A lot of things go into the power of navy - but historically, ships tend to be a pretty important component.
With the recent release of the U.S.N's 30-year shipbuilding plan we now have some insight into what kind of ships this administration wants to build, how many, and how much they expect them to cost.
So today I start to unpack this blueprint for the most expensive U.S. naval build-up in decades and some of interesting items in it, from the big or consistent, to the small and conspicuously missing.
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Video Summary
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The U.S. Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan for FY2027 outlines a strategic shift toward a more lethal, balanced fleet to counter global adversaries. The plan emphasizes a \"renaissance\" in American shipbuilding, prioritizing high-capability, nuclear-powered assets and a larger submarine force, while navigating significant industrial constraints and cost-efficiency paradoxes.
For all the political polarization in the states, there is something that both parties and successive
governments have tended to agree on. World-leading navies generally benefit from having ships,
and the United States Navy could probably do with more of them. To that end, successive
governments and naval leaders have released 30-year shipbuilding plans, containing new ideas
and concepts of how to get the U.S. surface fleet back on track. That said, for the last couple of
decades, the U.S. has been much more consistent producing those plans than it has the ships
themselves. The LCS program was cancelled at a fraction of the intended program size,
the Zumwalt destroyers were cancelled after three ships, the Constellation-class frigates after two,
and more recently, America's next-generation destroyer, the DDGX, may have actually exceeded
even the Constellation's performance by apparently managing to get itself sidelined before steel was
cut on a single vessel. In place of the next-generation destroyer, the plan was now
apparently the return of the battleship, and it's these that have made it into the most recent U.S.
shipbuilding plan, albeit with a twist. Because what was criticized by some as a gold-plated,
overly-expensive, industrially-challenging design has now apparently had the gold plating stripped
off and replaced with platinum. Because USS Defiant apparently isn't just meant to be the
first battleship built anywhere in something like three quarters of a century, it's meant to be the
world's first ever nuclear-powered battleship with a price tag to match. And so today we're
going to crack open the recently released U.S. Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan for fiscal year
2027, trying to get some insights into this new U.S. naval buildup, the vision for the future fleet,
and the ongoing contest between things like the battleship and the budget. We'll start with a
brief discussion of what this document actually is, and critically, what it isn't. Then we'll look at
what kind of navy it envisions the United States building over the next three decades, splitting
them into the big, the mostly unchanged compared to previous plans, the small, and the missing.
That means looking at various ship classes from converted Coast Guard cutters turned frigates to
nuclear-powered battle wagons, and asking how many the plan intends to build and how much it
expects them to cost. Before finally zooming out and asking, in practical terms, what does this
thing actually mean for the future of U.S. naval power? But first, let me welcome back long-term
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to it. Okay, so let's quickly talk basics. The U.S. military shipbuilding sector and where this plan
fits into it. As we previously discussed, U.S. shipbuilding has a bit of a storied history. In
the 2020s though, the days of victory ship spam are long gone. The U.S. now accounts for a fraction
of a percent of global civilian shipbuilding, leaving military shipbuilding, such as it is,
as a key bedrock for what U.S. yards continue to do. The task of making bulk carriers or LNG
tankers may have long passed the likes of Japan, South Korea, and China, but if you want the likes
of a nuclear submarine or an aircraft carrier, a majority of the capacity is still in the states.
And that makes the long-term shipbuilding plans of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard pretty much the
beginning and end of the story for large parts of the sector. And that's where the 30-year shipbuilding
plan we want to discuss today comes in. Now, let's be clear up front that the plan isn't a
statement of what is actually going to happen. Not just because things change, but because
critically, it's not an approved budget. In the United States, it's the U.S. Congress that
ultimately controls the purse strings, and they get the final say about what ships are funded
and potentially get built. Congress, year to year, ultimately has a huge amount of say over what the
U.S. Navy ends up looking like. They've currently legislated, for example, a minimum number of
carriers that the force needs to operate, and they've pretty consistently voted up more funds
for shipbuilding than have been requested by the White House and the Navy. One of the best ways to
think of the shipbuilding plan then might be as a kind of vision or statement of intent for what
kind of Navy the Department of the Navy, so by extension the White House, wants to see built.
It's a statement to the force, but also to Congress, that this is basically the force we're
trying to build, this is what we think we need in order to do it, this is how much we think it's
likely to cost, so please go ahead and start coughing up the money on schedule. As well as
qualitative comments about particular ship categories or the nature of the Navy, one of the
things we're really interested in here are two sets of data. You have detailed shipbuilding and
funding requests covering the next five years out to fiscal year 2031, so the future year's
defense program. That's how many ships they want to procure in a given year, and how much they're
likely to cost. Then you have tables of force planning information heading out 30 years, all
the way out to fiscal year 2056. So how many ships are expected to be commissioned in a given year,
how many are meant to be retired, and what will the fleet look like along the way. This plan
doesn't tell us what kind of Navy the United States will actually build, but it does tell
us a lot about the Navy the current White House wants to build. So before we jump into the detail,
big picture level, what does the plan say? Like many of these recent shipbuilding plans,
including the changeover in administration, this presents itself as a rebuilding plan for the
United States Navy. Basic implications include the peace dividend Navy being too small for current
demands, U.S. shipbuilding industry and the U.S. Navy's record on ship procurement being a bit of
a shambles, and there being a genuine need to grow the current battle force and expand the U.S.
shipbuilding sector significantly in the coming decades. To give you a sense of the tone, the plan
begins with the following quote. We are at a strategic inflection point. For decades, while
America's attention went elsewhere, our adversaries built fleets at a pace not seen in generations.
During this time, our own maritime industrial base was weakened by inconsistent demand and
misaligned priorities. This left our fleet smaller, our shipyards reduced in numbers and
atrophied in capability, and our people facing unacceptable risk. We will not allow these
conditions to continue, end quote. Before you even get to the ships, it then sets out three pillars.
