How the US Navy Can Sink Any Warship on Earth

Warship And Aircraft
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Picture an enemy warship, not a relic from the Cold War, a modern surface combatant built by a
peer adversary. Phased array radar tracking hundreds of targets, air defense missiles
intercepting threats at supersonic speed, close-in weapons firing 75 rounds per second.
On paper, this ship is nearly invulnerable. But the United States Navy has at least four
different ways to sink it, from four directions that no defense system on Earth can cover at once.
From below the surface, from across the horizon, from above the clouds, and from an island with no
port. The question is not whether this ship can be sunk. The question is, which direction is the
most dangerous? And how exactly do you kill a warship from a tiny island with no port?
Hit subscribe and let's break it down.
Earlier this year, during Operation Epic Fury, the U.S. military destroyed or incapacitated the
vast majority of Iran's naval fleet in less than 10 weeks. Tomahawks from destroyers, torpedoes
from submarines, bombs from carrier aircraft, cruise missiles from multiple vectors. Not one weapon,
everything at once. But there is a vast difference between striking ships moored at a pier
and hunting a peer adversary on the open ocean. The real question is different.
If the target is a maneuvering fleet with Aegis-equivalent radar, layered missile defense,
and submarine escorts, do these four directions of attack still work? The answer lies in a
doctrinal shift the Navy made quietly over the past decade. It is called distributed maritime
operations. Before 2015, the Navy concentrated its killing power in the carrier strike group.
The carrier attacked, the escorts defended. After 2015, that changed. Every American warship became
a killer. Destroyers now fire ship-killing Tomahawks. Littoral combat ships carry anti-ship
missiles. Patrol aircraft launch precision-guided cruise missiles. Even Marines on remote islands
fire anti-ship weapons from the back of an unmanned truck. The Navy went from one big fist
to a hundred knives coming from every direction. This is what those knives look like. Four
directions. Four different physics problems. Starting with the one no radar can see.
The Mark 48 ADCAP is the US Navy's heavyweight torpedo. It weighs 3,695 pounds, stretches 19
feet long, and is launched from the torpedo tubes of Virginia class, Seawolf class, and Los Angeles
class submarines. Its speed is officially listed as greater than 30 knots. That is almost certainly
a significant understatement. Open source estimates place it above 55 knots. Its fuel
is auto-fuel II, a liquid monopropellant that does not require air to burn. The torpedo runs
on chemistry alone, which means it operates at depths where no aircraft or surface ship can
follow. But the feature that makes the Mark 48 lethal against warships is not its speed. It is
where it detonates. The torpedo does not hit the hull. It swims beneath the ship and explodes under
the keel. The physics of what happens next is why navies fear torpedoes more than missiles.
When an explosion occurs underwater, the energy behaves differently than in air. Water is nearly
incompressible. In an air explosion, much of the energy is wasted compressing the surrounding
atmosphere. Underwater, that energy transmits directly into the target. The shockwave travels
through the water and slams into the hull with almost no loss. The explosion creates a massive
gas bubble beneath the ship. That bubble expands violently, lifting the center of the hull upward.
Then it collapses. When it collapses, it pulls the water out from under the ship's midsection.
The bow and stern are still supported by the ocean. The middle is not. The keel,
the structural spine of the ship, sags into the void and breaks. A ship with a broken keel cannot
be repaired. It sinks. Nobody punches through a concrete wall. But if you dig the foundation
out from underneath, the wall collapses on its own. The trade-off is proximity. A submarine
must get close, inside the enemy's anti-submarine warfare zone. Every Virginia-class boat carries
roughly 37 weapons, a mix of torpedoes and tomahawk missiles. The newest Block V boats
carry up to 65, thanks to the Virginia payload module. But none of them can reload at sea.
Every torpedo fired is one fewer weapon in the magazine, and the submarine is the most expensive,
hardest-to-replace platform in the fleet. During Operation Epic Fury earlier this year,
a U.S. fast-attack submarine torpedoed and sank the Iranian frigate Shaheed Sayajirazi
in the Indian Ocean. One torpedo, one ship on the bottom. No warning. But torpedoes require
proximity. What if you want to kill from hundreds of miles away, without ever seeing the target?
For decades, the Tomahawk cruise missile was a land-attack weapon. It hit buildings, airfields,
bunkers, fixed targets that did not move. If you pointed it at a coordinate on a map,
it flew there and detonated. But it could not hit a ship, because ships move, and the old
Tomahawk had no way to find a moving target at sea. The Block V-A changed that. The Maritime
Strike Tomahawk carries a multi-mode seeker, active radar and imaging infrared, that can detect,
track and engage a ship maneuvering on the open ocean. It launches from the same Mark 41 VLS
cells that every Arleigh Burke-class destroyer carries. And it has a two-way data link,
which means the crew can change the target after the missile is already in the air.
