In this episode, we explore whether “patchwork China” could break apart like the Soviet Union amid democratization or political turmoil.
Focusing first on ethnic minority regions, the video explains why Xinjiang and Tibet independence movements face steep challenges due to Han Chinese population dominance — over 90% nationally and often majorities even in autonomous areas. Using the Soviet collapse as a comparison, it highlights how China’s demographics make ethnic separation far less likely.
The discussion then shifts to Tibet’s heavy reliance on central government subsidies and how a democratic China might turn the “stay or leave” question into a financial negotiation driven by voters’ willingness to pay.
Finally, it examines Hong Kong, Macau, and especially Taiwan, analyzing their economic dependencies, possible windows for formal independence, and why military unification becomes highly improbable — and extremely costly — under democracy. A thoughtful look at unity, money, and the real limits of separatism in China’s future.
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Hi, I'm Dong Xiong. Welcome to Digging into China, where we take a deep dive into what's
really happening in China and share some unique insights. When we talk about China today,
there is a de facto independent country right across the sea on the east coast, Taiwan. Hong
Kong also saw massive protests around 2018, and out west you have places like Tibet and Xinjiang
where ethnic minorities are concentrated. So with this kind of patchwork China,
could the country one day follow the same path as the Soviet Union? Could it break apart because
of democratization or some kind of major political upheaval? That's what we are going to talk about
in this episode. First, I think the regions in China that some people want to separate from the
are all quite different. We can mainly divide them into Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan on one side,
and the ethnic minority region on the other side. Let's start with the ethnic minority issues.
Online you often see talk of Xinjiang independence, or Tibet independence. A lot of people
hope Xinjiang or Tibet will become independent. Some even dream of restoring Manchuria. But in
my view, none of these possibilities are very realistic. When you boil it down, the reasons
these places want independence are pretty similar. It all comes back to ethnic issues,
the nationalist feelings that grow out of those ethnic differences, or the religious problems
that sometimes come along with them. But I think this issue is actually overstated in China,
and the main reason is the population ratios. Let's compare it to the Soviet Union, which
did break apart. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the whole thing fell apart together.
Before it broke up, the Soviet Union's administrative setup was actually quite similar
to China. It had various republics set up along ethnic lines. In theory, those republics had a
high degree of autonomy, just like China has its autonomous regions. The names may sound similar,
but deep down, China and the Soviet Union are very different, and that difference comes down
to population structure. In 1989, right before the Soviet collapsed, they did a population census.
It showed that the Russians, the largest ethnic group, made up just a little over 50% of the total
Soviet population. The Soviet Union barely had a clear majority group. China is completely different.
Han Chinese have an overwhelming advantage in numbers. They make up more than 90% of the total
population and are the clear majority. If you break those big national numbers down and compare
the population ratios inside each Chinese autonomous region with the Soviet republics,
the difference becomes even clearer. Before it collapsed, the Soviet Union really did make
each republic feel like it belonged to its own people. For example, Uzbeks made up 70% of Uzbekistan,
Lithuanians made up 80% of Lithuania, and Armenians made up 93% of Armenia. Even in Ukraine,
which is fighting a war now, Ukrainians accounted for 73% of the population back in 1989.
So when you look at each Soviet republic individually, those minority groups were
the clear majority inside their own republics. But in China, the situation is totally different.
China has five provinces or regions with relatively large ethnic minority populations,
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Guangxi, and Ningxia. Among those five autonomous regions,
only Tibet has an ethnic group, the Tibetans, that forms an absolute majority. In Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang, Guangxi, and Ningxia, ethnic minorities do not make up more than 50% of the population.
In many cases, Han Chinese are still the clear majority. This kind of population structure
makes it very hard for nationalist-driven separation movements to succeed in these regions.
Under the current rule of the Chinese Communist Party, that goes without saying,
the CCP believes strongly in keeping the country unified, so they would never allow
these places to split off. Even in a democratic era, it still wouldn't be realistic, because
once you put the question inside a democratic framework, you have to think about the core
thing in democracy, votes, or in other words, what the people actually want. Take Xinjiang,
where the call for independence has been the loudest. Some Uyghurs may want Xinjiang to become
independent, but nearly 40% of the people in Xinjiang are still Han Chinese. How many of those
Han Chinese would want independence? I believe at least 95% of them would not. So even if you held
a referendum in Xinjiang tomorrow asking whether it should stay in China, it would be very hard
for the pro-independence side to get more than half the votes. That means Xinjiang simply doesn't
have the foundation for independence. In places like Guangxi, the Zhuang people have been heavily
assimilated by Han culture. In Inner Mongolia, the Mongols are the minority. In situations like
these, the idea of independence becomes even less realistic. What about Tibet then? Does it have any
possibility of becoming independent? From a pure population standpoint, it does look possible.
