With the war in Iran in a state of limbo, Inside America takes a look at what might happen next. President Trump has been speaking positively about the possibility of a peace deal, but has continued to threaten Iran with the resumption of military action. Selina Downes talks to global security analyst Jon Alterman who breaks down the options on the table for Trump. Later in the show, she’s joined by global affairs experts Kelley Vlahos and Professor Taiyi Sun to discuss China’s role in the war. The President’s trip highlighted how much leverage Beijing holds over Iran, with Washington seeking Chinese pressure to revive a peace deal.
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This episode of *Inside America* examines the volatility of U.S. foreign policy, focusing on the stalled conflict with Iran and the shifting global dynamics involving China. It analyzes the failure of U.S. strategies in the Middle East and how China is leveraging these tensions to position itself as a central diplomatic hub in an emerging multipolar world order.
Hello, I'm Selina Downs and welcome to Inside America,
the show that brings you insight and analysis
of the biggest issues facing the United States right now.
On this week's show, a war in limbo.
President Trump says a deal is close,
but continues to threaten Iran.
Well, we want it open.
We want it free.
We don't want tolls.
Where this all goes is unclear, I think,
both to the president's team,
but my guess is also to the president.
Trump's visit to China appeared to yield little
but what happened behind closed doors.
Our panel will examine the relationship
between the world's superpowers
as Beijing flexes its diplomatic muscle.
It seems to be a challenge
to the America-dominated global order
or the West-dominated international structure.
But first, there's no real clarity
over what comes next between the United States
and Iran as the world watches
to see what the president does next.
I'm joined by our North America correspondent,
John Brayne, who's been following developments
here at the White House.
John, it's always difficult to second-guess the president.
The messaging is often mixed.
He's bounced between striking a deal and military threats.
Is there a strategy here?
Well, I think if there is a strategy or was a strategy,
it could perhaps be boiled down to one word
and that word is Venezuela.
Trump was so emboldened by the Venezuela operation,
not just the successful seizure of Maduro and his wife
in that dramatic raid,
but the fact that the Americans have been able to work
with Maduro's basically his number two,
Delcy Rodriguez, install her as the new leader,
work with the old regime
and have this apparently successful collaboration
between the two.
Now, Trump seems to have thought
he could replicate that in Iran.
Venezuela 2.0.
Exactly.
He keeps mentioning Venezuela.
And of course, he was egged on by Benjamin Netanyahu,
the Israeli leader, to do this.
Netanyahu persuaded him that the regime would collapse
once the Americans and Israelis started bombing.
And of course, they haven't capitulated at all.
And in fact, although they took out
those first tranche of leaders,
those who replaced them seem to be more hardline than ever.
That regime change has not happened.
And I think Trump is often a very logical person.
He thinks in terms we often hear him say
about who holds the cards.
And I don't think he quite understands the fact
that the Americans are bombing Iran,
the leaders, the new leaders are at risk of being killed.
He doesn't seem to realize that it's more ideological
for the Iranians.
They're not so concerned about personal survival
and destruction in the country.
And so I think he's become more and more frustrated.
And that's why we've seen him veer between talking
about destroying Iran's civilization one minute
and almost the next minute saying,
oh, they're begging for a deal.
And I think a deal is imminent in his view.
And of course, it's not as simple as that.
The Iranians clearly have not been begging for a deal.
They're willing to negotiate,
but it has to be on their terms, it would appear.
So I think that's why we're seeing this almost floundering
from the US president.
I wonder if it's the mixed messaging
that is making it so unpopular here at home
because a lot of Americans are wondering
why they are bogged down again in the war in the Middle East,
not least because also of spiking oil prices,
which is hitting them in their hip pockets here at home.
Do you think any of that weighs on the president's judgment
when he's making his next move?
It's difficult to tell.
I mean, he at one stage said he didn't care about the economy.
And he's often said, look, prices
are going to come down once this conflict is over.
The problem for Trump is that he's not facing re-election.