That the Navy needs to shift from quote, a slow compliance-based bureaucracy to an accountable
warfighting enterprise, end quote. Talks about the need to build a larger, more lethal or more
balanced fleet, delivering a high-low mix of advanced combatants, cost-effective frigates
and unmanned systems, and also seeking to quote, ignite a renaissance in American shipbuilding,
end quote. To do that, the plan calls for a significant increase in funding when you compare
this to the fiscal year 2025 plan. Even if you're talking just about the next five years, you're
looking at the shipbuilding investment budget for battle force ships jumping from sub 40 billion in
fiscal 25 to being north of 60 billion U.S. dollars in fiscal 27, 28, 30 and 31. 29 is a bit of a dip,
but even then it's still close to 50 billion. Over the full 30 years of the plan, you're talking
about a 12-digit difference. Expressed another way, over 30 years, you might be looking at U.S.
military shipbuilding funding being topped up by more than the total value of all military aid to
Ukraine by all parties since 2022. In terms of what that kind of funding is meant to buy you over
time, what you're seeing here are charts using data taken from the plan, laying out some of the
main components of the USM battle force by ship type between 2027 and 2056. As you can see, the
goal here is to go from a sub 300 ship navy at present to one pushing closer to 400 in the mid
2050s. Most of that growth though is relatively slow to kick off and it's also unevenly distributed
between ship classes. The carrier force, for example, is meant to remain mostly static over
the 30 years and the combined cruiser and destroyer force is actually smaller in some of these forward
estimates than it is currently. The growth in surface combatant numbers then mostly comes from
two types of ships. The guided missile battleships that start to appear in the force in the 2030s
more importantly, in raw numerical terms at least, an absolute spam of the new FFX frigates.
For the nuclear submarine force, the good news is that growth is likely to be significant with
the force going from just over 60 to more than 80 nuclear submarines of all types over the course of
the plan. The bad news being that it takes a considerable amount of time to get there.
The force dips slightly in the early 2030s, starts to recover in the late 2030s and then
seriously picks up from there. What these figures don't entirely capture is the change over in type
that's meant to happen behind those numbers with the ballistic missile force entirely replacing
the old ohio with the new columbias over the course of this plan. While one area that does
see a rapid uptick is in combat logistics and support vessels. This category which includes
a lot of critical ships like oilers is meant to jump significantly between 2027 and 2037
with a lot of the growth being basically front loaded and then stabilizing in the 2040s.
So basically across the board not many things go backwards. Some elements like support ships and
nuclear attack submarines are scaled up and two new ship classes are introduced at scale, the battleship and the frigate.
Now it's hopefully obvious looking at charts like this one that the idea of this plan is to boost
the size of the US Navy. The natural next question to ask then I think is how much does it actually
intend to do that not just compared to the current baseline but previous ship building plans.
So first audience question of the episode, how many additional ships do you think all of that
additional funding buys for the US Navy battle force over the course of the plan compared to
fiscal 25 version? Okay I'm assuming your guesses are in and if you picked any number that didn't
start with a negative sign you'd be wrong for most of the years covered by the plan.
In ship count but not necessarily tonnage this plan would have the US Navy operating fewer battle
force ships through most of the 2030s and all the 2040s compared to the one from two years ago
before eventually both the old and new plan converge on a battle force of about 400 ships in 2056.
That's a significant increase in both cases from a force of 291 today but it probably immediately
raises the question how do you plan to spend a ---- ton more money and end up with fewer boats?
The complex answer here is there are a lot of moving parts and factors pulling in multiple
directions. The simpler but still largely correct answer is the plan needs to build fewer ships
because it plans to build some considerably more expensive ones with the simplest answer being
in the brawl between the battleship and the budget in this document the battleships are winning
compared to the FY 2025 plan the new one purchases fewer frigates slightly more destroyers and
differences in terms of things like carriers and subs are mostly around the edges the difference
is that lone orange bar sitting by itself the battleships. So let's have a look at the ship
and class that are apparently meant to be able to sink anything out there including the budget
the USS Defiant and the ships to follow. We first talked about the US plan to bring back the
battleship or if you prefer the heavy missile cruiser or the guided missile battle cruiser
soon after USS Defiant and the so-called Trump class were first announced. This was a ship that
was meant to put the large back in large surface combatant a 35,000 ton plus displacement ship
mounting among other things a pair of forward mounted conventional guns a rail gun a standard
VLS array a hypersonic VLS array as well as an assortment of directed energy weapons which in
most cases don't really exist yet. The apparent idea was to create something at the highest of
the high end of the high low spectrum something didn't really have to make any design compromises
on things like armament sensors or aviation facilities because it was big enough to just
fit all of them. As we noted at the time though the prospect to bring back something with the
size if not the displacement of the old Iowa class battleships didn't come without its potential
drawbacks. It was likely to be hideously expensive there was a question over what US yards could
actually build the things and on what timeline. The data release suggested they would be crew
intensive some of the weapon systems they relied on were still thoroughly experimental at best
and there was even just from a math perspective a question of whether or not the ship could
efficiently do its primary job. As the current acting secretary of the navy put it in their ship
building plan the idea is for the battleship to quote bring resilient commander control deep
magazines diverse weapons and long reach in one platform fires he goes on to say is the king of
battle and wars are won by forces that bring both capacity and killing power to the fight
this ship delivers exactly that end quote. But as we previously discussed if you leave aside the
experimental railgun for the moment and focus just on the missiles the proposed guided missile
battleship is kind of ---- at carrying guided missiles. As you can see on this chart we showed
last time in terms of the number of standard missile vertical launch cells carried the
proposed defiant is significantly outgunned either by a pair of Zumwalt's or a trio of either the US
Arleigh Burke or the Chinese type 55 missile cruiser. That matters because with a pair of
Zumwalt's or a trio of either other ship you're looking at comparators that are either in the
similar range or lower when it comes to both displacement or price when compared to defiant.
With either the very old now US Burke or the newer Chinese type 55 you'd be looking at the
defiant being outshot on a missile for missile basis by something like two to three to one with
tonnage and cost to spare. My point is there is a massive difference between a ship with a lot of
firepower and a force with a lot of firepower and on a cost for cost or ton for ton basis based on
the numbers we've been given the battleship is just a pretty terrible way to add additional
missile firepower to fleets compared to existing cruiser destroyer and even some frigate designs.
Now sure those ships don't have the larger VLS used for the defiance hypersonics but the Zumwalt's
do and those ships which on paper here pack additional firepower were remember considered
overly expensive failures but mere mathematical details like those aside this plan doubles and
triples down on the BBG so guided missile battleship concept. The basic idea here seems
to be the battleship should provide the fleet with a higher end capability than a destroyer.
