How They Parted The Desert To Build The Suez Canal _ HISTORY This Week

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April 25, 1859. About 150 people have gathered on the shores of Lake Manzala in Egypt. And one of them, a mustachioed, retired French diplomat, steps forward. He raises his pickaxe and strikes a ceremonial blow. The audacious goal is to cut through the desert to connect the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, creating a new tr …
History This Week. April 25th, 1859.
I'm Sally Helm.
Dawn on the shores of Lake Manzala. It's a shallow lake in the Nile Delta, maybe more
of a lagoon. There are a couple of villages clustered around it, some nearby fishing shacks.
And this morning, there's an extra camp on the thin strip of land between this lake and the
vast Mediterranean Sea. The men there have awoken early and are packing their gear onto camels,
shovels, and pickaxes. Because they're here to carve a new water route in this corner of the
desert, one that today helps move an estimated 12% of all global trade, the Suez Canal.
The men and their camels travel to a specific spot nearby. It's marked out by stakes in the
Pretty soon, there's a crowd gathered here, about 150 people.
And one of them, a mustachioed retired French diplomat, steps forward.
His name is Ferdinand de Lesseps. Theatrically, he unfurls an Egyptian flag and starts giving a
grand speech about trade and civilization and progress. He raises his pickaxe and strikes a
ceremonial blow. Then de Lesseps turns to the assembled workers, who are mostly Egyptian.
They're the ones who are actually going to do the brutal work of building this canal.
He tells them, remember that you are not simply digging up soil. Your work will bring prosperity
to your families and to your countries. There's a cheer, the workers raise their tools,
and digging begins on the Suez Canal. The audacious goal is to cut through the desert
to connect the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, opening trade routes between the East and West,
changing global trade and geopolitics forever. Today, the conflicts and unintended consequences
around building the Suez Canal. Why did the tremendous efforts of this mustachioed Frenchman
end up enriching the British Empire? And how, decades later, did the canal play an
unexpected role in the birth of modern Egypt? Decades before Ferdinand de Lesseps drives that
pickaxe into the ground, he is a budding French diplomat. His first posting is in Alexandria,
Egypt, where he's serving as vice consul. Part of his job will be to meet important people.
But for the moment, he's not meeting anyone. The consulate has stuck him in quarantine.
Because he arrived from Tunis where there was, I think, a cholera outbreak.
That's Ebrahim Elhoudaibi. He's getting his PhD at Columbia University, studying how the
Suez Canal has influenced the rise of modern Egypt. But when we called him, he was in his
hometown of Cairo, Egypt's capital. Cairo is a city that you can only understand from within.
It's organized chaos, in a sense. It has its own logic. It's beautiful in so many ways.
But Elhoudaibi told us, putting his hometown pride aside, that the most important Egyptian
city in the 1830s was not Cairo, but Alexandria. And that is where de Lesseps languishes in
quarantine, deeply bored. He has none of the 1830s entertainments he's accustomed to.
He can't go smoke his pipe while watching a regatta. But the consulate takes pity on him.
The consul sends him a pile of books, basically.
De Lesseps picks up a memoir written by a French engineer. It talks about Napoleon's
invasion of Egypt in 1798. The general surveyed his conquest and was struck by a grand idea.
What if we could link the Mediterranean to the Red Sea by building a canal right through
Egypt's northern desert? At that time, to get goods from Europe to Asia and back by sea,
traders have to sail for three months all the way around the Horn of Africa.
Great Britain and France are competing over trade with India in particular, and Britain is winning.
So Napoleon thinks, if we build this route, it would make it easier for France to get to India,
and we could get a bigger piece of that lucrative trade.
Napoleon wasn't the first person to have this vision. In fact, the pharaohs had imagined it
millennia before. But Napoleon thought, I have all this power and modern technology,
and he orders his engineers to look into it, find out whether this is possible.
De Lesseps, in quarantine decades later, reads about the result in that memoir.
This engineer helped study the landscape and came back with an assessment.
Which concludes that there's a difference in sea level between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean
that renders the construction of the canal impossible because it will flood the valley.
They thought water would spill down from the higher areas and swamp the lower areas.
Also, cargo ships can't travel uphill, so they would have had to build an expensive
system of locks to make travel possible. Napoleon scrapped the idea.
But De Lesseps is smitten by this vision of linking the East and the West.
He wonders, would it really be so hard? What if it were possible to build the canal?
As it turns out, others are asking the very same question,
and coming up with an electrifying answer.