So he escapes the public's dissatisfaction in that sense.
But of course, his party is up for the midterm elections.
And if the Republicans lose control of Congress,
that's going to leave a hamstrung president
for the last two years of his term.
They could even impeach him if the Democrats are in control.
So it's clearly a factor, even though he's playing it down.
And certainly for the American public,
we've seen this is the number one concern for them,
even before the war.
This war has not been popular from day one.
And the longer it goes on, it seems the bigger
hit there are to Trump's poll ratings
and to the Republican Party's poll rating.
So it's clearly got to be an issue there.
Yes, sure.
Democrats hoping to probably capitalise
on public dissatisfaction going into the midterms there.
John Brain, thanks so much.
Always good to hear your analysis there.
So where do we go from here?
I sat down with John Alterman, the global security analyst,
who worked at the State Department
on Middle Eastern affairs.
And I asked him why it's so difficult
for this administration to strike a deal with Iran.
You can certainly destroy targets in Iran.
And you can kill people in Iran.
The question is, how do you change
the Iranian political calculus?
How do you get the Iranians to make
different political decisions?
And it seems to me that the theory of the case
at the beginning of this war was that was relatively easy to do.
And arguably, one of the things you learned
in the first 40 days is changing the political calculus
is much harder than coming up with targets.
Well, it wouldn't be the first time
that the United States has launched military intervention
without a political calculus.
I mean-
But I think it's different now
because with advances of targeting,
with the use of artificial intelligence
to come up with target sets,
with the rise in use of precision munitions,
it really only hits the things you intend to hit,
but it achieves an outcome.
Now there's an expectation that it's very fast.
It's very precise.
You don't take any casualties.
And you get the other side to flip.
Well, except the casualties were in a school in Minar
when the United States dropped a missile.
But from a U.S. perspective, not taking any casualties.
Okay, but there has been collateral damage.
No, there's been some-
Iranian casualties, there have been casualties
in the Middle East.
When you're hitting 20,000 targets,
it would be surprising to me
if there weren't mistakes made.
And I think that the Pentagon should be honest
about exploring those and admitting those
and paying compensation.
Yeah, do you think they've been hiding
some of the damage to U.S. bases?
Hiding satellite imagery, disguising the risks?
Well, I don't think you wanna have the adversary
understand exactly where everything's hitting.
For military reasons.
So what do you think the political strategy is
of the administration?
What is the goal here with regards to Iran?
And is that goal realistic?
One of the words I keep hearing
when I'm talking to people in the White House
is the President's optionality
that the President retains as many possible
alternative courses of action as long as is possible.
I think that's different from the way
most administrations have worked in the past,
where the goal is how do you prepare a series of options,
all of which have pluses and minuses,
but have all been thought out.
That's not the way this White House works.
It's not the way this President works.
Do you see a path back to diplomacy here?
Is there an off-ramp for President Trump?
I can see an off-ramp to negotiating with the Iranians.
I have a very hard time seeing a deal
that can be struck with the Iranians
that meets the U.S. needs and the Iranian needs.
From an American perspective,
the President has talked incessant
that the Obama deal wasn't good enough.
It was too narrow
because it only focused on nuclear issues.
It didn't deal with proxies.
It didn't deal with missiles.
From an Iranian perspective,
they say we have to do much better than we did with Obama
because the United States didn't adhere
to the terms of the deal.
We didn't get access to capital.
Before, President Trump withdrew from the deal
and then we were attacked.
So we need a much better deal than we got before.
I think you can create the parameters for negotiation
where you can work through smaller issues.
But I think that the prospect that each side feels
it needs to get a much better deal
from a deal that each side has said completely failed
because we didn't get enough and the other side violated it.
I think that makes a new deal under any term
very, very hard to match.
And so if those differences are irreconcilable,
are we back in a forever war?
No, you can be back in forever diplomacy.
There's a long history of forever diplomacy
between the U.S. and Iran.
