San
Francisco to make sure that the weather was indeed better in LAX. These were all standard
diversion preparations and everything was still under control at this point but that was soon
about to change. At time 16 07 and 51 seconds a new engineer's voice called up flight 261 on the
operations frequency. He said that he just wanted to know if they still had the same issue with the
stabilizer and if they had indeed tried all of the different options including the pickle switches
on the control wheel and the suitcase handles. The captain responded that they had indeed tried
everything even together and that they would love to hear if he had any other suggestions like
hidden circuit breakers or something. The engineer responded that he was double checking the CB guide
but he just wanted to check that they had really tried everything. Captain Ted said that they
definitely had and that the AC meter, which is an instrument that shows the alternating current
load, showed a big increase in electrical load when they were using the normal trim switches.
Now this is important information because it clearly shows that the motor in itself was working
but that it wasn't successful in actually moving the screw. That's a sign of potentially serious
damage to the whole jack screw assembly but that would have been really hard for the pilots to
figure out from the little information that they had at that point. In later versions of the quick
reference handbook checklist the crew would be clearly told not to retry operations of any trim
systems if they didn't work after they were tried the first time and we will very soon see the reason
for that. Now because of the repeated questions from the engineer the captain now seemed to have
come up with an idea. Because at times 16.08 and 59 seconds he said to the first officer
I'm gonna click it off, you got it? And first officer Bill responded okay. 10 seconds later
the captain continued by saying let's do that and this will click it off followed by the autopilot
being disconnected. In all likelihood what the captain did here was to push both the pickle
switches and possibly also the standby handles at the same time which disconnected the autopilot.
Now a loud clunk could be heard on the cockpit voice recorder followed by two faint thumps from
the back of the aircraft. The next sound was the audible stabilizer movement tone followed by first
officer Bill exclaiming holy ----! The horizontal stabilizer now moved from its position of 0.4
degrees nose down which it had been jammed in for the last two hours to slightly beyond its maximum
nose down position of 3.1 degrees. It's possible that the sudden engagement of the trim motor
started moving the acme screw again causing the remaining threads inside the acme nut to finally
shear completely off allowing the screw and the stabilizer to start moving freely inside of the
nut. The fact that the elevators were pulled upwards to try and counteract the dive just
caused tension on the screw which moved it even further up making the situation even worse.
Now the reason we can assume that this is what happened was because the movement of the trim
during the seconds after the two thumps were heard was not linear as it would have been if
the screw was just rotating normally along the threads. The upwards movement of the screw only
stopped when the mechanical stop slammed into the bottom of the acme nut leaving clear indents and
scrape marks on it. The sudden stabilizer movement now caused the nose of the aircraft to pitch
forward leading into a rapid dive and with that a big increase in speed. The first officer shouted
out what are you doing and the captain responded I clicked it off likely referring to the autopilot.
There was no way for the pilots to know what had just happened in the back of their aircraft but
this call from the captain actually illustrates a very important point. One of the main reasons
we're not supposed to engage the autopilot when we have flight control problems is because the
autopilot can actually mask the control issues and cause a very sudden pitch or roll if it
suddenly disconnects. In this case the pilots now spent the next 80 terrifying seconds trying to
pull the aircraft out of the dive. The captain called air traffic control telling them that they
were in a dive and as he was doing so a strong vibration could be felt throughout the aircraft.
The captain called out you're stalled which was not the case but the vibrations together with the
quick descent rate could possibly be interpreted as that. This would also explain why he a few
seconds later called out no no you got to release it you got to release it possibly referring to
the way the first officer was pulling back on the controls. There were several forth and back calls
between the pilots until finally the overspeed warning started sounding. This caused the pilots
to extend the speed brake and that seemed to improve the situation slightly but still took
a combined effort of around 130 pounds or almost 60 kilos of force to pull the aircraft out of the
6 000 feet per minute dive. The crew finally managed to get the aircraft more or less on the
They then asked air traffic control for a block altitude between 20 and 25 000 feet which would
allow them clearance to other aircraft in case of another dive and then they started discussing what
had just happened. They both agreed to stay away from whatever switch they had touched that had
initiated the dive and they also agreed that the situation was now significantly worse with the
They also started talking about how they needed to slow the aircraft down and get the slats and
the flaps out to see if they could still control it but before they could do that Captain Ted went
off the radio to again talk to maintenance and update them on the now much worse new situation.
When they answered the engineers didn't have much new advice to bring them they just said that it
was up to him if he wanted to again try the trim system. This advice sparked a conversation between
the two pilots about whether or not they should maybe try it again but here the first officer
spoke up clearly and he said that he didn't think that that would be a good thing to do.
