Even Xi Jinping may no longer trust China’s official economic data. According to former CCP insider Du Wen, Xi’s inner circle has allegedly built its own independent data network to bypass China’s statistics bureau. And the numbers are alarming: factory deflation lasting 42 months, collapsing corporate profits, rising costs, and a deepening confidence crisis across China’s economy. At the same time, Beijing has launched a sweeping crackdown on offshore brokerage firms used by mainland Chinese investors to buy U.S. and Hong Kong stocks. Authorities are investigating platforms like Futu, Tiger Brokers, and Longbridge, while tightening cross-border capital controls and restricting overseas investment channels. Is China entering a slow-motion economic crisis hidden beneath official GDP growth? In this episode, we break down the hidden signals behind China’s worsening deflation, collapsing confidence, capital flight fears, and Beijing’s growing efforts to seal financial exits.
Reports suggest that Xi Jinping relies on independent investigations due to a lack of trust in official economic data. Internal reports reveal systemic exhaustion, characterized by prolonged deflation, contracting manufacturing, and collapsing profit margins. This crisis is compounded by institutional costs, capital flight, and a state-driven model that prioritizes political control over economic health.
Hello, everyone. Hi, welcome. Welcome to today's real talk.
All right. Thursday night, the weekend is ahead of us. Well, what if I told you Xi Jinping may
no longer trust China's own economic data? What if the numbers being reported to the public are not
the numbers being reported to him? And what if Beijing's latest crackdown on overseas investments
is a sign that China's economic problems are far worse than anyone realizes? We'll find out
tonight. China's economy is in trouble. Everyone knows it, including Xi Jinping. But here's the
real question. How bad is it actually? Can anyone truly quantify the problem? Apparently, it's not
so easy. Nobody really knows. And that may include Xi Jinping himself. Because according to recent
revelations, even the CCP's top leadership no longer fully trusts China's own official
economic statistics. And think about how extraordinary that is for a moment.
When the highest levels of a government stop trusting their own numbers, it usually means
the situation underneath is already spiraling out of control. And I'm not making this up.
These claims were revealed by a former CCP official, Du Wen, who, let me show you his picture,
who previously served as director of the legal advisory office of the Inner Mongolia government.
And according to Mr. Du, one of Xi Jinping's closest aides, his chief of staff,
Cai Qi, I just want to match name with the face. So according to Du, Cai Qi has been submitting
internal economic reports to Xi Jinping using an independent investigation system that bypasses
China's National Bureau of Statistics entirely. And speaking on his YouTube programs, Mr. Du said
Cai Qi rarely uses official bureau data when briefing Xi Jinping on the economy. Instead,
he has his own investigation team. And this team directly conducts various forms of
statistical and collection work on the economy. Now let's think carefully what that implies.
It means that Xi Jinping may no longer trust the economic information coming through the normal
state council system run by his premier, Li Qiang. Just put a face, put a picture to the face.
So if the official numbers themselves can no longer be trusted, what exactly did Cai Qi's
internal reports allegedly reveal? Let me tell you about them.
So according to Du Wen, the answer is deeply alarming because the data suggests China's
economic engine is on the verge of shutting down. It may be entering a systemic exhaustion.
All right. So this is according to Du Wen. As of the end of 2026, I'm sorry, what did I say?
Not end of 2026, end of April of 2026, China's producer price index or PPI had remained negative
year over year for 42 consecutive months. At the same time, China's manufacturing purchasing
managers index or PMI remained below the critical 50% contraction line for 17 straight months.
And during the first four months of 2026 alone, prices fell across 31 out of 41 major industries.