I think we can get into that space.
I think the Iranians are actually comfortable
being in forever diplomacy.
They think that gives them an opportunity
to make concessions when they need to,
to apply pressure when they want to.
I think from an American perspective,
that may be a better option
than either striking a bad deal
or prolonging a war that doesn't seem to be
changing Iranian political decision-making.
How do you think this has impacted
the U.S. and its relations with the Gulf states?
Do you think that the war has strengthened
or weakened the U.S. in terms of power and influence
both within the Middle East and globally?
I think it's done both simultaneously.
On the one hand, the Gulf states have come to understand
that there are things the United States can do
that no other country or collection of countries
in the world can do.
And therefore, it is ever more essential
for the Gulf states to have a close relationship
with the United States.
But it wasn't able to be that security guarantor.
But at the same time,
that is not adequate for the security needs
of the Gulf states.
So they will try to build stronger ties with China.
I would guess stronger ties with Europe.
I would bet investing both in connecting with the Iranians
and deterring the Iranians.
I think you're going to see them reach out
in multiple directions,
and they will both feel that the U.S. relationship
is essential, but also that as essential it is,
it is also inadequate.
I mean, this war has also had implications for China,
has it not?
With regards not just economically
with the Strait of Hormuz,
but also in terms of its relations with the Gulf states.
If, as reports suggest, it is helping Iran
with intelligence or providing weapons or components,
how does that impact its relations?
It's helping Tehran,
but then it also wants to maintain
these strategic alliances that it has forged
with some of those Gulf countries.
I think, frankly, the Chinese relationships
are transactional in the Middle East.
China's been very clear.
They see-
We often say that about President Trump.
Yes, but I think the Chinese view is
the Persian Gulf is kind of an American lake.
We don't want to send troops there.
We certainly don't want to fight there.
Let the Americans get dragged into the briar patch in the Gulf.
To my mind, one of the things that's been clear
is the Chinese really don't have much diplomatic ambition.
They want to be present for prestige,
but I think they're going to deal with everybody,
and the fact is they're large enough
that everybody wants to deal with them.
John Altman there speaking to me a little earlier
and John was right.
Everyone, it seems, wants to deal with Beijing.
So is China positioning itself as the stabilizer
to Washington's unpredictability?
Craig Boswell reports.
Just days after U.S. President Donald Trump departed Beijing,
Russian President Vladimir Putin flew in.
It's a sign of China's growing importance
on the international stage.
Beijing's back-to-back diplomacy is dramatic.
More than a dozen heads of state,
including five leaders from some of the world's
most advanced economies, have visited China
in the past six months.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney
met with Xi Jinping in January.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer arrived soon after.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz followed in February.
Spain's Prime Minister and Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince
visited in April.
But it was Trump and Putin who generated the most headlines.
The White House hailed Trump's visit a success
as both sides pledged to avoid another tariff war.
This has been an incredible visit.
I think a lot of good has come of it.
We've made some fantastic trade deals,
great for both countries.
He's a man I respect greatly.
So far, we have established a new relationship
between our two countries,
a constructive and strategic relationship.
This can be said to be a milestone visit,
and we have reached many understandings
on cooperative outcomes.
But there was a stark warning.
President Xi said the two countries could clash over Taiwan
if the U.S. continues to send weapons to the island,
which governs itself despite Beijing's claim
it is a part of China.
This political force of scheming for secession and provocation
should now come to an end.
China will achieve national reunification,
and Taiwan will inevitably return
to the embrace of the motherland.
Trump's visit made no major breakthrough on Iran.
China continues to support Tehran
in its war against the U.S.,
and Beijing continues to support Moscow in the war in Ukraine.
It's a diplomatic balancing act
showing China is positioning itself
at the center of a new global order
no longer dominated by Western powers.
Craig Boswell, Inside America.
Skepticism of China has largely driven U.S. foreign policy,
but the two leaders now say it's all about strategic stability.