Fire first, decide later. The range is classified. The land-attack Block V
flies approximately 900 nautical miles. The Maritime Strike variant is shorter,
the seeker hardware takes up space that would otherwise hold fuel, but it still reaches
several hundred nautical miles. Far enough that the destroyer firing it may never appear
on the target's radar. But here is the trade-off that defines modern surface warfare.
An Arleigh Burke Flight 2A destroyer carries 96 vertical launch cells. That is the entire
magazine, for everything. Air defense missiles, ballistic missile interceptors,
Tomahawk strike weapons. Every cell loaded with a Maritime Strike Tomahawk is a cell that cannot
hold an SM-2 or SM-6 air defense missile. The captain decides the loadout before the ship
leaves port. More offense means less defense. More defense means fewer ship-killing weapons.
96 rounds for both attack and self-protection. Every missile fired is one that cannot be used
to defend the ship. You cannot add ammunition in the middle of a fight. You choose before
you sail. And you live with that choice. The Tomahawk is not the only ship killer
on a destroyer's deck. The SM-6, originally designed as an air defense missile,
now doubles as an anti-ship weapon. It flies at Mach 3.5, faster than anything a warship can dodge.
And it can hit targets beyond the radar horizon by receiving targeting data from an F-35
or an E-2D Hawkeye. An air defense missile that kills ships. That is the level of multi-role
the U.S. Navy operates at in 2026. Smaller warships carry their own weapons.
The Naval Strike Missile, designed by Norway's Kongsberg, sits in canister
launchers on littoral combat ships and destroyers. It weighs roughly 900 pounds,
flies at Mach 0.93, and has one of the lowest radar cross-sections of any anti-ship missile
in service. Even the smallest American warship now carries a ship-killing weapon.
And the Harpoon, the missile every Navy in the world knows by name, still serves,
40 years after it entered the fleet. It is being replaced, gradually, by everything listed above.
But it remains in inventory. A reminder that the U.S. Navy has been in the ship-killing business
for a very long time. Every weapon in this section flies across the surface,
or just above the waves. The target ship's radar can see them coming.
The defense has time to react, track, classify, engage.
But what happens when the weapon arrives at an altitude the radar cannot scan?
The AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, LRASM, is the only ship-killing weapon in this video
that launches from an aircraft. And it solves a problem that none of the weapons in the first
two sections can solve, arriving without being seen. An FAA-18EF Super Hornet carries four LRASMs.
AP-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft is being configured to carry up to four more.
Each missile weighs 2,756 pounds and carries a 1,000-pound warhead.
During the cruise phase, the LRASM navigates by inertial guidance and GPS
at moderate altitude. Then, in the terminal phase, it descends.
Five to ten feet above the waves. At that altitude, the math of radar detection works
against the defender. The target ship's radar is limited by the curvature of the earth.
The lower the incoming object, the shorter the detection range.
At 10 feet, the defending ship's radar cannot see the missile until it is roughly 10 to 15
nautical miles away. For a weapon traveling at high subsonic speed, that is less than
60 seconds of warning. But the feature that separates LRASM from every other weapon in
this video is what happens when communications go dark. If the data link is jammed, if the
network connecting the launch aircraft to the missile is severed, the LRASM does not
go blind. It switches to onboard artificial intelligence. A passive ESM sensor listens
for the electromagnetic emissions of enemy radars. An imaging infrared seeker scans the
ocean surface for thermal signatures. The missile identifies targets autonomously,
selects the highest-priority match, and prosecutes the attack without any human input.
Every other weapon in this video depends on something external. The torpedo needs the
submarine to get close. The tomahawk needs a seeker to find a moving ship.
Nemesis needs targeting data from a drone or patrol aircraft. The LRASM, once launched,
needs nothing. It is the only weapon here that can lose every connection to the fleet,
and still find, choose, and kill a target on its own.
The trade-off is capacity. A Super Hornet carries only four LRASMs, constrained by the physics of
a 300-foot carrier flight deck and a catapult weight limit. Saturation requires coordination,
multiple aircraft, precise timing, shared targeting data. It works, but it is not simple.
Three directions covered, torpedo from below, tomahawk from the surface, LRASM from above.
But in 2026, there is a fourth, from a place no one expects.
This is the newest and most unconventional way the United States military sinks ships.
Not from a warship. Not from an aircraft. From a Marine. On an island.
The system is called Nemesis, Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System.
It is built on a JLTV chassis, a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle,
modified to operate without a crew. The launcher is called Rogue Fires.
It carries two Naval Strike Missiles. It fits inside a C-130 cargo aircraft.