It should provide quote longer endurance higher speed and accommodate advanced weapon systems
required for modern warfare end quote. The role the battleship is thankfully not just to deliver
high volume long-range defensive fires which is a good thing given its lack of missile cells
and so some of the pitch here if you like focuses on the other traits that make the battleship
different. In terms of those advantages the document offers six hard arguments if you like
and two soft ones. On the hard side the battleship is meant to have room for advanced payload modules
including for future vertical launch systems with more capacity than the current mark 41.
Basically eventually you might be able to fit bigger and more advanced missile systems onto it.
It's also point two meant to be a launch platform for theta nuclear weapons which I take to be a
suggestion that the US Navy's new nuclear cruise missile is meant to be mounted on this thing
helpful perhaps from a survivability perspective but it's also worth noting that in both cases
there's no reason the battleship has to be the launch platform. You could put a nuclear cruise
missile launcher on just about anything that floats other countries already do and if you go
back to the cold war the US has tested firing missiles off some very small platforms in the
past. The hypersonics also don't require something as big as a battleship to mount.
The Zulmauts are already being fitted with them. The intention is to put them on submarines
and given their very very long range there's also always the option of just you know
putting them on the back of a truck because as the likes of Ukraine and Iran have helpfully
demonstrated while a modern warship might be pretty survivable you can also do a lot with
dirt decoys and a cave or two. It's also meant to provide much more power generation capacity
more on that later advanced naval gunfire support so think the forward mounted railgun
which the plan seems to envision potentially having an air defense role not just ground strike
and then also the internal volume necessary to embark a fleet command staff. The final hard
argument is this ship is meant to be so capable so as to allow quote the battleship to single
handedly perform key missions to the sustainment of commerce like holding open choke points on
critical sea lines of communication that would otherwise require a wider commitment of assets
from the fleet end quote. Basically this thing is well armed and well defended enough that you
could send it into the Strait of Hormuz alone whereas normally you might be nervous about doing
that. A counterpoint might be that it's reasonable to expect that a 35,000 ton ship would be able to
do the job of multiple other ships because it's a 35,000 ton ship and for the same investment you
could probably field multiple existing destroyers and maybe a support ship or two. It's also hard
to imagine one or a handful of ships escorting a meaningful number of vessels through a maritime
choke point while if you focus on the more coercive and strike oriented side of the war in
the middle east if the carriers delivered a lot more firepower than a battleship would have been
able to while not needing to push into the strait and on a cost for cost basis other platforms would
have had the battleship beat in terms of missile slinging capacity. To cap it all off the document
puts forward what it describes as two unique advantages of the battleship. Firstly that it
represents a quote commitment to the future end quote. The basic argument here is the battleship
will be large enough and have enough power generation on board that if in the future new
technologies, new systems, new modules, new components are developed there'll be plenty of
room to integrate those onto the battleship and plenty of juice to power them. It may be
over-engineered for current technology but well suited for operations 10, 15 or 20 years down the
track. The second argument is the battleship provides quote distinct enhancements to deterrence
quote. While unseen platforms like submarines and space systems can give adversaries pause by
creating uncertainty ensuring peace through strength ultimately requires presence the arrival
of a battleship whether in the port of an ally or on the horizon of an enemy sends an unmistakable
signal of american resolve matched today only by our aircraft carriers end quote. Basically while
the battleship might be short on launch cells it would be long on drip an impressive way of showing
the flag and so one rocking up in an area might have deterrence value you know just like the
arrival of prince of wales and repulse in singapore deterred the japanese in the 1940s. So those are
the arguments the document puts forward for the battleship let's talk about how many they're
planning to build. The plan calls for the first battleship of the class to be procured so
ordered not commissioned in fiscal year 2028 the second in 2030 then 2031 and then on a fairly
regular cadence of one every two years. The idea is for the first of the battleships to enter service
with the navy in 2036 the second in 2038 finally reaching a peak of 11 of these ships in service
in 2055. What that suggests is that come the 2050s the us navy would be operating battleships
and carriers on a roughly one-to-one ratio and that comparison might feel all the more apt when
we start to talk about cost. When we first talked about USS Defiant and compared it to some of the
other ships out there the chart here shows the very rough numbers were used about nine billion
dollars a hull that was a very rough figure based on tonnage which suggested Defiant should cost
more than three Arleigh Burke's but a little bit less than two Zumwalt's. Based on that figure
you'll remember the conclusion being the ship was probably too expensive at that price point
relative to the capability it seemed to provide to merit large-scale inclusion in the force.
