States’ Due Diligence Obligations in the Practice of International Courts and Tribunals

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Jun 12, 2026
An address to the Ninth Annual Cambridge International Law (CILJ) Conference in April 2020, in Panel 1: International Legal Principles for Engaging with Risk—Due Diligence and Prevention, by Dr Vladyslav Lanovoy, Associate Legal Officer, International Court of Justice, Lecturer at Lille Catholic University and Teaching Fellow at Queen Mary University of London.
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Thank you so much, Catherine, and thank you so much to the organisers of the Cambridge conference,
as well as to my fellow speakers, whom I really enjoyed listening to. And thank you for the
invitation to present my research on states' due diligence obligations in the practice of
international courts and tribunals. Now, it is a common knowledge that there is, in fact,
no uniform interpretation of due diligence, which, as we have heard from the keynote speaker today,
and several of my fellow speakers have alluded to, is essentially context harm and actor specific,
which is very much in line with the ILA study group findings on the subject. Now, I would like
to submit to you that despite the infinite variety of the terms of the obligations of conduct that
require states to exercise their due diligence, in other words, best efforts to avert a particular
result, international courts and tribunals do seem to employ similar yardsticks when analysing
when, how, and what states are required to do to comply with their due diligence obligation
in order to achieve that particular result. So, basically, a very simple analytical decomposure
of the existing practice of international courts and tribunals into the trigger of due diligence
obligation, in other words, when does it kick in, the scope of its application, in other words,
how does it apply both spatially and temporally, and finally, the material content of due diligence,
in other words, what does the state have to do in order to actually discharge its obligation.
Turning to the trigger of due diligence, the so-called when, here I think we can analytically
decompose into two aspects which recurrently come up in the analysis of international courts
and tribunals. First, there is the risk of harm, and second, the knowledge of the risk.
In relation to the risk of harm, we could think about three really sort of three benchmarks.
First, does the risk need to be qualified, and the answer given by most international courts
and tribunals, yes, there must be a real and imminent risk as opposed to hypothetical risk
that could occur. The court, for example, in the genocide case spoke of the serious risk of
genocide. More generally, that is related also to whether there has to be some level of qualification
of the harm itself, and again, here across the board, we see references to significant harm,
in other words, something which is more than detectable but need not be at the level of serious
or substantial harm. The second aspect is does the harm need to be certain, and the overarching
answer of international courts and tribunals is that while the harm needs to be foreseeable on
the basis of the best information available to the state, whether it is technical or scientific,
it may also, in certain circumstances, entail the adoption of a precautionary approach,
for example, in cases of scientific uncertainty, as it was highlighted in the CBAT advisory opinion
or the Inter-American Court in its advisory opinion to which my colleagues have just referred.
The final aspect in relation to this analysis of the risk of harm is do the origins of the harm
matter, and again, the answer here is overarchingly no in the sense that it doesn't depend
whether the origins of the risk lie with another state, non-state actors' conduct, or natural
hazards. The second aspect, as I mentioned, as going to the trigger of due diligence obligation,
is the knowledge of the risk, and here, essentially, the big question hanging out there
is what is the standard of knowledge that is required of the state. Courts seem to align
in the perception that it's either actual or constructive knowledge which are sufficient
to satisfy thresholds, regardless, really, of the area of law or the nature of the harm.
Compare cases such as Bosnia, genocide of the ICJ, or Osman in the UK before the European Court of
Human Rights. However, importantly, there is no automatic presumption that control, as such,
over the territory means that the state should have known of the harm, and we have seen that
in cases such as Corfu or Nicaragua, but as the court noted in Corfu Channel, the mere fact that
the state exercises exclusive control over its territory does not, in fact, result in prima
facie responsibility, nor shift the burden of proof, but at the same time, importantly, the
state, that territorial state, may, up to a certain point, be bound to supply particulars of the use
made by it of the means of information and inquiry at its disposal. Similarly, courts and
tribunal appear to be much more willing to take into account circumstantial evidence when analyzing
questions relating to knowledge in such cases. The second aspect to which we can turn in the
analysis of the practice of courts and tribunals is what is the scope of application of due
obligation, and here there are, again, two subsets of consideration. First, the spatial
consideration. As we all know, physical control of the territory, and I'm quoting here, is the
basis of state responsibility for acts affecting other states, according from the Namibia advisory
opinion. Now, that control, however, need not be construed necessarily as an effective control in
the way that we have conceptualized it for the purposes of attribution, nor, it seems, according
to quite a few courts and tribunals, that a temporary absence of an effective control over a
particular portion of territory necessarily relieve a state from its due diligence obligation,
as we have seen, for example, in the Alaska decision of the European Court of Human Rights
or the Bosnia genocide case. In fact, the court in the latter found that it was necessary to
examine a state's capacity to prevent genocide in terms of, and I quote, the geographical distance
of the state concerned from the scene of the event and on the strength of political links,
as well as other links between the authorities of that state and the main actors in the event.
In fact, a trend seems to be occurring in the practice of international courts and tribunals
towards focusing much more on the control over the activities that may cause a particular harm,
rather than necessarily only over the person or the territory where that may be occurring.
As to the second aspect, the temporal aspect of the scope of obligation of due diligence,
the court seemed to emphasize that we are talking about essentially an
anti-evaluation of the risk, but that the obligation of due diligence applies throughout
the entire period of the activities that pose the risk of harm. Again, pulp mills or Kishanganga
Ward may be referred to, and that implies the monitoring obligations of the effects
of the activity posing the risk of harm. Turning to my third and final sort of analytical
constellation, which goes to the material content of due diligence, the what,
here essentially the existing output can be decomposed into two main aspects. One is the
means that are reasonably available, and of course, while we don't have a single formula,
there are several indicia to verify whether the obligation of due diligence has been discharged.
These are the monitoring and the supervision, the risk assessment in various contexts,
notification and consultation in good faith with other potentially affected states,
the inaction of legislation and administrative policy and regulation. Importantly, however,
it is not sufficient to adopt regulatory or administrative measures, but also as the court
has emphasized in the pulp mills case, as well as it was in Fisheries Advisory Opinion or China
Tribunal, a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative
control. Moreover, the means that can effectively be employed to discharge such due diligence
obligations need to be updated and may in fact change with the passage of time, as was underscored
in the CBAT Advisory Opinion, paragraph 117. The second important component going to that
material content of due diligence is the gravity of the risk. The principle is that the graver the
risk of harm, the greater the means the state has to employ in order to discharge its obligation.
And here courts have further helped us in our understanding of that relationship by indicating
that the question of whether the underlying activities are a one-off conduct or a recurrent
systematic activity is immaterial in fact to assessing whether the breach of an obligation
of due diligence has occurred. Finally, what we gather from the practice of international courts
and tribunals, that it is no defense for a state to argue that even if it had taken all measures
reasonably available to it, the harm would still have occurred. As the court emphasized in its
Bosnia genocide case, it is irrelevant whether the state claims or even proves that even if it had
employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the
commission of genocide. In conclusion, I would submit to you that the output of force
and tribunals in respect of when, how, and what in respect of due diligence seems to point in the
direction of many more common features of analysis underlying whether due diligence has been actually
fulfilled than the inherent differences there from one area of public international law to another.
Thank you.