In the 1830s, a British general conducts another survey of the desert of Suez and
concludes that this is an error. Napoleon's engineers were wrong.
There is no difference between the sea levels, which triggers all this interest by others in
Egypt, and De Lesseps is acquainted with this group of canalists.
The Canalists. They're a group of mostly French engineers and visionaries determined to act on
this new information. It's the summer of 1834, and De Lesseps is joining them at a lavish luncheon.
The group has recently pitched the idea of the canal to the ruler, or pasha, of Egypt.
He's a man named Mehmet Ali. Ali has been in power for three decades.
Not much happens in Egypt without his approval. The canalists thought that it wouldn't be that
hard to convince him. Surely he'd understand the glory and the profits that would be his
if he approved their plan. Ali listened to the pitch and said, absolutely not.
Mehmet Ali was strongly opposed to the idea of the canal for numerous reasons.
For one, the route for this canal would be in a region less tightly controlled by Ali,
and he feels that an overland route through Alexandria and Cairo would better guarantee
profits for Egypt. Plus, he's not wild about the fact that these canalists are French.
He feared provoking the British by accepting a project that is proposed by the French.
He was very keen on maintaining this kind of balance between the powers.
Britain, remember, dominates trade between Europe and India. It will have nothing to gain,
or so it believes, from a canal run by the French.
Britain is proposing instead to improve the existing rail lines in Egypt.
So it seemed that between these competing projects of the railway and the canal,
that the railway was winning.
Much to the dismay of the canalists. At their fancy luncheon,
they console themselves by hitting the champagne hard.
De Lesseps is disappointed too, but he will soon have a role to play in the drama of the canal.
He was not its poster child, but he took interest in the canal. He was
there interacting with them, discussing with them, maybe even lobbying on their behalf.
He still has a day job, of course, working as a French diplomat.
He's meeting a lot of people. And one of them is Pasha Ali's youngest son,
Prince Mohammed Said.
His father was very keen on his youngest son's physical health. So he forced his son, Said,
to go climb mountains and do hard labor a few days a week, and forbade him from eating.
But Said, at that time, used to escape and go to the house of Ferdinand De Lesseps.
The only place that he was allowed to go to, and De Lesseps offered him macaroni.
Macaroni, like pasta, just what the 11-year-old prince desires.
So this is how the relationship started, at least according to De Lesseps.
De Lesseps takes an interest in the young prince. He keeps slipping him pasta and pastries.
He also teaches him to ride horseback. And when De Lesseps eventually moves back to Europe,
the two stay in touch. And the Frenchman, though now far from Egypt,
still nurtures a hope that one day a canal will part the desert.
One thing is certain, though. It'll never happen under Ali Pasha.
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But no one stays in power forever. In 1848, Ali dies.
His nephew, Abbas I, takes over. And he's not exactly beloved.
Abbas had terrible relations with everyone. He was known to have a temper and whatnot.
He's on bad terms with many of his relatives.
And he too is opposed to the canal. Not just out of crankiness, but because he's so cranky
and people at home don't like him, Abbas I wants to maintain the support of the powerful
British government. So, like his uncle before him, he refuses to let the French canalists build.
Once again, the dream is dead. Until the summer of 1854.
What happened? Abbas was killed. He was actually killed allegedly by two of his
slaves who were fed up with the way he treated them, and they just killed him one evening.
So, when Abbas was killed, he was succeeded by his uncle, Said.
Mohammed Said. None other than the boy who once loved eating pasta with Ferdinand de Lesseps.
When Said takes power in 1854, de Lesseps is officially retired. His time as a diplomat is
over. But could it be, he wonders, that his time as a builder has just begun?
De Lesseps gets a meeting with Said, who is now 32 years old.
And de Lesseps basically begins to pitch him on this idea.
That's Aaron Jakes, a professor at the New School in New York City. He's working on a big book
about the canal's history. And he told us, this is a breakthrough moment. The canal project has
already been turned down twice by two different rulers. But when Mohammed Said hears about it
from de Lesseps, he's drawn to the audacity and grandeur of the project, and what that could mean
for Egypt. There's a case to be made that doing something so dramatic and transformative
would play a role in raising Egypt's stature on a world stage and demonstrating that Egypt
was an increasingly modern country worthy of being a kind of peer to the great powers of Europe.
So Said says yes. Now the question is, who's going to pay for it? The cost of digging a
trench through 120 miles of desert will be enormous. Said knows Egypt doesn't have that
kind of money. And especially as a new leader, he doesn't want to take out hefty loans from
foreign banks, risking dangerous levels of debt. But de Lesseps says, I have an idea.