If you were constrained on dollars there might be more efficient ways to get the capability you seem
to want by comboing different platforms and equipment together however that analysis assumed
a nine billion US dollar price point and thanks to the shipbuilding plan the US department of
navy has helpfully clarified they don't actually expect Defiant to cost nine billion dollars
they expect it to cost closer to 17 billion with a billion dollars requested in fiscal year 27
then 16.97 billion in fiscal 28 for the first ship with a total funding request out to 2031
of 43.5 billion US dollars with a b for three ships that gives you an average per unit price
making each of these battleships as or even more expensive than a nuclear powered aircraft carrier
almost three times their displacement and one of the many reasons for that incredible dose of
sticker shock might be is that despite the labeling on the chart there this isn't apparently a BBG
anymore it's BBGN because after repeatedly denying they were going to do so apparently the navy
decided to take the battleship nuclear now this is interesting because one of the last
sections of my episode on the potential return of the battleship was a hypothetical the basic
question was if you insisted on bringing back a battleship for modern navy what might you
potentially do to make it useful and one of the first things i suggested was that you use the
size of the ship to fit a significant nuclear propulsion system you do that because it would
give you a lot more endurance independence from logistics and access to a lot more electrical
generation capacity using that you could essentially turn your hypothetical battleship
into a high energy platform for lack of a better term you could choose the most energy intensive
over-the-top sensors electronic warfare and importantly directed energy weapons think lasers
and strap as many of them as you wanted to the platform because where a gas or diesel design
might struggle a reactor would manage the original concept for defiant and the trump glass battleships
though was that they'd be kodak vessels combined gas and diesel that potentially would have made
them very very thirsty but also potentially saved a couple of bucks on building the things
as recently as a couple of months ago the then secretary of the navy said that discussions were
ongoing about potentially making the warships nuclear powered but he said that was quote unquote
unlikely that was notably puzzling to many including a number of russian commentators
given that in the past when the soviet union faced a decision on how to build its own large
high-speed guided missile ships the kirov class battle cruisers it had also come to the conclusion
that if you wanted to build a high-performance ship that large you might as well stick a reactor
in it which they did now leadership at the navy department has changed and so too has the
propulsion system for the battleship it now seems the us is going to be getting its own kirovs after
all with the usn's chief of operations publicly saying that the u.s navy's decision to totally
abandon nuclear power for surface combatant other than carriers was quote one of the largest mistakes
it's ever made he highlighted some of the difficulties the navy had faced fueling its
conventionally powered ships taking part in operations against iran and through the discussions
we found out the defiant apparently won't just have a nuclear reactor we also found out which
one per the admiral quote we're going to use an existing design we're going to use the ford
reactor the a1b reactor and the components to support that from the vessel the steam generator
pressurizer loop components reactor coolant pump components so all that technology is going into
the design of the battleship the nuclear battleship from the reactor plant perspective end quote now
from a procurement and supply chain perspective if you were going to make a nuclear powered
battleship as the united states i'd argue this is pretty close to the top of the list of how you do
it it takes a long long time to design and stand up the supply chain for a new nuclear reactor type
each design has to have its own supply chain its own maintenance regime its own training regime to
make sure you have people qualified on it and given how fiendishly difficult it normally is to obtain
scale in the nuclear reactor business using an existing design makes sense and thankfully for
potential battleship the reactor is a divisible asset the 100,000 ton displacement carrier is
powered by two of them so hypothetically you don't have to put the power plant designed for a 100,000
ton ship in the 35 to 40,000 tonner you can chop the system down by half and be less ridiculously
overbuilt however there is a difference between not being ridiculously overbuilt and not being
overbuilt at all you're still talking about putting 50,000 tons of displacement worth of
and assuming the design and supporting systems can handle it that leads to some pretty interesting
implications for performance it's generally a bit of an open secret that america's cvn's and
especially the ford are some of the fastest ships in the fleet officially the navy just says that
the nimitz and later ford classes can do over 30 knots how much more they don't say but there's
plenty of evidence to suggest that plus is doing a lot of heavy lifting they can also hypothetically
maintain higher speeds for longer periods because they don't have to worry about emptying
their bunkers the way something like a destroyer might assuming the battleship comes in at the
higher end of its displacement estimate so 40,000 tons not 35 on one a1b you're looking at a roughly
25 percent increase in power to weight ratio compared to the already outrageously fast carrier
make some rough assumptions around other potential limitations like beam and waterline
and you're inevitably going to come to the conclusion that unless there's some other
aspect of the design holding it back these bbgns are going to be very very fast ships and as a side
note they may actually be in a better position to use that mobility strategically operationally and
tactically than the carriers are the carriers are restrained by the fact that most of the time
they have to be glued to their battle group a carrier with its destroyers is a tool for power
projection a carrier out by itself is a very expensive target waiting for an ambitious
submarine captain air or missile attack but if the us navy genuinely believes the new battleships
would be capable of independent operations then there might be cases where they aren't glued to
conventionally powered escorts in which case as long as you don't mind the potential quality of
life and maintenance implications they could potentially relocate around the globe faster
than any other ship in u.s or anyone else's inventory the numbers are also fairly confronting
if you try and estimate electrical power as a baseline the u.s navy's flight three aliburg
destroyers have gone through considerable upgrades and redesigns to get them to 12 megawatts of
installed electrical power by contrast in the open source the a1b reactors on the ford are
capable of providing so much electrical power that the u.s is planning exercises where ford gets to
play the role essentially of an offshore nuclear power plant for an emergency or disaster scenario
practically speaking you wouldn't really be energy constrained in terms of sensors electronic
warfare and if in the future you successfully move from lasers in the hundreds of kilowatt range deep
into the megawatts trying to provide air and fleet defense not just close-in ship defense or dazzling
this is a platform that could potentially run them and run them continuously you'd also have
a lot of hull volume for things like cooling and just general space for systems and equipment growth
i think a likely scenario is that a ship with this much installed electrical power
wouldn't be able to effectively use it all now the energy hungry systems that could require it
don't really currently exist but from a future-proofing perspective an a1b reactor would
probably do it there's also as i said more to like here from an industrial perspective about
the level of technical risk is reduced but not eliminated you can use the existing training
scheme and production line planning for maintenance overhaul modernization disposal is already in
place and so while as the admiral suggested it's likely to be a long way from plug and play
this is far more credible as an approach if you want to move quickly than trying to start with a
clean sheet design one way to characterize this change then would be that when defiant was first
announced an accusation was that it was a gold plated design that it was at once both hideously
expensive but also didn't provide much in the way of unique capability unless you're a massive rail
