The keynote address to the Ninth Annual Cambridge International Law (CILJ) Conference in April 2020, by Professor Anne Peters, Managing Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law Heidelberg (Germany), and a professor at the universities of Heidelberg, Freie Universität Berlin, Basel (Switzerland), and William W. Cook Global Law professor at the University of Michigan.
The Cambridge International Law Journal 9th Annual Cambridge International Law Conference on the theme of ‘International Law and Global Risks: Current Challenges in Theory and Practice‘ was held as an online webinar series due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
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This presentation analyzes the concept of \"due diligence\" in international law, examining its evolution from a qualifier of state obligations to a pervasive tool in human rights, environmental, and cyber law. It explores how due diligence balances state responsibility with practical capacity, while cautioning that its inherent ambiguity can either facilitate global governance or undermine the rule of law.
Can China or any other state be held responsible under international law for a failure to exercise
due diligence in managing the COVID-19 virus? This question lays bare both the importance
and weakness of due diligence. Probably some states, beginning with China where the virus
was first documented, have been violating their due diligence obligations enshrined in the
To all appearances, China has informed the World Health Organization a bit late about the virus
and some governments have reacted slowly and hesitantly or even counterproductively.
But it is highly unlikely that interstate responsibility will be activated.
The reasons are not only strategic considerations of governments but also the complexity of assessing
which hardly lends itself to create hard state responsibility.
I congratulate the organizers for the choice of the overall topic of this workshop,
which could not be more timely. Although the COVID virus forced you to transform the workshop
into a webinar, it underscored the pertinence of the theme in a dramatic way. And I'm happy
to get the opportunity to talk about due diligence as one important aspect of your theme
of global risks. And I'm all the more pleased to do this because Professor Jorge Manuelis is one
of the contributors to a book that I co-edited on due diligence across international law. Jorge
wrote a chapter sketching out a fine-grained cartography of due diligence in environmental law,
starting with the Alabama claims arbitration of 1872 in the law of neutrality up to contemporary
international environmental law, a topic that few know better than him. The book on due diligence
will appear with Oxford University Press later this year and my talk is based on the introductory
and concluding chapters which I co-author with my colleagues and co-editors of the book
of our Max Planck Research Fellow Group, Heike Krieger and Leo Kreutzer from Freie
Universität Berlin. And I thank them for allowing me to use our material.
Technically, I was not capable of producing a show with slides and myself standing in front
of the slides, so I don't have them, but I have a handout which I hope that this was distributed
to you. And the handout also contains an outline of the talk and references to the material I cite
and also to the key literature on due diligence. Let's start with the meaning of the term
diligence, which comes from Diligencia, which means circumspection. The opposite is negligence.
Diligence and due diligence is always a qualifier of some other obligation. One could say it is
therefore always ancillary. It's a modality of being something. What does it require?
We could distinguish first procedural obligations, for example, obligations to notify and report,
for example, the OECD common tax reporting standards, or obligations to inform, to consult,
to cooperate, to conduct a risk assessment, for example, environmental impact assessment,
but also human rights impact assessment as a newer tool. Obligations to monitor, to warn,
to publicly explain, or to take feasible precautions are all procedural due diligence
obligations. Second, due diligence obligations arise with regard to a state's institutional
capacity, for example, taking legislative or administrative safeguard measures,
for example, sanctioning violations by enacting criminal law provisions or establishing judicial
procedures for persons in administrative processes, or to establish monitoring mechanisms,
for example, periodic inspection measures with regard to hazardous activities.
Due diligence inevitably has a normative coloring. What is due is at least partly defined by other
spheres, such as business practice or morals. But this is not different from good faith,
or legitimate expectations, or ordre public, to mention some other concepts.
So we could say that due diligence is a bridge principle between law and other spheres of
normativity. Where does due diligence appear in international law? First, in the law of neutrality,
in the law of aliens, and in post 1945, so the actual modern international law, due diligence
is most pervasive in environmental law. Numerous environmental conventions, starting in 1972,
embody obligations to take appropriate measures. This is implicit due diligence, one could say.
I mentioned some of these conventions on the handout, on page two. Environmental law is still
the main field of application. There are also newer fields of application of due diligence.