It's along the lines of what today we'd call a public-private partnership. What if, he tells
Mohammed Said, what if I form a corporation? Call it the Suez Canal Company. We can distribute the
risk in this project by asking investors, regular people around the world, to buy shares in the
company. That money will fund the canal. And de Lesseps says he'll take charge of this whole
project. And in return for doing all of those things, the company would enjoy a very large
share of the profits on the canal for the period of a 99-year lease. And we are talking enormous
profits. De Lesseps predicts the canal will earn 30 million francs a year, or as much as 300 million
in today's dollars. The company doesn't get all of it. Egypt and the shareholders would make money
too. And Said says, sounds good. He strikes a deal with de Lesseps to create the Suez Canal Company.
Next, de Lesseps has to actually do what he promised. He has to find thousands of investors
willing to give him their money. And so he set out on the sales tour in the autumn of 1858
to give all of these speeches and drum up the promise of this notion that large numbers of
ordinary people would buy small shares. And ultimately, things did not play out that way.
In his home country of France, people say, sounds great, but also sounds very expensive.
Even a small share in the Suez Canal Company costs about as much as a French person's
average annual income. De Lesseps goes to Austria, Constantinople, Russia. He also goes
to an unlikely place, Great Britain. The same Great Britain that has vehemently opposed the
canal since day one. But it's a financial hub, flush with money and full of potential investors.
So the tireless Frenchman goes there. He finds some interest among the British public,
but the government greets him with scorn. The prime minister denounces the project.
British newspapers call it flagrant robbery. One naysayer gets up in parliament to denounce
de Lesseps' very character. That naysayer eventually offers an apology, thus narrowly
averting a duel. But the keenest blow of all comes from a group of British engineers.
Who conducted their own studies and concluded that the canal would not be a viable project.
All this means that by the end of his tour, about 176,000 shares remain unsold.
Yeah, it's a lot. So it's about 45% of the shares. This marketing scheme came up short.
De Lesseps is stuck. Construction can't begin until he has sold all of the shares.
So he has two choices. Abandon the project, or appeal to his old friend Mohamed Said,
now Pasha of Egypt, for help. And here again, his relationship with Said Pasha became consequential.
Basically, Lesseps returns to Egypt and says, I need you Said Pasha to buy 176,000 shares in the
canal company. By some accounts, Said and de Lesseps argue over this for days. Buying those
shares would require Egypt to take out massive loans from foreign banks, take on a staggering
load of debt. This is exactly the scenario that the Egyptian government was trying to avoid
when they opted for this arrangement. But Said Pasha also really wants the canal built. It's
a matter of both personal and national prestige. And in the end, he decides to bail de Lesseps out.
He agrees to take the plunge and commit the funds for the great canal.
On April 25, 1859, near the shores of Lake Manzala, Ferdinand de Lesseps plunges his
pickaxe into the ground. Then he turns to those assembled laborers. What lies ahead
is years of backbreaking work. And de Lesseps isn't going to be the one to do it.
He tells those men, honor to the immortal Mohammed Said Pasha. Long may he live.
There's a dark side to the agreement between de Lesseps and Said. Said has promised to bolster
the project's workforce by pressing tens of thousands of his citizens into forced labor.
In Egypt, this system is known as corvée. So the idea was basically the Egyptian government
would be effectively subsidizing the excavation by providing very cheap labor,
forcing Egyptian peasants to labor on projects of the government's choosing.
This kind of forced labor wasn't new to Egypt. It built the pyramids. Countries throughout history
and across the world had used it too. But at this time and in this place, it carries specific
political repercussions. Egypt is a province of the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Empire
had banned the use of corvée. This is a time when many anti-slavery movements are taking shape.
Said and de Lesseps know this, but they go ahead anyway, forcing tens of thousands of people to
work by hand in the desert sun, attacking the earth with picks and shovels. At the peak of the
use of this institution of the corvée, there were 20,000 people getting kind of summoned and
sent out to the canal zone, 20,000 working there, and 20,000 more getting sent home on a rotating
basis. At night, many workers sleep on the ground with little or no cover. And desert nights can be
cold. At times, they're paid for a day's work with just a loaf of bread. Some workers are given
notes that promise them scant wages, but many of those promises are broken in the end. More than
a hundred thousand Egyptian workers will die building the canal, making it one of the deadliest
construction projects in history. Yet the work proceeds uninterrupted. Until 1863, when another
shock arrives. An important figure dies. And it seems that the canal will die with him.