But it gets worse. According to Mr. Du, the operating cost per 100 yuan of revenue
for major industrial firms has now risen for 50 consecutive months,
reaching the highest level since records began in 2018. Meanwhile, corporate profit margins
have collapsed to just 2.1%. Operating profit margins fell to only 4.8%,
the lowest level since tracking began in 2012. Now, 2012 is also the year that Xi Jinping
became the fifth CCP leader. Now, stop and think about what all of these numbers mean
when you connect them together. This is no longer simply a weak quarter or a temporary
recession or a cyclical downturn caused by real estate or exports alone. What these numbers may
actually reveal is a problem that the entire economic engine is losing profitability,
confidence and internal circulation all at the same time. So let's break down. So a PPI that
remains negative for 42 consecutive months means Chinese factories have been trapped
in deflationary pressure for nearly three and a half years. In plain English, it means factories
are producing goods that continuously become less profitable to sell. And when prices keep
falling year after year, companies respond in predictable ways. They cut wages, they cut hiring,
they cut investment, and they cut research spending. And eventually, they begin cutting
survival itself. Now, combine that with the PMI remaining below 50 for 17 straight months,
that tells us China's manufacturing sector is not simply slowing temporarily, it has been
contracting continuously for well over a year. And then comes perhaps the most alarming signal of
all, prices fell across 31 out of 41 major industries. That means this is not isolated
to real estate or just one troubled sector. This is broad-based deflation spreading across
the economy itself. And deflation is psychologically devastating because it changes
behavior. Consumers stop spending because they expect prices to fall further. Businesses stop
investing because future profits look uncertain. Banks become more cautious because bad debts
keep rising, and slowly confidence begins deteriorating. Now, let's look at the next
set of numbers, right? Prices are falling across the board. Operating costs per 100 yuan of revenue
have risen for 50 consecutive months. So while prices are falling, the cost to run your company
is going up. It has been going up for 50 months. So that's, what, four years, right?
And that means even when companies do generate revenue, a larger and larger share is being
consumed simply by staying alive. Meanwhile, profit margins have collapsed to just 2.1%,
and that's terrifyingly thin. 2.1% profit margin, you may as well not be in business.
At that level, many companies are basically functioning one unexpected shock away from
collapse, right? It could be a small tariff increase, a slight export decline, a delayed
payment, a weak sales quarter. Any one of those could wipe out profitability entirely,
and this creates a very dangerous cycle. China's economy was originally built on
scale, speed, and massive investment. But now the system is entering a phase where companies
must continue producing simply to maintain cash flow, even when production itself becomes
increasingly unprofitable. And perhaps the biggest problem
is that more and more companies become trapped in this slow-motion exhaustion,
because this economy is exhausting, right? And then traditional stimulus tools or government tools
don't work anymore. Beijing can still print more money, it can still launch infrastructure
projects, it can still order banks to lend, but that may explain why China today appears
trapped in a very strange contradiction, because massive amounts of money exist inside the system,
but it's not generating anything, because confidence has fallen, it's disappearing.
Now many companies in China are now working harder, producing more, and competing more
aggressively, yet making less and less money. So according to Du Wen, Cai Qi's internal reports
to Xi Jinping already explicitly acknowledge that the real economy faces enormous difficulties,
some industries and enterprises are under tremendous pressure, and most key sectors
are trapped in distress. Now let's pause here for a moment. If Mr. Du's claims are accurate,
then it would mean that even inside the CCP leadership itself, there's already recognition
that large parts of China's real economy have entered systemic distress, and that the country's
economic engine may be approaching a dangerous breaking point. Now of course, we should add a
disclaimer here, Mr. Du's claims come from sources he personally says he has access to,
and they cannot be independently verified. However, another commentator, someone that,
where is that, oh yeah, Cai Sengkun, whom I interviewed several weeks ago on my own program,
endorsed Du Wen's information. And according to Mr. Cai, the information that Mr. Du shared
came from important figures within highly authoritative departments in Beijing,
and he described the reports as very accurate. So at least we have someone who has endorsed Mr. Du's
revelation. And Mr. Cai further suggested that Cai Qi may now be gathering information outside
the normal state council system, because the leadership found that the official statistical
data had become seriously distorted. And personally, I believe Mr. Du's information
is credible because many of the indicators that he discussed do align with trends already being
observed publicly. But this now raises a question. How did China's economy end up in this position
in the first place? Because it is the second largest economy, even though its GDP is grossly
inflated, it's still the second largest. It has enormous industrial capacity, massive infrastructure,
largest exports. So why does the system increasingly feel exhausted? I found something
that's extremely insightful that I want to share with you. And it came from an economist
from Beijing University. His name is Zou Qiren. I actually have a picture of him.