But when you look at the reality, the chances are still very small. And interestingly, when the time
comes, it might not even be Tibet that wants independence, it might actually be the inland
provinces that want Tibet to leave. Right now, under Chinese rule, Tibet has both clear advantages
and disadvantages. The disadvantage is that religious freedom is suppressed. Many Tibetans
probably feel their religious beliefs have been violated and they don't have real religious
freedom. But if China really democratizes one day, no one would want to keep suppressing religious
freedom in Tibet anymore. Tibetans could believe whatever they want. So that disadvantage would
disappear after democratization. However, the advantage would still remain. What is the biggest
benefit Tibet gets from being under Chinese rule? It's the huge financial transfers from the central
government every year. Although the amount of transfer payments Tibet receives isn't the highest
among all regions, its overall dependence on those payments is the highest in the country.
Tibet's own general public budget revenue is only a little over 30 billion yuan a year, while the
central government sends more than 200 billion yuan in transfers. That's close to the entire
GDP of Tibet. Nearly 90% of Tibet's government spending relies on central transfers and a paired
assistance program. And when you look at those 200 plus billion yuan, even though it's less than
what the Sichuan province gets, Sichuan receives nearly 600 billion a year, Tibet has a very small
population. In 2025, the central government gave Tibet 290 billion yuan in total assistance,
but Tibet only has 3.7 million people. That works out to about 7,800 yuan per person per year.
The per person transfer payments is actually higher than Tibet's own per capita GDP.
From an economic point of view, almost everything in Tibet, government revenue,
road construction, transportation, public servants' salaries, and basic public services,
depends on support from the inland province. If Tibet lost their support from the rest of China,
it would have serious trouble running itself. Religious faith is certainly an issue,
but so is simply having enough to eat. Besides, after democratization, the religious freedom
problem in Tibet would largely disappear anyway. So, when that day of democratization comes,
the situation might actually flip. The inland provinces might not want to keep supporting Tibet
and might not want it to keep taking resources. Instead, it could be Tibet that wants the inland
provinces to continue helping it. Something similar actually happened during the breakup
of the Soviet Union. One of the biggest forces pushing for the Soviet collapse was Boris Yeltsin's
and the Russian Federation he led. Before the breakup, there was one nationwide referendum in
the Soviet Union, the only real moment of democracy the USSR ever had. The question was simple,
do you support the dissolution of the Soviet Union? The results, it was the Russians who
supported the dissolution the most, while the five Central Asian republics were strongly against it.
That's what the situation was like right before the Soviet Union fell apart.
Many people find this surprising today, especially when they look at modern Russia,
which now shows such strong interest in territory. Why didn't they want to keep those lands back then?
The reason was that Russians at the time felt they were being bled dry by the other republics.
The way they were being bled wasn't through direct transfer payments like in China,
but through oil. The Russian Federation was not only the largest, most populous,
and richest republic in the Soviet Union, it was also the biggest energy supplier,
with huge reserves of oil and natural gas. Because the Soviet Union ran a planned economy
under communism, they didn't talk about money. Talking about money was seen as hurting feelings
and hurting the ideal. So Russian oil was given for free to the other republics,
and in return, Russia would get grain, cotton, and other goods for free.
When you calculate using international prices at the time, the deal was extremely bad for Russia.
In 1990, a barrel of oil worth $20 on the world market would only bring back about $3 worth of
grain and raw materials after circulating inside the Soviet Union. That meant Russia was quietly
subsidizing the other republics with hundreds of billions of dollars every year through cheap oil.
Yeltsin's main argument for breaking up the Soviet Union was exactly this story.
In his narrative, the other republics had been sucking Russia's blood. If Russia could shake off
these parasitic republics with its enormous oil and gas reserves, Russians could sell energy on
the international market and quickly get rich. The situation in China is actually quite similar.
The only difference is that under the CCP's unified narrative, the fact that Tibet has
been receiving resources from the inland is hidden. The CCP not only suppresses the religious
rights of Tibetans, it also suppresses the economic choice rights of Han Chinese. Chinese
people don't even have the right to decide whether they want to support Tibet, and they are not even
allowed to talk about it openly. Of course, Tibet's situation is better than that of the
republics in some ways. Even though Tibet is poor and relies heavily on inland support,
China's overall economy is large enough that spending a couple of hundred billion yuan a year
on Tibet is just a drop in the bucket. It doesn't make ordinary Chinese feel too heavily burdened.