For example, in human rights, with regard to private actors, violent men, and bad business
actors. There is the Istanbul Convention on Domestic Violence of 2011, and the open-ended
working group within the Union Rights Council produced a revised draft on business and human
rights. And in this draft treaty, they set out that the state parties should adopt measures
necessary to ensure that all persons conducting business activities, including those of
transnational character, undertake human rights due diligence. So this is also a dual due diligence
scheme. The parties of the treaty must be diligent in imposing due diligence on business. Both texts
are also mentioned on the handout. In younger subfields of international law, due diligence is
also rampant. For example, the World Bank requires due diligence by its clients, and is arguably also
itself committed to due diligence in project finance. In cyber law, in anti-terrorism law,
in tax law, and in health law, in all these legal fields, we find due diligence. Due diligence is
always about managing the risk. It's about risks emanating from private actors, ranging from pirates
over terrorists, to violent husbands, to business, or about risks emanating from nature, ranging from
radioactive waves to virus. Due diligence concerns notably risk management in the face of lacking
knowledge and or evidence, in the face of unclear causalities, and in the face of numerous
contributing factors and actors. Due diligence is, legally speaking, a companion of the precautionary
principle. This brings us to the legal functions of due diligence. The traditional function of
due diligence was to restrict the responsibility or accountability of states in the context of
the no-harm rule. Traditional international law obliges states to act diligently, so as not to cause
transboundary harm. The leading case for this is, as you know, the Trail-Smelter Award of 1941.
Even if this award did not use the word due diligence, due diligence was its undercurrent.
The word due diligence was already employed in other older arbitral awards, in the law of neutrality
and the law of aliens. The classic no-harm rule is breached only when conduct is negligence,
thus lacking due diligence, and when the unwanted results are present. This is also reflected in the
Inversely, harm alone is not sufficient to treat a state responsibility.
Even if harm occurs, but when the state was diligent, then the state will not be held liable.
So, the due diligence standard restricts responsibility. The classic function of due
diligence to restrict state responsibility is visible in various other fields of international
law, also where humans are the risks. States must take appropriate measures to protect premises
of a diplomatic mission from protesters. States must take appropriate measures to prevent terrorist
actions running from its territory. International anti-corruption treaties and money laundering law
have introduced a cascading system of obligations of supervision, which requires state parties to
diligently oversee legal entities, which in turn have to oversee associated natural legal
purposes. Same in tax law. Finally, due diligence against risky humans applies in IHL,
international humanitarian law, and in international criminal law. For example,
the International Committee of the Red Cross interprets Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions, the obligation to respect and ensure respect, as I quote the ICRC,
a general deal of due diligence. But, this is my next point, due diligence does not only serve
to limit responsibility, but also, at some places, to create responsibility.
Both in the Paltman case and in Costa Rica versus Nicaragua and the counterclaim,
the ICJ seem to keep apart two different rules. On the one hand, the harm prevention duty.
On the other hand, the duty to diligently not to cause harm. I realize that you'll be an expert on
this topic, Dr. Leslie Andrews-Howley, so I'll be short on prevention. Already in Cote d'Ivoire,
the ICJ held that two types of duties, the substantive duties, to manage soil and woodland,
so as not to impair water quality and the like, and procedural duties, to notify plants, to warn,
and so on, are independent from each other and can be independently breached or complied with.
And in Costa Rica versus Nicaragua, the ICJ held the states responsible for violating their
procedural obligations, but not for violating the substantive duty not to cause harm,
because in the end, no significant transboundary harm had occurred.
A lack of diligence was not sufficient for finding a violation of the traditional Nicaraguan law.
I submit that the detachment of the due diligence obligation from the result, in other words,
the complete proceduralization of the obligation, is adequate only in specific constellations.
Adequacy hinges, I claim, on the possibility to identify and pinpoint the result,
and whether this result is good or bad. If the result is easy to identify, then the procedural
and preventive obligations should not be completely detached from the result. For example,
with regard to the obligation to prevent genocide, the ICJ had held that a state
can be held responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide
was actually committed. Conditioning the breach of the obligation to prevent or the occurrence
of the bad event is adequate here, given that it is fairly easy to determine, actually,
whether the event, the genocide, did take place or not. If, however, the due diligence obligation
consists in breaching or maintaining a complex situation which is difficult to quantify,
for example, a certain level of education or a low level of production, and which, moreover,
extend over time and is not a spot argument, then the success is difficult to reach.