I've never heard of him before, but some of his statistics are extremely insightful. So let me
share the chart with you. There it is. And I think, frankly speaking, this may be one of
the most important concepts for understanding China's economic crisis today. He said that
there's a deeper problem that he calls China's institutional costs. So during China's high
growth period from 1995 to 2012, tax revenue increased 16-fold. Non-tax government revenue
increased 18-fold. Mandatory social security payments, or taxes, depending on how you define
it, surged almost 29 times. And land prices exploded by an astonishing 64 times. Meanwhile,
nominal GDP during the same period grew only about 8.6 times. Now think carefully about what this
means. The state's extraction of wealth grew far faster than the actual productive economy itself.
In other words, the cost of operating inside China's system expanded much faster than society's
ability to generate real wealth. And that gradually created a deeply distorted economy.
You have land prices increased 64 times, while GDP grew only 8.6 times. That tells you local
governments increasingly relied on selling land or land use rights as their primary source of revenue.
And once local governments became dependent on land sales, they had every incentive to inflate
housing prices, encourage speculation, and endlessly expand construction projects,
regardless of real market demand. Over time, China's economy became increasingly dependent
on property inflation rather than genuine household consumption. And as housing prices
skyrocketed, Chinese families poured their life savings into real estate instead of consumption.
And now you have the situation where young people delay marriage, delay having children,
and many simply can't afford a home at all. And because households had to save
enormous amounts of money just to survive inside the system, domestic consumption remains
structurally weak. And then companies, now official taxes were only part of the burden.
Companies also had to deal with heavy administrative fees, social security obligations,
licensing costs, land expenses, regulatory compliance, and countless informal political
costs, aka corruption and briberies. And when institutional extraction rises much faster than
GDP itself, private businesses eventually lose profitability, even if headline economic growth
still appears stronger on paper. So in a normal society or in a healthy economy,
capital is allocated toward the most productive sectors. It's driven by market demand,
but China's economy allocates capital toward politically favored sectors. So you have
enormous amounts of capital flowed into infrastructure, state-backed real estate,
and government-linked projects because those are government priorities. Meanwhile,
small private businesses, despite being more innovative and efficient, struggle to obtain
financing. So the result is an economy that looks massive on the surface while becoming increasingly
fragile and inefficient underneath. So in many ways, China's economy gradually evolved into a
gigantic machine designed primarily to sustain the state itself and enrich those at the top of
the political pyramid rather than improve the long-term well-being of its people.
And once real estate slows down, population declines, and debt levels become excessive,
the distortion that remained hidden during the booming years begins surfacing all at once. And
that brings us to where China is today. Because once growth stops, the state suddenly faces a new
problem. It still needs enormous amounts of money to sustain this gigantic system. And when new
wealth becomes harder to find or to generate, the only remaining option is to extract more wealth
from the existing economy itself. And that brings us to the subject
which happened last Friday. And by now, you probably have already heard that last Friday,
China's security regulatory authorities suddenly launched investigations into three major brokerage
firms, Tiger Brokers, Futu, and Longbridge. Authorities accused them of illegal securities
operations, illegal fund sales, and illegal futures brokerage activities. So what does that mean?
The three firms, I must tell you, they're not mainland Chinese brokerage firms.