In 1863, the ruler of Egypt, Mohammed Said, dies in his bed at the age of 40. He is succeeded by his
32-year-old nephew, Ismail. He was extremely ambitious and quite ruthless in a whole variety
of ways, but also, by many accounts, a much more shrewd businessman. This spells trouble for the
canal. Because Ismail has long believed that Ferdinand de Lesseps had gotten the better of
the agreement. That Ismail's uncle had basically been duped or pressured or swayed into accepting
a pretty lousy deal for Egypt. Ismail takes a fresh look at the Suez Canal agreement and decides
that it needs to be redrawn. Because the canal might involve future profits for Egypt, but Ismail
is more concerned with present profits. He sees a huge and immediate business opportunity for his
country. An opportunity that has resulted from a disruption on the other side of the world.
It's 1863 and the American Civil War is raging. Why was this important to the story of the Suez
Canal? When the Union Navy began to blockade Confederate ports at the beginning of the Civil
War, the American South, which until that point was the single largest supplier of raw cotton in
the world, was basically cut off from the world market that could be purchasing that cotton.
The American South can't get its supply of cotton on the world market, but the demand persists,
which means that cotton prices are rising. And who else grows cotton? Egypt. Egypt grows
lots of cotton. So Ismail knows that if he can seize the moment and get more cotton to market,
there's a lot of money to be made. But to do that, he'll need laborers, which means that he was
even less inclined to be devoting the labor force conscripted through the Corvée to work on this
foreign company's canal project. Ismail takes control of the canal's Corvée. Many of the
De Lesseps demands compensation for the loss. There's a long, heated arbitration, and the result
is bad for Ismail. He has to cough up 38 million francs, several hundred million dollars in today's
value. To pay up, he's forced to take out even more foreign loans. It's fine, he thinks. With
the profits I'm making from the cotton boom, which shows no signs of ending, I've got it covered.
Aaron Jakes says the payout to De Lesseps comes around the time the Frenchman realizes that
he doesn't need the Corvée anyway. And the reason for this is easily explained through an analogy
with enjoyable experiences at the beach. So if you dig a hole near the water at the beach, initially
you're just digging sand, even if it's wet sand, out of the ground. And you can make good progress
for a while, but eventually you will hit the water line. As you continue to dig,
water will fill into the hole, the sides of the hole will start to fall in. When that happens as
you're digging a giant canal, you no longer need men with shovels. You need heavy machinery to clear
the mud fast enough and stay ahead of the water. De Lesseps buys what's needed and gets the job
done. On August 15, 1869, a little over 10 years after construction began,
waters from the two seas, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, mingle for the first time.
Even at this moment, many think that the canal is a myth. But De Lesseps and Ismail are about to
show the whole world it's real by hosting an over-the-top opening ceremony. They start planning
for fireworks and banquets and camels in procession. And now it's November, the day before
the grand opening. Everything is in place. There will be no more hiccups, except... It wasn't as
deep as it should have been, so the bottoms of ships could sometimes hit ground. The night before
the ceremony, a ship gets stuck in the canal. De Lesseps turns to Ismail and asks how they should
deal with this. Ismail takes a minute to consider. And then he says, blow it up. For once, the two
men agree on something. Although in the end, the ship is removed without resorting to dynamite.
The next day, 6,000 spectators from Egypt and around the world show up at Port Said. It's a
city named for the now-dead Pasha. It's gone from uninhabited to a bustling port city since De
Lesseps struck the first ceremonial blow 10 years ago. At the celebration, royalty abounds. Everyone
from the Empress Eugenie of France to the Austro-Hungarian Emperor to the Crown Prince of
Prussia comes to see the canal. They sail at the head of a 78-ship parade. Ebrahim El-Hudaybi told
us that despite the enormous price tag, Ismail believed it was worth it. It's a changing moment
in world history. It's a triumph of man over nature. It's the opening of a new era. And it's
the beginning of a new era for Ferdinand De Lesseps. The opening of the Suez Canal, which he had first
imagined more than 30 years earlier, has made him famous. De Lesseps becomes probably one of the most
recognizable faces and names of the world globally for long decades after that. But the initial fanfare
eventually fades. And there are some problems. The Suez Canal serves fewer ships and earns less money
than De Lesseps and Ismail had expected. The strong winds hamper some sailing ships. The canal is more
suited to steamships, which have only recently started arriving on the sea. But it takes a lot
of money to build steamships. And one country in particular has that kind of money. Britain was the
global epicenter of world financial markets. So the city of London was a place where very large
pools of capital were constantly being formed and sloshing around. They've also had an industrial
revolution. And they're now great at building big things made of iron and steel. Aaron Jakes quotes
a saying from the time that describes the irony of Britain benefiting so handsomely from a project
it once tried to kill. The canal has been cut by French energy and Egyptian money for British
advantage. Meanwhile in Egypt, the cotton boom has long since ended. All that debt is coming due.