Here, the preventive and other procedural obligations, for example, under anti-corruption
law or under human rights law, should indeed be detached from the result. This then means,
firstly, that a state violates its obligations if it fails to act diligently, even if the level
of corruption is low or the level of literacy high, despite the laxity of the state. Conversely,
and as a flip side, a state is released from international responsibility if it takes
reasonable, diligent measures, even if the desired outcome is not reached. In our example,
even when a state is not entirely clean from corruption or when full literacy is not reached
in the population. Secondly, the state cannot avoid responsibility simply by showing that,
in our example, corruption or children missing school would persist despite all its efforts to
prevent it. Thus, although diligent preventive action would presumably not have eliminated the
problems, the lack of diligence still counts. If a breach of international law were denied here,
the state would be able to avoid responsibility all too easily. It is at this point that the
gist of the obligation are the means and processes that the state must employ. The
due diligence standard here creates accountability. I now turn to the legal structure and legal
qualification. The question is whether due diligence is always an obligation of conduct
as opposed to an obligation of result. Pierre-Marie Dupuy famously explained the difference
as follows. The obligation of a doctor to care for a patient is the obligation, an obligation
of conduct, while the obligation of the seller of a car to deliver a car is an obligation of result.
Due to the asymmetrical or limping relationship between procedures and outcomes that I just
explained, it is a bit simplistic to qualify due diligence only as an obligation of conduct as
opposed to result. Due diligence may sometimes but not always be both an obligation of conduct
and an obligation to guarantee a result. The next structural question is whether due diligence is
the primary norm or a secondary norm, to use the doctrinal terms of the law of state responsibility.
Helmut Aust and Priska Pahle have argued that due diligence sits in between primary and secondary
norms. In the Bosnian genocide case, the court could not successfully establish Serbia Montenegro's
responsibility, neither on the basis of attribution nor on the basis of complicity
under the Genocide Convention itself or under Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility.
Therefore, as a kind of last resort, the court developed and elaborated on the duty to prevent
under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention as an autonomous obligation of the state
parties, which is a due diligence obligation. The ICJ thereby sought to strike a balance
between avoiding impunity on the one hand and overburdening third states in case of atrocities
committed outside their objective territorial control on the other hand. On the handout,
and that's on page one, I explain how due diligence doctrinally sits as a third option
in between attribution and complicity. Another structural question is whether due diligence is
a customary norm or even a general principle of law. My claim is that due diligence cannot
and should not be qualified as a general principle for various reasons. First,
because the function of due diligence differs a lot in the different areas of law.
For example, in human rights law, the positive obligations in the dimension of protecting,
for example, against domestic violence, follow a more structural balancing process,
dominated by the principle of proportionality. So the type of due diligence assessment is
different here, although a family resemblance remains, of course. The meaning and function
of due diligence is again different in international economic law. The meaning is
here borrowed from private corporate law in relation to business transactions and corporate
finance. In that sphere, we might speak of doing due diligence as opposed to acting with diligence.
Doing due diligence is an exercise of risk mitigation by conducting a legal environment
or social audit before a visit approaches and before other legal undertakings,
in order to avoid a bad outcome. The bad outcomes to be planned off include not only potential
breaches of the law, but encompass all kinds of negative results. Therefore, doing due diligence
is partly outside the realm of the law. Still, from the perspective of a corporation,
the diligence exercise seeks to avoid the firm's legal liability and seeks to avoid other legal
problems. For example, an investor is expected to assess the present and possible future legal
framework of the state, where the investment shall take place. An investor who did not conduct due
diligence will lose its protection under a bilateral investment treaty. Thus, in investment
law, due diligence actually secures the investor's claim for damages. Here, due diligence is primarily
exercised to protect the actor itself and not, as in the constellations described before,
other actors' interests. In sum, the work that the audits called due diligence performs
starkly differs from the functions of due diligence as a standard of behavior in the
context of the no-harm rule. In the Bosnia genocide case, the ICJ cautioned against the
generalization of due diligence-based prevention duties. I cite the ICJ.
The content of the duty to prevent varies from one instrument to another
according to the wording of the relevant provisions and depending on the nature of the
In the same way, anyone who wants to identify and circumscribe the due diligence obligations,
both procedural and substantive, must always look at the substantive standards of a specific regime.
In consequence, due diligence as a general principle would not add much, but simply state
an unspecified duty of good behavior. A second, more normative consideration against
qualifying due diligence as a general principle is that it would not be normatively appropriate
as a fallback rule. Turning the due diligence standard into an overarching obligation to behave
diligently in international relations would imply that due diligence is normatively more desirable
than other standards. Standards such as absolute harm prevention on one side or mere avoidance
of gross recklessness on the other side. This would create an additional legal argument to
take burden from states when they intend to apply a different liability standard.