Their license, they're primarily Hong Kong and offshore-based brokerage platforms operating under
Hong Kong or operating, they're basically Hong Kong-based, or I should say they are
offshore-based brokerage platforms run by the Chinese operating under Hong Kong's financial
licenses while serving large numbers of mainland Chinese investors. So essentially,
overseas brokerage firms designed to serve mainland Chinese. And that is precisely why
Beijing targeted them. The real crime is that they helped Chinese investors move money into
overseas financial markets, including US stocks and even Hong Kong's own stock markets. In other
words, these platforms became channels through which Chinese capital could flow outside Beijing's
direct control. Now there's an interesting detail here. All three firms were founded by
former executives from China's tech giants. So there is an indirect relations between these
brokerage firms and China's tech giants. So for example, Tiger Brokers
is founded by someone who came from Xiaomi. So people say it's backed by Xiaomi. And Futu is
closely tied to Tencent. And Longbridge is somehow associated with Alibaba. So this crackdown is not
just about finance. It also shows Beijing's tightening control over some of China's most
influential private sector financial and technology networks. And the punishment
was severe. Confiscation of profits plus massive financial penalties.
Futu was fined the most. It confirmed that it was fined 1.85 billion yuan, roughly
$255 million. While its CEO was personally fined 1.25 million yuan, or $172,000 US dollars.
Tiger Brokers was hit with approximately 410 million yuan, or $57 million US dollars.
And its CEO received the same 1.25 million yuan personal fine.
Now these are only, here's the point I want to emphasize. These are only preliminary notices
and penalties. The real investigation has only just begun. Nobody yet knows how large this
crackdown could eventually become. And Beijing also made something else very clear. The operation
involved eight different government departments, including the Securities Regulator, the Ministry
of Public Security, the Central Bank, the Cyberspace Administration, and Foreign Exchange
Regulator. In other words, this is not normal financial regulation. This is a coordinated
national campaign. And the CCP's openly stated goal is that over the next two years, it intends
to completely eliminate the so-called illegal cross-border financial activities. What does
that mean? It means that mainland Chinese investors will be blocked from investing in
overseas stock markets through offshore brokerage firms, including Hong Kong markets.
But what if you already own overseas stocks? Well, you can sell. The regime wants you to sell.
You can sell, you can withdraw, but you are no longer allowed to buy. Beijing is now using
administrative power to force Chinese capital back into domestic financial markets. And this
crackdown is not sudden. Back in April, authorities already launched a nationwide three-year campaign
called the Overall War Against Illegal Financial Activities. So it has already declared war against
cross-border investments. You may ask, what exactly counts as illegal financial activity?
The answer is very simple. When the party needs your money, and your money is outside its control,
then your ownership of that money itself increasingly becomes a problem. That's
exactly what this is all about. In any country, or in any democratic country,
it's your money, and you're free to invest in whatever stock markets you choose, but not in
China. Years ago, P2P lending was promoted by the regime as financial innovation. Later, once
authorities realized that P2P lending was out of its control, it suddenly became illegal financing.
And this latest campaign follows exactly the same pattern. And according to rough industry estimates,
the so-called illegal income connected to these brokerages could total only tens of billions of
yuan. But personally, I doubt this operation is only about collecting money. I mean, the income,
I'm talking about the income, the profit part of the business. The bigger issue is capital flight.
According to reports cited by Bloomberg, Chinese money flowing overseas through offshore,
not through the official channel. I think it says that money flew overseas in 2025
may have already exceeded 1 trillion yuan. No, 1 trillion dollars. Yeah, 1.1 trillion dollars in
2025. And that brings us back to the core issue we discussed earlier, the collapse of confidence
for ordinary citizens and business owners, or even people inside the system itself,
officials. More and more people appear to be losing confidence in China's
economic future. And when confidence collapses, money naturally starts looking for exits.