gun fanboy to justify going with something new like this rather than cheaper existing concepts
the navy's response to that criticism seems to have been to remove the gold plate from the design
and replace it with platinum meaning you now have an even more hideously expensive design
but at least it can do some unique things if built as described it would be a very strategically
mobile ship it would have a degree of logistical independence more firepower on a ship for ship
basis than any other large surface combatant out there and if you believe that if not the fleet of
the 2020s or 2030s but the 2040s or 2050s might be in the laser business in a big way this thing
would have a significant advantage over conventional destroyers and cruisers when it came to the
but and there are a lot of buts that capability gain in swapping out the propulsion system
arguably makes many of these designs other issues worse there were already concerns about where
you'd be able to build these things and if you could do it on schedule now you're limited to
shipyards and workforce with nuclear capacity as well it was already going to be an expensive
design and adding a nuclear reactor it's probably unlikely to make it cheaper the core point is that
if this thing was actually built as advertised then as the document seems to suggest it probably
would be quite a capable ship it would bring a lot of performance some nice to have features
and a lot of bells and whistles to the navy's high low mix and i doubt a combatant commander
that was told hey you're getting one of these things in your ao would ever be disappointed
having one available as compared to an arleigh burke destroyer the challenge though is that
when you're designing a fleet resources are limited and everything is relative and when
you hypothetically have strategic competitors capable of turning out ships with fewer bells
and whistles but almost equivalent missile firepower for a tenth of the price there might
be some pretty big questions to answer as to whether betting it all on the battleship is
actually the best use of the available budget moving on from one of the big items that has
changed compared to previous shipbuilding plans i want to quickly talk about some of the things
that haven't places where investment plans seem mostly consistent with all the implications that
has for future u.s naval power the ford class carriers for example are being examined for
potential improvements but for the moment the plan is apparent to keep churning them out
we found out that over the course of its most recent deployment which kicked off in june 2025
ford executed something like 10 500 fixed wing launch and recoveries with the report describing
the class as now being a quote battle proven design end quote as we flagged in the force
growth figures there's also a lot of bubble head in the budget as well with the u.s due to spend
more on nuclear submarines than it is on carriers battleships destroyers and frigates combined
over the course of the five years the u.s would order 10 virginia class attack submarines with
the per unit cost dropping from about 7 billion in fiscal year 2027 to about 5.6 billion in fiscal
2031 for an average of about 6.3 billion per unit over the five years and as for the columbia class
boomers they appear to have kept their place at the top of the priority list the idea seems to
be to order one of these next generation ballistic missile submarines per year for an average cost
that might seem ridiculously high but it's in the same ballpark as the other next generation boomers
we know about in equivalent markets the uk's dreadnought for example or france's new sspn
are both believed to be in roughly that category one thing i'd suggest though reading between the
lines of this plan is the interesting element isn't what's meant to happen in the next five
years it's a subtle clue contained in the plan for the next 30. this isn't new it was also present
in previous versions of the shipbuilding plan but it's interesting enough that i think it's
worth flagging here the u.s actually currently operates three main types of nuclear submarine
there are the nuclear attack boats so los angeles seawolf and virginia class then there are the
existing ballistic missile submarines ohios until they're replaced with the columbias
then there's an interesting middle category the ssgn these are a small number of converted
ohio ballistic missile submarines that after the end of the cold war at great expense
had the u.s go in and basically rip out the old triad launches and replace them with approximately
all of the tomahawks a single ohio ssgn can carry a small fleet's worth of cruise missiles 154 in
total and as the plan notes they've contributed to us plans time and time again not only
theoretically because any opponent has to assume that at any given time the u.s could have 300
tomahawks parked practically anywhere off their coastline but also in actual kinetic operations
quote just one navy ssgn launched dozens of tomahawk land attack missiles in the destruction
of key iranian nuclear weapons facilities end quote so these things are arguably useful but
they're also old and due for retirement this plan has the remaining boats retiring one at a time in
fiscal years 27 28 and 29 meaning that throughout the 2030s the united states navy would have
zero of these tomahawk slingers however apparently that state of affairs isn't meant to last forever
because starting in fiscal year 2038 this plan has the united states navy ordering guided missile
submarines again procuring them at a rate of one every three years out the end of the plan in 2056
now this document says absolutely nothing about what kind of submarine those ssgns would be
technically speaking there's nothing to say they couldn't be a virginia for example stretched out
with a super payload module or maybe an ssnx modified for the role but as you can see demonstrated
through my artistic highlighting skills on the right there there's a coincidence of timing here
that might give rise to one additional theory the us is meant to procure the final ship of the
columbia class in 2035 at that point the question might be what happens to the columbia line from
there obviously it would be busy for a few years working through that back order of boats but what
then well hypothetically if you were to start ordering new boats again two or three years later
and then continue ordering them at a regular cadence potentially you could keep the yard and
workforce going and our mystery ssgn would you believe it starts getting ordered two to three
years after the last columbia you're likely looking at a large payload submarine that
given the potential hull size could probably accommodate just about any missile you care
to fit to it on the attack boat side the generational changeover isn't apparently
meant to happen until the mid-2040s that's when ssnx is meant to start entering the fleet
until then it's virginia the order cadence here is pretty simple two virginias a year
making it on average the most expensive line item in the entire shipbuilding plan
62.9 billion dollars over five years beating the 62 billion flat for the columbia and the combined
55 and change for the carriers and battleships that tells you a lot about the us navy continuing
to prioritize the nuclear submarine force but pressures little as i said about the next
generation we're told they're meant to start entering the fleet in the 2040s that they're
meant to operate alongside the virginias and they're meant to be able to quote penetrate
and dominate heavily defended adversary areas with a larger payload volume superior survivability
and organic housing of unmanned robotic and autonomous systems of those features most seem
to me like the standard incremental improvements you'd expect from class to class with the
confirmation the submarine is being designed from the ground up with hosting robotic and
autonomous systems in mind being perhaps the standout exception we know that a nuclear
submarine force is expensive and that it's always going to suffer a mass problem relative to say
a conventional submarine force because of that turning each nuclear boat into a hub a control
system and carrier for more numerous cheaper underwater uncrewed systems is a potential
response to that and so ssnx is starting to sound passingly for the navy submarine force the way
some concepts of ngad were meant to be for the us air force an extremely survivable extremely
expensive high-end frontline combatant that could serve as a penetrating control node for a team of
questions about the long-term survivability of submarines aside if there is an asterisk or
unknown here it probably isn't the quality of the underlying designs but instead the capacity of the