So what does that mean for these two superpowers
and for the rest of the world?
Joining me now to discuss the U.S.-China relationship
and their strategic calculations over the Iran war
are Kelly Vlahos, a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute
and editor-in-chief of its online magazine Responsible Statecraft,
and Taiyi Sun, associate professor of political science
at the Christopher Newport University.
Welcome to you both.
Taiyi, I want to start with you.
Has the intensity of competition
between the United States and China decreased?
Have they reached a certain level of tacit understanding
or is the distrust and the rivalry just too great
to achieve this strategic stability they're going to speak of?
Yeah, the intensity of competition
may not necessarily have decreased,
but I think both sides now have a basic understanding
that escalation will not lead
to the interests of both countries.
There were escalations and economic warfare tariffs
added last year, leverage used,
and so both sides now understand very clearly
if you play any cards, if you escalate the situation,
the type of retaliation you will get
that no side is willingly to move forward easily,
and so we've now reached this state
of mutually assured economic destruction.
It's stability, it's constructive,
but in the end, this is not necessarily
a decreased level of competition
or increased goodwill or trust.
Kelly, has economic leverage the new warfare?
I mean, I wouldn't call it warfare.
I mean, I do think, in all fairness,
that when Trump took office in his first term,
he really didn't see China
as a prospective military adversary.
I think he has always been about the deal
and economic competition with China
was very clear to him and his administration.
I think what you're seeing now is that more,
the inclination to work with China
while also being very realistic
about the economic potential threats
that China perceives or at least proposes
rather than him amping up or escalating
the military or potential military confrontation,
and I think you saw that borne out in their summit.
I mean, the Iran war, the conflict in Iran
is one of the areas where their strategic goals
appear to be very different.
Taiyi, is China deliberately trying to undermine
or weaken U.S. influence in the Middle East?
I don't think that's the case,
and I don't think China is capable
of undermining the United States significantly.
I think it's more of the United States
undermining its own capability.
We know that there are probably 10 aircraft carrier groups
the United States has,
but only about three can be operational at the same time,
and all of them were sent to the Gulf,
which means the Asia Pacific,
particularly the region close to China,
is mostly a power vacuum
when the war in Iran is happening.
I think the Chinese observers
are also paying close attention
that the speed of reduction of American ammunition
and the cost and the speed to recover that ammunition
is not going to keep the pace
to be able to both dealing with the war in Iran
and also a potential conflict in the Asia Pacific.
I mean, Kelly, that is one of the great ironies
I find here, find difficult to understand,
is that President Trump, when he returned to office
for a second term,
said he was going to take America
out of wars in the Middle East
and he was going to pivot back to the Americas and to Asia.
And what the Iran war seems to have done
is in fact had the reverse effect
and enlarged China's footprint in that region.
Yes, he has people that he brought
into this second administration
that are very much realists
who were pushing for that pivot that you call it
back to the Western Hemisphere.
And not so much pivoting military capabilities
towards Indochina, but a renewed competition
in that we were going to re-industrialize the United States.
We were going to redirect supply chains away from China
and back to the United States.
So there was a real plan to change.
So how realistic is that?
Well, it's not realistic
when you have people in your administration
who want other things.
And there are plenty of people who saw Iran
as the primary focus of U.S. foreign policy,
preventing Iran, quote unquote,
from getting a nuclear weapon.
And that diverted Trump's attention.
I mean-
And so I think there is a major lesson from Trump,
from the previous presidents,
that as long as American troops are not on the ground,
it is easy to pull back.
And so he decided that bombing Iran with Israel
is just a one-time thing,
that it can be easily done and terminated.
But he did not realize the fact
that now we have multiple channels
of influencing American public opinion
that Iran has leveraged over the Strait of Hormuz,
that through that you can impact American gas price,
American inflation.
And so through such economic changes,
American voters can be impacted.
And the dynamic is just as same
as American troops on the ground and having casualties.
And so I think Trump probably did not expect that.