So, after democratization combined with the strong Chinese tradition of
wanting a unified country, the question of whether Tibet stays or goes could turn into a
business negotiation. Under that unity mindset, many people would still be willing to pay some
prices to keep Tibet in China. Tibet, for its part, could use the threat of independence as
a bargaining chip to demand continued support from the inland. How much money inland Chinese
residents would be willing to spend or willing to send to Tibet to make sure it stays will depend
on each person's own choice. It will depend on how deep that desire for national unity still
runs in people's hearts. The deeper it is, the more they'd be willing to pay. The weaker it is,
the less they'd want to pay. I believe everyone already has an answer to this question in their
heart, and that answer will eventually show up in your vote. There will definitely be negotiations
between the two sides, Tibet and the inland government. Of course, if the desire for unity
becomes so weak that inland people don't want to spend even one yuan and would rather push Tibet
away, then Tibet really could become independent. But if someone says Tibet will one day simply
declare that it wants nothing and just wants to be independent, refusing all aid, I don't think
that's very likely. After all, people still need to live their daily lives. Now the situations in Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are quite different. If we put the ethnic minority regions into the old
Soviet context, they are more like the five Central Asian republics. But Hong Kong, Macau,
and Taiwan are more like the Baltic states. In that Soviet referendum, was there any place with
stronger separatist feelings than Russia itself? Statistically, no. But in reality, yes, and that
place was the Baltic states, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. These three countries had extremely
strong desire for independence. Why didn't it show up in the statistics? Because their governments
wanted independence so badly that they simply refused to hold the Soviet referendum in their
territories. In the end, those three countries didn't even participate. Why was the desire for
separation so high in those three countries? Besides having clearer cultural identities,
the Baltic states had already built modern legal and national systems even before the Soviet Union
was founded. More importantly, in the 1990s, they were the most economically developed parts
of the entire Soviet Union. Their economies depended very little on the rest of the USSR,
so breaking away and getting rich would actually have been easier for them than for Russia. This
situation is actually somewhat similar to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan today. These places are
more economically developed, more modern in culture, and on the institutional side,
Taiwan is already a democracy while Hong Kong and Macau at least had some democratic elements,
certainly much stronger than the mainland. But when it comes to wanting independence, Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan are still a bit different from the Baltic states. First of all, it would be very
hard for Hong Kong and Macau to actually achieve independence in practice. Their economies and
basic infrastructure depend too heavily on the mainland. For example, 90% of Macau's electricity
comes from Zhuhai, and 100% of its fresh water comes from the mainland. Economically, 80% of
Macau's revenue comes from gambling, and the customers for that gambling are mostly Chinese
from the mainland. Hong Kong is similar. Besides depending heavily on the mainland for water and
electricity, Hong Kong's economy also relies heavily on the mainland. Its main economic value
is serving as China's international financial gateway. If it completely cut ties with mainland
China, that advantage would disappear. This means these two places basically have no realistic
economic path to independence. Looking back, the main conflict between Hong Kong, Macau,
and the mainland wasn't really about economy or race, it was about the political system.
That kind of institutional conflicts would largely disappear after democratization. So
in a democratized China, Hong Kong and Macau would lose both the motivation and the economic
space for independence. Now Taiwan is a bit different. Compared with Hong Kong and Macau,
Taiwan's economic dependence on the mainland is high. For example, exports to China make up 27%
of Taiwan's total exports. But it is not absolute dependence. It's not like Hong Kong or Macau,
where leaving China would make life almost impossible. In recent years, Taiwan's exports
to the United States have already surpassed its exports to the mainland. So Taiwan now depends
more on the American market. On top of that, Taiwan has its own independent power system,
internet system, and water supply system. All of this gives Taiwan a stronger foundation for
independence. Of course, Taiwan is already de facto independent today, it just lacks
international legal recognition. So is it possible for Taiwan to turn that de facto
independence into internationally recognized legal independence in the future? First, I don't
think China will voluntarily give up Taiwan, whether under the current authoritarian CCP rule
or under a future democratic system. Taiwan is economically developed and culturally close to
China. So most Chinese people have no desire to let it go. The same goes for Hong Kong and Macau.
China is unlikely to actively agree to let the international community recognize Taiwan's
independence. In that case, whether Taiwan can move from the de facto independence to
internationally recognized independence will depend on whether a window of opportunity opens.