us submarine industrial base to actually deliver them to attack boats brannum is something the us
has been talking about for years delays aren't so much the exception as they are the norm and so
while this is a very impressive fleet submarine plan on paper the real question i think is whether
the funding and industrial capacity is going to be there to turn statements into subs okay so we've
talked about some of the big stuff the unchanging stuff now let's pivot to the small surface
combatant side america's favorite the frigates i think it's fair to say that the us navy's search
for a surface combatant smaller than the arlie burke has become a bit of a meme at this point
it's long been assessed and still being assessed by leaders in the navy that there are plenty of
jobs from submarine hunting to convoy escort very comparatively loud multi-billion dollar
full-size destroyer with weapons that can reach out into space probably isn't the best fit this is
absolutely not a new phenomenon as the us navy's surface warfare director recently put it quote
in 1995 i did counter drug ops in my first ship the uss philippine sea end quote for those of you
who don't know philippine sea is a ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser he went on to say
quote nowadays a guided missile destroyer for counter narcotics ops is a choice i don't want
the fleet commander to have to go through end quote for a lot of these missions that don't
need a full-sized air defense destroyer most navies out there have a class of ship the frigate
and in the past the us navy did as well in the late cold war era the navy had the oliver hazard
perry class frigates which generally worked as frigates but after they retired the next thing
in the broadly frigate size category was the lcs which didn't really work i won't reopen the entire
can of worms of lcs again here but suffice to say some of the criticisms were that was inadequately
survivable not properly armed and relied on a concept of modular mission payloads that in the
end didn't work as originally advertised the lcs build was truncated and in its place we got ffgx
the constellation class constellation addressed many of the criticisms that have been directed
against lcs as well as the usual missile box launches guns and defensive systems it had a 32
cell vls it was equipped with high-end sensors and the aegis combat system making a viable air
combatant and given its combination of propulsion and sensor systems it would have been a valid
anti-submarine warfare combatant as well some of the objections to constellation though were that
as all these capabilities were added and the design was revised it became too expensive and
too capable for the lower end surface combatant it was meant to be the congressional budget office
estimated the ships would end up costing about 1.4 billion us dollars each and so with the
exception of two ships that were already in construction which will be completed and delivered
as we covered in a previous episode the rest of the constellation class got canned
in its place was this thing much less a pocket air warfare destroyer in an anti-submarine warfare
frigate package and instead more a converted coast guard legend class cutter adapted for
naval use ffx so ditching the g to indicate a guided missile ship is still based on the data
we've seen so far meant to carry some guided missiles up to 16 naval strike missiles in
but the nsms were also present on the constellation anyway and what is missing
is the vls also missing are some of the higher end sensors and of course the aegis combat system
oh and the sonar doesn't have that either no built-in bow or towed array so if you want the
ship itself to be able to do that you're going to either need to modify the ship or use your
containerized payload to do so ffx then is clearly not meant to be a frontline frigate in the same
way as those operated by some other navies the people's liberation army navy put a 32 cell vls
on their frontline frigate the type 54 the british type 26 has a vls the japanese magami has a vls
frem fdi a lot of those european frigate designs have a vls and of course russian designs tend to
be very heavily missile equipped as well the basic idea here then seems to have been to very
deliberately downscale the design more down to the low end of what a small surface combatant
and instead go with something the plan describes as quote highly producible cost effective and
adaptive end quote there's a couple of places though where the data in the plan seems to
conflict with that characterization for one while ffx is basically described as the rapidly
producible faster market option the plan still expects constellation to make it into the force
first the first constellation is meant to enter service in fiscal year 2029 the second in fy2030
the same year the first ffx arrives in the force at that point a second ffx isn't expected until
2033 with no more frigates following until 2036 at which point there is a surge in deliveries
and then you fall into a cadence of three per year presumably in part thanks to the
later kickoff the procurement schedule is also slower to ramp up as well the fy25 plan envisioned
ordering three constellations a year starting in fy2031 this plan doesn't have the simpler
faster to deliver ship getting to that level until 2032 what's obviously possible constellation
would have been further and further delayed it's worth noting that on paper this rapidly
producible and deliverable ship isn't exactly next day delivery but okay peru you might ask
at least by going over to the simpler more affordable design the navy will then save a
bunch of money that it can spend on other things like you know battleships and it's true ffx has
been repeatedly described by various figures as an affordable or cost effective option although
based on past precedent there might be reason to suggest those words don't have the same meaning
in the halls of power of washington dc than they do in many other places that said how affordable
and cost effective are we talking here at one point the navy said it thought it could do the
constellation class for about a billion dollars a hull the cbo said that number would likely creep
up to about 1.4 1.5 from memory and since that was obviously way too high for a frontline fully
tricked out frigate this new ship building plan aims to procure four of these newer cheaper
frigates over the course of the next five years for a grand total of just over 7 billion us dollars
or about 1.75 billion dollars per as you can see on the right it's more than 1.4 billion in fiscal
year 27 300 million in fiscal year 2028 1.65 billion in fiscal 29 and a peak of 2.76 billion
in fiscal year 2031 meaning on paper you are potentially looking at a small surface combatant
can't really do surface combat a cheap ship that's actually expensive and a fast to deliver
option that actually arrives later than the slow to deliver one it replaced now obviously there's
more to the story here and it's not all that cut and dry but i still think it's stark enough that
the numbers on that page might prompt some people to ask a question america why do you do this to
yourselves how is it that when it comes to things like aircraft carriers you can build the kind of
constructions that other countries would deeply struggle with but as soon as you try and slap a
label on the side of a ship everything melts down if you hand the south koreans 1.5 1.6 1.7 billion
dollars a ship they won't build you a frigate they'll build you an aegis equipped super destroyer
with missile firepower of a ticonderoga class cruiser or if you ask for it a battleship so many
american ally countries have come up with modern frigate designs that have vls and a lot of these
combat features and yet cost considerably less frem has vls magami has vls the british type 26
is in the same rough cost category as you're talking about for the new ffx here and it has
a bunch of bells and whistles a 24 cell mark 41 and a separate vls to support its air defense needs
it was actually designed with the anti-submarine warfare role in mind not as a converted coast
guard cutter and if the u.s went with something like it there'd be some industrial commonality
with a bunch of allies the uk canada and australia included or alternatively if you don't want
something higher capability at the same price point you could go for the cheaper frigate option
and actually have it cheap i genuinely understand some of the defenders of the ffx concept who say
that we don't need a high capability pocket bert for a lot of the jobs the navy has to do if you're
doing a lot of flag flying counter narcotics sure you can probably get away with building something
that doesn't have the full traditional aegis air defense package or the sensors and systems
necessary to hunt the red october across the atlantic but if you're going to deliberately