The concept is simple. Fly the launcher to a small island. Unload it. Hide it in the terrain.
When an enemy ship passes through the strait, fire. Each NSM flies at Mach 0.93,
skims the sea surface, and carries a 265-pound warhead designed to penetrate a warship's hull.
The missile's composite airframe gives it one of the lowest radar signatures of any
cruise missile in service. Two missiles per launcher. Reload by hand. Targeting
data provided by external sensors, radar, drones, maritime patrol aircraft.
The physics here is not about the missile. It is about geography.
A strait is a choke point. Ships must pass through it.
Place Nemesis launchers on the islands flanking the strait, and the waterway becomes a missile trap.
The enemy does not know which island holds a launcher. Every uninhabited rock becomes a
potential threat. You do not need to sink the ship. You just need to make every island dangerous
enough that the fleet chooses not to transit. During Exercise Balikatan in April 2026,
Marines from the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment flew Nemesis launchers by C-130 to the Batanes
Islands, the northernmost point of the Philippines overlooking the Luzon Strait,
the most strategically significant waterway in the western Pacific. They set up, aimed at the
strait, and rehearsed the ability to interdict naval traffic from the shore. The tradeoff is
sustainability. Two missiles per launcher. Manual reload. Dependent on airlift for resupply. If the
C-130s stop flying, the Marines on that island are alone with empty tubes. But the threat remains,
because the enemy does not know whether the tubes are empty or loaded. A missile minefield,
except you do not know which island the mines are on.
Four directions. Four different physics problems for the Defender. From below,
a torpedo that detonates under the keel, in a medium where shockwaves hit harder than in air.
The target's radar cannot see it. Its air defense missiles cannot intercept it. The only defense
is sonar and anti-submarine warfare. And the submarine that launched it is already leaving.
From the surface, a Tomahawk that was retargeted mid-flight. An SM-6 arriving at Mach 3.5.
A naval strike missile, hugging the waves, with a radar signature the size of a seabird.
The ship's radar can see them, but each interception costs a cell from the same finite
magazine. From above, an LRASM skimming the ocean at 10 feet. Invisible to radar until 60 seconds
before impact. If jammed, it thinks for itself. If the network dies, the missile does not.
From the shore, a launcher hidden on an island. Firing through a strait the ship must cross.
No radar warning. No satellite signature. Just two missiles from a rock that looked empty.
No single defense system handles all four. Air defense missiles stop cruise missiles,
but not torpedoes. Sonar finds submarines, but not shore-based launchers. Electronic countermeasures
may blind a Tomahawk seeker, but the LRASM below the radar horizon switches to AI and keeps
hunting. The torpedo beneath the hull can be guided by a wire that no jammer can touch, or it cuts the
wire and hunts acoustically, chasing the target by sound alone. And the math is brutal. A destroyer's
Aegis combat system can simultaneously guide interceptors against roughly 8 to 12 threats.
The exact number is classified, but the limit is not software. It is hardware. The number of fire
control illuminators physically bolted to the hull. Those illuminators are what paint a target
and guide a missile to it. The ship cannot engage more targets than it has illuminators pointing at
them. Four LRASM from one Super Hornet? The defense handles it. But add 16 more LRASM from a second
wave of jets arriving from a different bearing, while Tomahawk maritime strike missiles arrive
from the surface at the same time, and the ship must solve two physics problems at once.
High-altitude interception and sea-skimming interception, with the same finite illuminators,
the same finite magazine. Every layer of defense covers one direction. Four directions arriving
simultaneously is overload. A modern warship is not killed by a better weapon. It is killed by
four physics problems arriving at the same time, and no ship solves all four at once.
If this made you proud of American engineering, type proud and hit subscribe.
What you just watched is not a list of weapons. It is 80 years of engineering the ocean.
80 years of asking the same question and refusing to settle for one answer. A torpedo that breaks
a ship's spine. A cruise missile that hunts across hundreds of miles. An AI that chooses
its own target. And a missile launcher hidden on an island, turning geography into a weapon.
Four directions. And the list is not finished. Hypersonic weapons are entering the fleet.
Unmanned ships are already at sea. The number of ways to kill a warship is not shrinking.
It is growing. Faster than any defense system can adapt. No single weapon here is perfect.
The torpedo demands proximity. The tomahawk reveals the shooter. The LRASM carries only
four per jet. The island launcher runs dry after two shots. But taken together, they form something
no adversary has ever faced. A system that attacks from every direction, at every altitude,
through every medium, all at once. Not one fist, a hundred knives. When every destroyer carries
ship-killing missiles, when every submarine is an ambush, when every patrol aircraft is a launcher,
when every island is a potential missile battery, the question stops being,
can you sink a warship? The question becomes, who still dares to put a fleet to sea?