And Beijing obviously sees that as a major threat. So by targeting these brokerages,
authorities are essentially trying to cut off the channels
through which Chinese capital leaves the country. Because from the CCP's perspective,
the economy is already under enormous pressure. And once money starts leaving on a large scale,
the bleeding just accelerates. But if you look at it from a market perspective,
it doesn't make any sense, right? It's ugly. Because these measures may temporarily slow
capital outflows. But in the long run, it does not enhance confidence. And aggressive
crackdowns only frighten away both domestic and international investors. Once investors conclude
that there are no stable rules left, and there's nothing worth their investment,
then they may simply liquidate when they still can and just leave the market entirely. You can't
force people to invest in China's domestic markets. You can force institutional investors
to do that, but you can't force retail investors to do that. So that's why people don't understand
Beijing's logic. So why do they act in such a destructive way? Honestly, this is exactly the
point that I'm trying to make, or I have made before. If you try to analyze the CCP using
the logic of a normal market economy, you may never fully understand how the system operates.
Because by preserving political control, the regime will be preserving economic efficiency.
But in my view, this is precisely why the system is beginning to behave
in a way that we call drain the pound. Drain the pound. Pond. Not the sterling pound. I'm
thinking about the sterling pound. No, the pond to catch the fish. Yeah, there's a Chinese idiom
for that. The leadership may feel that it no longer has the time to wait for the fish to grow.
It no longer has the time to wait for the chicken to slowly lay eggs. So instead, it feels compelled
to kill the chicken immediately and take the eggs away. And that, in my opinion, illustrates
the deepest danger facing China's economy today and the pressure the regime is experiencing.
Maybe Xi Jinping and his circles have finally understood that. The world's second largest
economy has begun hollowing out from within. And Mr. Du describes what China faces today
as a Chinese-style collapse, not a dramatic overnight financial explosion,
not a sudden Soviet-style implosion, but rather a slow-motion deterioration.
Official GDP numbers may still show growth, but ordinary people increasingly feel hopeless.
Banks may not openly collapse, but the real economy is severely starved of
liquidity. Cities may not suddenly fall apart, but streets and commercial districts
have slowly emptied out. And perhaps that is the most dangerous kind of crisis of all,
because slow-moving crises are often the hardest to recognize and the easiest to ignore until the
system suddenly realizes it has already gone too far to reverse. So the question maybe is,
can an economy continue to prosper when its leader doesn't even trust the data?
I think that may be the real challenge facing China today, because it tells us that there's
complete collapse of confidence when its leader can no longer trust his own officials and the
data they gave him. So I think that there's no way he could fix that problem. Everyone is just
for the moment to arrive. So that's what I have for you. I still think this slide that you're
looking at on the screen is extremely insightful, because that pinpoints the distorted economic
growth model that we've seen in China during its reforms and opening up. It's an extremely
exhausting and inefficient model. All right. Let's see. How about we play some music? People
suggest that we play some music. How about we play our theme song for a change? Because
I think we need to play wisdom and courage just to encourage ourselves a little bit.
What do you think? Let me play our theme song. Where did it go? Okay. All right. Let me play the
music. All right. Where did it go? Oh, here. Wisdom and music. English official video. Okay.
Here we go. You guys see? Yeah? Okay. Good. Let's play this.
In this fleeting world of minds that come and go, so many search for truth yet few truly know.
We build our thrones of smart machines and screams, but lose the voice of wisdom in between.
True wisdom rises from a heart that's kind, from quiet depths and clarity of mind.
Like a spark, it glows. In the dark, it stays, guiding our souls through the storm and haze.
Through the ages, warriors rise and fall, but courage lives in the hearts that give their all.
The body's chained by fear and strife. Spirit fades from the song of life. Courage is born
when the self is gone, where love remains after fear moves on. Let go and you will soar.
May the spark of wisdom forever shine through the test of time.
Wings of courage lift you high to see the truth beyond the sky.
Forever shine and the wings of courage make you fly.
Wisdom to know, the courage to tell. The wisdom to know, the courage to tell.
All right. This one was my fifth anniversary's theme song. I commissioned a friend, a musician
friend to write it. I wrote the lyrics and it's not AI voice. This is a song by a real artist.