try and build something at the low end of the high low mix it has to actually be cheap and while
there could be some stuff going on here with things like long lead items just looking at this
ffx isn't that the uk and european union are notoriously not the cheapest shipbuilding
environments but they've been able to come up with genuinely cheaper general purpose
frigate designs type 31 out of the united kingdom or fdi out of france as examples
so if there's any desire to copy someone else's homework there are plenty of answers already out
there there are even legitimately military scenarios where you can argue you would be
better off with a russian gorshkov class frigate than you would with ffx because this is what you
should expect from the front view of a russian frigate yes you might be able to strap some
containerized vls to the back of an ffx but that's not the same as an integrated vls and it's arguably
not directly equivalent to a russian ship that might be flinging citricon hypersonics in return
now we've talked about the constellation class there were very real criticisms very real issues
and between the navy congress and everyone else involved there are probably not many out there
that would argue this was a good case of program management but at least it was unambiguously a
combat frigate asw and air defense capable and a match in a potential fight for a lot of the
competitive designs out there ffx while clearly still expensive is not intended to operate at
and while yes as stated in the plan the idea is to give it some missile firepower by adding
containerized vls the navy's documents already make clear there's some intention to study further
iterations of the design including would you believe it quote studies for future flights
that will consider expanded capabilities including vertical launch systems and anti-submarine warfare
systems end quote so yeah we might see a switch away from constellation to ffx in order to save
money by chopping features not actually saving money in the process and then adding some of those
features back onto ffx in short while things could always be turned around there's no sign yet of the
u.s navy throwing off its long-term frigate curse ffx doesn't appear intended to save the navy a
huge amount of money at least over the short term we have detailed estimates for while at the same
time it'll presumably polax the total fleet's vls count because remember how the document said
earlier that fires were so critical to winning wars well a lot of the u.s navy's future missile
firepower was meant to be on those constellation frigates and by swapping them out to ffx you get
this chart here compared to the cheaper fiscal year 25 plan introducing 15 guided missile battleships
adds about 1900 standard vls cells to the fleet there's also six additional destroyers and if
we ignore the change in type of those destroyers and instead generously assume that in both plans
they were all ali burks they weren't but more on that later that's roughly another 580 cells for
but removing all the vls from the frigate force loses you about 2600 which actually puts you
negative unless you account for either containerized vls being added to ffx or you start counting the
conventional prompt strike hypersonics on the battleships in reality that probably means the
fy 2027 fleet is going to have more missile cells on net just but given how much additional money is
meant to be spent some people might be surprised to see it close at all which brings us to our
final section we've done the big the small and the unchanging what about the missing stuff you
might have expected a couple of years ago to be in the 2026 plan but isn't now right up front one
thing that isn't missing is the ali burke class destroyer the plan calls for continuing to procure
guided missile destroyers the ali burke is specifically named in the plan at a rate of
one per year in 27 28 and 29 and then two every year out to the end of the plan what isn't there
that you might have previously expected is a replacement for the burke in the fiscal 25 plan
destroyer procurement was chopped into two parts the next 23 ships would be ali burks and the 28
destroyers after that a next generation ship ddgx this is a concept that had been in the works for
years and incorporated many of the features we discussed earlier in relation to the battleship
more power generation directed energy weapons hypersonic missiles you name it now we were told
late last year the ddx was likely being canned as the announcement on the right there put a quote
navy's previous plan to develop a new class of destroyer the ddgx end quote but a number of
commentators still held out expectations or hope that that wasn't the case with one of the main
arguments being that a destroyer and a guided missile battleship serve different purposes
that's actually something this shipbuilding plan explicitly calls out saying the battleship is
meant to serve as a quote robust survivable forward command and control platform it is not
a destroyer replacement end quote so unless the argument was you wouldn't need destroyers
in the future or the burke would be fine forever it would arguably be kind of odd to replace your
destroyer program with a ship you specifically say is not a destroyer replacement and yet in
this shipbuilding plan ddgx is nowhere to be seen it's not mentioned in the ship designs even though
other future concepts like the next gen attacks up are it's not in the budget it's not in the
build list it's nowhere if that's so it has a lot of implications for the potential future firepower
and capability of the us navy's destroyer force that aren't entirely captured in that missile
chart i showed you earlier ddgx wasn't just meant to be more survivable longer endurance with better
sensors more power generation more future-proofed etc it was also meant to be capable of carrying
the same large hypersonic missiles that are going on to zoom waltz and are apparently intended for
the battleships only because there were meant to be more of them in the fleet removing them
and replacing the program with the battleship might actually result in there being considerably
fewer hypersonic cells in the future force than there otherwise would be it also potentially
raises a massive question over the long-term future of the u.s destroyer force the ali burke
is a great ship but it is still a 1980s design and arguably close to maxed out on upgrade potential
other nations out there u.s allies and competitors alike have come out with new modern destroyer
concepts or designs so the question probably is if you're canceling the next gen destroyer project
what are you building instead is the plan genuinely to keep building ali burke's into
the 2050s because at that point the design would be close to 70 years old and there is a genuine
possibility that other countries that aren't constrained by the need to keep retrofitting an
old design are able to jump ahead in terms of the capability and efficiency of their ships
some voices in the u.s navy might say they want a battleship but they clearly need destroyers
and so not having ddx or an equivalent in a plan like this is arguably a bit of a deafening absence
a final note here is on unmanned systems and a lot of the strategy and thinking here
is actually in an appendix overall the plan highlights some expenditure on unmanned systems
over the next five years but all of it pales in comparison to things like the battleship
there's 1.1 billion over five years to purchase 16 uncrewed xl uvs think the orca on the right there
they can potentially do a bunch of things like you know sail out into interesting highly contested
areas of water that an adversary might want to cross as part of an amphibious operation
and play a bunch of minds there while described as part of a quote core element of naval combat
power end quote the total investment on the entire fleet of these things over the next half decade
is less than that being spent on a single ffx frigate there's also 3.1 billion over five years
to purchase 47 musvs so medium unmanned surface vessels which are still very much in that
development prototype phase but are likely to look something like what you see on the right
there a relatively simple robotic vessel that you can put a containerized payload on what isn't
present is something we've seen other navies like the germans start to gravitate towards
which is uncrewed systems specifically designed to boost the overall firepower of the fleet
in the german case that would be the large remote missile vessel which is basically what happens
when you take a small robotic ship and stick a bunch of missiles on the back of it you then sail
it around with a manned frigate that provides the sensors the commander control etc and the small