First officer Bill also at this point reminded the captain that he needed to make a PA to the
now likely terrified passengers in the back. Captain Ted agreed and he made a short concise PA
without giving too much detail but also without any type of bullshit. A very well made PA given
the extreme circumstances that they were in and hopefully that gave some reassurance to the
passengers. The Los Angeles air traffic controller now handed over flight 261 to the approach
controller and when the captain called them up explaining the nature of their problems they were
cleared to proceed direct towards Los Angeles. But here the captain made a truly heroic decision.
He likely knew that his jet was in a very bad shape so he declined the direct and instead asked
to remain on radar vectors out over the bay in order to complete the configuration tests over
water rather than over populated land. By doing so he would avoid third-party damage if something
went further wrong and it shows extraordinary situational awareness under pressure. Once this
decision was taken the captain asked for a further descent clearance down to 10 000 feet in order to
complete the handling tests. ATC initially told them to stand by and now again the first officer
spoke up and suggested that they should run the test at their present altitude rather than
descending down to 10 000 feet and do them there. Now I understand the captain's idea of doing it
at a slightly lower altitude where the air is thicker and more similar to what they would face
on approach but the first officer's suggestion to try it with more altitude margins also makes
perfect sense. It's great to see airmanship and CRM play out under such dire conditions.
Air traffic control cleared the aircraft to descend to 17 000 feet initially which the crew
read back and they also reminded the controller that they needed a block altitude. They were
to turn on to heading of 280 degrees out of the sea and then change controller frequency over to
the next sector. The purser was now called into the cockpit and when she came in she informed the
pilots that the crew had heard a large bang in the back of the aircraft just prior to the first dive.
The captain thanked her for the information and he told her to secure the cabin and strap
everyone down because he was planning to unload the aircraft and see if he could get the trim
working that way. Unloading the aircraft would mean pitching forward to reduce the back pressure
and therefore the load on the stabilizer. This type of maneuver has been known to be effective
in fixing certain types of stabilizer jams in other aircraft types like the 737 for example
where this was referred to as the roller coaster maneuver. However trying that would again mean
also trying to activate the trim system. Anyway the first thing they needed to do was to try and
configure the aircraft and see if it was actually controllable. They started with retracting the
speed brake and then at times 16, 17 and 54 seconds captain Ted took control of the aircraft and asked
for the slats to be extended. First officer Bill moved the slat handle to the extend position and
this apparently made the pitch down tendency even worse. The captain then asked for the flaps to be
extended to 11 degrees and when the flaps started to move the aircraft actually stabilized and
became slightly easier to fly again. Now for some unknown reason once the test was complete the
captain decided to retract the flaps and slats again even though the aircraft was flying reasonably
well in that configuration. He possibly did this because he had just wanted to try the configuration
for the landing later on but wasn't planning to actually keep it all the way to LAX. So here comes
another lesson for you budding pilots out there. If you ever have flight control problems like this
and fuel is not an issue, don't change the configuration back after you have started
configuring it. It's generally better to just continue to fly the aircraft in this new configuration
than trying to test your luck by reconfiguring more times. Anyway the next thing that the captain
wanted to do was to try to unload the stabilizer and see if that would sort the trim problem out.
But here first officer Bill put his foot down. He said that he didn't think it was a good idea to
touch it again since the aircraft was flying and he also said I think that if it's controllable we
ought to just try and land it. Captain Ted listened to him and agreed again showing excellent CRM
between the two but unfortunately this was just not supposed to be. Because only five seconds later
a series of faint thumps could be heard from the back followed by the first officer saying
You feel that? The captain who had the controls responded yeah okay give me this is a bitch
indicating that he now required much more forces to keep the aircraft from pitching down.
What had likely happened at this point was that the torque tube inside of the ACMA screw had been
subjected to significant bending and pulling loads during the 10 minutes that had passed since the
sharing of the ACMA nut threads. Those bending loads had activated existing fatigue cracks inside
of the torque tube and now those cracks caused the torque tube to completely fracture into two pieces
and therefore leave the nut and the backstop completely. This meant that the stabilizer was
now allowed to move almost freely around its aft hinges. It now slammed up against the vertical
stabilizer tip fairing brackets who now became the only thing holding it from moving even further
upwards. This caused the stabilizer angle to move from 3.1 degrees to 3.6 degrees nose down
which explained the additional pitch down that the captain was feeling. The captain almost
immediately asked for the slats and flaps to be redeployed as the aircraft had been easier
to control with those extended but this was sadly too late. The vertical stabilizer tip
fairing brackets were not made to hold the type of loads that the stabilizer was now exerting on it.
At time 16.19 and 35 seconds a horrible noise was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder and
simultaneously several small radar returns could be seen on the air traffic control radar
as the tip fairing was ripped off and separated from the aircraft. The stabilizer now moved upwards
to an angle too high to measure on the flight data recorder and this caused an immediate and
violent pitch forward. This was a hopeless situation to recover from as the whole horizontal
stabilizer was now completely out of control but that didn't stop captain Ted from trying.