There are actually three possible windows for Taiwan. The first is if CCP directly attacks
Taiwan. Once invaded, there is not much more to say. It would force Taiwan into a kind of
independence under pressure. At the same time, being attacked by China would win Taiwan a lot
of international sympathy and support from more countries. The second possibility is if China
locks itself down, causes its own national power to decline, and eventually loses all influence
on the international stage. The United Nations could see a complete reversal, with countries
switching from supporting Beijing to supporting Taiwan. The third is a democratic transition in
China. If that transition happens through civil war and chaos, it would create a window for Taiwan
to push for independence and gain more international support. But if the transition happens
peacefully, through protests, then the window would probably be much smaller. Based on China's
current situation, I believe democratization will not come through civil war, but through protests.
It also won't wait until China has become so weak that it's just another poor country that can be
marginalized. Even the American intelligence agencies believe that Xi Jinping has temporarily
given up on using force to take Taiwan for now, given how cautiously he is handling the military.
So, looking at the current situation, although Taiwan is already de facto independent,
the window for it to gain full international recognition may not exist. What would the
relationship between a democratized China and Taiwan look like? I don't think direct unification
would be realistic. It would more likely be a long period of pulling and pushing.
And in my view, that pulling and pushing would rule out the possibility of military unification.
If China democratizes, the chance that it would use force to take Taiwan is, in my view, zero.
A lot of people today imagine that if China became democratic tomorrow and everyone gets
one vote, they would immediately vote to take Taiwan by force. But that kind of thinking still
comes from the mindset shaped by the CCP authoritarian system. There is certainly
still a lot of great unity thinking in China today. Many people still hope to recover Taiwan.
But compared with that unity sentiment, what Chinese people care about more is their own
wallets. Different research institutions have calculated the cost of trying to take Taiwan by
force. Even a conservative estimate says war and the resulting trade blockade would cause China's
GDP to drop by 10% to 20%. Even 10% would mean a loss of trillions of US dollars, tens of
trillions of RMB. That works out to at least 10,000 RMB per person and probably more. Would ordinary
Chinese really be willing to each pay 10,000 RMB to take Taiwan by force? How many people would
actually agree? Wanting to take Taiwan by force and being willing to personally pay 10,000 RMB
for it are two completely different things. I believe no matter how strong the unity emotion
is, it is not stronger than the money in people's pockets. Most people are just talking big online.
When it comes to actually reaching into their own pockets and paying real money,
that's a very different story. And most people haven't realized this yet, largely because of the
CCP's strict control over speech. Taking Taiwan is the CCP's highest goal. If you talk about the
real cost of military unification inside China, you will quickly get your accounts banned. That's
why, in the minds of many Chinese, taking Taiwan not only costs nothing, it might even bring
profit. They imagine they could seize TSMC and everyone would get 10,000 RMB richer. Many people
simply don't understand the losses that military unification would bring. But when democratization
arrives, these questions will have to be brought into the open and debated by different political
parties. Once people truly understand the cost, I believe very few would still want to take Taiwan
by force. In an atmosphere that still values national unity, if people don't want Taiwan to
become independent but still want to bring it back, what would likely happen? The mainland
would probably offer Taiwan trade benefits or various subsidies. Compared with how most people
feel about Tibet, the willingness to pay for Taiwan would be much higher. People would be
ready to give Taiwan more money to encourage it to return to China. Of course, that would also
depend on how well democracy and the economy develop in China made by them. Actually, the
main conflict between Taiwan and China is not about democracy, it's about economics and politics.
If China's economy becomes very similar to Taiwan's, if living standards get close, and if
politics also become fully democratic like Taiwan's, then the price China would have to pay
would be lower, and the chance of peaceful unification would be higher. So sometimes I
want to say to those who dream of recovering Taiwan, the best way to bring Taiwan back
is not through military force. If Xi Jinping really presses the missile launch button and
starts a war to take Taiwan, Taiwan's separatist feelings would reach their peak. Ethnic and
national identity conflicts that didn't exist before would suddenly appear in Taiwan. And
internationally, it would create even more space for Taiwan's de facto independence.
The real way to recover Taiwan is to push for democratization in China as quickly as possible.
While separatist feelings in Taiwan have not yet become dominant, and while there are still many
people in Taiwan who want to return to the mainland, complete the democratic transition
and build up the economy. If you want to recover Taiwan, the gun barrel should not be pointed at
Taiwan, it should be pointed at the Chinese Communist Party. Thank you so much for watching.
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