And Ismail must find a way to pay it. He tries squeezing every possible penny by raising taxes
and selling off government assets. What we might now describe as a kind of fire sale. But it's not
enough. Ismail is forced to take a desperate measure. And the most dramatic of these sales
was the purchase for the British government of the Egyptian government's shares in the Suez Canal
Company. Which meant that from 1875 onwards, the British treasury was the single largest shareholder
in the Suez Canal. Now the irony is doubled. Britain has gone from despising the canal to
owning almost half the company. And to their benefit, the canal is soon widened and deepened,
allowing more ships to use it. In the canal's first decade, the amount of goods passing through
skyrockets by 700%. More than 3 million tons of goods will pass through every year.
Profits soar. Profits that Great Britain gets a big share of. But despite Ismail's fire sale,
Egypt's debt crisis only deepens. And in 1876, finally the thing that they had been trying to
avoid happened. Egypt defaults on their debts. Government jobs and paychecks are cut,
and civil unrest follows. Egyptian activists say their government has made the country
beholden to foreign banks and that the people are paying for Ismail's mistakes.
Great Britain watches nervously. They want Egypt to keep paying back their debts.
And then eventually the British found a pretext to invade the country and basically quash that
uprising. Beginning in 1882, Egypt becomes a de facto protectorate of Great Britain.
The Egyptian government is pretty much controlled by British officials.
British troops roam the cities. And then in 1909, the Suez Canal Company tries to extend
its lease on the canal long before it expires. But it runs into Egypt's nationalist movement,
which has arisen in opposition to the country's colonial occupation.
The nationalists loudly oppose the renewal. And the nationalist movement that organized
this campaign actually won that fight. But Great Britain still owns a majority
of shares in the canal and has the right to operate it for the next 50 years. Although,
that's not how things will turn out. In 1922, Egypt gains its political independence.
And in 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Company,
taking ownership away from its European stakeholders.
Ebrahim El Houdéby told us that through this struggle for independence, the canal became a
potent symbol for Egyptians. It was more than just a part of their land. It was now a part
of their identity. It is through this project, import, that the nation emerges. Because there
is this sense of like collective identity, collective experience, but also collective
ownership of the canal. We dug the canal collectively. The labor force came from all
over Egypt. So yes, it's servitude. Yes, it's humiliation to a certain extent. But also,
it is the togetherness of the Egyptian people that emerges from and through the construction
of the canal. In the midst of nationalizing the canal, some Egyptians even call for a statue
memorializing the workers. They say, If there will be a statue welcoming the travelers through
the canal, it will be the statue of the Egyptian peasant and not of Ferdinand de Lesseps.
Not of Ferdinand de Lesseps. Since 1899, a 35-foot-tall bronze statue of de Lesseps had
stood at the northern entrance of the canal, his right hand outstretched, welcoming the ships.
But in 1956, protesters attacked the statue of de Lesseps. And the statue was
exploded and fell into the waters of the canal they had severed from its body.
The French government lobbies Egypt to reinstall the statue at the mouth of the canal.
But the inhabitants of Port Said insisted that this is not going to happen.
And the protesters get their wish. Today, where his statue originally stood,
there sits instead an empty concrete pedestal. Maybe one day it will support a bronze statue
of an Egyptian worker, a laborer of the corvee, holding a pickaxe.
Thanks for listening to History This Week. For more moments throughout history that are also
worth watching, check your local TV listings to find out what's on the History Channel today.
If you want to get in touch, please shoot us an email at our email address, historythisweek
at history.com. Or you can leave us a voicemail at 212-351-0410. We are reading and listening,
and we really love hearing from you. So please reach out. Thank you to our guests,
Ebrahima Hudaibi and Professor Aaron Jakes for speaking with us for this episode.
Thank you also to Dr. Bella Galil for talking with us.
This episode was produced by Julie Magruder, sound designed by Dan Rosato,
and story edited by Jim O'Grady. History This Week is also produced by Ben Dickstein,
Julia Press, and me, Sally Helm. Our associate producer is Emma Fredericks.
Our executive producers are McKamey Lynn and Jesse Katz.
Thanks for listening, and we'll see you next week.
