The Duty to Prevent Environmental Harm as an Aterritorial Norm

Global Affairs Academy
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Jun 5, 2026
An address to the Ninth Annual Cambridge International Law (CILJ) Conference in April 2020, Panel 1: International Legal Principles for Engaging with Risk—Due Diligence and Prevention, by Dr Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli, Lecturer, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London.
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AI GeneratedThis presentation examines the principle of prevention in international environmental law, specifically questioning whether a state's duty to prevent environmental harm extends beyond transboundary impacts to include purely domestic territory. The speaker argues that while sovereignty has traditionally been central, emerging legal trends and human rights jurisprudence suggest a shift toward an objective duty to protect the environment regardless of location.
Efrain, thank you very much and let me start by really thanking the organisers
who've done such a fantastic job organising this webinar. This is great to be able to engage
with the fellow speakers and with the audience as well. So today I'd like to say a few words
on the principle of prevention in international environmental law with a specific focus on the
geographical scope of a preventive obligation. As we know, international environmental law is based
on the willingness to avoid environmental harm before it happens, based on the idea that we
should avoid harm from occurring rather than repairing the damage. So it is generally
acknowledged that this preventive principle is customary international law, having found
its origins in the landmark award of the 12th case and then having consolidated in the form
of principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration. For the purposes of this presentation, the three
fundamental components of the principle of prevention as expressed in principle 21
are quite important. As we know, the first component is one that says that states have
sovereign rights to exploit their own natural resources, so very much a principle focus on the
sovereignty of the state when it comes to its environment within its domestic territory,
and then two more environment-focused components with a traditional prohibition to cause
transboundary harm to other states and an even more environment-friendly component about protecting
the environment in the global commons. What we are seeing really is that even in this principle of
prevention, sovereignty preservation remains central. So we have on the one hand the sovereignty
of a state to exploit its resources, that is balanced with the sovereignty of other states
to be and their right to be free from external interferences. However, if we look at the landmark
advisory opinion on environment and human rights of the international of the inter-american court
of human rights from 2017, what we see here is that the advisory opinion says that states have
a duty to prevent damage to the environment, and I quote, both inside and outside their territory.
So this affirmation actually raises questions about the geographical scope of a preventive duty
as we are indeed going beyond the transboundary context in which principle 21 has operated so far.
So what I'd like to do today is to assess whether and if so under which circumstances states might
have a duty to prevent harm to the environment within their jurisdiction or control, even when
no external impact can be reasonably foreseen. So I will start with some brief preliminary
methodological remarks, I will then very briefly outline a number of either environmental or human
rights obligations that might be applicable in a purely domestic context, and then I will explain
why does this matter, why does this matter that we have actually an obligation, that states might
have an obligation to prevent harm only within their domestic territory. So understandably the
thesis of the extension of a spatial scope of prevention is not uncontroversial, it is challenging
the traditional conception of prevention as a norm designed to preserve the territorial integrity of
states. And while there's a lot of doctrinal discussions about the fact that the concept
of sovereignty might be reshaped by a globalised world, we see that the proposition that a state
can use its resources as it sees fit is rarely actually openly challenged. However at the same
time if we look at some codification works from the UN Environment Programme, from the IUCN
Environment and Development Covenant, as well as some of the legal scholarship, for instance if you
look at the textbook of Sands and Peel, we see here that there's often an allusion to the applicability
of prevention in a purely domestic context. So what I'd like to do today is to look under which
circumstances can we say that such an obligation can apply. This is raising a fundamental question
that relates to whether a norm exists in customary international law, and if so how do we actually go
about in trying to identify the existence of such a customary norm. So I do not seek to
undertake a comprehensive assessment of state practice or opinion heurist, but what I'd like to
do today is to highlight a number of obligations that are actually asking states already to
preserve their environment within their domestic territory. So if we look at international
environmental obligations, what we see is that sovereignty again remains quite important,
and those obligations are very much driven by a willingness to preserve sovereignty and
not the environment as such. However we can identify three sets of obligations that create
a domestic obligation to prevent harm. The first one is if we transpose the international law harm
rule to a domestic setting, in a situation where an administrative entity in a state,
such as a province, canton or land, causes environmental harm to the territory of another
domestic administrative entity within that same state. So this is what we have seen
in relation to a number of decisions from domestic courts, in which domestic courts have actually
applied the international law harm rule, looking for instance at the Belsen-Elter case or the ILC
prevention articles, in a purely domestic setting. So they've used this law harm rule
as an inspiration to actually regulate and try to protect the environment within their own
territory. Such transposition obviously has its own limits, it works better if we are in a federal
system, it might not work all the time because it's not really creating an overall obligation
to avoid harm within the territory of the state. A second possibility is to look at the emerging
obligations of sustainable use of natural resources. That has been considered to be
an emerging norm under customary international law by the International Law Association.
Again here we are only looking at how states are using their resources within their domestic
territory and we are in a sense including this preventive rationale in that obligation,
the preventive rationale that has nevertheless to be balanced with the other components of
sustainability, economic and social considerations. So it means that the preventive obligation
does not have, will not prevail over, necessarily over other considerations.
And then the third component, and the one that is perhaps more convincing,
relates to the general duties to protect the environment that we see in certain international
treaties. In article 192 of the UN Convention of the Law, we see that creates a broad obligation
to prevent, to preserve the environment irrespective of where harm might happen,
which means that it also includes the domestic territory of a state. Same thing with the UN
International Waterforce Treaty or even the work that is being done by the IALT on the protection
of the atmosphere, where we can also find that kind of broad environmental obligation.
The second approach is to look also at human rights duties that in a sense are better suited
when we're trying to identify state obligation in the context of a purely, of purely domestic
activities. And in this context we can look at the obligation to prevent and mitigate disasters
to protect people, as has been identified in the work of the International Law Commission,
an obligation that has actually, that finds its background in the environmental principle
of prevention, but that has been applied only in a pure domestic context irrespective of external
impact. The two obligations are obviously linked, but they are also very different as
when we're talking about disasters, we are talking about an emergency, a focus on protecting the
population and not the environment as such. And then the second type of obligations that relates
to the increasingly important case law that we have on relationship between human rights and
the environment. Here again an implicit obligation to prevent harm in as much as certain activities
might affect the enjoyment of existing human rights. This jurisprudence is often implicit
when it comes to recognizing this obligation of prevention, but for instance if we look at
the latest judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from February 2020
in La Carroncade against Argentina, what we see in this judgment is that there is a specific
reference based on the advisory opinion that I mentioned previously about the preventive duty
to avoid environmental damage and about how this preventive duty applies in a strictly domestic
context. So why does this matter? Well it matters because basically if we're only looking at principle
21 as an expression of the prevention principle, well we actually see that this is not enough
and that there might be some emerging duties to protect the environment also within a state's
domestic territory. This kind of objective standing in which prevention applies irrespective
of where environmental harm might happen has consequences both legal and symbolic.
Legally speaking, if we have a territorial norm of prevention, it means that states will have
an obligation to avoid environmental damage in disputed areas and this is what has been
recognized by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in Ghana versus Cote d'Ivoire or in the
South China Sea arbitration. So this is quite important because it means that we have obligations
that are applicable irrespective of sovereignty considerations. In addition and perhaps more
controversially, it also means that we could perhaps justify a right to take unilateral
preventive measures which allows the objective of environmental protection to actually prevail
over the right of a state to be free from external interference. Theoretically speaking,
the objective standing is significant because it's really signaling a change in the logic that
drives international law in the context of environmental protection. It is making prevention
applicable irrespective of sovereignty considerations and hence better able to value
the environment. Thank you.