And the kidnapping of Maduro probably emboldened him
that this can be a quick and easy thing
because of American military supremacy.
But I think his advisors and him probably got this wrong.
With U.S. attention diverted from the Indo-Pacific,
does this essentially set up potential clash over Taiwan?
And Kelly, Taiwan's status with regards to American support
or U.S. support seems as ambiguous as ever.
Right, and as you saw in the summit,
that Trump was being much more conciliatory-
Than Biden ever was.
Than Biden ever was,
basically conveying to Xi Jinping
that he was going to put a hold
on the $14 billion weapons package
that had been going through Congress.
And that's upset a number of people in the U.S. Capitol
who are much more hawkish
and they want to get those weapons over to Taiwan.
He's walking a fine line.
I think he felt that he had to assure Xi Jinping
that he was not Biden,
that that hadn't been settled yet
in terms of how much we would give Taiwan.
And this has upset Taiwan greatly.
Taiyi, do you agree?
Do you think both sides are trying to use Taiwan
a little bit as leverage?
I actually think Trump's policy on Taiwan is practical,
even though he may not necessarily care too much
about the geopolitical side of Taiwan.
I think Beijing's calculation on the unification with Taiwan
is probably not too much related to the war in Iran.
And also, the outside environment,
unless the United States provokes initially,
those who are involved in policymaking on Taiwan
would argue that the use of force, the use of coercion,
and invading the island of Taiwan are very different things.
Most of the time, it's going to be coercion
and maybe use of force to demonstrate credibility
so that the provocation by the other side,
the independent movement within Taiwan
or American-China hordes could back off.
So even if you see military exercise
or coercive economic measures,
it's not an indicator of Beijing ready
to take over the island of Taiwan because it's too costly.
What do you both make of President Xi
hosting all of these world leaders,
five of the G7 leaders
of the world's most advanced economies,
hosting President Trump, hosting President Putin?
And sometimes you can read into the subtleties
and the optics a little more
than you can just from a one-page readout
from the White House or the governments of the day.
But what is your main takeaway, Kelly,
from the events we've seen?
I mean, my main takeaway is that Xi Jinping
perceives a new world order that's multipolar.
And when he does bring in these world leaders,
including Donald Trump,
he is expressing his acknowledgement
that this is no longer a U.S.-led world order.
Yeah, so I think the situation might be different.
And so a few days before Trump visited Beijing,
a friend in Beijing who's probably involved
in the planning of receiving Trump asked me,
Taiyi, why is Trump so determined to visit Beijing?
So it sounded like that they would rather Trump
not visit at the time
because the American president was still making decisions
to bomb Iran potentially.
And the American president just took a head of the state
from Venezuela.
And so a violator of international law
should not be treated that way.
And so I think that's probably how the bureaucracy
in Beijing was feeling.
And so it's a good thing that the United States
and China are touching bases
to maintain the strategic stability.
But I don't think Beijing at the moment
was eager to receive Trump,
but on the other side,
Trump was probably eager to visit Beijing
to declare victory diplomatically.
So some of the domestic crises
can be less in the spotlight.
Think about Epstein files,
think about the inflation,
the gas price skyrocketing
as well as the Iranian situation, right?
But I think Putin and Xi has this routine
of getting on the same page
and they just announced in the joint statement
saying that they would rather see a multipolar world.
And so even though it did not mention
United States specifically,
but it seems to be a challenge
to the America dominated global order
or the West dominated international structure.
And so I think strategically,
Beijing is probably trying to ally with Russia
more than the United States,
but it also understands that in a trilateral relationship,
it's probably the best that two of the other powers
are fighting with each other
that you can reap the benefits.
We are running out of time.
We have to end it there.
I want to thank both of my guests.
We can talk about this all afternoon.
It's glorious day in Washington,
Taiyi Sun and Kelly Blahos.
Thanks so much for joining us.
Thank you for having us.
Inside America.
And that is it for this show.
Join us next time on Inside America.