She's bilingual. I also have a Chinese version. I actually like the Chinese version better.
But anyway, I love that song. I hope you do too. Okay. Questions. Someone come up with a term
called layers. L-E-I-E-R-S. Layers. I love that word. Okay. All right. Thank you. Someone asked
me about China's population. Yes, I was on a Chinese TV. They invited me to their news program.
They interviewed me about China's population. I gave an answer that people told me that was
very logical and smart. I want to tell you what I said.
China officially announced its one child policy when the country's population was at 700 million.
China had 1.4 billion people now when the government pushes people to have more children.
That doesn't make sense. Why would a government announce a mandatory one child policy when the
population is 700 million and when you reach 1.4 billion people and then all of a sudden you still
want more children? You want more babies? That tells us two things. One, China doesn't have 1.4
billion people now. Two, when people ask me what China's population is, if you really think about
it, if China started one child policy when the population was 700 million and it's crying out
loud to force young people to have more children, that tells me its population probably is not even
700 million. Of course, that argument is purely just based on logic. It's not based on facts or
anything. I'm just using CCP's own logic to answer that question. That's just one way to look at the
question. It's a logical answer to that question. But anyways, that's what I said in that Chinese
interview. I want to share that with you. I have a question from Andrews Kags. It says,
she is always worried about Black Swan events. You had a question. I think it was about whether
or not Xi Jinping would start a military operation when he realizes that his economy is
not doing well or is falling. I think that was the question. It's a very difficult decision
for him. On one hand, he's very tempted to do that. On the other hand, does he have full control
over the military? Because if the answer is no, if he doesn't fully control the military,
then that would be a risky move. If he controls just a faction within the PLA and start a war
prematurely, then that could be the end of his regime, or even his rule. But if the argument
is that he has full control over the military, then he's more likely to take the risk and start
something militarily to cover up the economic crisis, the economic sufferings. So the answer
to that question depends on how much control Xi Jinping has over the military. And I think there
may be some indications coming out because the signals that we're getting are the state media,
because you can't really rely on rumor mills so much to assess. So people have been studying
every PLA articles that seem to tell us something. And maybe I'll talk about that
this weekend. At this point, I do not think Xi Jinping fully controls the military.
I do not think so. I still think the party elders do. And I have evidence to prove that.
Maybe I'll talk about that this weekend. So stay tuned. If you haven't subscribed, please do.
All right. Let's see. All right. Where's the question? Okay, I already answered that question
from Drew Skaggs. I love this song so much. Yeah, I have a music playlist. So if you love this song,
if you can't find it, it's in the music playlist. Okay. All right.
Yeah, I love that song too. Logic doesn't... Okay. All right. Netflix Foreign. Lei,
I promised you the Goji berry info. Did you find anywhere to get them? No. I haven't got time.
Someone asked me, Lei, any update on Liu Yuan? No. No. I have not heard anything.
All right. Goji berry. I would love to have that info. Oh, Goji berry. All right. Maybe
someone can post it in the comment section. And then I like Lei's shirt. This is green,
so it stands for money, right? And it also has the money sign, the traditional Chinese money sign.
So that's why I picked this. Since I'm talking about money today, I may as well wear something
that resembles money. All right. How about we end it here today? It's Thursday night. How about we
end it here? Enjoy the rest of your day or night, and I'll be back over the weekend. Oh, here's a
question. From Jasper Robber, do most people in China believe the propaganda given by the
government? A lot of people do, and a lot of people don't. And a lot of people don't have
any opinion one way or the other. So I would say a third of the people don't trust the propaganda.
A third are still very much brainwashed. And a third don't have any opinion because they're
afraid to question the propaganda. Yeah. I mean, this is a very rough... I think more and more
people are suspicious of the state propaganda now. But there are three groups. All right.
That's all for tonight. I thank you for joining. I'll see you in a couple of days. Okay. Bye.