Cybersecurity under the WTO Framework: Addressing the Challenges and Adopting Solutions

Global Affairs Academy
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An address to the Ninth Annual Cambridge International Law (CILJ) Conference in April 2020, in Panel 4: Risk in Cyberspace—International Legal Dimensions, by Sarah Alturki, LL.M. Graduate, University of Edinburgh.
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AI GeneratedThis presentation examines how the World Trade Organization (WTO) handles cybersecurity concerns regarding the trade of information and communication technology (ICT) goods. The speaker analyzes the tension between national security restrictions and GATT rules, arguing that current security exceptions are inadequate and proposing the adoption of international technical standards as a viable solution.
Greetings. It's my pleasure to join you all today to discuss a research topic I've been working on for the past year and a half now, I should say,
about how the World Trade Organization deals with cyber security.
Now, this is a very broad topic, so today in this presentation specifically we will just focus on cyber security
insofar as it affects the international scale of goods and therefore restricting my analysis to the general agreement on tariffs and trade or the GATT.
I will be discussing two instances in which trade restrictions have been imposed on information communication technology.
Although these measures have never been formally challenged in the WTO settlement system,
I will proceed with looking at these examples as if they were a hypothetical dispute
and accordingly looking at how they would be justified under the exceptions in the GATT
and even looking at possible solutions elsewhere.
For an example, resolving cyber security concerns under the GATT or technical barriers to trade agreement.
Now, to begin with, an important issue to address is that states will have various policy considerations
behind restricting trade and ICT or information and communication technology products
and some of these considerations will entail protectionist or politically motivated intentions.
However, I do believe that cyber security is a global concern and accordingly I feel it's appropriate to deal with it as such,
meaning that the WTO should address the concerns related to cyber security within the system
instead of having states resort to other resources.
Now, for the sake of argument, I will be dealing with these issues even if they are at times of a political nature
as if they were a genuine, novel cyber security concern.
So let's begin with looking at two particularly controversial measures that have affected trade and information and communication.
So the first of these measures has been the banning the use of foreign equipment in critical infrastructure projects
and this concern was essentially raised by Australia in 2018 in which it banned the use of Chinese telecommunication equipment
in building its 5G broadband network.
Now, the ban was initiated in the concern that because information would be traveling through this Chinese equipment
the company might be compelled to hand over and gather that information to Chinese intelligence agencies.
The measure adopted by Australia has had a spillover effect.
So we've seen the US, Japan and New Zealand have all adopted similar regulations.
Another issue regarding trade in technological goods has been banning or imposing export restrictions on information and communication technology components.
So in 2019, the US added Huawei along with several other affiliates to its entities.
Now what that does is that it bans US companies from exporting any kind of items to the Chinese companies on the list over national security concerns.
Now, why is this a problem?
Now, the GATT agreement as part of the WTO framework sets out a series of rules to strengthen economic cooperation between the states
and it does so by eliminating or reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
The aforementioned examples are all examples of non-tariff barriers that would violate the GATT.
For an example, they would violate Article 1 on multilateralization, Article 3 on national treatment and Article 11 on continental restriction.
Naturally, a state will try to justify these measures under one or more of the GATT exceptions.
Specifically, because a lot of these states have adopted the measures under our national security rationale, Article 21 is of utmost importance here.
And I think a little bit of background is necessary about Article 21.
So, the article has been the focal point of much debate and discussion about its justicability and appropriate standard of review.
Fortunately, we have the Russian Traffic and Transit Dispute, which is the first and currently the only WTO case adjudicating Article 21,
in which the panel have kind of clarified these concepts.
So, what the panel did in that case was divide the article into both objective and subjective elements.
So, while a WTO member has the right to self-judge what would be considered an essential security interest, subject they do so in good faith,
a member must also adhere to an objective analysis of the fact under which these measures were taken.
And here's where it gets a little bit tricky.
So, can we consider cybersecurity an essential security interest within the meaning of Article 21?
And perhaps the best way to look at this is through Article 21b, paragraph 3,
in which it justifies measures taken during a time of emergency in international relations.
However, in the Russian Traffic and Transit Dispute, the panel interpreted emergency in international relations
by reference to the concept at a time it was developed in 1947, when the article was drafted.
So, the panel says that an emergency in international relations is one that would be of comparative gravity to war,
or one that would involve armed conflict, some sort of heightened tension, or general instability involving the state.
Now, this concept would be difficult to apply to nowadays threats, especially when it comes to cybersecurity,
when they don't necessarily have to become military or of a military nature.
On the contrary, they could be completely peaceful, but could have a significant impact on a state's security.
Another issue with applying the concept as defined by the Russian Transit Panel
is that they required chronological concurrence between the emergency in international relations and the measures taken,
which is challenging for issues related to cybersecurity, because it basically relies on states taking preventive action.
If states were not allowed to take action until a cyber attack or cyber breach happened, then it would be irrelevant.
Therefore, it is unclear if Article 21 would be able to allow for preventive measures to be taken, or precautionary measures in that sense.
Another challenge in applying Article 21 would be to determine the good faith of a reputable member in adopting these measures.
The panel, although they recognize the self-judging nature of part of the clause,
they also require that it is subject to some sort of review of good faith in which a member should adopt these measures of good faith.
Unfortunately, the examples we have seen nowadays in banning or restricting information and communication technology
is that it has often been of a political or punitive nature,
which will make it particularly difficult to apply Article 21 on cybersecurity.
Given the complexity of dealing with cybersecurity under the national security justification,
I alternatively propose addressing the cybersecurity concerns under the TNT agreement,
which allows states to adopt technical barriers or new specifications to products imported into their country
subject that they do so in a non-discriminatory way.
This is quite frankly perfect when it comes to cybersecurity and security in technology
because there are currently several systems or specifications internationally recognized
that do address cybersecurity and integrity of devices collectively with their networks, softwares, and systems.
For example, we have the NIST cybersecurity framework,
which is an extensive framework that deals with cybersecurity in product, services, and different layers of technology.
We also have the 2013 joint standards by the International Standardization Organization along with the IET,
which also talks about hardware and software cybersecurity.
The NERC also has a set of standards for the electric power industry and insurance trade fair.
The problem with these standards is that states have not sat down and agreed on them collectively altogether.
Certain members have adopted these regulations,
but I think it is possible to split all the states together and have one specific standard adopted
by which all of them would be able to implement.
I generally believe that states have a legitimate concern when they want to address cybersecurity and information and communication products.
However, states should be more concerned about how these products are being used instead of where and who are using them.
Adopting international standards in accordance with the TTT would resolve a reasonable number of cybersecurity concerns
and also do so within the existing WTO framework.
This is still a work in progress and feedback is very much appreciated.
I would like to thank you all for listening and I hope you enjoyed this presentation.