What he now did was to instead of trying to pull out of the 70 degrees deep dive
he pushed forward and rolled the aircraft left over to an inverted position effectively
counteracting the downward pitch of the stabilizer. He called out push push push and roll whilst the
first officer called out mayday but without actually transmitting it on the radio. Because of the roll
the pitch decreased from minus 70 degrees to 29 and then minus 9 degrees as they were now flying
inverted out of the bay. At time 16.19 and 54 seconds captain Ted called out okay we're inverted
and now we need to get it indicated that he wanted to get it rolled back into a normal position again
and as he was trying this they were passing 16 400 feet still descending with a speed of 208 knots.
During the next few seconds the flight data recorder indicated aileron movement both in left
and right direction as the flaps were being retracted. Captain Ted called out push push push
the blue side up indicating that he wanted to get the aircraft back on the right keel again
and that was followed by a call to kick rudder kick left rudder left rudder. First officer Bill
responded that he couldn't reach it and captain Ted then called okay right rudder right rudder.
This effort didn't work and 10 seconds later captain Ted said gotta get it over again but
at least upside down we're flying. But sadly this call was almost immediately followed by the sound
of several compressor stalls and the sound of the right engine spooling down. Likely because of the
extreme angle of the oncoming air that was hitting the engine inlets. From this point there was
nothing more that could be done. Captain Ted asked for the speed brakes to be extended but his last
words could be heard on the cockpit voice recorder at times 16 20 and 56 seconds when he said
ah here we go. Less than a second later the aircraft impacted the pacific ocean and all 88
people on board were instantly lost. Several other aircraft in the area had witnessed flight 261's
final descent and with the help of them and radar pictures the crash site was quickly found.
The debris was scattered over the seafloor and it took a week to salvage the majority of the pieces
and among them was the flight data recorder the cockpit voice recorder and most of the jackscrew
assembly from the horizontal stabilizer. With the help of those pieces the NTSB investigators could
relatively quickly start honing in on what had caused this horrible tragedy. When they looked
closer on the acme screw and knot they saw that the knot was almost completely smooth with only
remnants of thread still left inside. On the acme screw they found several spiral formed pieces of
thread which had been ripped out of the knot likely during that first dive. But what really
shocked everyone was that there didn't seem to be any grease at all left neither on the screw or on
the knot. The grease fitting on the knot was clogged with a gray mixture of old grease and
wear material and the rest of the components were completely dry there was no lubricant at all on
them. This led the investigators to start scrutinizing the maintenance records of Alaska Airlines as well
as interviewing mechanics and engineers. Big discrepancies were quickly found in both their
maintenance manual and how the maintenance work was actually being carried out at their various
technical centers. On top of that important management functions were not filled in the
airline which had caused real confusion about who was responsible for what. This had happened over
several years as the Alaska Airlines operation kept growing and this is what I was referring
to as organizational creep. It had all happened in small incremental steps. The conclusion of the
investigation was that the crash had been caused by a loss of control due to the in-flight failure
of the horizontal stabilizer trim jack screw assembly. Contributing to the cause was Alaska
Airlines extended lubrication schedule and wear checks which had both been approved by the FAA.
Those two components combined with one or possibly several poorly executed lubrications
meant that excessive wear went undetected and ultimately led to the complete failure of the
threads inside of the Ackman knot and the subsequent failure of the torque tube. There were 24 safety
recommendations that came out of the investigation. A few of them gave clearer guidance to pilots
about not repeating actions in checklists regarding the trim system and not using the autopilot with
flight control problems. But the vast majority of the recommendations were aimed at Alaska Airlines
and the FAA regarding maintenance intervals, lubrication and wear checks of the horizontal
stabilizer. After the accident the lubrication schedule was immediately changed to be completed
every 650 hours on all MD-80 aircraft. There were also recommendations about not allowing certification
of aircraft unless they could prove that they weren't susceptible to catastrophic single point
failures like the one that had happened in this case. The two pilots captain Ted Thompson and
first officer Bill Tansky were posthumously awarded the airline pilots association gold
medal for heroism in recognition for their actions during the emergency. And if you think that you
recognize some of the scenes from this video that's likely because the same failure and similar pilot
actions were used in the 2012 movie Flight starring Denzel Washington. Now this was a very scary
episode and I know that some of you watching this are probably nervous flyers. Please know that even
though things like this has happened it is tragedies like this one that has had the most
profound impact on improving safety in the airline business and to stop things like this from ever
happening again. I have actually created an app precisely for you guys where you can ask your own
questions, check for turbulence on upcoming flights and listen to me explaining aircraft noises,
feelings and procedures. It's available on all devices and you can check it out by going to
app.mentorpilot.com and just create a user. I really hope it will help. Now check out
these videos next and have an absolutely fantastic day. Bye!