ship serves as a kind of uncrewed magazine extender that concept obviously has drawbacks but if you're
trying to add massed firepower and magazine depth it's probably much cheaper to do something like
this than it is to build a 35 000 ton ship and then put a cruiser's worth of missiles on it
in other words while there is some investment in uncrewed systems this isn't an uncrewed centric
budget this is not a revolution naval ship building so much as an incremental step in it
and i think the question still deserves to be asked whether in light of recent experience with
the ukrainians and iranians this budgetary division of effort really accurately reflects
all the modern lessons learned now if we had an unlimited amount of time there's plenty more i
could potentially go through here there's a lot in the plan about ship building reform for example
which i'll talk about in a future episode and there are questions to be asked about things like
projected sustainment costs but in the interest of time let's keep the closeout discussion focused
compared to previous years this is a record-breaking ship building budget but it's
also on paper a budget being eaten by the battleships over the next five years they're
meant to absorb more funding than the destroyers and frigates combined and almost twice what's
been allocated for the carriers expressed another way if you kept the same amount of funding that
you cut the battleships from the budget you could potentially fund seven additional arleigh birks
add an extra carrier and still have enough money left over to buy the entire ukrainian naval drone
force or enough missiles and torpedoes to sink a reasonably sized navy and still probably have
cash left over budgeting is generally the art of the trade-off and in this case the battleship is
the trade and a lot of other things get the off of course i'd suggest if we're being realistic
there's a decent chance that most of this never happens it seems highly likely that a future us
administration might put the kibosh on the battleship and even now congress which controls
the purse strings appears to be deeply skeptical a recent move for example would potentially
reportedly block the progress of the battleship program until it was clear that all of its weapon
systems had reached a sufficient level of technical readiness which given the thing
is meant to pack everything from rail guns to hypersonic missiles to directed energy weapons
could in practical terms basically be the same as saying no and from a long-term us
naval planning perspective that opens up a couple of uncomfortable options version one the us
administration changes over at the end of 2028 none of these battleships are actually built
the program is cancelled and the focus is moved back to things like next generation destroyers
in that case what you're talking about here is billions of dollars and critically years of time
potentially being wasted you put ddgx on hold you might have shuffled the people involved in it
around and in the interim you spend a bunch of money developing something that you end up not
building or perhaps build just one or two examples of in that world the defiance become the next
a handful of artisanally produced ships in a standalone class in an alternative hypothetical
let's assume for a moment the ships actually do get built the risk in that case instead
is that you end up with a very cost inefficient u.s fleet it's hard to imagine in many of the
major u.s wargaming scenarios an asia-pacific escalation or a kickoff in the middle east
a world where you wouldn't be better off replacing a 17 billion dollar battleship
with an equal dollar value in some other investment carriers drones missiles submarines
satellites you name it and if you accept the u.s is entering a world where its primary strategic
competitor has a lot of industrial heft and budgetary resources efficiency is arguably going
to be much more critical from the u.s perspective than it might have been in the 1990s or early 2000s
it's notable that no other global fleet is really going in this direction the russians have actually
attracted a lot of flack internationally for pouring ruble after ruble into trying to keep
their expensive nuclear-powered surface combatant in service the admiral nikimov absorbed a lot of
modernization and maintenance funding arguably at the expense of a lot of other things russia
probably needed more although even there you could make the observation that ton for ton
the kirovs both displaced less than the proposed defiant while also packing by western standards a
very very heavy misalignment i'm very happy to acknowledge that i always come at these things
from a very specific defense economic standpoint but there's a final set of comments i want to
reflect on the end here that kind of go to the nature of this entire shipbuilding plan a lot of
the u.s navy figures we've seen speak in favor of these battleships have spoken to the capabilities
of the individual vessel one reportedly described the ship as quote-unquote badass others noted that
with the ddgx program the navy was facing having to make quote undesirable capability and weapon
system compromises in quote in order to make the design work as the director of surface warfare
put it quotes in order to keep an adequate number of mark 41 cells on ddgx we were going to have to
make a choice between a gun weapon system and conventional prompt strike i don't want to put
those kind of limits on the fleet end quote but here's the thing you can't escape trade-offs not
entirely you can just move them to another part of the problem and to a great extent i'd argue
effective trade-offs are part of what a good requirements process is made of the foresight to
know what you want now and are likely to want in the future the ruthlessness to then separate want
from need and the discipline to avoid getting sidetracked along the way sure ddgx would have had
to make trade-offs the same way the chinese type 55 does but presumably if those trade-offs had
allowed it to stay in the destroyer cruiser size and cost category you could have built more of
them you could have established industrial scale you could have diverted resources to other aspects
of the fleet if you fail to make trade-offs on what you want an individual platform to be able
to do well that's how you potentially end up with a 17 billion dollar surface combatant and the limit
for the fleet doesn't become what the individual ship can do it becomes a limit of what the force
can do because you've had to defund a bunch of other things in order to build the super ship
it's still probably the case that the most likely future for bbgn is eventual cancellation or
serious revision but given the resources available if the focus and time was dedicated to it by
successive administrations the u.s could probably build the thing you probably could bring back the
modern battleship and it almost certainly would be the most dangerous most capable surface combatant
fast strategically mobile heavily armed well defended and seriously future-proofed for energy
intensive systems what this budget shows though is what a super weapon can cost the rest of the
force given the enormous size of the u.s military budget a double digit percentage boost to ship
building could do a lot of things it could dramatically refill magazines refresh just
about every aspect of the force continue with destroyer modernization it could build a significant
number of well-armed high-end asw capable frigates and adopt a whole bunch of unmanned systems to
reflect the nature of modern warfare oh and don't forget funding is still up in the air for some
vital aspects of u.s naval air power the element that's done so much heavy lifting in so many u.s
campaigns think things like the faxx sixth generation fighter or various unmanned systems
the navy wants as well or it could give the united states navy its own fleet of 21st century kirovs
what it can't do by these numbers is both and okay brief channel update to close out firstly i hope
you enjoyed this brief pivot back to the united states but barring any dramatic events in the
next couple of days i do want to get back to ukraine relatively soon because having recently
covered the battlefield and long-range strike campaign i think there is an element in the
middle that bears talking about in terms of planning for the channel itself i'm now in the
process of long-term planning for travel in the second part of the year with the idea being that
as much material as possible is prepared in advance to try and avoid potential disruptions
finally on the peruan gaming side the xenonauts 2 series should be finishing off soon
so expect some announcements there on what's going to come next including the long-awaited
closeout to the icbm series that's all for the moment so i hope you enjoyed and with any luck
i'll see you all again next week