It would also restrict the state's freedom to work out the most appropriate allocation of
accountability. The ongoing negotiations on autonomous weapons are a case in point.
States and academics are recommending various mechanisms for creating accountability here.
Proposals range from a complete ban to a broad permission and include strict liability
or a presumption of liability or prevention and harm mitigation duties based on the due
diligence standard. But none of these standards is per se normatively more desirable than any other.
To conclude, in view of the widely divergent functions of due diligence
and its dependence on the primary rule which it accompanies, due diligence should not be
conceived as a general principle of international law. Rather, due diligence is an emanation or
sibling of other structural principles such as good neighborliness or good faith.
Turn to the policy benefits of the rise of due diligence.
Despite the shrinking space for the application of the lotus principle that restrictions on the
independence of states cannot be presumed, states still need a certain leeway for pursuing
legitimate interests. Due diligence has become one of the legal tools granting such leeway.
Thereby, states' freedom of action has been transformed from a pre-legal concept into a
circumscribed and curtained form of discretion. The opaque notion of sovereignty is here only
a placeholder for legitimate or legally recognized interests the states may pursue.
For example, Article 4, Section 1 of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change lays down the
objectives and goals of the regime. It refers, amongst others, to efforts to eradicate poverty.
One another provision permits the states to consider different national circumstances.
This gives developing states more leeway for setting national policy priorities
by weighing interests in poverty eradication and development against concerned with climate
protection. The balancing process informs the parameters which will then define the
due diligence standard in the concrete case. In conclusion, due diligence exemplifies the
paradigmatic shift from the state of nature among states to a legally regulated sphere.
At the same time, due diligence reintroduces a regal meaning, which casually operates as
a compensation for losses of natural sovereign freedom. This might be the price to pay for
legalization and risks to undermine the benefits of that legalization. A second policy benefit of
due diligence is that due diligence facilitates dealing with uncertainty in places of high
connectivity and the diversity of international actors, where several actors are in a position
to avoid the harm. What matters for the legal response is here not direct causality between
action and damage, but proximity of an actor to a risk. I will give examples from three legal fields.
In international climate law, risk proximity is contingent both on states' resources for action
and on their path for reduction to climate harm. As it is well known in the Bosnian genocide case,
which I mentioned several times already, the ICJ concentrated on the capacity to influence
as the relevant criterion that triggers the due diligence obligation to prevent genocide.
In international environmental law, one relevant factor for defining the risk management capacity
of the state is the state's economic level. To conclude, the due diligence banner is flexible
enough to allow ongoing adaptation. Due diligence also takes into account the diversity of state
actors. It finally permits to grade the responsibility based on distinct degrees of
risk proximity. Overall, due diligence works against a too summarial and formless allocation
of accountability among international actors which are increasingly connected. Seen from the
perspective of the international rule of law, this adds an element of material justice, which can be
seen as a core component of the rule of law. A third, one might say, policy function of due
diligence is in lawmaking. The normative openness of the due diligence banner facilitates treaty
negotiations because at least some of the antagonist interests do not need to be enshrined
in explicit legal rules. Due diligence here works as a tool for managing contestation.
In the design of a treaty, contravening interests may be made explicit, for example in the preamble
or in programmatic articles, but their accommodations transfer to a major point
in the process of implementing and applying a treaty. In other words, the use of a term
such as due diligence facilitates lawmaking through the use of constructive ambiguity.
The fourth benefit of due diligence is the stabilization of the international order
through proceduralization. The creation of procedures associated with or stemming from
the due diligence standard has considerably contributed to a proceduralization of international
law. By proceduralization, we mean the extension and refinement of rules on procedures,
and that is about steps and ways to proceed, as opposed to substantive rights, obligations,
command, prohibitions, or guarantees. In international law, we observe a proliferation
of procedural rules on hearings, on participation, obligations to explain and give reasons,
voting modes, monitoring, and verification, which constitute and shape the processes of
lawmaking and law enforcement. Procedures generally protect the weaker participants
in any given relationship because they prevent powerful players to change the rules of the game
at their whim. Importantly, procedures thus outbalance the power disparities,
for example by giving equally long speech swaths to all sides,
asking for written justifications by all sides, and the like. The antidote to sheer power play
is especially important in international relations where the disparities of strength
and influence are huge. Second, procedures also tend to increase accountability because they
create, comply, and publicize knowledge and thus allow outsiders to hold interests to account.
And thirdly, over time, processes and procedures within long-term treaty regimes
build consensus about how to assess and deal with the risks addressed in the treaties.
Thus, broadly framed due diligence obligations and related procedural obligations may work as
a starting point for creating more specific substantive obligations under a particular
treaty regime over time. An important driver of this trend toward proceduralization is the
disagreement among the members of a pluralist and even deeply divided international society
about proper outcomes. The impossibility to reach consensus about substantive outcomes
is exacerbated by the complexity of problems and lack of knowledge about their nature and scope,
let alone about ways to solve them. In this constellation, negotiators may find it easier
to agree on procedures because these are less burdened with ideology and are to some extent
open-ended. The underlying idea is that fair procedures will also lead to normatively
acceptable and, in fact, accepted outcomes. Thus, the elements of deliberation inherent
in a procedural approach complement more traditional forms of justifying international
law. Seen as a new key procedure, due diligence might bolster the legitimacy of international law.
However, this presupposes that due diligence is indeed fleshed out as a procedure and is
not only used as a buzzword. Where mere references to due diligence in treaty texts
and soft law do not encompass due diligence procedures, then powerful states might simply
define what is due. There is the danger that states and other international processes simply
proclaim due diligence and then do what they want. So the growing reliance on due diligence
comes with risks for the international rule of law and global governance, to which I now turn.
On the handout, this is on page two, the dark side of due diligence.
Broad, indeterminate normative standards such as due diligence may underline the capacity of the
law to govern behavior because the vague and blurry terms of those norms give plenty of leeway
to those interpreting and applying the norms. This undermines the international rule of law.
When due diligence obligations are introduced through secondary law or interpretation into
trickier regimes, which had previously provided for substantive standards, then due diligence
may dilute the strictness of those regimes by reopening states' discretion. This may give
room for more subjective, self-selected, and self-justifying processes and for self-serving
narratives and thereby contribute to a detachment of states from international legal commitments.
An example is the application of due diligence to cyber sphere. Russia and China have focused
on the risk of cyberterrorism in order to forge an international consensus to restrict freedom
of expression on the internet. The International Code of Conduct for Information Security of
September 2011 may be seen as such an attempt to legitimize restrictions of free speech that
actually disregard international human rights obligations. A duty to monitor and prevent cyber
harms may also serve as a narrative to bolster further disproportionate surveillance measures.
Another, at least ambivalent, consequence of due diligence relates to private actors.
We have seen that the traditional and probably so major field of application of due diligence
relates to the activities of private actors, which have thereby been at least indirectly brought
under the purview of international law. Thereby, due diligence contributes to the rise of informal
international law, notably professional and industrial standards, which are often issued
by transnational non-state actors such as professional associations, business interest
groups, frequently in collaboration with NGOs, or with government agencies. Such standards are often
crucial for determining which conduct is actually due in a given issue area, and they heavily
influence the interpretation of the relevant hard law. However, informal lawmaking processes are
often associated with negatively promoted concepts such as managerialism and technocracy.
These processes must answer calls for new forms of legitimizing global governance,
since these are not covered by state consent. I'm now reaching my conclusions and would like
to return to COVID-19. I venture to say that it would be impossible to pin down and assign
responsibility to one or several states for harm caused by the new virus. So in the end,
due diligence here in global health law does not provide any clear solution to a concrete problem.
However, on a more general level, as my talk tried to show, the rise of due diligence across all
areas of international law can be seen as a response and also as a manifestation,
and at the same time as a driver of structural change in the international legal order as a whole.
The most notable structural change is proceduralization, as I described.
This change is overlapping new types of risk management in the face of complexity and
diversification of factors. Seen through the lens of global constitutionalism, which I could not
give up, the rise of due diligence as a tort law-like and criminal law-based institution
at first sight might suggest an undue privatization or deconstitutionalization of the
international legal order. However, in the era of global capitalism, constitutionalism can and
should not be confined to states. The rise of due diligence both in interstate constellations
and in so-to-speak diagonal state non-state constellations, such as human rights, investment
protection, international criminal law, and anti-terrorism law, can be interpreted as one
feature of a global societal constitutionalism. Overall, due diligence is responding to the
current technical and economical insecurity, to the global political and economic power shift,
to the rise of economic private actors, and to probably growing ideational and ideological
strife. But in doing so, it not only leads these developments, but might even push them further
by offering cheap talk and empty rituals. Due diligence is as yammer-spaced as current
international law as a whole, oscillating between a hollow hope and a guarantor of peace and justice.